Customer Reviews

The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Gifford Lectures (Princeton University Press))

5 star:		(4)
4 star:		(3)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Michael Ignatieff, a liberal writer, columnist, broadcaster, and Harvard University professor has written a thoughtful, readable, and non-partisan book on how democracies should deal with the domestic civil rights challenges of terrorism. This book elevates the discussion beyond political hate rhetoric, propaganda, spin, and jingoism.

What Ignatieff is concerned about is how democracies avoid political repression at home while fighting brutal wars abroad. Ignatieff's political ethics of the lesser evil charts a midway course between a pure civil libertarianism and cynical pragmatism (antiterrorist measures should be judged by only their effectiveness).

In a nutshell Ignatieff's book discusses how emergencies such as 9/11 can be used to abandon civil rights, how he believes that democracies usually overreact to terror, how he believes terrorism is a response to injustice and blocked political means of redress, how terrorist and anti-terrorists may start with high ideals but end up in a vicious cycle of violence for its own sake, and the challenges to liberal democracies posed when weapons of mass destruction pass into the hands of small terrorist cells rather than states. Ignatieff bases his lesser evil approach to political ethics on novels and Greek plays and the political philosophy of the 15th Century Italian diplomat Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince, The Discourses).

Ignatieff's implication that the Iraq war is an overreaction to terrorism is inconsistent with his own ethical criteria that force should only be used as a last resort. He contends that 9/11 did not endanger the social order of the U.S. and likens the U.S. response to 9/11 to that of the Red Scare of the 1950's. Here Ignatieff's reasoned book deteriorates into mush. Ignatieff ignores the encroaching steps of terrorism going back to the 1970's beginning with the Iran hostage crisis, the assassination of Anwar Sadat in Egypt, the bombing of 200 U.S. Marines in Lebanon, the destruction of two U.S. embassies in Africa, and the bombing of the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole, all leading up to 9/11. Considering the totality of these terrorist acts, it would seem the U.S. has not been easily prone to provocation and thus met Ignatieff's last resort ethical criteria.

Where Ignatieff is at his best is when he points out that the strategy of insurrectionary terrorism employed by Russian revolutionaries is similar to that of current Islamic terrorists: to provoke ruling governments into atrocities on the battlefield and political repression at home that will weaken the grip of the allegiance of their citizens and allied nations. If this is so, Ignatieff offers us no insights as to what is the lesser evil: domestic civil rights violations incited by anti-war activists or the horrific mass murder and destruction of legal institutions of revolutionaries once they are in power. Ignatieff prefers to confine his discussion of the lesser evil to domestic civil liberties rather than the more difficult question of what was the lesser evil in Vietnam for example - political repression at home such as the Kent State tragedy provoked by the burning down of the campus ROTC building by anti-war activists, or the killing fields of Pol Pot and tragedies of the boat people that resulted after the war? One is left with the impression that to Ignatieff the genocides of post-war Vietnam and Cambodia were just another big Red Scare and that Kent State was the greater evil? To be fair, I'm sure Ignatieff doesn't believe this but he leaves the reader with this ethical dilemma without resolving it.

Ignatieff quotes Machiavelli that during emergencies constitutional safeguards shouldn't be abandoned. But Ignatieff conveniently ignores the political advice of Machiavelli on pre-emptive wars. Machiavelli wrote when trouble is sensed well in advance it can easily be remedied; if you wait for it to show itself any medicine will be too late because the disease will have become incurable. He also wrote that political disorders can be quickly healed if they are seen well in advance; but, for lack of proper diagnosis if they are allowed to grow in such a way that everyone can recognize them, remedies are too late.

Believing that liberty at home can only be achieved by a strong outward military defense, Machiavelli wrote a book The Art of War that outlined the strategy and tactics necessary to win wars. The world would be beholden to a modern day Machiavelli who could similarly outline a strategy for combating terrorism that would avoid political repression and wartime abuses. Ignatieff's book is no such primer. It might have also been helpful if Ignatieff had provided an overview of the wartime civil rights abuses of Presidents Lincoln, Wilson, FDR, and Nixon.

Using Ignatieff's lesser evil criteria for example, what would be the lesser evil if the U.S. was faced with a choice of a war of preemption in Iraq or a disastrous world-wide economic depression? Islamic political destabilization of Saudi Arabia for example could likely result in a sudden spike in oil prices that would likely cause massive unemployment and suffering. Here Ignatieff is strangely silent.

Nonetheless this is a good book that poses many of the right questions, even if it offers only partial answers. I recommend reading it but perhaps also reading Gil Merom's How Democracies Lose Small Wars and Lee Harris' Civilization and its Enemies as a counter balance. I nevertheless rate this book a 5 because the civil rights issues the author raises are very important whether you agree with his argument or not.

