Lincoln and Black Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership [Paperback]

Lawanda Cox (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: January 1, 1994

If you are interested in presidential strategy, emancipation, reconstruction, or just Lincoln, then you should add this book to your library of American History. For all the detail, strategy, and depth, all scholars should read this book.

Product Details

• Paperback: 276 pages
• Publisher: University of South Carolina Press (January 1, 1994)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0872499979
• ISBN-13: 978-0872499973
• Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 6 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 14.9 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (4 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,034,226 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Discover books, learn about writers, read author blogs, and more.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Lincoln and Black Freedom, February 18, 2002

By 

Dave J Peavler (Somewhere Between Texas and Mexico) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Lincoln and Black Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership (Hardcover)

The title of LaWanda Cox's Lincoln and Black Freedom may be somewhat misleading. At first glance, the reader may assume that this book is simply a hybrid of two familiar animals in postbellum literature-a biography of Abraham Lincoln and a survey of African-American efforts to better their condition. Yet while the actions and attitudes of Lincoln may be the primary subject of the work, most of the book focuses on the deeds of lesser men in relation and response to his efforts in reconstructing Louisiana. While the efforts of black Americans themselves are all but entirely missing, this is still a great book that succeeds in its mission to reexamine the actions and intentions of Lincoln and reflect on what might have been had he lived.

Cox begins her study with an investigation of Lincoln's own personal beliefs about emancipation, black suffrage, equal rights, and the creation a biracial society. Despite some historians who had recently questioned his dedication to abolition and egalitarianism, Cox convincingly portrays Lincoln as equally committed to the Radicals' goals while transcending their limited ability to understand that politics is "the art of the possible."

While regional politicians such as Thaddeus Stevens had the luxury of being able to unequivocally condemn the South and her peculiar institution, Lincoln knew that his obligation as President required a message of conciliation, leading rather than pushing towards egalitarian goals that could be reasonably achieved as the opportunity presented itself and in a manner consistent with legal and political norms.

Lincoln was passionately and publicly opposed to slavery. But he was equally concerned with the preservation of the union and adhering to the Constitution. Cox's many assertions that Lincoln was cautious in his maneuvering while consistent in his beliefs are backed by scores of examples taken from Lincoln's own words of instruction. These words, of necessity, may have been privately conveyed, but they were no less uncompromising in their message that the Union must be preserved while slavery must be destroyed.

One of many examples Cox employs to illustrate this point is the action of James McKaye, Lincoln's liaison to the Freedman's Inquiry Commission. The group outlined a plan for dealing with former slaves that would later serve as the model for "Radical Reconstruction" based on citizenship, suffrage, and landownership. Even amongst radicals of the day such as Charles Sumner, McKaye was the most progressive member. Although Lincoln did not lead the group or outline their objectives, Cox reminds the reader that it would be atypical of Lincoln to allow a subordinate such as McKaye to act without first consulting the President.

The core of LaWanda Cox's work is a review and reinterpretation of Lincoln's attempt at Reconstruction in Louisiana prior to his death in 1865. Because Lincoln did not view the Presidency as a endowment to act upon his own beliefs-a view that is reinforced by his moderation in forming executive policies while pressing local officials to be more progressive, such examples as the Louisiana "experiment" may serve as the best model for understanding Lincoln's true intentions for Reconstruction as well as his personal beliefs about black freedom.

Cox joins most historians in acknowledging that Lincoln's first priority in the struggle to reconstruct former rebel states was to aid the Union cause. The Ten Percent Plan was intended to quickly create a "rallying point" for southern loyalists while delivering the Confederacy an important psychological defeat. But Cox examines in great detail the behind the scenes actions of President Lincoln in assuring that the Louisiana government abolish slavery, and if possible, enfranchise black males with the right to vote.

