Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture [Hardcover]

Roger Thompson (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: April 6, 2007

Despite its reputation as the most impressive naval force in the world, the U.S. Navy is in trouble, according to the author of this book, and systemic weaknesses could be its undoing. Here, military sociologist Roger Thompson provides a compelling, often scathing, assessment of the U.S. Navy and its learning disabilities and then presents a convincing argument for reform.

Thompson points to the U.S. Navy s up or out promotion system, massive personnel turnover, inexperienced crews, and drug and alcohol abuse as problems that make it difficult for the Navy to build cohesive, well-trained fighting units. In a review of the Navy s recent history, he finds that its ships, submarines, and aircraft are often outperformed in competitions and exercises with other navies and its failures are either denied altogether or perfunctorily excused. Diesel submarines so quiet that they are rarely detected until it s too late to prevent an attack routinely surpass expensive U.S. nuclear subs and put U.S. aircraft carriers in danger. American naval pilots, whose weapons are often improperly tested, are frequently bested by military pilots from other countries. Because the U.S. Navy doesn t have enough surface ships to protect its capital ships, American carrier strike groups now use Canadian ships as escorts. Shortcomings like these, Thompson argues, undermine the Navy s potential and should be cause for national concern.

In presenting a side of the U.S. Navy that s rarely discussed, this book spells out lessons the Navy must learn if it is going to succeed in an era of asymmetrical warfare of David-versus-Goliath conflicts. In his conclusion, the author puts forth a twelve-step program that calls on the U.S. Navy to rethink its naval strategy, to lose some weight, and to focus on the fundamentals.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"The US Navy is among the most powerful fighting forces in the world, yet it has repeatedly been embarrassed in exercises with smaller and less technologically equipped forces. In Lessons Not Learned, respected military scholar Roger Thompson discusses the institutional biases, the outmoded strategic thinking, the use of the wrong technology at the wrong times, and much more. This book is a scholarly and perceptive study that delves into all of this, and more, and helps the reader understand why such a formidable force is not living up to its potential. This is a must-read for naval scholars, strategists, or anyone who really cares about the Navy and its sailors." --Dr. Andrew Karam, author of Rig Ship For Ultra Quiet

"Lessons Not Learned is more than a brilliant book. It's an irrefutable case for reform and change in the United States Navy, a service that maintains itself almost exclusively to fight. In the aftermath of America's misguided occupation of Iraq, the United States will rely more than ever on the reach and effectiveness of its naval power. Thompson points the way ahead. The question is will anyone in the Navy Staff listen?" --Douglas Macgregor, PhD, Colonel (Ret.) US Army, author of Transformation Under Fire and Breaking the Phalanx

For nearly a century, the U.S. Navy has been plagued by a self-imposed albatross, an approach to personnel management known as the individual replacement system and the up or out promotion system, also hampered by a force structure developed for warfare of the past and an out-of-date doctrine of mobilization. This has created a culture where only the positive is seen, thus no learning takes place. It encourages a culture of corruption, where only yes-men survive, and adaptation only exists on power point slides. Roger Thompson has conducted a masterpiece of research. Lessons Not Learned tells the story of this self-inflicted wound how it prevents the Navy as well as the entire U.S. military from evolving and being prepared to fight in the 21st Century. True leaders of our Republic, if there are any, need to take this as the beginning blue print toward revolutionary reform. --Donald E. Vandergriff, author of Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War

About the Author

Roger Thompson is an internationally recognized authority on combat motivation, military sociology, and military bureaucratic politics whose work has drawn praise worldwide, including an Admiral s Medallion from the chief of staff of the Italian navy. His book Brown Shoes, Black Shoes and Felt Slippers: Parochialism and the Evolution of the Post-War U.S. Navy was called "essential reading" by Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. and is now considered a classic. Many of his essays have been published in leading journals and his papers presented at international conferences. Currently Thompson lectures at Kyung Hee University in South Korea.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 272 pages
• Publisher: Naval Institute Press (April 6, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1591148650
• ISBN-13: 978-1591148654
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.1 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.9 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (8 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,289,109 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

