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Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror

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Licensed to Kill is Robert Young Pelton's broad survey of the modern world of mercenaries. Strike that, of contractors. Mercenaries, after all, as Doug Brooks of IPOA (International Peace Operations Association) said in the movie Shadow Company: anyone convicted as being a mercenary should be shot along with his lawyer (Doug, pardon my paraphrasing). Regardless, Pelton's subtitle captures what these guys are: hired guns. Or as one of the contractors in the book put it: "guns with legs".

Pelton's book is (or can be) a quick read. It's conversational, often with the feel that you're sitting in a pub having a beer while he tells you a story (as you do in his World's Most Dangerous Places books). For me, however, it wasn't a quick read. I found myself highlighting sentences, scribbling in the margins, and applying colored flags for quick and future reference. Pelton may challenge the journalist\ community with how he gets into the action (journos not always being the type who will ride with the bad guy when something might happen), but this is how he gets the facts, the story, and the respect that opens doors later. A perpetual cycle, his access gets him more access and so on. Unlike other others who seek to justify a point of view, Pelton comes off balanced, telling it like it is and, very importantly, with context.

Licensed to Kill is more than a narrative of private operators, it is an almost forensic look into the use of private military forces. High profile actors in the world of hired guns, such as Erik Prince and Blackwater, Tim Spicer, Simon Mann, and Michael Grunburg (profiled deeper in Three Worlds Gone Mad) of various ventures, and even a con-artist who's convinced he's the greatest American hero.

This book is a great resource that pulls the curtain aside to see how PMCs operate, a look into their motivations, and where they are being used. If you're not provoked to learn more, you're not paying attention.

RYP's book on the modern history of PSC's offers what appears to be an honest look into the world of today's military contractor, or what some would call "mercenary". Much of the book covers the work of PSC's in Iraq today and gives an honest look into what the job entails. The daily hurry-up and wait game, the same routine day in and day out, with short bursts on intense violence and excitement and the ever-present knowledge that the enemy is everyewhere and can be everyone (or anything - IED's).

Mr. Pelton seems to gain a lot of access to not only the personalities of those running today's security companies, but those that ran and operated in past ones, such as Sandline and Executive Outcomes. Some of their (the owners and the operators) motivations are laid out in the open, some are percieved and some are questioned. For example, the US contractors that work in Iraq mostly seem to be family men, trained in the military, that have no other job experience or training and who "saw the light" in making military wages or go private and make upwards of $10k p/month. Now although their main motivation seems to be money and might classify them as a "mercenary force", you do not get the idea that they are for hire to the highest bidder. They are doing what they were trained to do, working for the goals of the US, just making more money. There are also those who seemto like the money and excitement of the job. RYP also covers the effects of the Blackwater contractors who were ambushed, mutilated, killed and hung from a bridge on the industry. He is able to give an objeective and honest look into both the worlds of private military companies, those that are working "above board" as security specialists and those who have taken of on more a mercenary role in world affairs.

His book raises many questions and issues, some raised by the contractors themselves. One being the genocide in Darfur. Eric Prince, founder of Blackwater says he can field a military force to go in and deal with the atrocities happening in Sudan, and that he can do it faster and for pennies on the dollar of what it would cost the mostly-inept UN to do it. Obviously many questions arise, but as we debate, innocent people are having their houses burned down, while being raped, mutilated and killed by the Janjaweed. What is our (the worlds) excuse to these people on why we seem to be sitting on our hands. As one contractor said, give them the word and it they would be "Janja-weed-Be-Gone".

The biggest question raised is one that is not answered in the book and one that only time will tell. As this private military complex becomes more popular with more companies popping up worldwide, at what cost will that have to our nation and military. Although Eric Prince says that his Blackwater firm will not take on any job that is not in accordance with the security of the US, what will happen as more and more trained professionals (both inside and outside of the us) that do not have his same patriotism are pulled out into the world market by the almighty dollar, no matter the side?

Another successful presentation of Pelton's trademark seamless mixture of adventure travel, keen observation and wry humour. In this work he takes us on an incredible journey through the controversial world of private military companies. Up front he promises to take us along for the ride and we can form our own opinions, and by every measure in that regard he delivers.