Lincoln was concerned about the permanent legal status of persons emancipated under a wartime proclamation. He knew that the only guarantee against a reverse of the freedman's status was for the states themselves to abolish slavery in their constitutions. He ordered his military governor, Nathaniel Banks, to quickly hold elections and create such a constitution. Lincoln was sure that the Republican Congress would surely ratify such a document, setting a precedent for readmission that would require permanent emancipation before the elections of 1864 would give the Democrats the opportunity to interfere.

The resulting elections and constitutional convention did result in a relatively progressive government in Louisiana by February 1864. In fact, the new constitution not only outlawed slavery but also included equality before the law. Its framers were open to gradual black suffrage. As Cox illustrates, Lincoln used his powers of influence and patronage to prod the fledgling government into accepting these provisions. Unfortunately, a controversy arose over the readmission of the new government that all but destroyed its legitimacy after the Republican Congress denied its petition.

The conflict erupted from the fallout of an ugly campaign that resembled a soap opera more than a free election. The contest for governor pitted Governor Banks' candidate, Michael Hahn, against Free State Committee leader Thomas Durant. Although there was no essential matter of principle that divided the two men or their followers, (both were committed to abolition and to the idea of extending civil rights to blacks but were hesitant about immediate suffrage) governor Bank's un-Lincolnian style of management by force and Congress' distrust of Lincoln's methods such as military occupation caused Durant and his followers to discredit the Louisiana government after losing the election. The tragic irony, as Cox points out, was that the government that Lincoln had engineered through Banks was even more radical than what was Congress outlined in its own wish list, the Wade-Davis Bill.

Cox's final chapter entitled "Reflections on the Limits of the Possible" compares the policies, skills, and beliefs of Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, Ulysses Grant, and the Republican Congress as a whole and explores the great question of what might have been. Her conclusion is that the ten-year battle between Congress and the Executive would have likely been reduced to a discussion of how to achieve the mutually accepted goal of guaranteeing the rights of the freed slaves. The Republican Party, especially in the South, would have benefited by association with the political skill and moderation of Lincoln rather than with the single-minded "Radical Yankee Republicans" of Congress. Had a stronger Republican party taken root, it may have resulted in a viable two party system that would have made the inevitable transition to home rule more agreeable. Yet even Lincoln could not have immediately guaranteed and enforced equal rights for the freedmen because racism was firmly entrenched and the Southern economy offered no assistance. Even the most radical plan of land redistribution failed to provide a means to revive the Southern economy. Even so, Cox provides a compelling argument to support her case that had Lincoln been able to extend his Louisiana program of consent and force, Reconstruction would have been much more successful.

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Marvelous history, not great reading, October 12, 2006

By 

Dennis Brandt (Red Lion, PA United States) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: Lincoln and Black Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership (Paperback)

This is yet another book written by a quality historian, one that provides a wealth of information but sadly is a sluggish read. I was especially interested in Lincoln's handling of Reconstruction in Louisiana, which takes up a good portion of the book. This is a critical issue since it was the only opportunity we have to see how Lincoln might have handled the other states had he lived. While Louisiana is a complex topic, Cox makes it downright turgid. Too often I finished reading a page only to realize that I could not recall what I had just read and had to reread it. The issue here is not knowledge or sources - she had plenty of those - but of writing skill. Syntax is academic, not the living, breathing prose that can make a complicated subject readily understandable and interesting to boot. She is definitely from the I-like-Lincoln school but gives in depth analysis as to why she feels that way, unlike the Lincoln-hating DiLorenzo types who seldom dip their heads underwater to see how much iceberg hides below. Put this book on your shelf for reference, particularly for the topic of Louisiana Reconstruction. But a great read it is not.

