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Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture

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I opened Mr. Thompson's book with great anticipation. I finished it with equally great disappointment. Considering Mr. Thompson's credentials, I have expected a constructive review and critique of failures of thought, philosophy, and attitudes affecting USN. I looked forward to a dispassionate and objective analysis of problems frequently discussed on the pages of the "Proceedings," but in a broader context, founded on open- mindedness and objectivity. Instead, I learned a lot about naval and aerial excellence of Canada. The inevitable conclusion I derived from the book was the need for USN to moor its ships as rapidly as possible, and embark upon "introspective fleet-wide stand down" of indefinite duration.

The need for a thorough study of problems affecting USN is preeminent. Mr. Thompson's execution of the concept falls short of the intent. Probably the greatest deficiency is the fact that much of the information contained is based on secondary or even tertiary sources, and evident lack of objectivity. An inexperienced, sensation-hungry reader will accept all statements as facts, even if the latter are too often tinted by journalistic eagerness to "get a good story" or the wish to prove superiority of the home team.

The tendency to praise one's own achievements at any cost is not the exclusive attribute of USN, and PAOs of any navy will make certain that a tug accidentally swamped by the wake of a destroyer steaming at 35 knots during a hectic free-play exercise will be converted into "significant damage to the OPFOR surface asset." The need, whether real or perceived, to convert embarrassment into some measure of success is fairly universal in all organizations tasked with public reporting of their affairs. Unsurprisingly, the art of "positive spin" is vigorously taught at all university-level crisis management courses. Harmful? Yes. Frequent? Very. Globally distributed? Indeed.

The dismissive or even scornful evaluation of USN efforts by foreign officers quoted in the book as the supporting evidence is often nothing but the reverse of the same sentiment exhibited by USN personnel when unofficially commenting on non-US services. With the professional rivalry among all navies, admission of excellence in others is probably the most difficult to get, and when forthcoming, it has a very grudging form. Thus, in the absence of specific evidence, post-exercise debriefing data and conclusions, raw personal comments devoid of quantitative scrutiny are largely insignificant in an analytical study. Mr. Thompson admits that such data are virtually unobtainable. Unfortunately, he fails to qualify his findings by clearly indicating that personal comments may not reflect the true reality, and constitute nothing but the reflection of subjective thought. Combined with the author's consistent and uncritical touting of the Canadian excellence, one's doubts about the factual nature of his reservations concerning USN are amplified. Both Royal and Canadian navies had enough troubles of their own to provide material for companion volumes to the "Lessons Not Learned." Some of these troubles were, indeed, quite spectacular.

Most of the book is devoted to the criticism of large aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines as useful fleet assets. Nobody, not even their staunchest supporters, offered serious professional arguments that CVNs and SSNs are invincible platforms. To the contrary, concerns about their vulnerability and operational usefulness in the context of current realities have been frequently raised, and debates on the pages of the Proceedings prove the fact. Equally, USN recognizes the threat posed by modern SSKs operating in either littoral or open waters. Mr. Thompson does not introduce a new arguments. The fact that the navy "acquired" a Swedish Gotland class vessel in order to develop and practice appropriate ASW measures proves that, institutionally, USN is keenly aware of the need to develop measures limiting SSK-posed threats. One may also add (Mr. Thompson failed to mention the fact) that RN's elimination of conventional submarines from its list of its commissioned vessels represent a clear step backward. The author's objectivity is shaken even further by the omission of the fact that, following the sale of the Upholders to Canada, the Royal Navy is now dependent on foreign SSKs to maintain its full range of ASW capabilities. Thus, while USN made a sensible decision, the pansy-footing of the British politicians led to a colossal blunder whose impact upon ASW readiness of RN remains yet to be seen.

The events in Persian Gulf provided USN with a sharp lesson on the importance of MCM, and corrective measures are introduced even if slowly. New MCM vessels are joining the fleet, training is intensified, and the threat by the wide range of mines is clearly recognized. Surely, the level of arrogance and hubris characterizing USN are far less intense than postulated by Mr. Thompson. Unfortunately, after reading "Lessons Not Learned" a non-professional reader will derive entirely opposite conclusion.