Michael Ignatieff has been a writer I have read quite a bit in my Master's degree in Genocide Studies. He is a leading Human Rights advocate, professor and writer. However, I have enjoyed reading his works because he is very practical. He often examines the psychological nature of "warriors" or people engaged in warfare. He realizes that liberal democracies must be able to fight those who seek to terrorize them. But, how do you do this and remain true to everything a liberal, democratic society stands for? The answer is fighting back with necessary but "Lesser Evils."

This is no easy task, for a Human Rights professor to admit that some atrocities must be committed in the defense of a nation, but what are they? He is hardly an apologist for sadistic and unethical treatment of suspects though. This point must be clear before you read this book; he is no Dershowitz and argues against him here.
Ignatieff often tells how democracies may be tempted to fight their enemies with an "eye for an eye" mentality, but sinking down to their level is a bigger threat that some terrorists are aiming for as a goal.
He uses history as a guide and notes that democracies tend to overreact to terrorist threats. He even notes that civil liberties may be suspended TEMPORARIRLY in times of emergency, (which he notes would outrage many civil libertarians) but this would be an example of a lesser evil. However, he writes as a person admitting some measures may need to happen, but it will leave a bad taste in all of our mouths, and the longer it goes on the more bitter. Its "lack of permanence" is necessary.

Yes, he talks of torture (before it came out in the media in Iraq) "They (national leaders) need results from their security services, and in the pressure of the moment, they may not care overmuch about how these results are obtained. A culture of silent complicity may develop between civilian political leaders and their security chiefs, in which both sides know that extralegal means are being used but each has an interest in keeping quiet about it." -p. 135 Hello Mr. Rumsfeld.

He goes on to say why torture is especially bad for a democracy, "a moral hazard."

Finally, of great importance in this book is he looks at six different types of terrorism, explains them and then talks about how they can be confronted, though sometimes his answers fall short (you hope he gives a workable solution to all these problems, though you realize it isn't possible).

He finishes with a chapter on the possibility of terrorists possessing a biological, chemical or nuclear weapon. History, which served as his guide in earlier chapters, would no longer apply to this scenario. He suggests that a society that is truthful to its citizens and will engage in dialogue with other countries, international organizations, while also placing responsibility on itself and other stable nations not to let unstable ones divulge into chaos is essential.

Rarely has terrorism been able to topple a whole nation alone, and when it has happened, it was because of additional political circumstances that it occurred (Tsarist Russia and WW I). But if democracies are self-questioning and honest on their ethical reactions to terrorism, than the more civil liberties will be preserved and tangible victories will result. Ignatieff has no doubt that liberal democracies will succeed in the war on terror, by defeating our enemies and also preserving the civil liberties of our minorities.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks threatened Americans' safety, and strained the U.S.'s judicial and social interpretations about how to respond to a national emergency. Civil rights and constitutional experts from both conservative and liberal camps had to respond to the country's new "Homeland Security" practices dealing with surveillance and detention. Their reactions involved everything from the right of habeas corpus to the U.S. Constitution and the rights of captured combatants. Michael Ignatieff covers this heady area in essays adapted from a lecture series. The topic is crucial, but alas the book is dense reading. However, the author's interpretations of civil and legal issues, constitutional law, the rule of law, and the ethics and morality of fighting terrorists will deeply intrigue those in related fields. getAbstract considers this an important book for lawyers and academics, if not casual readers. Ignatieff shows that balancing the rights of those criminals known as terrorists against the safety of citizens is an issue society will debate hotly for years to come.

I've only read a few sections out of his book, and now I am determined to invest a few days out of my upcoming break to read his entire book. The man is brilliant, absolutely brilliant. The book, by all means, sheds light on matters that have most people in the dark. Definitely a worth while read.

This is a well written book. Its basic theme is that democratic societies may have to, from time to time, suspend certain rights and freedom in order to deal with threats to their citizens or their very existance. The key presented is that these suspensions be limited by their scope in time and ultimately subject to review by the judiciary, democratic process, the public and the press.

The subject of torture comes up but what I found most interesting was the discussion of how we might have to react to the threat of nuclear or biomedical terrorism. As the cost of these technologies comes down it becomes more possible for society to be threatened by small groups or radical nations acting directly or anonymously through surrogates who would not be deterred by the threat of mutual self destruction.

Overall the message is that these are ethical issues that we must, even imperfectly, need to work out. Ignatieff's book does a good job of laying out directions of discourse. We may not get it right and we may have to even choose to do wrong for the greater good but the fact that we struggle with the question makes us a better society.

In this short book, Ignatieff presents a valuable and well-researched historical context for the current climate of terrorism.