"A most remarkable scholar." - The late Dr. Charles C. Moskos, past Chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society

"Expertise, independence, and intellectual courage... Roger Thompson, a respected scholar of military and especially U.S. Naval organisation, has all of these things..." - Dr. John Reeve, Osborne Fellow in Naval History, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy

"His professional work is insightful and highly regarded by military specialists. He has an elegant writing style..." - Dr. John A. Williams, Chairman of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces & Society

"His work has been widely recognized by the international naval authorities including the Chiefs of Naval Staffs of the German, Spanish and Italian navies as well as the Chief of Naval Operations of the United States Navy." - Rear Admiral Fred Crickard, Royal Canadian Navy (Retired)

"Professor Thompson, while still in his twenties, earned worldwide acclaim for his work on combat motivation in naval forces, and was decorated by the Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy in 1993. This is a very impressive accomplishment for someone so young. I note that his highly successful MA thesis "Brown Shoes, Black Shoes and Felt Slippers: Parochialism and the Evolution of the Post-War U.S. Navy" was published twice, and has been used as a text book at the famous Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Again, Professor Thompson has proven more than capable of producing leading edge and first class research that is respected in academic and professional circles around the world." - Douglas Macgregor, PhD, Colonel (Ret.) U.S. Army, author of "Transformation under Fire" and "Breaking the Phalanx".

"Professor Thompson is not only incredibly well-informed in his area of expertise, but he is also an incredibly thoughtful individual. There are many who can amass facts and regurgitate them on command; few can put those facts into a larger context, and even fewer can synthesize these facts into a coherent big picture. In this, Professor Thompson is without equal - I have developed a profound respect for his ability to see through the clutter, to pick out the relevant facts, and to come to conclusions that are often unsettling, sometimes surprising, and almost always spot-on." - Dr. Andrew Karam, author of "Rig Ship For Ultra Quiet".

Professor Roger Thompson is a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, an assistant professor at South Korea's prestigious Kyung Hee University, and a former researcher with the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment at National Defence Headquarters (Canada). He is an internationally recognized authority on combat motivation, military sociology, regular/reserve total force issues, military culture, and military bureaucratic politics. His seminal work "Combat Motivation and Behaviour Among Naval Forces: A Discussion Paper" was endorsed by the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, SACLANT, CINCPACFLEET, best-selling novelist and submariner the late Captain Edward L. Beach, U.S. Navy (Retired), and the German, Australian, Chilean, Italian, Canadian, New Zealand, and Spanish chiefs of naval staffs. He also received praise from senior officers of the French Navy, South Korean Navy, and the Royal Navy. His work in this area was translated into Spanish under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armada de Chile, Admiral Jorge Martinez Busch. He received a medallion from the Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy, Admiral Guido Venturoni, for his contribution to military sociology, and his work has been acknowledged by General Colin Powell as well. His 1994 MA thesis "Brown Shoes, Black Shoes and Felt Slippers: Parochialism and the Evolution of the Post-War U.S. Navy" was published as a book by the U.S. Naval War College in 1995, and again by the Mine Warfare Association in 1997. The original publication was endorsed as "essential reading for professional naval officers" by the former U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations, the late Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. The famous military sociologist the late Dr. Charles C. Moskos called it "a classic in the sociology of the armed forces and civil military relations," and called Professor Roger Thompson "the leading scholar in the sociology of naval institutions."

His second book, "Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture" was published by the Naval Institute Press in April 2007.

