A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West [Hardcover]

Ronald Asmus (Author)

Book Description

Release date: January 19, 2010

The brief war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 seemed to many like an unexpected shot out of the blue that was gone as quickly as it came. Former Assistant Deputy Secretary of State Ronald Asmus contends that it was a conflict that was prepared and planned for some time by Moscow, part of a broader strategy to send a message to the United States: that Russia is going to flex its muscle in the twenty-first century. A Little War that Shook the World is a fascinating look at the breakdown of relations between Russia and the West, the decay and decline of the Western Alliance itself, and the fate of Eastern Europe in a time of economic crisis.

Editorial Reviews

Review

Praise for A Little War That Shook the World:

"Required reading if you want to know what really happened behind the scenes in the Russo-Georgian war -- and how the West let Tbilisi down in the face of Russian aggression."--Senator John McCain

“[P]rovides a very timely, historically clarifying, geopolitically illuminating analysis of the first post-Cold War East-West military conflict --- and does so with unique insider's knowledge of what actually did happen… an important statement and a very good read!” -- Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor and author of The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership

"Ron Asmus has been an original thinker, diplomat and the go-to expert on Central and Eastern Europe for the more than 20 years that I have known him.  His writing should be required reading for those who care about Europe and its neighborhood, and his account of the August 2008 Russo-Georgia war is one that no one who cares about the region should miss."--Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Secretary of State, 1997-2001

 "I can think of few individuals more qualified to judge the background to, nature of and consequences of the five-day war between Russia and Georgia than Ron Asmus. With unique access to key actors, he discribes the political background of what happened in a way no one else could have done. The book is an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the Caucasus, Europe, the transatlantic relations as well as the Russia of today – and tomorrow."--Carl Bildt, former prime minister of Sweden

"Mr. Asmus writes with authority." --The Economist

“Ronald Asmus has given us a detailed, gripping and disturbing account of the latest war on a continent that claims to be at peace.  He does not disguise his sympathies, but is scrupulously fair in attempting to untangle what really  happened, and to be fair to all sides.  It should be a starting point for a sadly missing debate.”--Tim Garton Ash

“Credible and convincing.”—Financial Times

"Mr. Asmus's book offers the details.  And clarity." --John Vincour, New York Times

 

Praise for Opening NATO’s Door:

"Detailed... impressive." --Foreign Affairs

"Asmus shares his ringside seat with his readers, which can be most informative, and great fun." --Robert G. Kaiser, The Washington Post

"It is a marvelous story, must reading for anyone interested in American foreign policy and the future of our relations with Europe and Russia." --Richard C. Holbrooke, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations

 

About the Author

Ronald Asmus is executive director of the Brussels-based Transatlantic Center and responsible for Strategic Planning at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.  He is the former deputy assistant secretary of state for European Affairs during President Clinton’s second term. He has published numerous essays over the years on US-European relations, including in Foreign Affairs, Survival, the American Interest and Policy Review.  He is the author of Opening Nato's Door, a contributor to The Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and The New Republic, and others, and is a commentator in both the American and European news media. He lives in Brussels, Belgium.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 272 pages
• Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan; 1 edition (January 19, 2010)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0230617735
• ISBN-13: 978-0230617735
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.1 x 1.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (18 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #483,044 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #8 in Books > History > Asia > Georgia

More About the Author

Ron Asmus is a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund
of the United States and an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations.

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

30 of 36 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars An insightful analysis of the wider context of the 2008 war January 22, 2010

By Graham

Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase

This is a valuable overview of the politics and diplomacy around the 2008 Georgian-Russian war. Asmus argues that the war needs to be primarily understood not in terms of a local secessionist dispute, but rather in terms of the overall Russian-Western relationship, especially in the context of EU/NATO expansion and Kosovo's independence.

By the early 2000s Russia observed that many of its traditional satellites were moving towards the EU and NATO. Asmus argues that in response, Russia was increasingly drawn back towards a 19th century model, where a leading Great Power, such as Russia, was entitled to have a sphere of influence within which it could control major foreign policy issues.

By 2008, Georgia and Ukraine were requesting a Membership Action Plan ("MAP") to join NATO. Russia was strongly opposed to this. After much discussion, NATO declined to offer either country a MAP but instead stated that both countries would join NATO in the future. Asmus notes that this response clearly ignored Russia's true concern, which was of course around NATO membership, not MAPs. Russia seems to have been particularly vexed by its intended client Georgia's aggressively pro-Western stance and to have believed that there was now a limited time window in which it could act to prevent Georgian NATO membership.

Asmus also notes that Kosovo's independence in early 2008 amounted to a unilateral restructuring of Russia's client Serbia, without the consent of either Serbia or Russia. The West saw this as a reluctant necessity, in the face of ethnic cleansing and intransigence. But from Russia's perspective, the West's behavior around Kosovo was unilateral, bypassing the UN Security Council and breaking the established rules of the game.... Asmus suggests that Russia thus felt both entitled and motivated to respond in kind.