The book has a major potential to be used as a "factual resource" in public debates concerning the future of the Navy. Herein lies another danger: rather than promoting a healthy review (author's stated intention), Mr. Thompson may have done a significant disservice to the organization that has better things to do than rebutting ill-informed and poorly reasoned criticisms leveled by often amateurish journalists and populist politicians basing their opinions on "Lessons Not Learned." Unfortunately, Mr. Thompson fails to observe that USN is indisputably a "learning organization:" it keenly observes the achievements of other navies, their level of training and excellence, and extracts/adapts many of their best practices. Like all giants, it may often learn embarrassingly slowly, and the process could be improved. But learn it does, and quite effectively at that.

There is hardly any doubt that USN has many problems related to personnel issues. Very frequent subject of recent contributions to the Proceedings, this critical aspect is (surprisingly) the subject of only two chapters in the book. If the intentions of Mr. Thompson to provide a measure of constructive criticism were to be fulfilled, his main thrust should be applied here rather than to a extolling the excellence of Canada.

Threat-laden and bordering on the absurd promotion philosophies, personnel policies that do not effectively support professional development, "monorail" training, extreme administrative loads imposed upon personnel afloat, rapid rotation, etc., prevent concentration on issues as fundamental as ship handling, damage control, and war fighting. Obesity is, frankly, an irrelevant issue in this context.

The modern USN might have fallen the victim of policies summarized by the famous signal sent by Admiral Sir Percy Scott, RN to HMS Roxbourgh "Since paintwork seems to be more in demand than gunnery you had better come in and make yourself pretty." The recent article in the US Naval Institute "Proceedings" that documents potential need to have civilian shiphandler contractors amplifies this impression to a hair-rising level. It is a sign of most embarrassing times when many a surface warfare officer is incapable of getting underway or placing the ship alongside without tug assistance. Still, shiphandling is not much of an element in an officer's evaluation, and, in the atmosphere where a dent in the bow will require hundreds of pages of reporting at best, and a complete ruin of one's career at worst, it is not surprising that all "play safe," and concentrate on more "career promoting" endeavours. In fact, today's USN would not allow another Nimitz to emerge: grounding one's ship was a "capital offence" even in his days. Today a lesser incident would ruin the future of a junior lieutenant. A Nelson among the ranks of modern USN is equally unthinkable. He'd be dismissed as a "dangerous and insubordinate maverick."

There is no doubt that many senior and flag officers shudder at the thought of nonconformity and criticism: the invariably tight "mind control" exercised by PAOs in all interactions between USN personnel and the outside world proves the point. Too often constructive criticism offered by junior officers is not only unwelcome, but will result in a long-lasting, career-damaging leads "blot in one's copybook." The institutional fear of criticism is but an exponent of poor leadership whose consequence is the substitution of unflattering realities with slogans, meaningless verbiage, and political correctness. Too often the wardroom forgets that words hardly ever impressed the lower deck. Personal integrity, professional competence and knowledge, and even-handed, fairly applied discipline always produced wonders.

The demonstrable deficiencies in the arena of leadership lead to cynicism, indifference, and even "mental paralysis" whose ultimately outcome is careerism, "ticket punching," and the accompanying development of new layers within the already massive bureaucracy whose members shudder each time they hear the word "ship." The notion of USN's own version of Parkinson's Law alive and operating at full throttle is quite inescapable. Far worse is the fact that, while leadership failures are evident at all strata of the navy, the problem is probably most acute at the officer intake level: the Academy. Honour code notwithstanding, incidents of dishonourable conduct emerge with a fairly high frequency, and underscore inadequacy of the current leadership training. For reasons that remain utterly inexplicable, the latter is not conducted in the manner reflecting the nature of the service, but rather as a combination of school of business theories on leadership mixed with intellectual naivite and "issue sensitivity," that ultimately convey nothing but thinly veiled, politically correct reflection of "what's in vogue."

Many of the problems relating to the issues of leadership are intimately related to personal erudition (knowledge.) The need for knowledge-based professional competence is indisputable notwithstanding, and the Navy makes great efforts to supply such. Where the Navy fails miserably is in the arena of the development of adequate and general intellectual excellence of an average, particularly junior, officer. In his superb but long-forgotten book "The Art of Leadership" the late Captain S.W. Roskill, RN stressed most eloquently the need for all-around knowledge that a naval leader must posses. His postulates, based on a long and distinguished naval career and as a Fellow at Cambridge's Churchill College are valid today as in the sixties when the book was written. Yet, the most popular graduate degree among the officer corps of USN (and other services) is the civilian career-promoting MBA or its variety. Degrees in history, political science, art, etc., are not only viewed as "career-indifferent," but may even be frowned at.