Reviews of "Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture"

"I was in the Persian Gulf in 1990 as a reporter with the amphibious ready group aboard the USS Gunston Hall, and the World War I-era mines deployed by the Iraqis caused the mighty U.S. Navy to lose command of the sea. As for dealing with small, fast attack boats, our vaunted Aegis cruisers have neither 30mm stabilized guns or searchlights. The problem is not want of money but want of thought about the real threats facing our fleet. As Roger Thompson argues so eloquently in Lessons Not Learned, big carriers, big submarines, and the admirals who lead them are blocking funds and needed training for capabilities the Navy really needs... Thompson properly emphasizes that the problem of naval reform is ultimately one of having the right people and encouraging their creativity. He offers what he calls a "simple twelve-step program" to produce a more vital and less parochial naval leadership (for example, "Discontinue the 'up or out' promotion system and use the systems used by all other English-speaking countries"). His program of reform is about a page in length, tucked all the way into page 179, but it should be a poster emblazoned on every office in the Department of the Navy. " - David Evans, Lt. Col., USMC (Ret.) former defense correspondent with the Chicago Tribune.

"For nearly a century, the U.S. Navy has been plagued by a self-imposed albatross, an approach to personnel management known as the individual replacement system and the 'up or out' promotion system, also hampered by a force structure developed for warfare of the past and an out of date doctrine of mobilization. This has created a culture where only the positive is seen, thus no learning takes place. It encourages a culture of corruption, where only 'yes-men' survive, and adaptation only exists on power point slides. Roger Thompson has conducted a masterpiece of research. Lessons Not Learned tells the story of this self-inflicted wound - how it prevents the Navy as well as the entire U.S. military - from evolving and being prepared to fight in the 21st Century. True leaders of our Republic, if there are any, need to take this as the beginning blue print toward revolutionary reform." - Donald E. Vandergriff, author of "Raising the Bar: Creating and Nurturing Adaptability to Deal with the Changing Face of War".

"Roger Thompson raises crucial questions about choices made by the United States with respect to national defense matters. While readers may not agree with every point made here, due regard for the truth demands that each be critically debated. Thompson questions whether investment in technology and sheer size has come at the expense of investment in tactics, strategy, and war-fighting skills- and shows that other navies are superior. He further questions whether adverse psychological and social-political factors inherent in the United States are the reason for its weakness. Is the U.S. Navy learning from its failures? This is a debate of absolute necessity among friends, and well done in this important book." - Professor Guntram F.A. Werther, Executive in Residence, Thunderbird School of Global Management.

"Thompson has written the most important military reform book in almost a decade and certainly the most important book for the post-20th century U.S. Navy, ever. The USN is on a collision course with disaster and to try to save it, Thompson ambushes the reader immediately with a flurry of covered-up facts and incidents not unlike the missiles, bombs, torpedoes and sea mines that are going to overwhelm the Navy in real life as it goes down overcome by events (OBE). This book is a slap-in-the-face to make the USN wake up before it's indeed too late since there is no internal constructive criticism taking place now." - Mike Sparks, 1LT, U.S. Army Reserve, editor of "Air-Mech-Strike: Asymmetric Maneuver Warfare for the 21st Century".

"Provocative... In detailing what he sees as the Navy's shortcomings - from expensive ships and aircraft that often don't perform up to expectations to serious personnel problems - and offering a twelve-step program for fixing the problems, Thompson opens an important debate on an issue that's crucial to national security in the twenty-first century." - Professor Tom Miller, www.military.com

"Lessons Not Learned is more than a brilliant book. It's an irrefutable case for reform and change in the United States Navy, a service that maintains itself almost exclusively to fight. In the aftermath of America's misguided occupation of Iraq, the United States will rely more than ever on the reach and effectiveness of its naval power. Thompson points the way ahead. The question is will anyone in the Navy Staff listen?" - Douglas Macgregor, PhD, Colonel (Ret.) U.S. Army, author of "Transformation under Fire" and "Breaking the Phalanx"

"The U.S. Navy is among the most powerful fighting forces in the world, yet it has repeatedly been embarrassed in exercises with smaller and less technologically equipped forces. In Lessons Not Learned, respected military scholar Roger Thompson discusses the institutional biases, the outmoded strategic thinking, the use of the wrong technology at the wrong times, and much more. This book is a scholarly and perceptive study that delves into all of this, and more, and helps the reader understand why such a formidable force is not living up to its potential. This is a must-read for naval scholars, strategists, or anyone who really cares about the Navy and its sailors." - Dr. Andrew Karam, author of "Rig Ship For Ultra Quiet".