Asmus then describes the growing tensions around Georgia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the final descent into war. Asmus argues that Russia appears to have been intent on launching a full scale invasion and that this can be demonstrated by a major Russian military build-up ahead of the conflict. As events unfolded, Georgia's President Saakashvili ordered Georgia's troops to the attack, but Asmus portrays this as occurring within the context of a premeditated Russian invasion, which had the aim of de facto Russian annexation of Georgia's secessionist regions and the overthrow of Saakashvili's pro-Western government.

French President Sarkozy successfully negotiated a cease fire, which preserved Tbilisi from invasion and allowed Saakashvili's government to survive, but which also allowed Russia to benefit from much of its gains. Asmus suggests that the US deliberately stood back from the negotiations to avoid having the situation escalate into a direct US-Russian confrontation and to force the EU to have a stake in resolving the situation. Asmus notes that Russia's actions have weakened Georgia, but he urges the West to continue supporting Georgia's democratization and European membership.

Overall this is an exceptionally thorough, well written, and nuanced analysis. (And of course I am only touching on that analysis in this short review.) Asmus had previously worked as a US diplomat on many of the underlying issues, such as NATO expansion. While there is some risk of bias, this gives him an exceptional background for analyzing the thorny context and for trying to explain how and why Russia, Georgia and the West behaved in the ways they did. Read more ›

10 of 12 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars A howling untruth in an otherwise very good book April 6, 2010

By Hands-on Jeb

Format:Hardcover

In trying to explain the deep psychological and patriotic feelings that motivated President Saakashvili and the Georgians during the August 2008 war, Ronald Asmus goes back to the First Georgian Republic of 1918-21 and writes: "The decision by the government in Tbilisi then (in 1921) not to fight for their independence left a legacy that would shape Saakashvili's decision in August 2008. It had taken Georgia seventy years to regain its independence and many Georgians were not about to give it up a second time without a fight" And he repeats several times in his book the astonishing assertion that the 1921 Georgian government chose not to fight the invading red army.
Nothing could be further from the truth, so much so that I am totally amazed that this complete reversal of history could have found credence with such a savvy gentleman as Mr. Asmus.
The facts can be easily ascertained. [ I invite the interested reader to Google these words: Georgia - 1921 - red army, and peruse the results.]
In brief: in 1921 the red army attacked with overwhelming numbers from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and from the North through the mountain passes as well as alongside the coast of the Black Sea. The Turks joined in, and invaded from the South. Everywhere the invaders met with fierce resistance, so much so that it took over one full month for the Reds to seize all of little Georgia.
A grace note: before being finally vanquished, in a quixotic action the remnants of the Georgian army attacked and defeated the Turks who had occupied Batumi, so that the region would remain part of Georgia.
I am at a loss for where Mr. Asmus found his totally erroneous information.... Perhaps he confounded the year 1921 with the year 1805, when Russian forces indeed entered Georgia without a shot in response to a plea for help against the Moslem invaders from the South, and ended up annexing the country.
President Saakashvili is extraordinarily well-informed. I am certain he is well aware of the fact that in 1921 the first republic fought with all its might against the communist invader, and therefore the memory of those times cannot have had on him the psychological impact asserted here. I heartily hope Mr. Asmus will correct this egregious distortion of history in future editions of his book, which otherwise is well worth reading. Read more ›

19 of 27 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars Balanced January 28, 2010

By Historylover

Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase

Ignore the KGB reviewer's comments. This a balanced account. The author offers up much criticism of the Georgian leadership and military, while exposing the authoritarian designs of Moscow.

19 of 27 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars great book January 25, 2010

By Nadezhda Janashia

Format:Hardcover

having lived in the country during this war, i have to say the book explains well what has really happened.

14 of 21 people found the following review helpful

3.0 out of 5 stars Analysis is very biased but facts are good February 10, 2010

By Sergey Markov

Format:Kindle Edition|Amazon Verified Purchase

The author has clear pro-Saakashvilli bias and he does not hide it. He met Georgian president on multiple occasions, he knows Georgian leadership and lived in a country. While facts in the book are mostly balanced, his comments and analysis is so pro-Georgian that it's not even funny. He trumps up every anti-Russian fact and tries to gloss over and explain away anything anti-Georgian.

One thing that I concluded after reading this book is that Saakashvilli is not qualified to lead a country due to his character. He is hot-head who is ready to risk war and his country to achieve his political aims and is not ready to wait until conflict can be resolved by peaceful means. He is not consistent in his policies - from diplomatic resolution to military escalation and then back to diplomacy in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Asmus tells that Georgia multiple times asked (and was denied) US permission and support for war against Abkhazia and South Ossetia but he decided to start the war anyway hoping to create new facts on the ground. After he lost the war he did not have decency to relinquish his post and violently crushed opposition protests.

After reading the book I have no doubt that Saakashvilli is the most responsible for this war even though author draws mostly opposite conclusion.