28 of 34 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
An insightful analysis of the wider context of the 2008 war, January 22, 2010
This review is from: A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (Hardcover)
This is a valuable overview of the politics and diplomacy around the 2008 Georgian-Russian war. Asmus argues that the war needs to be primarily understood not in terms of a local secessionist dispute, but rather in terms of the overall Russian-Western relationship, especially in the context of EU/NATO expansion and Kosovo's independence.
By the early 2000s Russia observed that many of its traditional satellites were moving towards the EU and NATO. Asmus argues that in response, Russia was increasingly drawn back towards a 19th century model, where a leading Great Power, such as Russia, was entitled to have a sphere of influence within which it could control major foreign policy issues.
By 2008, Georgia and Ukraine were requesting a Membership Action Plan ("MAP") to join NATO. Russia was strongly opposed to this. After much discussion, NATO declined to offer either country a MAP but instead stated that both countries would join NATO in the future. Asmus notes that this response clearly ignored Russia's true concern, which was of course around NATO membership, not MAPs. Russia seems to have been particularly vexed by its intended client Georgia's aggressively pro-Western stance and to have believed that there was now a limited time window in which it could act to prevent Georgian NATO membership.
Asmus also notes that Kosovo's independence in early 2008 amounted to a unilateral restructuring of Russia's client Serbia, without the consent of either Serbia or Russia. The West saw this as a reluctant necessity, in the face of ethnic cleansing and intransigence. But from Russia's perspective, the West's behavior around Kosovo was unilateral, bypassing the UN Security Council and breaking the established rules of the game. Asmus suggests that Russia thus felt both entitled and motivated to respond in kind.
Asmus then describes the growing tensions around Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the final descent into war. Asmus argues that Russia appears to have been intent on launching a full scale invasion and that this can be demonstrated by a major Russian military build-up ahead of the conflict. As events unfolded, Georgia's President Saakashvili ordered Georgia's troops to the attack, but Asmus portrays this as occurring within the context of a premeditated Russian invasion, which had the aim of de facto Russian annexation of Georgia's secessionist regions and the overthrow of Saakashvili's pro-Western government.
French President Sarkozy successfully negotiated a cease fire, which preserved Tbilisi from invasion and allowed Saakashvili's government to survive, but which also allowed Russia to benefit from much of its gains. Asmus suggests that the US deliberately stood back from the negotiations to avoid having the situation escalate into a direct US-Russian confrontation and to force the EU to have a stake in resolving the situation. Asmus notes that Russia's actions have weakened Georgia, but he urges the West to continue supporting Georgia's democratization and European membership.
Overall this is an exceptionally thorough, well written, and nuanced analysis. (And of course I am only touching on that analysis in this short review.) Asmus had previously worked as a US diplomat on many of the underlying issues, such as NATO expansion. While there is some risk of bias, this gives him an exceptional background for analyzing the thorny context and for trying to explain how and why Russia, Georgia and the West behaved in the ways they did.
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7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A howling untruth in an otherwise very good book, April 6, 2010
This review is from: A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (Hardcover)
In trying to explain the deep psychological and patriotic feelings that motivated President Saakashvili and the Georgians during the August 2008 war, Ronald Asmus goes back to the First Georgian Republic of 1918-21 and writes: "The decision by the government in Tbilisi then (in 1921) not to fight for their independence left a legacy that would shape Saakashvili's decision in August 2008. It had taken Georgia seventy years to regain its independence and many Georgians were not about to give it up a second time without a fight" And he repeats several times in his book the astonishing assertion that the 1921 Georgian government chose not to fight the invading red army.
Nothing could be further from the truth, so much so that I am totally amazed that this complete reversal of history could have found credence with such a savvy gentleman as Mr. Asmus.
The facts can be easily ascertained. [ I invite the interested reader to Google these words: Georgia - 1921 - red army, and peruse the results.]
In brief: in 1921 the red army attacked with overwhelming numbers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and from the North through the mountain passes as well as alongside the coast of the Black Sea. The Turks joined in, and invaded from the South. Everywhere the invaders met with fierce resistance, so much so that it took over one full month for the Reds to seize all of little Georgia.
A grace note: before being finally vanquished, in a quixotic action the remnants of the Georgian army attacked and defeated the Turks who had occupied Batumi, so that the region would remain part of Georgia.
I am at a loss for where Mr. Asmus found his totally erroneous information. Perhaps he confounded the year 1921 with the year 1805, when Russian forces indeed entered Georgia without a shot in response to a plea for help against the Moslem invaders from the South, and ended up annexing the country.
President Saakashvili is extraordinarily well-informed. I am certain he is well aware of the fact that in 1921 the first republic fought with all its might against the communist invader, and therefore the memory of those times cannot have had on him the psychological impact asserted here. I heartily hope Mr. Asmus will correct this egregious distortion of history in future editions of his book, which otherwise is well worth reading.
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18 of 24 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Balanced, January 28, 2010
This review is from: A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West (Hardcover)
Ignore the KGB reviewer's comments. This a balanced account. The author offers up much criticism of the Georgian leadership and military, while exposing the authoritarian designs of Moscow.
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