"A thought provoking and occasionally sobering, contribution to current naval literature... This is a book which will infuriate many people for different reasons, but it is scholarly, well meaning, obviously written by someone who cares, and is therefore hard to dismiss lightly. It is to the credit of the USNIP that it has been published. May it encourage constructive debate. Recommended."- Dr. John Reeve, Osborne Fellow in Naval History, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy.

"Roger Thompson has spent decades thinking about military culture and the bureaucracy that hampers effectiveness. He has reduced his commentaries, questioning aspects of how the U.S. Navy conducts itself, into a single volume. This book is not for those with delusions of invincibility. It takes a realistic look at adversaries both conventional and asymmetric that could undermine if not defeat U.S. Navy combat platforms... One may disagree with Thompson's observations and recommendations, however for those passionate about our Navy, it is necessary to read criticism that is constructive and offers readers a way to reflect on how to solve problems that undermine the U.S. Navy." - Lt. Cmdr. Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy. You can read the full review here.

"Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture" contains never before published primary research materials including excerpts from Lt. Cdr. Dean Knuth's infamous unpublished article "Lessons of Ocean Venture 81″ as well as quotes from the late Scott Shuger's unpublished book manuscript called "Navy Yes, Navy No". The book also contains excerpts from previously unpublished interviews with a USN nuclear submarine commander, a Naval Reserve CPO, and officers of the Royal Navy, Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force, Royal Australian Navy, USAF and USMC.

Kudos for Previous Work by Roger Thompson

Praise for "Combat Motivation and Behavior Among Naval Forces: A Discussion Paper":

"Excellent...A first class piece of work." - Admiral Paul Miller, U.S. Navy, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic

"Interesting and well worth reading." - Admiral R. J. Kelly, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

"Very well done and interestingly written..." - The late Captain Edward L. Beach, U.S. Navy (Retired), author of the famous novel Run Silent, Run Deep.

"Interesting and enjoyable reading... The paper provides an excellent account of the factors which determine motivation..." - Vice Admiral Ian MacDougall, Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Australian Navy

"Realistic, rigorous and easy to read...In certain aspects, Thompson's paper constitutes a master text for the professionals of the sea." Admiral Carlos Miranda, Spanish Armada

Praise for "Brown Shoes, Black Shoes and Felt Slippers: Parochialism and the Evolution of the Post-War U.S. Navy":

"Essential reading for professional naval officers." - The late Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, U.S. Navy (Retired)

"Outstanding!" - Rear Admiral James Forrest, SC, U.S. Navy (Retired)

"Roger Thompson's study provides an excellent basis for study and discussion." - Rear Admiral J.R. Stark, U.S. Navy, President U.S. Naval War College

"A classic." - The late Dr. Charles C. Moskos, Northwestern University

"A super piece of scholarship." - Dr. Edward Rhodes, Rutgers University

You can contact Professor Thompson by visiting his blog at http://seaview.wordpress.com/

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

27 of 29 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars A poor study, but a "must read" nonetheless, June 26, 2007

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Dr. Dag Von Lubitz "Generalist and Conceptualist" (Mt. Pleasant, MI United States) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture (Hardcover)

I opened Mr. Thompson's book with great anticipation. I finished it with equally great disappointment. Considering Mr. Thompson's credentials, I have expected a constructive review and critique of failures of thought, philosophy, and attitudes affecting USN. I looked forward to a dispassionate and objective analysis of problems frequently discussed on the pages of the "Proceedings," but in a broader context, founded on open- mindedness and objectivity. Instead, I learned a lot about naval and aerial excellence of Canada. The inevitable conclusion I derived from the book was the need for USN to moor its ships as rapidly as possible, and embark upon "introspective fleet-wide stand down" of indefinite duration.

