Customer Reviews

Lifting the Fog of War

5 star:		(8)
4 star:		(4)
3 star:		(2)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Admiral Owens' recent book, Lifting the Fog of War, is a courageous, insider's explication of what's right and what's wrong with the Pentagon, today. It is a courageous statement because it breaks with the tradition that professional, senior military leaders do not criticize their contemporary professionals. Politicians, of course, certainly the civilians who challenge "professional military judgement" as the sole guide to designing and buying future military forces -- these have always been fair targets of American military professionals who turn to literature after they retire. And the book unfortunately has a few journalistic cheap shots. But what distinguishes it from journalism -- and makes this book a serious and significant work -- is the primary author's insights to the inner world of service parochialism. (One suspects Owens' collaborator on the book -- the journalist Ed Offley -- may be responsible for the slips into administration bashing and the newsy cliches.) It is a bold assessment of the central military problem currently faced by the United States; namely, a reluctance of the professional military leadership to accelerate the American Revolution in Military Affairs. Owens' description of the promise of information technology is brilliant and wise. Here is an in-depth explication of what could be done if the Pentagon had the courage and wisdom to move more expeditiously down the path it has already chosen. But it is more than a technological tour de force. The real power of the author's insight stems from his vision of the international political leverage the United States could gain from moving faster -- and why this would be good for the world. His specific recommendations at first seem a bit esoteric. Defense wonks will know what he's talking about immediately, but maybe not everybody. But they fit with the mainstream of the argument. And if the reader can avoid the diversions into journalism, they ought to end the book convinced the recommendations are right on and hoping Owens somehow gets tapped to be the next Secretary of Defense.

I've done my time-18 years and two more to go. "Lifting the Fog of War" is a catalogue of all that has gone wrong militarily, compounded by "solutions" to make it all "right". It is a precise, logical, and largely accurate portrayal of "where we have been, where we are today, and where we are going"-the favorite lead-in to all military briefings.

This passes the ABC test(Accuracy, Brevity, Clarity) with flying colors. We are moving into a new sphere of capability. For good reason, not least of which is personal experience gained in eighteen years of military service, I have diminished regard for our armed forces in terms of readiness and warrior ethos-both now at a level far below Carter's "hollow military". I have far greater respect for the technology that will be critical to bridge the performance gap. The troubling issue is that these same technologies will be applied across the board.

Benjamin Franklin likened government to fire-it is always dangerous to play with fire. Once it is out of control everyone burns. The technology that is touted here as the panacea for low levels of readiness, spare parts, training, fuel and munitions, to say nothing of plummeting morale and esprit de corps, is really nothing more than a top down con job to sell us on the notion that ubiquitous government backed by an omniscient military is good.

There is danger here, danger that authors like Reg Whitaker (The End of Privacy), Jerry Furland (Transfer-the end of the beginning), Justin Raimondo, Claire Wolfe, etc. etc., have taken pains to expose. The final justification for any governmental over-reach has consistently been, quite simply, "because we can".

In closing, "Lifting the Fog of War" is a fine summary of what the military is likely to become. If you have a care for your own liberty, your right to be left alone, and your privacy, this book will inform you as to how tenuous those cherished rights are becoming. What is used in the military, without fail, migrates first to Federal law enforcement and then spreads it's tenacles to state and local LEAs. These technologies will be applied domestically for both legitimate and extra-constitutional control of the populace.

I hope many will read this work and come to understand that this is not good news for their freedom. But then, many people prefer a cage in a zoo to life in a jungle.

With the fall of the Soviet Union, American military forces are currently being reduced in size and misused, and the mission of our military is in confusion. How can we overcome this decline?

Throughout history, confusion on the battlefield has always been a problem. As history has progressed, weapons and tactics have become more sophisticated and deadly, and confusion is still a major problem. The next Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) can lift the fog of battlefield confusion and make our military stronger than ever with the limited resources we have. This new RMA is Information Technology. The U.S. has the capability to finally remove the confusion of war by employing multiple sensors and computers to give battlefield commanders, as well as individual soldiers, a clear real-time picture of what the enemy is doing.

Admiral Turner states a clear case as to how to utilize this new information technology to our advantage. In the Gulf War, we saw a glimpse of what Information Technology can do, but we have a long way to go to fully take advantage of the technology available as well as emerging technologies.

A fascinating read and I highly recommend this book for our government and military leaders. We have a golden opportunity to "Lift the Fog of War" and keep our military "Second to None".

I worked with Bill Owens when I was Speaker of the House. He is a very intelligent patriotic career Naval officer who showed as much courage in the Pentagon as he did on the sea. He saw the need for a new information-age approach to national defense and he fought for it despite enormous bureaucratic opposition. When someone proposes a 50% (yes 50%) reduction in procurement bureaucracy in the Pentagon (page 234) then you can understand how many institutions and careers he is threatening.

This book is a clear indictment both of the Clinton-Gore Administration's approach to defense (under-funding and overusing the military thus stretching it to exhaustion and near the breaking point in Owens' analysis) and also a tough critique of the isolated service mentality and the unnecessary duplication and waste which still dominates the defense system despite a decade of talking about "jointness". If you care about America's continued ability to lead in the world this is a book you will want to read. It is also a book you should call your Congressman and Senators and ask them to read. In fact it is a book both Gore and Bush should comment on in the campaign.

