The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge Classics) [Paperback]

Karl Popper (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: March 31, 2002 | ISBN-10: 0415278449 | ISBN-13: 978-0415278447 | Edition: 2

Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.

Editorial Reviews

Review

'One of the most important documents of the twentieth century.' – Peter Medawar, New Scientist

About the Author

Karl Popper (1902-94) Philosopher, born in Vienna. One of the most famous thinkers of the twentieth century.

Product Details

• Paperback: 480 pages
• Publisher: Routledge; 2 edition (March 31, 2002)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0415278449
• ISBN-13: 978-0415278447
• Product Dimensions: 5.1 x 1.6 x 7.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (20 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #171,857 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

122 of 125 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars old but still outstanding book November 27, 2002

By A Customer

Format:Hardcover

This is Popper's early masterpiece, which still deserves to be thoroughly read. Thesis of the book: theories are guesses which have no secure basis and can be at any time overthrown, but which must be able to stick out their necks and face experimental tests. If they pass the tests, this does not make them any more secure or reliable than they were before.

Its first chapter explains two fundamental problems which will be grappled with in the following chapters: the problem of induction and the problem of demarcation (between science and non-science). The solution to the first problem is straightforward: there is no such thing as induction. If you want to learn more on Popper's formulation and purported solution of this problem, you should read the whole book.

The second chapter gives some methodological rules which, though presented as conventions, are set down in order to combat "conventionalism", the attempt to regard theories as irrefutable, as true by convention.

The third chapter, a bit boring, is an analysis of causality, scientific explanation, the kinds of scientific concepts and the structure of theories (these are considered interpreted axiomatic systems).

The fourth chapter deals with the notion of falsifiability, something theories must have in order to be scientific according to Popper's criterion of demarcation. Falsifiability, as here defined, is (roughly) incompatibility with at least one singular statement reporting the existence of an observable event (the distinction between occurrences and events will be found here; it was previously drawn by Bertrand Russell, I may add).

The fifth chapter deals with these last kind of statements (basic statements): their form, their content and their role in science. These statements are in no sense justified by experience, says Popper, even if their acceptance is caused by experience; they are as risky as theories, although in scientific practice there is not (usually) much trouble in agreeing to accept or to reject them. It is a pity that Popper says that basic statements are accepted by a "free choice" or convention, because it is only after observing that the popperian Forscher will agree to accept a basic statement.

The sixth chapter tries to define comparative criteria of falsifiability. Given that all scientific theories have an infinity of observable consequences, how are we to compare their boldness = refutability = their sticking out their necks?

I am running out of words. The seventh chapter deals with the notion of simplicity. Popper's thesis here is: simplicity = boldness = falsifiability; a simple thesis, and a bold one.

The eighth chapter contains a deft and clear discussion of some methodological and mathematical problems of probability. I highly recommend it. It is after reading a chapter like these that you can realize how cheap and misleading the criticisms of Stove are to which some previous reviewers refered.

Chapter 9 contains a plea for objectivism in quantum physics, although it is rather out-dated. But the attack on Heisenberg's programme is still instructive.

The last chapter deals with "corroboration" of theories and includes an important critique of justificationist probabilism. One should read it together with Reichenbach's highly negative Erkenntnis review: "Über Induktion und Wahrscheinlichkeit: Bemerkungen zu K.Popper's Logik der Forschung".

The appendices are also worth reading, even if they tackle mainly with technical problems.

I think that no one has seen with greater clarity the problems and ambiguities of Popper's methodology as displayed in this book than his coleague-rival Imre Lakatos. Even if he is not half as gifted as Popper, and makes many mistakes as regards induction, his critique of popperian demarcation and rules of science is certainly worth reading.

On this book, one can also benefit and enjoy reading Neurath's indignant review of the 1934 edition: "Pseudo-Rationalismus der Falsifikation", and Grelling's review in "Theoria", 1937 (1).

18 of 19 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Very interesting December 24, 2006

By Downtown Mr. Brown

Format:Paperback

I have to ask myself, "What is the basis for my scientific knowledge?" On a daily basis, as I am a chemist. I have often been struck by arguments for "induction" as lacking credibility, because how can one argue of probabilities with an unknown sample size? Popper argues that a proposing scientific hypothesis is an inductive act, but it is a creative act not a logical one, but that scientific knowledge is dedective.

I agree with him. The nature of science is such that one must put for statements about how the world works and test them. A scientist should always try to find a way of proving himself or herself wrong. If the predictions of the test are shown to be false, then the hypothesis must be false. That is the basis of scientific knowledge. The rest, the best theories we have are just "working models" and we can never justify why they work. They're simply our best working models now.

I don't find Popper's argument disheartening. Popper points out that we don't have to justify our search for explanations of the world, because they may do us benefit (if we happened to live in a world with stable physical laws, for instance).

I think many scientists would fundamentally agree that the laws of nature can never really be proven. They can't, but they speak volumes about what is relevant to us as a species (which is why Popper's argument that "induction" is creative is so interesting). All Popper asks of a scientific hypothesis is that it can, in principle, be demonstrated false by experience.

This is by far one of the most interesting and (I feel) important books I've ever read.

12 of 13 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars From avant garde to rear guard November 17, 2005

By Thomas J. Hickey

Format:Paperback

Logic of Scientific Discovery is Popper's magnum opus, and is one of the most important works in twentieth-century philosophy of science. Its title notwithstanding the book is not about the processes for inventing new scientific theories; it is about the criticism of theories and the growth of scientific knowledge.

Eddington's solar eclipse observations in 1919 corroborating Einstein's theory of gravitation led Popper to conclude that when scientists test a theory, they aim to refute the theory rather than verify it. This falsificationist philosophy of scientific criticism is a central thesis of Popper's philosophy of science. Peirce had anticipated Popper's falsificationist thesis, but Popper drew implications that anticipated the contemporary pragmatist philosophy of language and science, even as he rejected pragmatism. His most important anticipation is his rejection of the naturalistic theory of meaning that is fundamental to positivism.

This rejection in turn implies rejecting ontological criteria for criticism in the testing of theories. Contrary to Kuhn, who said the prevailing paradigm functions as the criterion for scientific criticism, Popper maintained that the criteria for criticism are independent of the semantics and ontology of any theory or paradigm. In this sense Popper said that science is "subjectless".

Later, however, Popper compromised his rejection of ontological criteria with his ideas of "metaphysical research programmes" and "commonsense realism" in support of Einstein. He spent much of his career attempting to reconcile his philosophy with quantum theory, and as part of this attempt he developed his own distinctive particle-propensity interpretation of quantum theory and his own interpretation of probability for singular events. But the new string theory has since made this effort irrelevant.

Pragmatist philosophers looked to quantum physics as the paradigm of modern physics and touchstone for philosophy of science, as Popper had looked to Einstein's relativity theory. Thus by the 1970's Popper was cast as the defensive rear guard instead of the aggressive avant garde he had been in the 1930's.

For more of my commentary on Popper see my book, History of Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science - or Google my com web site called philsci for free downloads, specifically BOOK V. See also my ebook Philosophy of Science: An Introduction.

Thomas J. Hickey