The need for a thorough study of problems affecting USN is preeminent. Mr. Thompson's execution of the concept falls short of the intent. Probably the greatest deficiency is the fact that much of the information contained is based on secondary or even tertiary sources, and evident lack of objectivity. An inexperienced, sensation-hungry reader will accept all statements as facts, even if the latter are too often tinted by journalistic eagerness to "get a good story" or the wish to prove superiority of the home team.

The tendency to praise one's own achievements at any cost is not the exclusive attribute of USN, and PAOs of any navy will make certain that a tug accidentally swamped by the wake of a destroyer steaming at 35 knots during a hectic free-play exercise will be converted into "significant damage to the OPFOR surface asset." The need, whether real or perceived, to convert embarrassment into some measure of success is fairly universal in all organizations tasked with public reporting of their affairs. Unsurprisingly, the art of "positive spin" is vigorously taught at all university-level crisis management courses. Harmful? Yes. Frequent? Very. Globally distributed? Indeed.

The dismissive or even scornful evaluation of USN efforts by foreign officers quoted in the book as the supporting evidence is often nothing but the reverse of the same sentiment exhibited by USN personnel when unofficially commenting on non-US services. With the professional rivalry among all navies, admission of excellence in others is probably the most difficult to get, and when forthcoming, it has a very grudging form. Thus, in the absence of specific evidence, post-exercise debriefing data and conclusions, raw personal comments devoid of quantitative scrutiny are largely insignificant in an analytical study. Mr. Thompson admits that such data are virtually unobtainable. Unfortunately, he fails to qualify his findings by clearly indicating that personal comments may not reflect the true reality, and constitute nothing but the reflection of subjective thought. Combined with the author's consistent and uncritical touting of the Canadian excellence, one's doubts about the factual nature of his reservations concerning USN are amplified. Both Royal and Canadian navies had enough troubles of their own to provide material for companion volumes to the "Lessons Not Learned." Some of these troubles were, indeed, quite spectacular.

Most of the book is devoted to the criticism of large aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines as useful fleet assets. Nobody, not even their staunchest supporters, offered serious professional arguments that CVNs and SSNs are invincible platforms. To the contrary, concerns about their vulnerability and operational usefulness in the context of current realities have been frequently raised, and debates on the pages of the Proceedings prove the fact. Equally, USN recognizes the threat posed by modern SSKs operating in either littoral or open waters. Mr. Thompson does not introduce a new arguments. The fact that the navy "acquired" a Swedish Gotland class vessel in order to develop and practice appropriate ASW measures proves that, institutionally, USN is keenly aware of the need to develop measures limiting SSK-posed threats. One may also add (Mr. Thompson failed to mention the fact) that RN's elimination of conventional submarines from its list of its commissioned vessels represent a clear step backward. The author's objectivity is shaken even further by the omission of the fact that, following the sale of the Upholders to Canada, the Royal Navy is now dependent on foreign SSKs to maintain its full range of ASW capabilities. Thus, while USN made a sensible decision, the pansy-footing of the British politicians led to a colossal blunder whose impact upon ASW readiness of RN remains yet to be seen.

The events in Persian Gulf provided USN with a sharp lesson on the importance of MCM, and corrective measures are introduced even if slowly. New MCM vessels are joining the fleet, training is intensified, and the threat by the wide range of mines is clearly recognized. Surely, the level of arrogance and hubris characterizing USN are far less intense than postulated by Mr. Thompson. Unfortunately, after reading "Lessons Not Learned" a non-professional reader will derive entirely opposite conclusion.

