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The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East

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This is an important, but depressing, book. Its 253 pages of text is one long list of examples of Islamic self-deception and lies, relieved only by the rare counter example of a dozen or so Muslim "liberals", who state plain truths but who are drowned out by the shouts of the Arab street. One cannot help but feel sympathy for these few Muslim "liberals," but it is hard to believe they will become significant voices in thier home lands anytime soon. (A significant proportion, perhaps half, of these liberals have moved to the West where they typically hold university appointments.)

What do I mean by "self-deception and lies"? Well, the lie that Jews caused the events of 9/11 for one. Despite the open admission by Osama bin Laden that his people did it, from the beginning Arab Islamists have claimed it was the Jews who did it, and that the events were just punishment for the sins of the West (p. 181). Why are the Arab nations so economically backward and militarily ineffectual compared, for example to Israel, or even to South Korea? It is all the fault of the Jews and of the West, especially the Americans (pp. 204, 236, 240).

None of this is even remotely related to the true sources of Arab backwardness and misery. It is plausible to me that even if Israel had not been created in 1948, the Arab Muslim states would would be in the same fix they are today. America had done nothing specific to harm any Arab state, until it attacked Iraq to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from Saddam Hussein. Yet this act of aid to innocent Arab victims of a dictator's aggressions was what so infuriated Osama bin Laden that he plotted the attacks of 9/11. Why are these Arab Muslims so hopelessly irrational?

A decision was made, by Sunni Muslim jurists and government officials back at the end of the 10th Century, to "Close the doors of interpretation" (p. 106). The practice of interpretation (Itjihad) was the means by which Shari'a Islamic Law was created out of the vague and ambiguous pronouncements of the Koran. So long as these doors of interpretation were open, islam was a flexible, pragmatic, and adaptive religion. After the doors were closed at the end of the 10th Century, Islam became set of fossilized dogmatisms which drifted ever further out of touch with reality. Christianity went through a similar period of defensive rigidity, especially in Spain during the Inquisition. But the Reformation and Enligtenment moved Christian nations past that period of inflexible dogmatism (p. 236). The mission impossible of the Muslim liberals is to lead the massive weight of Sunni Muslim public opinion away from such rigidity toward a re-opening of the doors of interpretation. I feel both pity and admiration for them. I fear their task will take many generations, and who knows how many civil wars will be required? These Muslim-on-Muslim religious wars could well be at least as nihilistic as the 17th Century European Wars of Religion.

Fred Hallberg

You hear a lot of things about the Middle East. On the one hand, countries such as Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan hold elections, and Saudi Arabia and Jordan are monarchies. Lebanon and Tadjikistan are run by coalitions of various political parties within the country. These facts give the casual Western observer the idea (backed up by natives of the region) that the Muslim world is no different from ours, really. In reality, the similarities are at best superficial, and the differences are often profound. This book is an attempt to survey the reform movements in the region, examining the opinions of various reformers on subjects ranging from Israel and the United States on the one hand to the basic freedoms (speech, the press, courts, women, etc.) on the other.

Rubin (a columnist and university professor from Israel) looks at the whole subject topically, starting with a background chapter that examines the Arab and Muslim world's progression through the ages in terms of philosophy, culture, and religious belief. He then spends several chapters talking about such things as the struggle to define Islam in various lights. Next, he attacks a series of more specific subjects, talking in turn about Israel, the United States, the war in Iraq, and the war on terror, in each case outlining what the various players in Arab countries have said on each subject.

At times, my eyes glazed over as I read this book. Half of the arguments in each case were at least somewhat predictable. In any particular instance you can think of two or three opinions that are sure to be held by *someone* with regards to a particular subject. Since Rubin feels the need to discuss *anyone* who's got a position where he can speak publicly and have people listen, that means you get points of view from across the spectrum, many of which aren't particularly surprising or enlightening. Given this, the material presented here is very informative.

I enjoyed this book a great deal, and would recommend it to anyone interested in the subject.

Rubin has written a great primer on one of the most important topics today. Today, Hamas lawfully earned the right to form a government in Palestine. Hamas is a not a group of liberal want to be democratizers, they are instead violent radical Islamists. This topic is so relevant to what is unfolding right now!

Rubin skillfully shows that there are liberals in the Broader Middle East and that they are fighting to be heard above Islamists. There is hope for Arab liberalism but the way forward is very rough indeed, as Rubin details. Anti-americanism, anti-israeli sentiment, and the war in Iraq are giving the field of discussion over to the radicals.

In the west we can not easily understand what is happening. Across the Middle East, authoritarian governments and radical islamists have created a climate that ignores the truth and history and that then propagates a twisted reality out to the masses. Conspiracy theories and finger pointing abound as the Middle East continues to seek deeper and deeper into chaos. Can we imagine a place where intellectual thought, curiosity and truth are not valued? It exists and it is the Middle East.

Overall, Rubin's book is a valued contribution to the field of Middle Eastern studies. Scholars, students and lay alike must understand the political climate of the region. Elections and democracy are good so long as usher in positive and progressive forces, and not radical Islamists.

We must do everything in our power to support the liberals - as the Islamists, born out of the repressive nature of their countries, are not a force for progressive change. In the end, the future of the region may boil down to revolutionary change or evolutionary change as the repressive governments begin to collapse. Arab liberals must be ready and supported to pick up the pieces, or else the way of Khomeini will prevail.

Barry Rubin is one of the top Middle East experts working today. He has a broad- ranging knowledge of the societies involved, and has done detailed studies of a wide variety of subjects, everything from a biography of Arafat to a portrait of modern day Syria. Rubin in this work shows how dominated this world is by a political culture in which the inability to face and state the simple truth prevails everywhere. Fixed ideas, obsessions of hatred and blame of the other mean that the Arab societies are not able to take full responsibility for their own problems. It is always the other guy usually the little Satan (Israel) or the Big Satan( The West) who is to blame. This situation has been described many times in a wide variety of studies. Bernard Lewis, David Pryce- Jones and in a more belligent way Robert Spenser have illuminated the kinds of psychological and social complexes which make Arab society so incapable of modernizing, and democratizing. Rubin is especially good in giving inside portraits of the socieites. He is a clear and convincing writer. And his understanding of how dominating a role Islamic fundamentalism is now playing in the Arab world is second to none.
If only President Obama's Middle East advisors would read this book they would be a bit less willing to announce grandiose plans there is little chance for realizing.

This book explains just how bad the assault on truth has become in much of the Arab world. Rubin shows us the plight of those Arabs who would prefer freedom and democracy. But no matter what system of government the Arab nations may choose, the most important reform will be to get the populations of those nations to value truth. Have any Arab nations done so? Rubin does tell about Tunisia, which may be the best of the bunch in this regard.

Even the realization that one's government may be lying does not help much. We've seen that even in the free world, mere mistrust of government pronouncements does not translate into actual determination of facts or into public support of sensible policies. As the author shows us, in the Arab world, there is considerable suspicion of some of what the government says, but many absurdities are in fact believed. In addition, challenging what one's leaders say publicly is a very dangerous exercise. Meanwhile, were Arab leaders to permit some reform, their regimes would be in great danger of being overthrown.

Rubin explains that in the Western world, "freedom" is defined as a set of individual rights, such as that of speech, the press, religion, assembly, and so forth. However, when the government of Saudi Arabia talks about "freedom," it means the ability to submit to what is called the will of God. We need to define our terms properly when we deliberate public policy on this topic!

Some diplomats have noticed an Arab recalcitrance to compromise. This uncompromising attitude can be misinterpreted as the genuine reaction of people who are totally right and know it. But Rubin cites a liberal Arab, Tarek Heggy, who indicates that much of this steadfastness is simply the result of intentionally ignoring reality. By contrast, Rubin explains that Western philosophers have tended to argue that systems, laws, institutions, and ideas need to be judged by "how well they work and must be changed if they do not meet this test." The Western approach, as Rubin warns us, sometimes results in a bogus and counterproductive assault on tradition, high standards, and anything else that may be good about the past. But without a willingness to judge and compromise, progress is precluded.

There is an interesting chapter about Arab attitudes towards the United States. In general, the dominant feature of Arab attitudes towards us is the huge degree to which our words and deeds are misreported. As Rubin tells us, "even if the main complaint about the United States concerns its policies," the problem is that what these policies consist of is subject to enormous distortion. This is a point far too often missed in Western discussions of this issue." I was struck by the prevalence of Arab claims that the United States or Israel were behind the September 11 attacks. And it's fascinating to see the malicious intensity of replies to a very polite American request to Egypt to, just as a favor, stop making such claims as a routine part of what the state-controlled media dish out. After all, bin Laden's responsibility for the attacks is manifest, even from his own words.

The author shows that a big problem for Arab liberals who wish to give some credit to America is that to be politically correct, they are forced to stipulate that Americans are terrible people who want to hurt Arabs and Muslims. Once this slander is conceded, it is hard to argue that Arabs ought to take any of our advice seriously.

There is also an excellent chapter about Arab reactions to Israel. Some folks see the Arab reaction to Israel as a reasonable response to Israeli actions. But Rubin shows that something else is going on. As he says, "Israel is almost always defined in the Arab discourse as absolutely evil, not a state with interests or a people with rights but a force designed to injure and destroy Arabs or Muslims." Israel then becomes "the great excuse" for Arab inability to modernize. Whatever reform is asked for, the answer is that it can't be done until the problem with Israel is solved. Rubin implies that the problem with Israel can never be solved, and I agree. I feel that even if Israel were destroyed, and even if all Israelis, Zionists, Jews, and Hebrew-speakers were eliminated, the problem would remain, and the excuses would remain. In any case, the Israel that the Arabs are fighting is generally a demonic fantasy, very far removed from the genuine article.

Rubin makes one point that I feel is overstated. He says that the West did far more than the Arab side in trying to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and he cites all the work Clinton did, which was thwarted by relatively effortless Arab maximalist demands. While he's right about this, I think we also ought to consider the work of Sadat in bringing about a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. Here, I think it might well be argued that the Arab side did more than the West.

Rubin has an excellent test for the extent of reform in the Arab world, namely Women's rights. After all, it could be claimed that, say, opposition to the West or xenophobic reactions to Israel do not clearly show opposition to human rights. But that claim can't be made when one mistreats half of one's society! In addition, we see plenty of Arab nationalists boast that their fight is for some social agenda. We ought to expect some sort of progress here. But we don't see very much of it.

Rubin's conclusion is unsurprising. Only the Arabs can solve the problems we've been discussing, especially the problem of blaming all their misfortunes on others. And we all need to hope that they move in the right direction soon.

This is an excellent book, and I recommend it.

The book begins by asking why the Arab world failed to adapt to modernity and Western innovation whereas other cultures such as Japan, Korea, Malaysia, South America, India and Eastern Europe were able to do so yet still maintain their own uniqueness of identity. He points to and quotes a number of promising progressives such as Salama Moussa (who wrote the banned book "Freedom of Thought", Taha Hussein or Qassem Amin who in 1899 published a book advocating equality and education for women. Nevertheless by the mid 20th century this form of political itjihad (along with religious itjihad) had been thoroughly put aside by despotism. Outwardly the slogans or the right and the religious appeared to be democratic. For example the author cites the Baathist slogan: "Unity,Freedom, Socialism". Unity meant rejecting political pluralism (under a charismatic leader). Freedom is not individual freedom, but freedom from imperialism, socialism meant state control over the economy and over social institutions. Not what we would recognize as democratic. This is what liberal reformers had to contend with. There was no equivalent to Turkey's Kemal Ataturk.

Today classic democratic liberalism however is distinctly a minority view in the Arab ME, caught between reactionary Arab nationalism and various forms of radical Islamic fundamentalism. The former is embodied in both paternalistic monarchies and military supported "revolutionary" governments. The latter is the focus of semi diverse movements such as Al Queda, the Iranian Shia led revolutionaries, the Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Wahabists all of which are based on idealized concepts of early Islam.

In Rubin's view the essential problem is that in order to achieve political influence liberals have needed to appeal to the arguments of either opponent, both of whom find liberal programs of democracy extreme, both of whom find power sharing, free speech and emancipation a threat either to their ideology or the regime. Liberals were just as likely to find themselves shut out of state publications or thrown in prison for a year or two as anyone else who advocated for change. Nor are these liberals necessarily friendly to West, some arguing that better education and reducing state monopolies on the economy in favor of free enterprise would better equip their countries to fight the bogey men of Western Imperialism and Zionism. Some found themselves under physical attack (Nobel Prize winner Naguib Moufaz), murdered or, in the case of one Egyptian writer charged with apostasy and, since non-Muslim man could not be married to a Muslim woman, had his marriage forcibly annulled. (The couple left the country.)

Though now six years old I found the numerous examples, highlighting of thinkers and various quotes helpful in understanding the current upheaval (early 2011) in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere in the ME. In the coming years this should be a useful resource in following the threads of what happens next. I found one of Rubin's earlier books The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East), written 25 years earlier equally valid and insightful.

It's a keeper that has suggested several other follow up books along with the web site MidEastTransparent.com which I'm finding to be quite interesting. Recommended.