4.0 out of 5 stars To lose a battle is not to betray a cause, October 30, 2009

By 

B. R. Morris (USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Lincoln and Black Freedom: A Study in Presidential Leadership (Paperback)

Abraham Lincoln once stated, "I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think, and feel. And yet I have never understood that the Presidency conferred upon me an unrestricted right to act officially upon this judgment and feeling. . . . And I aver, to this day, that I have done no official act in mere deference to my abstract judgment and feeling on slavery" (p. 14). LaWanda Cox believes this is the real Lincoln, and Cox's stated purpose for writing this book is to establish that Lincoln was an abolitionist and that he was greatly and always concerned about the emancipation and subsequent welfare of blacks. She believes that he was never indifferent to the plight of the Negro. She believes he always had the same values; whereas, she says, other authors continue to make the claim that Lincoln's opinion regarding slavery "matured" after he was elected. Cox believes that Lincoln possessed strong feelings against slavery before he became president, and his opinions on slavery did not change substantially after he became president.

The author further explains that Lincoln has too often been criticized for not planning for the welfare of the freedmen after the Civil War. Cox maintains that throughout the war Lincoln was more correctly focused on emancipation and ending slavery - an aim that itself was not established fact until the 13th Amendment was adopted by Congress in January 1865 and subsequently ratified in December 1865. Before this was accomplished, Cox points out, Lincoln understood that he could do nothing but contain slavery in those regions where it currently existed. Lincoln recognized that among his powers as president, he did not have the right to abolish slavery because it was morally wrong. Lincoln valued constitutional government, and slavery was protected by the constitution.

According to Cox, once war broke out Lincoln's drive to end slavery was second only to his desire to maintain the Union. The war did provide the executive with one shortcut to emancipation, and, Cox pointedly notes, Lincoln used it. As Commander and Chief, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation.

Cox delves extensively into the case of Louisiana to illustrate Lincoln's firm stance against slavery. She pointedly notes, "In a letter of frustration and barely restrained anger, on November 5, 1863, Lincoln demanded the establishment without further delay of an elected state government in Louisiana. Not any state government, not even any Unionist government; Lincoln now demanded a loyal government committed to the destruction of slavery by state action" (p.47). Lincoln let it be known that Louisiana would not be readmitted to the union without first changing its proslavery constitution, and his intentions were "confirmed by subsequent events" (p. 59). She maintains that it is wrong for subsequent detractors to focus on what was not accomplished in Louisiana, i.e., suffrage for blacks. Cox believes this shortcoming should not obscure what was accomplished: the abolition of slavery and the ratification of a constitution that was conducive to future participation by black men in the democratic process. Likewise, this shortcoming should not be perceived as Lincoln's will manifested; he desired and pushed for a loftier goal. Cox firmly states that what was accomplished in Louisiana surpassed what Congress's Wade-Davis bill mandated in respect to civil rights guaranteed for blacks. Cox points out Lincoln commended Louisiana for making an "`excellent new constitution - better for the poor black man than we have in Illinois'" (p. 114). That Lincoln was happy with the constitution should not come as a surprise. One of Lincoln's contemporaries, Missouri Senator B. Gratz Brown, wrote, `the insertion of the suffrage provision in the Louisiana constitution "was prompted by the executive head of our nation himself"' (p. 129). This goes to the heart of Cox's thesis: Lincoln was a proactive abolitionist.

It is not without purpose that Cox entitled Chapter 4 "Defeat Before Battle". She explains that after Lincoln's death, President Andrew Johnson repudiated Banks, Hahn, and other Radicals. Lincoln's death and Banks's long absence from Louisiana had allowed returning Rebels and Copperheads to take control of the government in Louisiana. Governor Wells, who took office in March 1865, was turning out all of Hahn's and Banks's men by the end of April. By the end of May, Johnson had turned out Major General Banks, and with him, all hopes for equal rights for blacks and universal suffrage. This is where Cox should have concluded her study, but she exceeds the scope of her thesis. Cox examines Andrew Johnson's prejudices and considers, hypothetically, what Lincoln might have done had he survived.