The book has a major potential to be used as a "factual resource" in public debates concerning the future of the Navy. Herein lies another danger: rather than promoting a healthy review (author's stated intention), Mr. Thompson may have done a significant disservice to the organization that has better things to do than rebutting ill-informed and poorly reasoned criticisms leveled by often amateurish journalists and populist politicians basing their opinions on "Lessons Not Learned." Unfortunately, Mr. Thompson fails to observe that USN is indisputably a "learning organization:" it keenly observes the achievements of other navies, their level of training and excellence, and extracts/adapts many of their best practices. Like all giants, it may often learn embarrassingly slowly, and the process could be improved. But learn it does, and quite effectively at that.

There is hardly any doubt that USN has many problems related to personnel issues. Very frequent subject of recent contributions to the Proceedings, this critical aspect is (surprisingly) the subject of only two chapters in the book. If the intentions of Mr. Thompson to provide a measure of constructive criticism were to be fulfilled, his main thrust should be applied here rather than to a extolling the excellence of Canada.

Threat-laden and bordering on the absurd promotion philosophies, personnel policies that do not effectively support professional development, "monorail" training, extreme administrative loads imposed upon personnel afloat, rapid rotation, etc., prevent concentration on issues as fundamental as ship handling, damage control, and war fighting. Obesity is, frankly, an irrelevant issue in this context.

The modern USN might have fallen the victim of policies summarized by the famous signal sent by Admiral Sir Percy Scott, RN to HMS Roxbourgh "Since paintwork seems to be more in demand than gunnery you had better come in and make yourself pretty." The recent article in the US Naval Institute "Proceedings" that documents potential need to have civilian shiphandler contractors amplifies this impression to a hair-rising level. It is a sign of most embarrassing times when many a surface warfare officer is incapable of getting underway or placing the ship alongside without tug assistance. Still, shiphandling is not much of an element in an officer's evaluation, and, in the atmosphere where a dent in the bow will require hundreds of pages of reporting at best, and a complete ruin of one's career at worst, it is not surprising that all "play safe," and concentrate on more "career promoting" endeavours. In fact, today's USN would not allow another Nimitz to emerge: grounding one's ship was a "capital offence" even in his days. Today a lesser incident would ruin the future of a junior lieutenant. A Nelson among the ranks of modern USN is equally unthinkable. He'd be dismissed as a "dangerous and insubordinate maverick."

There is no doubt that many senior and flag officers shudder at the thought of nonconformity and criticism: the invariably tight "mind control" exercised by PAOs in all interactions between USN personnel and the outside world proves the point. Too often constructive criticism offered by junior officers is not only unwelcome, but will result in a long-lasting, career-damaging leads "blot in one's copybook." The institutional fear of criticism is but an exponent of poor leadership whose consequence is the substitution of unflattering realities with slogans, meaningless verbiage, and political correctness. Too often the wardroom forgets that words hardly ever impressed the lower deck. Personal integrity, professional competence and knowledge, and even-handed, fairly applied discipline always produced wonders.

The demonstrable deficiencies in the arena of leadership lead to cynicism, indifference, and even "mental paralysis" whose ultimately outcome is careerism, "ticket punching," and the accompanying development of new layers within the already massive bureaucracy whose members shudder each time they hear the word "ship." The notion of USN's own version of Parkinson's Law alive and operating at full throttle is quite inescapable. Far worse is the fact that, while leadership failures are evident at all strata of the navy, the problem is probably most acute at the officer intake level: the Academy. Honour code notwithstanding, incidents of dishonourable conduct emerge with a fairly high frequency, and underscore inadequacy of the current leadership training. For reasons that remain utterly inexplicable, the latter is not conducted in the manner reflecting the nature of the service, but rather as a combination of school of business theories on leadership mixed with intellectual... Read more ›

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Engaging and Shocking, December 11, 2010

By 

moreconcernedthanbefore - See all my reviews

This review is from: Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture (Hardcover)

