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128 of 149 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
THE Reference on Private Military Contractors and Those Who Hire or Fear Them, August 29, 2006
I was the guy that did the threat study that put private military contractors on the official targeting list for the US Government, establishing them as legitimate targets who needed to be understood by all available (secret and open) means as either belligerents or at least relevant actors in any situation.
Robert Young Pelton, whom I know personally and admire as one of the most honest, courageous, and mature investigative journalists and adventurers (see my review of his Robert Young Pelton's The World's Most Dangerous Places: 5th Edition (Robert Young Pelton the World's Most Dangerous Places), is without question the best reporter and observer in the world of the "dogs of war." He ranks up with and above Robert Kaplan, Seymour Hersh, and John Fialka, three intrepid and intellectual reporters who help define the extraordinary talents and veracity of this author, Robert Young Pelton.
When I received his book I dropped everything and offer here a few of the highlights:
He distinguishes carefully between Mercenaries (soldiers for hire) and Private Military Contractors (PMC) who are security for hire.
Blackwater, the best of the (PMC can train 35,000 men in a year, and delivers a lighter, faster, smaller (and more effective) security force than the U.S. Army.
He recounts the history of CIA money into Special Operations Forces (SOF) black operations, which in turn created PMCs. Just as CIA funded the jihad in Afghanistan, so also has it funded--perhaps ignorantly in both cases--the emergence of the PMCs.
Telling early story: before 9/11, lawyers reduced CIA and other action elements of the US Government to wimpy toast. It took 9/11 to frost the lawyers and unleash the real men in the USG and elsewhere.
EDIT: Prior to 9/11, the lawyers were piss-ants such as those who advised the ABLE DANGER team to destroy evidence discovered pre 9-11 of two hijackers, instead of turning it over to the FBI. CIA lawyers, with a couple of exceptions, are also piss-ants. Real men include the guys that went into Afghanistan (see my reviews of Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander and First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan), and the guys at US Special Operations Command who are on their own all over the world. I never imagined that NSA and CIA would simply turn the lawyers off and violate ALL of our civil liberties, including warrantless wiretapping and rendition (kidnapping to export for torture) and the denial of habeas corpus to US and UK and Australian citizens, among others.
His overall account makes it clear that the new breed of PMC warrior is better in all respects (stronger, faster, smarter, better shot, more tech savvy) than the past SOF heroes, but FAILS in one important respect: tactical combat decision-making. He explains that communications has robbed the field men of all initiative, and they are now nothing more than risk takers for fat-assed pasty-faced Rear Echelon Mother Fryers (REMF) with too much rank, too much air conditioning, and not enough character to make it in the field.
This book will be, for some time, the basic reference for those who wish to be PMCs, manage PMCs, or employ PMC companies. On the one hand, he documents the rates and the profits ($500 a day per man, billed at $1500 a day per man, with $500 for overhead and $500 for profit PER DAY), but he also points out that at 24/7 ops tempo, this can come out to $25 an hour, or worse. He points out that SOF and other skilled uniformed professionals earn $50K a year, while PMCs can earn $200K a year--the contrast explains why SOF is hemorrhaging personnel. He discussed the 90 days on, 30 days off, but also notes that a third of the candidates do not make the grade in training, while half of those who are sent to the field do not make the grade under combat conditions and are Ordered Home.
In passing he notes that CIA tends to stink at local level relations, throwing money at locals to get intelligence, which is consequently generally bad and useless.
He also warns those who receive USG funded PMCs that as was the case in Haiti, the withdrawal of US funding for PMC security can be capricious and sudden.
He related the rise of the PMC to the political desire in the US of limiting the uniformed head counts in combat conditions, and this in turn not only supports PMCs with guns instead of uniformed military with guns, but also turning over all logistics to PMCs, some of which are unrealizable (and thus leave our troops without water and food and shower points in the clinch).
The book adds further to the documented view of Paul Bremer as a dictator no better than Saddam Hussein (who at least provided electricity and water and stability).
This thoughtful study notes that the Rules of Engagement (ROE) have not been well developed for PMCs, and that the seam between PMCs and the US military and the US Department of State are thoroughly screwed up to non-existent.
He notes that in addition to Iraqi disdain for Paul Bremer, there is acute Iraqi consciousness for the fact that in Iraq, PMCs are the top of the food chain and have everything, including jobs, which Iraqis have not received in the so-called "peace."
This author and this book SMASHES both the Rolling Stone article on "Heavy Metal Mercenaries" and the self-promoting and largely false book The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger.
Passing comments document the different "tribes" in the PMC world, the fact that many PMCs are paying their US citizens with offshore accounts that evade taxes, that laptops not guns are the focus for many individuals (their lifeline to family and reality), that London is the center of gravity for PMC activity, that over 400 PMCs have been killed in Iraq (contract this with 2,500 from US military), and that the bottom line for PMCs is that they are largely ethical, moral, professional, and committed.