The breadth of the journey is astonishing. As a reader you feel as though you are tagging along for visits to Washington DC product launches, secret operations on the Afghan/Pakistan border and convoy trips along Iraq's deadly Route Irish. You can also vicariously attend training at the Blackwater facility in Myock NC, then go back in time to hear about the action in Sierra Leone and Equitorial Guinea. The view is as comprehensive as possible without sacrificing detail or overloading the reader.

The question regarding the difference between a security contractor and a mercenary in artfully dealt with through stories of colourful characters. The book is rich in these, from conversations at a Dallas convention for security to imprisoned mercenaries. The point is made that the difference between a mercenary and a security contractor lies in a personal moral code. The high end of the spectrum is illustrated by a contractor nicknamed "Miyagi" who embodies professionalism and gives up police work to become a contractor in Iraq, incredibly to allow his wife to give up the stress of being a court reporter in LA. The low end of the spectrum is the circus tale of "Jack" Idema, an opportunist who travelled to Afghan to end up in jail. In seeing these characters we see the potential, both good and bad, of actors in the privatized security.

The book really hits stride in the illustrations of corporate behaviour. Corporations by their very nature need profit in ever increasing amounts and Pelton walks us through how service providers have dealt with becoming corporate in the War on Terror. We read poignant stories about the temptations that can befall security companies in search of new profits with illustrations from the past. In this, the conversations with rising star security provider Erik Prince of Blackwater Security whose aspirations to field a privatized brigade transported by armoured monster trucks with air support from leased helicopter gunships sit side by side with the story of Simon Mann's ill fated attempt to raise a private force to overthrow Equatorial Guinea. It is when these heavily armed companies run out of problems to solve and begin creating their own solutions that we see the industry's potential at its most troubling.

Pelton has given the characters, the context and told the reader where to look. It is up to the reader to make up his or her own mind on the subject. When it comes to an author of a book on an obscured topic without much clear information readily available otherwise, you can't ask much more than that.

I was the guy that did the threat study that put private military contractors on the official targeting list for the US Government, establishing them as legitimate targets who needed to be understood by all available (secret and open) means as either belligerents or at least relevant actors in any situation.

Robert Young Pelton, whom I know personally and admire as one of the most honest, courageous, and mature investigative journalists and adventurers (see my review of his Robert Young Pelton's The World's Most Dangerous Places: 5th Edition (Robert Young Pelton the World's Most Dangerous Places), is without question the best reporter and observer in the world of the "dogs of war." He ranks up with and above Robert Kaplan, Seymour Hersh, and John Fialka, three intrepid and intellectual reporters who help define the extraordinary talents and veracity of this author, Robert Young Pelton.

When I received his book I dropped everything and offer here a few of the highlights:

He distinguishes carefully between Mercenaries (soldiers for hire) and Private Military Contractors (PMC) who are security for hire.

Blackwater, the best of the (PMC can train 35,000 men in a year, and delivers a lighter, faster, smaller (and more effective) security force than the U.S. Army.

He recounts the history of CIA money into Special Operations Forces (SOF) black operations, which in turn created PMCs. Just as CIA funded the jihad in Afghanistan, so also has it funded--perhaps ignorantly in both cases--the emergence of the PMCs.

Telling early story: before 9/11, lawyers reduced CIA and other action elements of the US Government to wimpy toast. It took 9/11 to frost the lawyers and unleash the real men in the USG and elsewhere.

EDIT: Prior to 9/11, the lawyers were piss-ants such as those who advised the ABLE DANGER team to destroy evidence discovered pre 9-11 of two hijackers, instead of turning it over to the FBI. CIA lawyers, with a couple of exceptions, are also piss-ants. Real men include the guys that went into Afghanistan (see my reviews of Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander and First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan), and the guys at US Special Operations Command who are on their own all over the world. I never imagined that NSA and CIA would simply turn the lawyers off and violate ALL of our civil liberties, including warrantless wiretapping and rendition (kidnapping to export for torture) and the denial of habeas corpus to US and UK and Australian citizens, among others.

His overall account makes it clear that the new breed of PMC warrior is better in all respects (stronger, faster, smarter, better shot, more tech savvy) than the past SOF heroes, but FAILS in one important respect: tactical combat decision-making. He explains that communications has robbed the field men of all initiative, and they are now nothing more than risk takers for fat-assed pasty-faced Rear Echelon Mother Fryers (REMF) with too much rank, too much air conditioning, and not enough character to make it in the field.