The minimal amount of space devoted by Mr. Thompson to the issues that really are significant is disappointing. However, probably the worst faux pas of the book is to use Mr. Clancy as an authority on naval matters and the exponent of USN's preoccupation with the positive image of itself. There is no doubt that Mr. Clancy may shape perceptions of a large segment of otherwise ill-informed lay readership. However, the intellectual world of US naval analysis produced authorities such as Baker III, Friedman, and Polmar (to mention just the most prominent few) whose in-depth studies are characterized by superb objectivism, knowledge, and the contextual relationships of the main subject to other relevant issues. The arguments contained in the book would gain a convincing strength had such resources been used, particularly in a book aimed at those who either actively practice or devote their lives the intellectual analysis of the naval profession.

In a most embarrassing fashion, Naval Institute Press confirmed Mr. Thompson's postulates. Contrary to the legend, the jacket photo does not show a Nimitz class carrier conducting UNREP. Instead, it depicts the same class carrier being peacefully pushed along a shipping channel by a tug barely visible on its port bow. To add insult to injury, each chapter has a leading vignette of a Batch 1 Type 42 ("Sheffield class") destroyer of Royal Navy. Is this a tacit (Tacitus again, in another version!) pointer that there is a lot USN could learn from RN? Probably not, at least in the arena of damage control: while Mr. Thompson resoundingly (and with very ill justification) criticized damage control aboard USS Stark, the crew saved the ship after two Exocet hits. The Sheffield sank after only one. But this is a "tongue-in-cheek" comment: both crews were well trained, fought valiantly to save their respective ships, and both did all that could be done. Sometimes one just does not win.

In summary, what to think of Mr. Thompson's book? Often irritating with its excessive glorification of Canada, often losing objectivity at the expense of proving an irrelevant point, too often using less than impressive sources (Google searches, as Dr. Thompson surely knows, are a dangerous form of gathering reliable bibliographic information), it still remains the "required reading" for all who are genuinely interested in the future of USN. Like all "peer reviews," while offering "objective critique," the peer trumps his own ideas rather than objectivity: the book is an irritant. But like all irritants, it also elicits vigorous reaction, and this is a good response. When any form of criticism is carefully evaluated, and all reasonable arguments accepted, the end product of one's efforts becomes only better. Outsiders often see things with less partiality, and the study of their arguments (but not necessarily acceptance) may be among the most important contributors to continuing progress. Which is probably the solitary reason why consultants are allowed to charge their exorbitant prices!

First off, let me preface this my saying that my knowledge of the American military was practically nil before reading this book so I found it all the more engaging and eye-opening especially because the American Navy is generally thought of as the best in the world, I know that was the impression I was under until I read Lessons Not Learned. The American Navy is the largest sea power in the world and the most expensive and depictions of it in movies all lead us to believe that we can rest easy knowing that there would never be any chance of the Americans losing in a conflict against any other nation in the world. Unfortunately, that simply seems to not be the case, Lessons Not Learned points out a number of flaws in many, if not all, aspects of the American Navy. More frustratingly, it seems that many of these flaws could actually be fixed but are not. The system of hierarchy and promotion, along with a stubborn way of thinking and far too much pride not only limits the capabilities of the Navy but also puts those nations that rely or expect support and candidacy from it in danger.

The system of hierarchy in the Navy and the promotion system enforces and ensures that the officers put in charge are ones that care more for their careers than for the candidacy and for the state of the American Navy. The Navy itself encourages an "up or out" system which ensures that only officers who are willing to regurgitate prepared statistics, facts and speeches are ever able to ascend in rank. This is particularly disconcerting because we are taught, shown, and the military takes every opportunity to depict a strict and rigid code of conduct and honor. Yet, in the very institution itself, an officer cannot hope to achieve a rank or status if he was to actually adhere to that code and image the American Navy works so hard to sell. Knowing this, is it really any wonder that the Navy is as poorly trained and prepared for war at sea as is illustrated in the book? Most officers of any distinguishing rank have already been lying, falsifying, and putting all of their effort into convincing the world at large that the American Navy is the best in the world instead of actually endeavoring to make it so.