His book helped me to understand the motivation of terrorist organizations. He suggests a middle way for a liberal democracy's response to a terrorist threat, suggesting that a temporary loss of the freedoms and rights that define liberal democracy may be necessary to ensure security. He suggests careful safeguards to ensure that these rights and freedoms are restored when the threat ends.

Here we go.
Yes, the book is well written (maybe it's pointless to say it's preachy given the subject matter, but the narrative tone is preachy, too). It presents thoughtful arguments and deep considerations of many and varied aspects of specific recent conflicts. The ultimate and deep flaw of the book and in the author's thinking is at the heart of the author's proposed solution for many of the world's conflicts: Leviathan.
Derived from a biblical monster, the concept of Leviathan as Ignatieff presents it is an omnipotent global arbiter to intercede in local conflicts when the other moral safeguards fail, such as neighboring nantions and states near places of conflict and genocide.
Liberals (Ignatieff among them)always tout their philosophy as the most democratic and freedom- nurturing, and see their ideas and "mission" as those that prevent and combat oppression. It would appear contrary to liberalism, then, to propose tha creation of an omnipotent global military power. It would also seem contradictory to support and praise any despotic or tyrranical regime, but Fidel Castro and his locked-down Cuba are always spoken of with respect, and always held up as an example of a small country standing up to the democratic USA's oppression and imperialism.
I can't read Ignatieff's book without getting a cold streak hearing his earnest, hopeful imaginings of a Leviathan rising up and promulgating the liberal moral and socio-political standard around the world.
There's something insidious in the inherently subversive viewpoint of liberalism that functions on the basis of saying that every other viewpoint is somehow immoral or evil or greedy, eroding the validity of the premises of opposing views and never actually answering the questions raised. A Leviathan operating under that standard is the most total and direct path to global oppression and supression of any ideas that do not stem from a liberal basis.
It is good and necessary to analyze the thorny moral issues associated with comflicts around the world, but it becomes a moot gesture when the effort is undertaken from a moral standpoint rooted in a very specific political ideology (here postmodern socialist liberalism, which espouses social and cultural relativism, a standpoint that essentially has no standpoint on morality).
Liberalism wants to seem the most good, truthful, just and honest political philosophy, but it has injected itself surreptitiously into so many aspects of scholarship and society, into fields such as history, archaeology and anthropology, where a narrow political philosophy has no place, unless the purpose is to place a liberal interpretation on the subjects and findings at play. This is revisionism, and it ill serves history.
I won't even get into journalism; it's not pertinent to the book.
I recommend the book, definitely, but I suggest you keep an open mind and stay informed. Just like the news, get every viewpoint: watch CNN and Fox. Read the liberal and conservative side of an issue. Get foregn views about domestic happenings. Watch out for leviathan. Especially coupled with big government, gun control and redistribution of wealth, you might find as I have that liberalism is as divisive, flawed and frankly, dangerous, as rampant conservatism with its fascistic tendencies.

This book seems to be about an interesting topic, namely what ethics ought we adopt if we are faced with threats of terror?

Ignatieff asks "What lesser evils may a society commit when it believes it faces the greater evil of its own destruction?" And he says this "question must not only be asked. It must be answered."

I disagree. I think Ignatieff displays an enormous amount of shallow thinking in this book. I think his question is not that good, need not be asked, and need not be answered.

What we ought to be interested in is the question of what rational people ought to expect people like us to do when faced with threats of terror. It's a slightly different question, although I admit that Ignatieff does deal with it to some extent. By "people like us," I mean just about any group or nation, rational or irrational.

Ignatieff wanders on, describing various threats to people and governments as well as the reactions to these threats. In many cases, the threats were overrated, making the reaction look overly intense. Ignatieff makes the point that at the time, the severity of each threat was not easy to determine.

The author says that "when civil libertarians try to explain why their own governments adopt repressive measures, they often blame unscrupulous politicians exploiting terrorism to pursue their own agendas. This fails to explain why politicians often get away with it." This makes a good point, but it does not go far enough. The public often agrees with the politicians, but why? Do such policies merely fit public agendas or are they in some sense the best options? Ignatieff is not good at answering this.

Ignatieff also says that terrorism generally works as an ancillary tactic, a "shortcut" to the proper (although uncertain) strategy of peaceful political mobilization. And he gives some examples of this. One is the Arab use of terror against Israel, which has not caused an Israeli surrender, has not caused Israelis to stop debating what to do, has not caused Israelis to abandon asking about the ethics of what they are doing, but has caused Israelis to fight back in a fairly united manner. This also makes a good point but does not go far enough. We need to see just how severe the threat is (destroying Israel, getting rid of human rights for Middle Eastern Jews, and so on) to appreciate what Israelis are up against and to see if the strategy of peaceful political mobilization would have much chance. But Ignatieff does not get into this either.