This book will be, for some time, the basic reference for those who wish to be PMCs, manage PMCs, or employ PMC companies. On the one hand, he documents the rates and the profits ($500 a day per man, billed at $1500 a day per man, with $500 for overhead and $500 for profit PER DAY), but he also points out that at 24/7 ops tempo, this can come out to $25 an hour, or worse. He points out that SOF and other skilled uniformed professionals earn $50K a year, while PMCs can earn $200K a year--the contrast explains why SOF is hemorrhaging personnel. He discussed the 90 days on, 30 days off, but also notes that a third of the candidates do not make the grade in training, while half of those who are sent to the field do not make the grade under combat conditions and are Ordered Home.

In passing he notes that CIA tends to stink at local level relations, throwing money at locals to get intelligence, which is consequently generally bad and useless.

He also warns those who receive USG funded PMCs that as was the case in Haiti, the withdrawal of US funding for PMC security can be capricious and sudden.

He related the rise of the PMC to the political desire in the US of limiting the uniformed head counts in combat conditions, and this in turn not only supports PMCs with guns instead of uniformed military with guns, but also turning over all logistics to PMCs, some of which are unrealizable (and thus leave our troops without water and food and shower points in the clinch).

The book adds further to the documented view of Paul Bremer as a dictator no better than Saddam Hussein (who at least provided electricity and water and stability).

This thoughtful study notes that the Rules of Engagement (ROE) have not been well developed for PMCs, and that the seam between PMCs and the US military and the US Department of State are thoroughly screwed up to non-existent.

He notes that in addition to Iraqi disdain for Paul Bremer, there is acute Iraqi consciousness for the fact that in Iraq, PMCs are the top of the food chain and have everything, including jobs, which Iraqis have not received in the so-called "peace."

This author and this book SMASHES both the Rolling Stone article on "Heavy Metal Mercenaries" and the self-promoting and largely false book The Hunt for Bin Laden: Task Force Dagger.

Passing comments document the different "tribes" in the PMC world, the fact that many PMCs are paying their US citizens with offshore accounts that evade taxes, that laptops not guns are the focus for many individuals (their lifeline to family and reality), that London is the center of gravity for PMC activity, that over 400 PMCs have been killed in Iraq (contract this with 2,500 from US military), and that the bottom line for PMCs is that they are largely ethical, moral, professional, and committed.

I especially liked the author's closing contrast between the British PMC model "it's about minimum force, Old Boy" and the US model, "high tech max force" approach.

Immortal quote on page 227: "The post 9/11 world opened up a Pandora's box of prospects for adventurers, conmen, and opportunists...."

I will end with three points the author brings out:

1) PMC Blackwater is smart, focused on the bomb makers not the bomb deliverers.

2) Everybody is making money in Iraq (that is a US citizen) EXCEPT the US uniformed soldiers actually fighting the war.

3) PMCs are, like guns, something that can be used for good or bad.

Robert Young Pelton is extraordinary, and this book is the cutting edge of reality: PMCs. He is unique for his preparation and for walking in the PMC shoes.

I can't speak for the accuracy of other parts of this book, but I was working as a private contractor in Baghdad when the author was there gathering his info. I hate to say it, but he spent so much time in one small location talking to a limited group of people that his perspective was somewhat warped. At times his writing demonstrates an amateurish over-infatuation with GI-Joe cliches. The result, as one other reviewer aptly pointed out, is that the book sometimes reads like a half-baked article from Soldier of Fortune.

Many (but, I emphasize, not all) of the guys working at his location at that time had very questionable backgrounds and were definitely not the best and brightest of the bunch. A few were unqualified for any other job in country and wound up there, where the author was located, by default. What made the author's "research" more puzzling was the presence of a compound with about 300 more highly qualified PSD guys less than a mile away from where his head hit the pillow. I'm not sure what kept him from coming to talk to the rest of us, but I think it might have changed his perspective a bit had he taken the time to broaden his scope.

[...]

BOOK REVIEW
Mercenaries or 'contractors'?
Licensed to Kill by Robert Young Pelton

Reviewed by David Isenberg

Sometimes doing a book review is difficult. An author may write informatively and lucidly in one chapter and bomb in the next. A reviewer wants to praise where warranted but also feel compelled to point out its flaws. Trying to strike a balance can be difficult.