No matter how well funded and well equipped a Navy is, it is only as good as its people. Poor standards and training is the reason wars are either won or lost. This point is detailed in the book when, with testimony from both American and Japanese officers, the battle at Midway, among others, was won simply because the Japanese officers did not capitalize on their opportunities and did not engage the Americans to the best of their ability. It is hard to believe that the American forces have grown any more adept since then with the way enlisted sailors are treated, educated and are recruited. Low education standards, poor quality of life, and training programs that never see any scrutiny all prevent the American Navy from being the best in the world, a claim which it makes at every opportunity.

American pride is famous throughout the world and history and it can often be detrimental to a country's image as any one who has traveled to any other part of the world can attest to. Assuming that the promotion system were changed, the largest barrier stopping the American Navy from actually living up to the reputation it works so hard to generate is its pride. There is no other explanation for the refusal to admit that there are problems, to learn from other countries, to build submarines that are non-nuclear, and to fix and cheat at war and naval exercises. It seems that the Navy, once making a decision, never admits it being a mistake or, in addition, every even changing it. Aircraft carriers are given as an example in the book - despite having been proven time and time again in exercises that these carriers do not function to their best capabilities without other escorts and other vehicles used in consort the Navy still pumps most of its funding into them. In addition, their pride prevents them from learning from the practices of the other navies of the world despite having to learn the lesson during previous wartimes and, in particular, having to do with submarines. Exercises are not available to most and impossible to critical over if the American Navy is involved, the Navy rarely admits to a mistake or changes because of one and even goes to far as to falsify and strong-arm reports that cast it in a less-than-pleasant light.

All these problems are tied together of course; at the heart of it all is the pride that has gotten the United States of America into hot water in international affairs. Having traveled and lived in America itself for a short, as well as having traveled to South America, Europe, Japan, China, and South Korea, I can confidently say that a vast portion of the world has strong feelings accrued for American pride already. The larger issue is that other countries rely on America for support, aid and its military power on a global scale. Living in South Korea at present, a country that relies on America for military aid and support, I find it extremely disconcerting that the American Navy is actually poorly equipped, inadequately trained, and deceitful. In an age where antisubmarine can mean the difference between life and death, I can only hope that the American Navy will actually heed the advice presented in this book. There is a large responsibility on the United States, being the superpower that it is, to live up to the standards it has set for itself. It seems all of its issues stem from this underlying cause and, once cured, many solutions would be naturally implemented.

This book is basically an extension of Mr. Thompson's paper "Is the US Navy Over-rated", which was on the Internet up to its Draft 15.5 version before dropping off my radar. The ordering of paragraphs and general thrust is identical. The basic changes include a few more anecdotes to reinforce his point. There are probably enough of them to make a reader of his paper willing to cough up dollars, but I suggest you make this a low-priority purchase.

Contrary to Dr. von Lubitz's assessment, the only place where Canada is disproportionately emphasized is in the discussion of Aviation units and the Canadian Patrol Frigate. Otherwise, what you will see a lot of are the "naval and air excellence" of a variety of other nations - from Aussies to Soviets.

You will also read a lot of history - the past is the key to the present. The thesis of the book is that all the problems mentioned are longstanding ones. So of course history is essential.

Von Lubitz also asserts that praise is "grudgingly" and "most difficultly" given by other officers. I'll defer to his experience on this matter, but Thompson's book manages to scrape up many such praises by American officers towards foreign navies. While of course it does suggest some American officers are humble enough to choke down their pride (though Thompson never contested this - he is criticize the naval officer "mass"; indeed without a few of these "humbles" his book will have no references!), by this standard Thompson's point must be quite valid.

On the subject of data sources, Dr. Thompson heavily uses anecdote and "qualitative data". I must say that this is actually common in criticism of the military. It is the norm in the British Naval Review (at least 1955-1996), US Military Review (80s) and Russian Military Thought (early 21st century). Since I have yet to find free versions of Proceedings forgive me if it is the one exception that massively uses quantitative data and dense statistical tables...

That's not to say, however, that this is a top-class book. While his thesis seems reasonably sound, many of his historical interpretations are one-sided.

For a more detailed discussion of Midway, one should review, for example, Parshall's work when he upgraded his Paper into this book. The base point is, thanks to logistics, Japan will be lucky to even get the Midway Island even if it won Midway, to say nothing of threatening the American coast.