First off, let me preface this my saying that my knowledge of the American military was practically nil before reading this book so I found it all the more engaging and eye-opening especially because the American Navy is generally thought of as the best in the world, I know that was the impression I was under until I read Lessons Not Learned. The American Navy is the largest sea power in the world and the most expensive and depictions of it in movies all lead us to believe that we can rest easy knowing that there would never be any chance of the Americans losing in a conflict against any other nation in the world. Unfortunately, that simply seems to not be the case, Lessons Not Learned points out a number of flaws in many, if not all, aspects of the American Navy. More frustratingly, it seems that many of these flaws could actually be fixed but are not. The system of hierarchy and promotion, along with a stubborn way of thinking and far too much pride not only limits the capabilities of the Navy but also puts those nations that rely or expect support and candidacy from it in danger.

The system of hierarchy in the Navy and the promotion system enforces and ensures that the officers put in charge are ones that care more for their careers than for the candidacy and for the state of the American Navy. The Navy itself encourages an "up or out" system which ensures that only officers who are willing to regurgitate prepared statistics, facts and speeches are ever able to ascend in rank. This is particularly disconcerting because we are taught, shown, and the military takes every opportunity to depict a strict and rigid code of conduct and honor. Yet, in the very institution itself, an officer cannot hope to achieve a rank or status if he was to actually adhere to that code and image the American Navy works so hard to sell. Knowing this, is it really any wonder that the Navy is as poorly trained and prepared for war at sea as is illustrated in the book? Most officers of any distinguishing rank have already been lying, falsifying, and putting all of their effort into convincing the world at large that the American Navy is the best in the world instead of actually endeavoring to make it so.

No matter how well funded and well equipped a Navy is, it is only as good as its people. Poor standards and training is the reason wars are either won or lost. This point is detailed in the book when, with testimony from both American and Japanese officers, the battle at Midway, among others, was won simply because the Japanese officers did not capitalize on their opportunities and did not engage the Americans to the best of their ability. It is hard to believe that the American forces have grown any more adept since then with the way enlisted sailors are treated, educated and are recruited. Low education standards, poor quality of life, and training programs that never see any scrutiny all prevent the American Navy from being the best in the world, a claim which it makes at every opportunity.

American pride is famous throughout the world and history and it can often be detrimental to a country's image as any one who has traveled to any other part of the world can attest to. Assuming that the promotion system were changed, the largest barrier stopping the American Navy from actually living up to the reputation it works so hard to generate is its pride. There is no other explanation for the refusal to admit that there are problems, to learn from other countries, to build submarines that are non-nuclear, and to fix and cheat at war and naval exercises. It seems that the Navy, once making a decision, never admits it being a mistake or, in addition, every even changing it. Aircraft carriers are given as an example in the book - despite having been proven time and time again in exercises that these carriers do not function to their best capabilities without other escorts and other vehicles used in consort the Navy still pumps most of its funding into them. In addition, their pride prevents them from learning from the practices of the other navies of the world despite having to learn the lesson during previous wartimes and, in particular, having to do with submarines. Exercises are not available to most and impossible to critical over if the American Navy is involved, the Navy rarely admits to a mistake or changes because of one and even goes to far as to falsify and strong-arm reports that cast it in a less-than-pleasant light.

All these problems are tied together of course; at the heart of it all is the pride that has gotten the United States of America into hot water in international affairs. Having traveled and lived in America itself for a short, as well as having traveled to South America, Europe, Japan, China, and South Korea, I can confidently say that a vast portion of the world has strong feelings accrued for American pride already. The larger issue is that other countries rely on America for support, aid and its military power on a global scale. Living in South Korea at present, a country that relies on America for military aid and support, I find it extremely disconcerting that the American Navy is actually poorly equipped, inadequately trained, and deceitful. In an age where antisubmarine can mean the difference between life and death, I can only hope that the American Navy will actually heed the advice presented in this book. There is a large responsibility on the United States, being the superpower that it is, to live up to the standards it has set for itself. It seems all of its issues stem from this underlying cause and, once cured, many solutions would be naturally implemented.