Fortunately, that is not a problem here. This book is, in a word, terrific. Anybody who is remotely interested in the world of private security contractors should run, not walk, to the bookstore and buy this book immediately. It is going to be the gold standard on private military and security companies for years to come.

That being said, a little background is in order. For years now the media have increasingly publicized what is usually described in sensationalistic purple prose as the murky world of corporate mercenaries. While such firms started gaining attention back in the early 1990s with the exploits of, for example, the now-defunct South African-based Executive Outcomes, which did actual combat operations in Angola and Sierra Leone, and gained more publicity with the training contracts of MPRI in the Balkan wars of the mid-1990s, the war in Iraq propelled the industry to the top of the media and pop-culture food chain. Such firms as Blackwater Security, Triple Canopy, and DynCorp are now conversational staples.

And yet while there have been numerous articles in the periodical press and even many academic books, one of which - Peter Singer's Corporate Warriors - even achieved a measure of popular acclaim when it was published in 2003, they all lacked one key ingredient essential to a real understanding of this world. And that is culture. The key to really understanding any society is to understand its culture. And, as anthropologists have long understood, true cultural understanding comes only from living in the midst of it.

While some people, usually foreign or war correspondents, have limited exposure to this world, very few have the patience, thoughtfulness, humor, objectivity, curiosity, broad historical perspective, knowledge of geopolitics, or eye for detail, not to mention a nonchalant, breezy, blunt but respectful style of writing that is so entertaining that at times it will leave you laughing so hard you will be gasping for air.

It is an intended tribute to the author that very few people in the world could have written a book this witty and informative aside from him. That naturally raises the question: Just who is Robert Young Pelton? Originally from Canada, he moved to the US to make his fortune, which he did with enough success that one day he decided to get out of it and start traveling to the world's hot spots and war zones as a neutral observer and chronicler of the truth, which is never an easy thing to ascertain.

As an author Pelton is best known for his classic work The World's Most Dangerous Places, which is sort of an underground Fodor's guide to surviving war zones and other assorted mean, nasty and dangerous places, from Grozny to Baghdad.

Licensed to Kill is divided into three sections, comprising 12 chapters. Some of these have been news stories in their own right

The first is about the exploits of legendary US Special Forces veteran and Central Intelligence Agency contractor Billy Waugh who, after September 11, 2001, was asked by the CIA to recruit contractors to operate in Afghanistan against Osama bin Laden and his forces. It was here that Blackwater got its first CIA contract, to bolster personal-protection teams for CIA officers.

It is here that one appreciates Pelton's eye for detail - details that are always generalized about in the mainstream press, but never clearly explained. Such as, what are security contractors actually paid? What is the difference between Tier 1, 2, 3 and 4 operators? What the heck is a tier? All these questions get answered.

It bears remembering, because this is not an academic work with hundreds of endnotes, that this is an extremely well-researched book. Pelton has gained access to an enormous amount of insider information that normally never sees the light of the day. Researchers could undoubtedly spend years happily sifting though all the material he has accumulated.

One gets the answers to these questions only by hanging out with a wide variety of people where they live and work over the years. And while Pelton has spent the past three years sitting down with security contractors on different continents, often while they were on the job, whether doing convoy runs from the Green Zone in Baghdad to the airport or roaming the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, it is clear that his prior years touring the world's killing zones have conferred on him a special sort of street credibility that has given him a special access to a tribe that does not normally talk to outsiders.

Chapter 2 is fittingly titled "Edge of the Empire", because it details his travels with a CIA contractor, one of those engaged in a truly "murky" shadow war against the al-Qaeda forces still present in Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan.

Chapter 3 ends the empire section by recounting the day in the life of a private security detail responsible for Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Simply by showing how utterly dependent Karzai is on foreigners for his survival, Pelton makes the point that private security contractors truly can be influential tools of US foreign policy.

The next section takes you to Iraq, where he covers both the well-known ambush of Blackwater contractors at Fallujah and the vastly under-covered stories of Blackwater contractors who engaged in combat at al-Kut and al-Najaf.

