Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis [Paperback]

David M. Potter (Author), Daniel W. Crofts (Introduction)

Book Description

Publication Date: November 1, 1995

Originally published in 1942, this perceptive and impartial analysis of one of the most baffling periods in American history--the months between the election of Lincoln and the fall of Fort Sumter--was a bold declaration of intellectual independence. David M. Potter revolted against the prevailing southern argument that Lincoln deliberately provoked the South into war to bring a violent end to slavery, arguing instead that the new president followed the least aggressive course available to him in dealing with the secession crisis. Based on a painstaking examination of the writings and statements of both the northern principal players in the crisis and the other, lesser-known Republicans who revealed the sentiment of the party's rank and file, this groundbreaking study details the Republicans' attitudes to the threat of secession, their reaction to the actual withdrawal of the southern states, and their faith that the Union could be restored without violence. Daniel W. Crofts provides a new Introduction, setting Potter's account in the context of contemporary literature.

Product Details

• Paperback: 464 pages
• Publisher: Louisiana State University Press (November 1, 1995)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0807120278
• ISBN-13: 978-0807120279
• Product Dimensions: 8 x 5.2 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,620,915 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Detailed Examination of Fateful Period, March 13, 2006

By 

J. Grattan "Ideas can move the world" (Lawrenceville, GA USA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (Paperback)

The book is a highly focused look at the Republican Party and the thinking and actions of its key principals in the few months from the time Lincoln was elected up to the firing on Ft. Sumter and is primarily interested in Washington-based maneuverings. The central question asked, is did those individuals either by commission or omission fail to bring about an obtainable solution to the pending crisis? Because Lincoln chose to remain largely in the background after winning the election on Nov 6, 1860, it is William Seward, Lincoln's nominee for Sec of State, who executed much of the Republican strategy during this period, though Lincoln was kept apprised of most of it.

For those who would claim that the Republicans had the power to shape the course of events, the author points out that the Republicans were not currently in power and had no history of ever having been in power. They were forced to operate in the background or from secondary positions. Furthermore, they had no national mandate to act, having won less than forty percent of the national presidential vote with many of their voters not being radically opposed to slavery. In addition, the ultras, or fire-eaters, of the South had been threatening secession ever since the Wilmot Proviso of 1848. Many in the Republican ranks viewed renewed talk of forming a southern confederacy as a political tactic to frighten moderates to exact concessions.

Many have felt that compromise was possible and when Congress reconvened in Dec, 1860, they pursued compromise. The most notable compromise, The Crittenden Compromise, was proposed by a Border Republican and consisted of a series of non-modifiable Constitutional Amendments that sought to reestablish the east-west slavery demarcation line of the Missouri Compromise, disallowed the federal government from banning slavery on government property in slave states, prevented interfering with interstate transportation of slaves among slave states or territories, and reinforced fugitive slave compensation. But Republicans would have nothing to do with any legislation that attempted to extend slave-permitted territory, having gone through the Kansas fiasco. They were hardly ready to abandon their free-soil platform after the immense struggles of the past decade.

Republican hopes on averting a bloody war were primarily based on their belief that a majority of southerners did not support secession, but were at heart devout Unionists. Furthermore, Republicans sought to keep the Border states from passing ordinances of secession, believing that a disunited South would hasten a Southern reaction to the secessionist movement.

The book, as are most doctoral dissertations, is highly detailed and narrowly focused. The various travels, meetings, and words of key individuals involved in these issues are greatly elaborated, though often to little effect. Though rather lengthy, the book really extends little beyond those connected with Seward and Lincoln. There is little concerning Southern figures and thinking.

The author makes abundantly clear that the Republicans, Lincoln and Seward among them, had little in the way of a coherent program to prevent the cataclysmic separation of the Union, were naïve concerning Southern sentiment, and most definitely bungled events leading up to Ft. Sumter. But frankly those few months have to be understood in the context of all that had transpired dating back to at least the 1820 Missouri Compromise and even the founding. The author' last work, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1976, completed posthumously, gives a far better perspective on the causes of the Civil War. Nonetheless, this book sorts through some of the minutia of this fateful period and clarifies any number of misconceptions.

5.0 out of 5 stars Essential Reading, January 23, 2012

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hmw - See all my reviews

This review is from: Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (Paperback)

Essential Reading for those interested in the coming of the war. Wonderfully detailed about the machinations in the Republican Party, Washington and the Nation as they confronted, first the threat of secession following Lincoln's election (Nov. 6, 1860), and then, secession in fact (by January 18, 1861, 5 of the seven lower south states were out, and soon joined by La and Texas). Makes sense of Lincoln's "unwillingness" to compromise on the issue of extension of slavery (and thus, betray the party's Chicago Platform); by his (Lincoln's) own admission, the "other things" didn't matter--i.e. tightened enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law and repeal by northern states of their "personal liberty" laws, which he said he would not oppose and did not care about. Lincoln firmly held to his conviction that no further expansion of slavery was permissible, while many others in the party went wobbly, including Seward.

A curious, and contradictory thing happens on the way to one of his theses. Potter indicts Lincoln for completely misunderstanding the South and the strength of secession sentiment in the South. Yet, in one of his chapters intended to show that the South might have been susceptible to compromise during the winter 1860-61, Potter adduces evidence showing that even in the deep south, there was vocal opposition to disunion, or at least disunion at that time. We know Lincoln was an avid newspaper reader, and often read papers of opposing viewpoints, so he certainly must have been fully aware of these dissenting voices. While Lincoln of course had absolutely no way of knowing at that time how representative --or unrepresentative-- such viewpoints were, it certainly was not a far cry to believe that there was significant unionist, or at least, anti-secessionist feeling in the South that could eventually reverse or arrest secession. And of course, he thought secession to be an incomprehensible and irrational act.

Thus, Lincoln's understanding of the situation, as imperfect as it was, and as incorrect as it proved to be, can hardly be said to have been uninformed or unreasonable AT THE TIME. And it was certainly not unreasonable to believe that secession might be arrested or revered internally (within the South) in the context of his and others' understanding of previous secession threats, as merely hallow threats intended to obtain for the South political concessions from Northern states (in the case, perhaps carried to the extreme, but unlikely to be maintained for long). Lastly, he had only to look at the eight other Southern states, where, until Sumter, unionists routed secessionists at the polls or in the secession conventions.

So, Potter's indictment on this score really must be seen as contradicted by his own evidence.