This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct--one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism--then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.
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Editorial Reviews
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"Clarke's book marks a leop forward in our understanding of all the various forms of incompatibilism."--Gideon Yaffe, The Journal of Ethics
"This book is an important contribution to the debate on free will. Clarke provides a careful and comprehensive assessment of a variety of libertarian accounts. He displays impressive command of the subject and argues with subtlety and ingenuity. As far as I can tell, he significantly advances the discussion about such central issues as the problem of active control and the possibility of agent causation."--Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
About the Author
Randolph Clarke is at University of Georgia.
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Inside This Book
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First Sentence:
In making decisions, we actively and intentionally form intentions to perform actions of certain sorts. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
broad incompatibilism, adequate libertarian account, direct active control, sufficient active control, further positive powers, nondeterministic causation, nondeterministic event causation, contrastive rational explanation, greater active control, required indeterminism, agent causalist, having certain reasons, causally complex event, practically unavoidable illusion, microlevel laws, chance that the agent, characterizes free will, immediate causal antecedents, rational explicability, indeterministic occurrence, given incompatibilism, exercising active control, nonactive control, rational free action, substance causation Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
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Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
In making decisions, we actively and intentionally form intentions to perform actions of certain sorts. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
broad incompatibilism, adequate libertarian account, direct active control, sufficient active control, further positive powers, nondeterministic causation, nondeterministic event causation, contrastive rational explanation, greater active control, required indeterminism, agent causalist, having certain reasons, causally complex event, practically unavoidable illusion, microlevel laws, chance that the agent, characterizes free will, immediate causal antecedents, rational explicability, indeterministic occurrence, given incompatibilism, exercising active control, nonactive control, rational free action, substance causation Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
David Lewis, Difference Condition New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
Citations (learn more)
This book cites 95
books:
See all 95 books this book cites
4
books
cite this book:
- Free Will (Blackwell Readings in Philosophy) by Robert Kane on 8 pages
- The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford Handbooks) by Robert Kane on 5 pages
- Action Theory (Synthese Library) by M. Brand in Back Matter (1), Back Matter (2), and Back Matter (3)
- Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka by Jules L. Coleman in Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
- Explanation and its Limits (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements) by Dudley Knowles in Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
See all 95 books this book cites
- Locke (The Routledge Philosophers) by E.J. Lowe on page 159, and Back Matter
- Merit, Meaning, and Human Bondage: An Essay on Free Will by Nomy Arpaly in Back Matter
- What is this thing called Metaphysics? by Brian Garrett on page 117
- Free Will and Luck by Alfred R. Mele in Back Matter
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