This is followed by a chapter on the training and selection process that Triple Canopy, a major security contractor, puts candidates though at its facility in the US state of Arkansas. The same chapter also describes the Blackwater training facility in North Carolina. As Blackwater is the alpha male of the US private security contractor world, no description of the world would be complete without it.

Chapter 8 describes making the run on the road (Route Irish) between the Green Zone and the airport in Baghdad. For a long time this was one of the most dangerous places in Iraq. For many making this trip, death was not a possibility but an inevitability. Contractors who made this run took big hits, which makes for some interesting psychology and motivation. As Pelton notes, "The business end of warfare requires a mercenary attitude. Private security has no ideology, no homeland, no flag. There is no God and country. There is only the paycheck."

Chapter 9 starts the last section, the one dealing with various rogues and tycoons. While the vast majority of security contractors do exactly what they sign up for without complaint, their world is not without opportunists. One of the better known, now serving a sentence in an Afghan prison for illegally running his own prison and torturing its prisoners, is Jonathan "Jack" Keith Idema. The chapter on Idema is priceless, and it is worth buying the book just for that. It also serves as a warning that there is a downside to relying too heavily on the private sector for traditional military tasks, as it leaves the door wide open for the unscrupulous.

But if Idema represents the pond-scum side of the private security world, the following chapter, which explores the creation of Executive Outcomes and Sandline, two private military firms that were prominent in the 1990s and helped propel the industry into public prominence, offers a fascinating look into that rarified world where high finance and venture capital, old boys' networks, multinational corporations, foreign policy, the legacies of colonial empires, and public relations intersect. It is surprising to realize what a small world it really is. It provides an invaluable perspective for better understanding an industry that is attempting to "find the sweet spot - the balance between naked aggression and passive peacekeeping - the neo-mercenary", as Pelton puts it.

Chapter 11 details both the past and the plans of Blackwater Security. Blackwater is not only one of the biggest players in the private-military world today, it is also one of the most ambitious, spinning off new business divisions left, right and center. When Blackwater speaks, people listen. One example was this year when one of its officials said that Blackwater was prepared to provide its own brigade-sized private army for hire to support United Nations peacekeeping efforts like the one in Darfur.

The last chapter deals with the attempted overthrow in 2004 of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, president of Equatorial Guinea, a small, poor country in West Africa but one that has enormous oil reserves. The attempt put together by Simon Mann, a former soldier in Britain's Special Air Service and ex-employee of South Africa's Executive Outcomes, was publicly presented as an attempt to overthrow a violent dictator but in reality was an attempt, albeit clumsily organized, to seize control of its oil. The lesson of this chapter is sobering. Many proponents of private military and security contractors argue that they should be allowed to be all that they can be; that they are capable of greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness than regular military forces, and since they are motivated by profit rather than ideology, they are freer to intervene in a conflict that a regular state would ignore as it would be irrelevant to their national interest.

But as Pelton notes, "If there is a lesson in all of this, it is that once the security business is unhitched from established corporate or government clients, its proponents can quickly turn it into the insecurity business."

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, the international system has developed a vacuum. Private military and security contractors have emerged in increasing numbers to help fill this void. Up to now, nobody has been sure exactly what they do or how they work. But now, thanks to Pelton, an enormous number of dots have been connected.

While some may still not have an interest in understanding the brave new world of private military and security contracting, they can no longer claim they lack the means. If the US intelligence establishment could connect dots as well as Pelton, Osama bin Laden would have been captured years ago.

Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror by Robert Young Pelton. Crown Publishers, September 2006. ISBN: 1400097819. [...], 358 pages.


David Isenberg is a senior research analyst at the British American Security Information Council, a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser to the Straus Military Reform Project of the Center for Defense Information, Washington. These views are his own.

Robert Pelton's book "Licensed to Kill" is a history book of the private army/modern contractor industry. It looks like about 3 years of traveling, living with contractors in Iraq, Afganistan and parts of Africa and a zillion interviews went into this work. The resulting book will likely become a standard for studying where the contractor came from and where the whole concept of private armies might be headed. This is about as close as you will get to understanding this high risk industry without being in the field yourself.