I especially liked the author's closing contrast between the British PMC model "it's about minimum force, Old Boy" and the US model, "high tech max force" approach.
Immortal quote on page 227: "The post 9/11 world opened up a Pandora's box of prospects for adventurers, conmen, and opportunists...."
I will end with three points the author brings out:
1) PMC Blackwater is smart, focused on the bomb makers not the bomb deliverers.
2) Everybody is making money in Iraq (that is a US citizen) EXCEPT the US uniformed soldiers actually fighting the war.
3) PMCs are, like guns, something that can be used for good or bad.
Robert Young Pelton is extraordinary, and this book is the cutting edge of reality: PMCs. He is unique for his preparation and for walking in the PMC shoes.
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19 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Must-have resource on PMCs for the casual reader, the academic, and the policy wonk, October 11, 2006
Licensed to Kill is Robert Young Pelton's broad survey of the modern world of mercenaries. Strike that, of contractors. Mercenaries, after all, as Doug Brooks of IPOA (International Peace Operations Association) said in the movie Shadow Company: anyone convicted as being a mercenary should be shot along with his lawyer (Doug, pardon my paraphrasing). Regardless, Pelton's subtitle captures what these guys are: hired guns. Or as one of the contractors in the book put it: "guns with legs".
Pelton's book is (or can be) a quick read. It's conversational, often with the feel that you're sitting in a pub having a beer while he tells you a story (as you do in his World's Most Dangerous Places books). For me, however, it wasn't a quick read. I found myself highlighting sentences, scribbling in the margins, and applying colored flags for quick and future reference. Pelton may challenge the journalist\ community with how he gets into the action (journos not always being the type who will ride with the bad guy when something might happen), but this is how he gets the facts, the story, and the respect that opens doors later. A perpetual cycle, his access gets him more access and so on. Unlike other others who seek to justify a point of view, Pelton comes off balanced, telling it like it is and, very importantly, with context.
Licensed to Kill is more than a narrative of private operators, it is an almost forensic look into the use of private military forces. High profile actors in the world of hired guns, such as Erik Prince and Blackwater, Tim Spicer, Simon Mann, and Michael Grunburg (profiled deeper in Three Worlds Gone Mad) of various ventures, and even a con-artist who's convinced he's the greatest American hero.
This book is a great resource that pulls the curtain aside to see how PMCs operate, a look into their motivations, and where they are being used. If you're not provoked to learn more, you're not paying attention.
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16 of 16 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A nugget of gold in a sea of spoon fed opinion, September 23, 2006
Another successful presentation of Pelton's trademark seamless mixture of adventure travel, keen observation and wry humour. In this work he takes us on an incredible journey through the controversial world of private military companies. Up front he promises to take us along for the ride and we can form our own opinions, and by every measure in that regard he delivers.
The breadth of the journey is astonishing. As a reader you feel as though you are tagging along for visits to Washington DC product launches, secret operations on the Afghan/Pakistan border and convoy trips along Iraq's deadly Route Irish. You can also vicariously attend training at the Blackwater facility in Myock NC, then go back in time to hear about the action in Sierra Leone and Equitorial Guinea. The view is as comprehensive as possible without sacrificing detail or overloading the reader.
The question regarding the difference between a security contractor and a mercenary in artfully dealt with through stories of colourful characters. The book is rich in these, from conversations at a Dallas convention for security to imprisoned mercenaries. The point is made that the difference between a mercenary and a security contractor lies in a personal moral code. The high end of the spectrum is illustrated by a contractor nicknamed "Miyagi" who embodies professionalism and gives up police work to become a contractor in Iraq, incredibly to allow his wife to give up the stress of being a court reporter in LA. The low end of the spectrum is the circus tale of "Jack" Idema, an opportunist who travelled to Afghan to end up in jail. In seeing these characters we see the potential, both good and bad, of actors in the privatized security.
The book really hits stride in the illustrations of corporate behaviour. Corporations by their very nature need profit in ever increasing amounts and Pelton walks us through how service providers have dealt with becoming corporate in the War on Terror. We read poignant stories about the temptations that can befall security companies in search of new profits with illustrations from the past. In this, the conversations with rising star security provider Erik Prince of Blackwater Security whose aspirations to field a privatized brigade transported by armoured monster trucks with air support from leased helicopter gunships sit side by side with the story of Simon Mann's ill fated attempt to raise a private force to overthrow Equatorial Guinea. It is when these heavily armed companies run out of problems to solve and begin creating their own solutions that we see the industry's potential at its most troubling.
Pelton has given the characters, the context and told the reader where to look. It is up to the reader to make up his or her own mind on the subject. When it comes to an author of a book on an obscured topic without much clear information readily available otherwise, you can't ask much more than that.
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