In fact, the after half of Midway chapter is a farce, and a full star can be taken off for that chapter alone despite the fact it is a relative sidepoint. Thompson seems unable to differentiate b/w Wars and Battles. It is certainly possible for a weaker power to win Battles, even a Campaign (a string of battles). When he's citing the Finns victory over the Soviets in 1940 or the Japanese victory over the Russians in 1905, I'm surprised he didn't cite the German invasion of Barbarossa in 1941. After all, that was arguably even more devastating on a tactical and operational level than the two mentioned. But it won't do, of course, because the Eastern Front actually shows what ultimately happens when a weaker power fights a stronger one on a critical point. The stronger power can afford to make so many more mistakes, and as time goes on, even the indices that Thompson values, like intelligence, tactics, logistics, communications, training, planning and even resolve tends to gradually favor the stronger power, not just the quality and quantity of equipment and men. Generally (for example, in Vietnam and Afghanistan which he cites), a very much smaller power can only win wars if the larger power isn't critically interested.

While, of course, the relative American appetite for low-casualty wars may make the emphasis on Battles more appropriate than otherwise, the overall product is still very unsatisfactory. The only defense ultimately is that it is only half a chapter and one may just clip together P.73-80 so they can enjoy the rest of the book.

His discussion of the noise of nuclear submarines at high speed completely downplays the point that a diesel can't even make those speeds.

His views on the Canadian Navy during WWII can certainly be balanced against other sources.

Such flaws keep the book from getting a 5. I'll actually give it a 3.5 for its quality. Considering the flaws, maybe 3 stars is more appropriate, but the base thesis is important enough I decided to encourage more buyers and give it a 4.

Mr. Thompson has himself another smart, tough and thought-provoking book. Thompson's approach is both a sobering and effective means of making his case -- an excellent read.

There will be many critics who will try and say that this book in "anti-American," but that is not the case. Some people just can't handle the truth. Professor Thompson's book meticulously describes the USN's institutional flaws and operational shortcomings. Whether or not Navy officers and leaders make use of this information and implement the changes required to put the USN back on course, remains to be seen. We can only hope that it doesn't take the loss of multiple carriers (and thousands of sailors) to make the U.S. Navy wake up and start dealing with reality. The civilians in charge are as bad as the admirals. Most of them are drawn from the corporate world and have ties to the Military-Industrial-Congressional-Thinktank-Complex, so they're not about to bite the hand that feeds them. The U.S. Navy needs civilian leaders with guts, vision, and determination, who are ruthless enough to "chop off some heads" and replace the gatekeepers of the status quo with bright, energetic officers who have fresh ideas and the willingness to adapt and overcome the challenges facing America in the 21st-century. Currently the U.S. Navy has a 19th-century mindset in its culture and traditions. We must replace the British RN-style "officers are royalty, enlisted sailors are peasants" mentality if we want to attract and retain the high-quality enlisted personnel necessary to man our Fleet. This antiquated policy breeds visceral hatred and resentment among enlisted sailors. The internet is full of vitriolic web sites authored by ex-Navy enlisted personnel, a phenomenom not seen with regards to the other branches of the U.S. military. This problem flows downward from Annapolis and the Pentagon, and it needs to be addressed at all levels, not just officers but NCOs as well. Elimination of intraservice rivalries is another top priority. The USN needs to restore a sense of team unity and a warrior mentality, aka "fighting spirit." These qualities are sorely lacking in today's Navy, and it shows. Navy personnel development is focused on technical proficiency, with little, if any, regard for ability and readiness to fight. If America enters a war in which the U.S. Navy will actually be called upon to fight (other than launching aircraft sorties and fielding "mud sailors" like Special Warfare, EOD, and Seabees), I fear the results will be disastrous and the loss of life will be devastating. It could also cost us victory in battle. It is vital that we address these issues before the Navy suffers a major combat catastrophe.

Why is it that when someone capable of typing enough words in a row to fill up a book comes out and slings mud, it is so glamorous that people want to think it is brilliant Woodward-and-Bernstein expose? Sometimes it is just a willfully ignorant nincompoop grinding an axe.

The author has already gone on record in REAL book reviews in REAL journals (Armed Forces Journal to name just one--sorry, Amazon) as holding ridiculous misinterpretations of "evidence" that he cites. He is at least intellectually dishonest, if not incompetent.

Remember, the points of a non-literary book review are two:

1. You only have finite money,
2. The minutes and hours of your life are irreplaceable,

and you wish to use both of the above wisely. (The point behind a literary review is the endless flapping of gums, flogging of opinions, felling of perfectly healthy trees, etc. Perhaps Mr. Thompson's book is, in fact, literature.)