There is a very disturbing thought that follows the logic of "Licensed To Kill". Back in the early 90's the U.S. government used sections of U.S. Code to prohibit militias from forming 'private armies'. Now Private companies can field a well equipped battalion at very short moment's notice. Since the U.S. Government is prohibited by law to use it's own militaries domestically could it then legally 'hire' a private force to quell a domestic disturbance? The question of what all can private armies be used for can be greatly expanded beyond foreign wars and conflicts. Can our own military be replaced by private contracts? How about our police forces across the country? I am not trying to sound conspiratorial here but I think that what you have seen and written about is the very beginning of a long trend that will likely grow beyond what anyone thinks now. Read this book.
Mike Perrin

Robert Young Pelton has been reporting from global hotspots for the past 15 + years. His record of reporting from far a field is impeccable, including stints in Afghanistan, Columbia, Kashmir, Algeria, and now Iraq. Having long been acquainted with private military contractors throughout his travels, Pelton ventures to Iraq to experience first hand the move towards privatization in the US military.

Pelton spends the majority of his time in Iraq with the controversial Blackwater USA; making runs along the "highway of death" between Baghdad Airport and the Green Zone. He gives a good description of the life of a military contractor in one the world's most dangerous zones. Pelton refrains from painting a too glorified picture of contractor life, and seems more to concentrate on the motivations of men working in the field.

Pelton also describes the history of the military contractor beginning in the early 1980s with such firms as the South African Executive Outcomes, and the British Sandline. He illustrates both the perceived benefits of private military intervention, such as quelling the RUF in Sierra Leone, to the not so clean interventions in Equatorial Guinea sponsored by the wealth-seeking interests of international business and finance.

All in all, I think Pelton does an excellent job refraining from the political bias which clouds much of the recent work on military contractors. Licensed to Kill serves as a readable description of the unstoppable move towards the expansion of private military contractors, and provokes thought and discussion on this new Pandora's Box.

Robert Young Pelton's Licensed to Kill is a book well worthy of the time invested in reading it. Pelton illuminates the world of modern private security contracting both from the inside and from an historical perspective. He draws a distinction between the security contractor, who is essentially a defensive fighter, and a mercenary, who undertakes offensive actions. The reader meets individual contractors and a few of the men behind the organizations. Tales of trial by fire mix with broader-perspective cautionary tales about where the trend in security contracting may be headed and the gray zone between the private security company and the mercenary army. Pelton's work offers valuable perspective on a phenomenon that has erupted since the start of the War on Terror and which deserves serious attention.

Licensed to Kill is many things at once. Pelton's book is a jigsaw puzzle of personal experiences with contractors on the ground, small-picture stories about individuals in the post-9/11 world of gun-for-hire opportunities, and big-picture stories that serve to frame the pre- and post-9/11 world of security contracting. A literary critic might argue that Licensed to Kill is a postmoderist work that lacks central direction or a single message. I believe that Pelton's book is a creditworthy effort at giving a human face to security contractors while creating a context for the world in which the War on Terror contractor operates.

At the personal level, Pelton devotes several chapters to his experiences in Iraq and North Carolina with contractors. Based on his subjects, Pelton to enjoys the closest contact with the American company Blackwater--one of post-9/11 private security success stories and one of the big winners of the outsourcing of security in Iraq. Pelton describes the Blackwater people in detail. The reader is imparted the knowledge that these are real people. The author sees most of them as men of (surprisingly) complex motives: they want to fight for their country; they want to support wives, children, etc.; they don't want to put up with the Big Army's bureaucratic nonsense; they want better pay than an Army junior enlisted man gets for putting his life on the line; they fear they have no other skills, so they want to earn a living marketing what they have; many are too old to go active duty, anyway; they crave the high that comes from danger.

As a mid-thirties National Guardsman and junior NCO who served in Baghdad in 2005, I understand the men Pelton describes reasonably well. Pelton describes a run down Route Irish to BIAP (Baghdad International Airport) and back to the Green Zone. I've made that run more than once myself. Although I find Pelton's description a touch dramatic, he's very authentic when he describes the hazards of the situation. I understand completely why these men hate the Big Army way of doing business. Soldiers in Iraq--NCOs included--are treated like irresponsible children, forbidden any sort of liberties, and subjected to the attentions of bored sergeants major who think the insurgency will be defeated by proper uniforms and correctly-laced boots. The contractors Pelton describes have found a way to get into the fight while avoiding the Army's less-attractive aspects. Many of my fellow soldiers talked about trying to come back as contractors so they could make twice as much money (or more) and be treated like men into the bargain. Pelton gives the reader an idea of who the contractors, mostly prior military, really are. Seemn through Pelton's eyes, contractors are not predominantly bloodthirsty raiders looking to spill as much innocent blood as possible. They are men being paid to carry a rifle to accomplish specific tasks and trying to survive while doing it.