Surprisingly compelling account of the failure of the US military to prepare for future conflicts. I say "surprising" because the book contains little in the way of exciting futuristic technology, but lots of descriptions of bureaucratic resistance. Particularly interesting are the inside descriptions of absurd interservice rivalry.

This is a well-intentioned book and the best available manifesto for the "system of systems" that can integrate intelligence, precision strike, and communications technologies by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). On balance it provides several important contributions, but its core assumption that technology can be a substitute for people is flawed, as is its completely insupportable assumption that our allies might be willing to follow us down this very expensive and dubious interoperability trail. Perhaps even more troubling, the school of thought represented by this book suffers from the severe delusion that everything that needs to be seen can be seen by national technical means, and processed in time to be relevant to the commander. Nothing could be further from the truth-fully 90% of what is needed to succeed in today's environment is not in digital form, not in English, and not collectible by technical means. The most important point made in the whole book, and here I give the author high marks, is its compelling description of why military reform cannot be achieved from within: because there is no decision process by which a "joint" leadership can determine force structure and weapons acquisition without fear of service politics. His approach to reform, shifting from a focus on system stovepipes to joint mission areas, is valuable and could be helpful in defense transformation if it were cleansed of its unhealthy obsession with expensive technology and forced to face the fact that three-quarters of our challenges in this new century are Operations Other Than War (OOTW) that call into question virtually every dollar being spent under existing RMA auspices. The book is also helpful in pointing out the redundancy between the four services, the 12:1 support ratio in personnel, and the need to embed information handling capabilities in all future mobility and weapons systems. Perhaps most disappointingly, this book by a distinguished Admiral and apparent out-of-the-box thinker fails to outline a force structure, including a 450-ship Navy, capable of dealing effectively with all four levels of war in every clime and place.

Anyone who doesn't think this is a timely and important book should study the military history of 1941 and 1942 with particular attention to the fall of the Philippines and Singapore. Generals often fight the next war like the last war to the pain of the nation and military. Admiral Bill Owens provides a compelling case for change. Lifting The Fog of War is a must read for all members of the military, congress, executive branch, and others interested in a strong U.S. military and peace. Questions that remain unasked thus unanswered are when, where, and why America should deploy military force.

What a shame that the most I can give this outstanding, thought-provoking book is only five stars. It deserves at least twice that many for honestly and publicly discussing the challenges and opportunities that today's U.S. military faces as it struggles to accept and adapt to the revolutionary and transforming environment in which it finds itself.

Today's U.S. military faces a post-Soviet Union superpower-rival environment with an asymmetric global terrorism threat, in a rapidly exploding advanced technological computer-networked world, and an administration that respects it and understands today's forces cannot continue to function on yesterday's paradigms and be successful against tomorrow's foes. The authors clearly described these dynamic circumstances, boldly challenged today's defense status quo, and bravely offered compelling alternatives intended to further the revolution in military affairs (a Clinton-era term) or the transformation of the armed forces (today's current term).

I read this book after being stationed in the Pentagon for the last two-plus years. I believe it has influenced many of the highest-level transformational studies and initiatives that I have heard about and in which I have participated. I do not necessarily believe everything the authors describe and recommend, but I do believe their insights and vision of what our future forces might be and what they might be able to do are certainly deserving of serious discussion and consideration.

If I were the Secretary of Defense for a day, I would make reading this book a requirement for all my staff and a pre-requisite for any assignment or appointment to the Pentagon.

Adm. Owens was the Vice Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is aware that the Achilles Heel of our current Military capability is joint Service rivalry. Each Service will go its own way until it is too late or until the American people start paying attention. Adm. Owens explains the problem simply and eloquently. It is more about military culture than money. Since the money just isn't there, he explains how and why the culture must change. Unfortunately, this may mean the end of the Army Navy football game. If the two Services are taught to hate one another at the collge leve, why would they start cooperating when they become Admirals and Generals. According to Adm. Owens the U.S. has the technology to continue to be a great military power but the Services will have to stop trying to "outplay" their Service counter parts in real "wars".

This book provides great insight as to why it is so difficult to implement a Revolution in Military Affairs.

The author could explain his theory for the Revolution in Military Affairs in far fewer pages, as his thesis is that the future US military should be able to "see the whole battlespace", to "talk" (communicate) more efficiently beteween the various services and to "act" in a coeherent manner, unlike the Kossovo campaign of 1999. Written before 2003 the book lacks any mention to the operation "Iraqi Freedom" and is somehow dated. Although there are some good parts, especially those regarding the satellites and their role and capabilities, the text becomes often very repetitive stressing the same arguments over and over. There is also a temptation for overreliance on new technology which is considered as a modern panacea for winning wars. Overall, it is not a bad start for someone who wants to learn something about the structural and doctrinal problems that modern US military faces today, but I would recommend instead Macgregor's "Transformation Under Fire" which is more complete and overturns many myths.