This book is not a good use of irreplaceable hours of your life. And going on any further about this "book" is not a good use of mine. PLEASE go spend your money and time on something else that Amazon sells.

This book rocks. First of all, some major voices in the defense community have endorsed it like Dr. Richard A. Gabriel, author of "Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win", and former Chicago Tribune Defense Correspondent Lt. Col. David Evans, USMC Ret. Secondly, it is brutally honest about the US Navy, and this is a rare thing indeed. The author compares the USN with other navies like the RCN, RN, and RAN, and finds the USN wanting. Some people didn't like hearing that the Royal Canadian Navy often outperforms the USN, but the truth hurts. This book is destined to be a classic.

"Amid the ongoing debate among serious minded observers of the United States military's [in]ability to change in ways that increase its readiness to prevail in 21st Century conflicts, The Wall Street Journal recently noted in its front page analysis on military spending priorities that "Overall, the Pentagon's recent spending has largely reinforced the status quo...Military budgets have long been shaped by pork and pet projects." With respect to the US Navy within this overall atmosphere of status quo non reform and continued technology dense procurement, The Wall Street Journal concludes that "The [new proposed] warship is so expensive that it threatens the Navy's plan to upgrade its fleet..." (Jonathan Karp, The Wall Street Journal, 16 June 2006).

In "Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture", Professor Roger Thompson takes the reader two critical steps further toward critically assessing the US Navy's actual war fighting capability with these technology dense boats by creatively linking the inability of such expensive, high technology dense ships to prevail in numerous war-gaming exercises against the smaller, less technology dense boats of various allied navies - submarine crews that Professor Thompson argues are better trained and motivated than are those of the US Navy. According to Professor Thompson's analysis, these too frequent negative outcomes stem ultimately from the US Navy's inability to learn from mistakes, adapt tactics, and thus prevail. This second critical observation; that the US Navy's inability to change is embedded in largely unsupported opinions, particularly the presumption and expectation that they will prevail in any dispute, renders the Navy's high-technology fleet vulnerable. This overarching hubris is, according to Professor Thompson, the US Navy's core weakness.

Dealing in his early chapters with the arguments that naval exercises are not "real" tests of battle field performance, that David cannot really defeat Goliath (despite the proven fact that the high-tech US military has often failed to prevail in the post W.W.II period against less technology dense foes), and with the observation that asymmetric war fighting remains a low priority, Professor Thompson next presents numerous and densely documented examples of war-gaming exercises wherein the US Navy was regularly defeated by smaller allied navies using smaller, less technologically sophisticated non nuclear submarines but better war fighting skills.

It is this data driven observation that leads to several chapters critically assessing as causal agents the US Navy's management, policies, and training; all embedded within a highly critical assessment of extant attitudes, beliefs, and war fighting hubris.

It is a sobering presentation.

If it is simultaneously true, as The Wall Street Journal article asserts, that "In the case of destroyers, the senators maintained a weapon whose origins dated back to the last decade for the sake of jobs...[such that generally speaking] the military is buying pretty much the same things as before...they just cost more..." and that, as Professor Thompson asserts, the mix of advanced technology dense boats and deficient war fighting skills does NOT translate to victory, then Professor Thompson's "Lessons not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture" becomes a critical read for military scholars and policy makers generally, for citizens, and for soldiers; whose job it is to prevail...and survive."

Reviewed by Guntram Werther, Ph.D.
Professor of International Politics and Economics, Western International University

The US Navy is in deep trouble, and Roger Thompson has done a commendable job describing the problems facing the world's largest navy. Some people will not like this book BECAUSE IT TELLS THE TRUTH. His thesis is compelling, well researched and eloquently presented. If you care about the USN, you need to read this magnificent book.

"Roger Thompson has spent decades thinking about military culture and the bureaucracy that hampers effectiveness. He has reduced his commentaries, questioning aspects of how the U.S. Navy conducts itself, into a single volume. This book is not for those with delusions of invincibility. It takes a realistic look at adversaries both conventional and asymmetric that could undermine if not defeat U.S. Navy combat platforms... One may disagree with Thompson's observations and recommendations, however for those passionate about our Navy, it is necessary to read criticism that is constructive and offers readers a way to reflect on how to solve problems that undermine the U.S. Navy." - Lt. Cmdr. Youssef Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy