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Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America 1775-1783

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Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America 1775-1783 by R. Arthur Bowler. 290 pages. 1975

Found this book in a local library while I was doing research for a Staff Ride at the Paoli Battlefield. A former co-worker had read it several years ago and highly recommended it.

The book is shorter in length than I expected given that "To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775-1783" is 321 pages and "Supplying Washington's Army" is 492 pages. The writing in parts is swift moving and in other parts it bogs done into minutia. The later especially occurs in the chapter on war profiteering. An important subject but perhaps best left in this detail to a separate book.

The first couple of chapters and the chapter on the Northern Campaigns and Canada proved excellent in balancing readability and detail. The structure and numbers involved in the British logistics effort are stunning and when probed too deeply the reader can get lost. It is remarkable that so much of this data survives in usable form. While the author in the conclusion states that you can not solely lay the failure of the British to triumph in the American Revolution on the altar of logistics, he does make a great case for how significant a role it did play in the outcome.

What becomes clearer with this text then with other standard or generalized books on the American Revolution is how much influence the logistics situation had on British operations and plans. It also validates that amateurs and popular historians study tactics and biographies while professionals study logistics. Much of the maligned movements or lack of movement of British forces in the war are too often attributed to poor generalship or other myths. A little deeper investigation and the logistics situation can generally account for a lot of what happened and why and how it happened.

The scope of the British logistics effort was amazing. The majority of military supplies, food stuff, fodder, and equipment issued to the armies was supplied from across the Atlantic Ocean. This explains the lack of deep maneuver away from the ocean and the rivers by the British. Locally they harvested firewood, though rarely with out escort and loss. The British operated breweries in New York City, spruce beer proved a prophylactic for scurvy.

The battle for provisions both locally collected and transported proved a constant drain on British manpower. Not only did having to provide escorts and fight off attacks waste and fatigue manpower but I also seasoned American troops and boasted their self-confidence. The notion of transport also proved sticky as there were competing theories about owning the transport versus contracting the transport. None the less supplies are only worthwhile if they are in the right place at the right time and in the right condition which in the 18th century was not always easy. Salt and salt-rations were the normal preservative and preserved type of rations. This placed salt at a premium for all sides.

The biggest eye opener for me though was the effect of the Sullivan Campaign of 1779 on the rationing situation of British forces that winter and into the next year. It hampered British operations across the theater and conflict and could have proved even more disastrous across the spectrum then it was. Attacking an enemy through his economy and logistics rather than through direct combat is akin to the modern police theory of; if you follow the drugs you will catch drug users, dealers, and suppliers. If you follow the money you get the kingpins.

A good book for most readers though not the entire book. The chapter on war profiteering is drudgery.