The author discusses the terrorist argument that "the weak must have the right to fight dirty; otherwise the strong will always win." Of course, this is nonsense. The strong can't possibly win a fight to oppress others in a fair world without using violence. And even if the strong do use violence against those who fight "clean," they will lose their share of wars. Ignatieff did not think about this enough.

At one point, Ignatieff says there are six kinds of terrorism!

1) Terror aimed at the overthrow of a state
2) Terror aimed at the promotion of a single cause
3) Terror aimed at the overthrow of a colonial regime
4) Separatist terror
5) Anti-occupation terror
6) Terror against a global power

He later adds nihilistic terrorism as pretty much a separate category. But I am not sure I like these categories very much. The Ku Klux Klan, while it might get put into one of these groups (say 2 or 4), is simply a racist terrorist organization. It should be described as such, but the author ignores it. The Stern Gang, an organization Ignatieff alludes to, certainly could be put in almost any of these categories, but in fact its most important goal was to get immigration permits for Jews! That's basically a group that wanted to obtain a specific human right; to lump it with all sorts of other "causes" is not very helpful.

Ignatieff says it is possible to justify armed struggle in defense of self-determination only if the group's just claims have been met by violence, if the refusal to meet the claims is systematic, enduring, and unlikely to change, if the claims are fundamental to the survival of the group, and if the struggle observes the laws of war and the rule of civilian immunity. I'm not so sure I agree. By the way, I think Israel's claim to self-determination comes pretty close to meeting these requirements. Yes, as the author says, there were (pre-state) incidents such as the King David hotel and Deir Yassin, but I think these may well meet these criteria as well. Perhaps we ought to call the Irgun members "freedom fighters," not terrorists. By the way, Ignatieff comes up with a truly silly statement about Arab and Israeli claims to land being equal. That is nonsense. Arab land is Arab. Israeli land is Israeli. Disputed land is disputed. In none of these regions are all claims equivalent, morally or otherwise.

Now, is terrorism often directed not only at an oppressor but at one's own people? Does it spur others to join you? Can it get others to attack one's whole society, forcing some neutrals to side with you? Does it involve a war against "collaborators" in one's society who oppose you, and does it suppress political dissent in your own population? Yes, and Ignatieff says so. Should one negotiate with terrorists (or with supposedly peaceful supporters of terrorist goals)? Are there really serious differences between freedom fighters and terrorists? The author discusses these questions as well.

This is an interesting book, but I think it needs considerably more thought and work.

This is an excellent, short book that expertly tackles the problem of individual-rights based democracy versus majority-rights based democracy, and argues towards the existence of a middle ground that can assure a semblence of security without destroying the rule of law that a liberal democracy rests on.

The recognization that some suspensions are necessary, but that they MUST be regarded as 'lesser evils' is a compelling argument from this respected human rights scholar. The book convincingly lays forth its arguments, and critically dissects both the position of the civil libertarian and that of the security state.

It has certainly changed my outlook on the 'war on terror', and the parable of Ulysees is the most graphic image I retained from the book and is useful. Hopefully, leaders in the United States and other liberal democracies will read this book and take some of the lessons (arguments?) to heart.

Michael Ignatieff is a Canadian academic currently working at Harvard in the US. Among his past claims to fame were an argument in favour of Canada participating in the US-led attack on Iraq (on the pretext of its possession of weapons of mass destruction), and, more recently, an argument in favour of Canada's participation in North American anti-ballistic missile defence (on the scientifically-unfounded pretext that it is feasible). His track record on matters of life and death, and on the spending of billions of dollars, leaves a lot to be desired.

Similarly, in The Lesser Evil, Ignatieff is quick to come to the conclusion that we should be ready to sacrifice some of our civil liberties in order to combat terrorism. While young Canadians are to be expected to travel to the Middle East to get themselves slaughtered in the desert for a meaningless war, Canadians here at home are expected to surrender their hard-earned human rights to fight Canada's non-existent enemies.

Luckily for Canadians, we have other intellectuals, such as Naomi Klein and John Ralston Saul, for whom life and human rights are a lot more than the mere concepts they are for Mr. Ignatieff. Neither Canadians nor Europeans are buying into this Manichean, bloodthirsty discourse. The fact that the right-wing National Post is touting Mr. Ignatieff as prime ministerial material sums his views up as well as anything that could be written here.

Canadians who think that the current American government is leading that country to disaster, and who are interested in a more humane appraisal of the current situation which harbours some realistic hope for the future, should consult Jeremy Rifkin's The European Dream, and leave over-rated apologists such as Mr. Ignatieff to their ivory towers.