Cox speculates that Lincoln, had he lived, would have advanced the cause of black civil rights and suffrage further than Johnson, because Lincoln could have dealt more adroitly with Congress. She imagines there would have been less conflict and more conciliation; thus, legislation and executive authority would have been more united in requiring obstinate southerners to accept blacks as equal partners in government. To illustrate her point, Cox reminds the reader that Lincoln's use of military force to achieve reconstruction goals in Louisiana in 1864 had been a point of contention between Lincoln and Congress. By 1867, Lincoln's policy had become national policy - fait accompli -- by Congress's own hand (p. 154). Yet Cox concedes that such measures as

these alone may not have been enough. She recalls that "John Kenneth Galbraith in 1979 reminded his readers that `and end to injustice . . . is not necessarily or even usually an end to poverty.' And it is doubtful that any former slave society has completely eradicated economic or racial injustice" (p. 160).

Cox says, "To lose a battle is not to betray a cause" (p. 156). By this, Cox means Lincoln and his party beat the South militarily during the Civil War but lost to the South during Reconstruction. Hence, Lincoln et al did not betray the cause. They, most especially Lincoln, were steadfast in purpose, but, alas, they were defeated.

Cox wraps up her monograph by discussing the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s: a period she refers to as the "Second Reconstruction." She points out that both major political parties agreed that change was necessary to enfranchise blacks and protect their civil rights. She maintains that this unity was not evident in both parties, or even within the Republican Party, following the Civil War. She also notes that the fount of change in the "Second Reconstruction" was not in Congress or in the executive branch but in the judicial branch. Furthermore, she points out that during the "Second Reconstruction" blacks assumed a larger role in securing their rights than was possible immediately following the Civil War. Concluding, Cox poignantly notes that Lincoln's course of action was so very promising; yet, subsequent players "`narrowly missed opportunities to leap a century forward in reform'" (p. 183).

Dr. LaWanda Cox is the author of several seminal works on the Reconstruction period and has received awards recognizing her for her work. "She is the Professor Emeritus at Hunter College and Graduate Center, City University of New York" (source: book cover). She is a qualified authority on this subject.

Much of Cox's bibliography consists of secondary works, yet she makes excellent use of extensive primary sources to explain and sustain her argument. Her footnotes are sufficient. This book is worthy of recommendation to others. Overall, Cox's book is an excellent summary of her subject. I feel that she is deservedly considered to be one of America's premiere Reconstruction historians. In this one text, the reader finds the repository of the best argument that sustains Lincoln as a champion for black freedom.

I find some of her sentence structure weak; thus, clarity is lost. For example, the following subordinate clause is incorrectly presented as a sentence: "What deeply embittered Davis and Wade was not only their despair of obtaining a constitutional amendment and their fear of practical consequences of executive policy" (p. 42). I found it extremely difficult to figure out what the author was saying on pages 82 through 84. I read these pages six times before I found the problem: Cox, in an abstract reference, completely obscured Banks's decision not to issue an election proclamation. Once I understood what it was that Banks did (in this case did not do) to alienate the Free State men, the subsequent pages made sense. The following error is on page 86: "Hahn was expect to appoint as senators . . .", and on page 171 there is: "Second Rconstruction." These types of errors can be found throughout her book. Poor editing detracts from her important and meaningful work.

In explaining the failure of Reconstruction following Lincoln's death, Cox tends to gloss over the penury of sharecroppers and tenant farmers (white and black). She must know that the South's infrastructure, i.e., its railroads, its harbors, its warehouses, factories, and bridges, was completely destroyed during the war.

"Sherman sentinels" and "Sherman bowties" are notorious. With little or no means to travel or transport goods themselves, poor blacks and whites were dependent on local markets that charged exorbitant prices for necessities while simultaneously offering low market prices for crops that the tenantry were forced to accept. There were no alternatives. When Cox says that it is inconceivable why blacks did not leave the South following the Civil War, she ignores the fact that the poor, who initially and optimistically undertook farming... Read more ›