Pelton is clearly in the trenches with the contractors physically and sympathetically. He acknowledges as much, so we are free to take his anecdotal experience as exactly that: anecdotal.

That much said, Pelton is not a mindless promoter in Licensed to Kill. He raises questions about the legal framework of contracting. To whom do the contractors really answer? Soldiers are clearly representatives of their nation, and they are held to well-published standards of conduct. Contractors, though as former soldiers may be guided by the same moral and ethical compass as their uniformed brethren, are not bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Pelton points out that contractors exist in a sort of legal and ethical limbo. This, Pelton claims, is what the US government wants. When a contractor messes up and is called to task for it, the US government can claim that the contractor does not represent the policies and intent of the United States. The contractor can be dismissed out of hand, Pelton tells us, and the government thereafter washes its hands of the whole thing. Deniability, the author claims, is one of the chief virtues of the contractor and, by extension, one of the chief moral pitfalls. What does it say about the United States of America when we engage disposable men to fight for our causes? Soldiers are expendable in that their lives may be sacrificed to accomplish a mission. However, soldiers receive a host of benefits and long-term investment as part of their service. Contractors receive pay and nothing more. Currently, they are mostly immune from legal consequences in Iraq; but when and if they do start to be charged with crimes for their activities, the US government can give them up with a clean conscience--no harm, no foul to the government. Compare this to the fallout associated with Abu Ghraib and other poor conduct by American troops, and one can see the allure of disposable, deniable contractors. Whether or not the rest of the world will buy the argument that the actions of contractors do not reflect on the government sponsoring the contract remains to be seen. Pelton's point is that the US government has been entranced by the prospect and is likely to remain so until circumstances invalidate the idea.

Pelton devotes some narrative to the world of security contracting prior to 9/11. The main point of doing so seems to be to illustrate the fact that while private security contracting is by no means a new activity, the War on Terror has completely transformed contracting and contracting companies. He also points out that the more mercenary activities of private contracting that occurred in the 1990's still exist as possibilities in the 2000's and beyond. Pelton tells us that the leadership of Blackwater in particular is interested in building a force larger, more capable, and much more powerful than the armies of a number of Third World countries. Pelton seems assured that the Blackwater leadership assumes a priori that a Blackwater army would be used only in support of American foreign interests and that this fact creates a satisfactory moral and ethical framework for the use of said force. At the same time, Pelton raises the question of what will happen when the bounties of the War on Terror cease to provide satisfactory employ for the growing mass of men and companies under arms by contract. Men like the men Pelton describes in detail in Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Carolina may find that having decided to live by the rifle in their post-military careers they are unable to resist bending their codes of conduct to take jobs that are neither entirely in nor out of line with American foreign policy and interests once the ratio of contractors-to-contracts starts to become more competitive. (Sooner or later, this will happen. The market makes it inevitable.) Where in the gray zone between security contractor and mercenary will these men then operate? This is no academic question. As Pelton points out, it is a reality being rushed along by the decision of the US government to privatize much of the security force of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Licensed to Kill is a worthy read. The men are real. The world in which they operate is filled with dangers, rewards, and uncertainties. The national policies unfolding today lead us down a road fraught with hazard and paved with the bodies and rifles of security contractors and those they have been engaged to fight. Pelton provides the reader with an interesting, informative read. Whether one agrees with him or not, Pelton paints a fascinating picture and raises important questions.

This is the kind of book you read cover to cover and want more. Always running the fine line between fly-on-the-wall and sarcastic-historian RYP's latest post-fact diary of life in gun infested environments doesn't disappoint. I made a documentary about this subject and still found plenty of nuggets of humour and information that were totally new and set this apart from the usual media nonsense on the subject.

The coolest thing about this book is that it in no way glorifies or villifies the military contractors it is talking about - it just tells it like it is - good, bad or otherwise. And that is a commendable stance to take in this world of extremely polarised political opinion.