2 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Same old as his paper..., December 19, 2007

By 

Kazuaki Shimazaki - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture (Hardcover)

This book is basically an extension of Mr. Thompson's paper "Is the US Navy Over-rated", which was on the Internet up to its Draft 15.5 version before dropping off my radar. The ordering of paragraphs and general thrust is identical. The basic changes include a few more anecdotes to reinforce his point. There are probably enough of them to make a reader of his paper willing to cough up dollars, but I suggest you make this a low-priority purchase.

Contrary to Dr. von Lubitz's assessment, the only place where Canada is disproportionately emphasized is in the discussion of Aviation units and the Canadian Patrol Frigate. Otherwise, what you will see a lot of are the "naval and air excellence" of a variety of other nations - from Aussies to Soviets.

You will also read a lot of history - the past is the key to the present. The thesis of the book is that all the problems mentioned are longstanding ones. So of course history is essential.

Von Lubitz also asserts that praise is "grudgingly" and "most difficultly" given by other officers. I'll defer to his experience on this matter, but Thompson's book manages to scrape up many such praises by American officers towards foreign navies. While of course it does suggest some American officers are humble enough to choke down their pride (though Thompson never contested this - he is criticize the naval officer "mass"; indeed without a few of these "humbles" his book will have no references!), by this standard Thompson's point must be quite valid.

On the subject of data sources, Dr. Thompson heavily uses anecdote and "qualitative data". I must say that this is actually common in criticism of the military. It is the norm in the British Naval Review (at least 1955-1996), US Military Review (80s) and Russian Military Thought (early 21st century). Since I have yet to find free versions of Proceedings forgive me if it is the one exception that massively uses quantitative data and dense statistical tables...

That's not to say, however, that this is a top-class book. While his thesis seems reasonably sound, many of his historical interpretations are one-sided.

For a more detailed discussion of Midway, one should review, for example, Parshall's work when he upgraded his Paper into this book. The base point is, thanks to logistics, Japan will be lucky to even get the Midway Island even if it won Midway, to say nothing of threatening the American coast.

In fact, the after half of Midway chapter is a farce, and a full star can be taken off for that chapter alone despite the fact it is a relative sidepoint. Thompson seems unable to differentiate b/w Wars and Battles. It is certainly possible for a weaker power to win Battles, even a Campaign (a string of battles). When he's citing the Finns victory over the Soviets in 1940 or the Japanese victory over the Russians in 1905, I'm surprised he didn't cite the German invasion of Barbarossa in 1941. After all, that was arguably even more devastating on a tactical and operational level than the two mentioned. But it won't do, of course, because the Eastern Front actually shows what ultimately happens when a weaker power fights a stronger one on a critical point. The stronger power can afford to make so many more mistakes, and as time goes on, even the indices that Thompson values, like intelligence, tactics, logistics, communications, training, planning and even resolve tends to gradually favor the stronger power, not just the quality and quantity of equipment and men. Generally (for example, in Vietnam and Afghanistan which he cites), a very much smaller power can only win wars if the larger power isn't critically interested.

While, of course, the relative American appetite for low-casualty wars may make the emphasis on Battles more appropriate than otherwise, the overall product is still very unsatisfactory. The only defense ultimately is that it is only half a chapter and one may just clip together P.73-80 so they can enjoy the rest of the book.

His discussion of the noise of nuclear submarines at high speed completely downplays the point that a diesel can't even make those speeds.

His views on the Canadian Navy during WWII can certainly be balanced against other sources.

Such flaws keep the book from getting a 5. I'll actually give it a 3.5 for its quality. Considering the flaws, maybe 3 stars is more appropriate, but the base thesis is important enough I decided to encourage more buyers and give it a 4.