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To Lose a Battle: France 1940

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This is a fascinating review of France between its victory in 1918, and its fall in the summer of 1940. The first half of the book deals with the social and political upheaval in France during the interwar years, and the demise of French military power. The second half covers the debacle from the onset of the 2nd World War through France's fall. Very well written, fascinating and informative. The first book I read by Alistair Horne, and it got me hooked.

In "To Lose A Battle" Alastair Horne tells the story of the Fall of France in 1940 in great detail. Beginning with the political and military background which lead to French weakness, the reader is carried through to the final collapse and its aftermath.

The parts of the book which I liked the best were the beginning and the end. In the early parts we read how the tragedy of World War I set France up for failure in World War II. France had been badly divided politically for generations, a heritage which contributed to the disaster of 1940. The massive kill-off of 1914-18 followed by the low Depression-era birthrate left France with a much smaller manpower pool than had existed in 1914. The memory of World War I, along with the long-standing divisions in the French body politic prevented the French form preparing an army which could maintain the distinguished French military tradition.

During the reading of this book, I gained a deeper appreciation of the role played by the Maginot Line. I has always heard that it was the last stand of fixed fortifications. In this book we see how the costs of the Line and its personnel demands drained money and resources which would have been more productively devoted to other units. During the "Phony War" the only effective relief that France could have provided to embattled Poland would have been an invasion of Germany. The ultimate irony is that the impregnable Maginot Line formed a barrier, not only to German invasion, but also to a French advance into enemy territory.

The massive middle of the book explains the facts of the defeat of France in agonizing detail. Although the credentials, such as thus usage of this book by the Israeli Armed Forces, suggests that this book has real value for the military professional, the endless recital of names and actions makes it difficult for an amateur historian, such as myself, to maintain interest.

In concluding sections, the narrative returns to more recognizable themes, such as the breaking of the lines, the collapse of the Belgians, the evacuation of Dunkerque and the last effort to organize a final defense in France. This book introduced me to the depth of irony in the French surrender. I had known that the French were forced to surrender in the same rail car and at the same location as the Armistice signing of 1918. I was unaware that the Versailles Conference had taken place in the same hall in which Wilhelm I had been proclaimed Emperor of Germany in 1871 after the Franco-Prussian War.

I did enjoy reading about the involvement of Rommel and de Gaulle, two figures who would play major roles later in the War and, in de Gaulle's case, thereafter.

Although this book focuses on French failures, it is balanced in that it does note that the British performed no better than did the French.

In the end, Horne explores the question of how the defeat of France influenced subsequent developments in Europe and the world.

This book may be a great one for pursuing expertise in the Battle of France but it is a bit detailed for recreational reading.

It's a shame this book is out of print. Horne's book is the best treatment of the Battle of France I've come across so far.

Horne prelude's the battle very well with his analysis of French culture and politics during the inter-war years. His detailed descriptions of the major engagements are well written and obviously researched. His conclusions are not forced but seem to flow naturally.

The only aspect of the book that I would have altered is to tone down some of Horne's politically conservative prejudices. However, a dozen or so passages does not invalidate this excellent book. Highly recommended.

Alistair Horne does a masterful job in distilling the political, military and social aspects of the Third Republic's collapse in his third book on the Franco-German wars. Starting with the "Grandeur and Misery of Victory" following the Allies' victory in WW1, Horne traces the path that led to the shattering defeat of the French at the hands of the nation that they had humbled less than 25 years previously. Horne examines the men and women whose influence on events was so important, and avoids the dry recitation of times, places and names as he brings the Battle of France to life not only on the battlefields but in the streets, bedrooms, and ministerial offices where fateful decisions were made and battles lost...or won.

Alistair Horne's story is an honest look at a battle that has been largely sterotyped and forgotten by the American Public. Post war authors have tended to deal with The Battle of France as a forgone conclusion. We have long been treated a vision of the German Army completly overwhelming the Allies while most of the Frence Army was performing garrison duty. Horne reminds us that it was the Allies who had the Germans outnumbered in both troops and tanks, even without the fortress troops. Horne also notes that the French High Command thought that they were winning while the German High Command was convinced that things would soon go wrong. I strongly recommend this book to anyone who wants to know more about World Two than the general works that simply rehash old well known stories.

I have tried many books in the past to learn about the military aspects of the german invasion of france in 1940. I wanted to read about the fall of Eben Emael, the tactics Guderian employed to cross Meuse, how Rommel crossed Dinant, the role of Luftwaffe etc.etc. I must say that ONLY THIS BOOK covers all of the above in a very engrossing style.

I also loved the excerpts (from the then newspaper headlines) at the start of each chapter. I also liked the quotes that the author uses to make us see things in perspective (eg., when talking about General Maurice Gamelin's preference to experience over technology, the author quotes Fredrick the great - "Experience is useless unless the right conclusions are drawn from it" !!)

I strongly recommend to all lovers of WW2 books. If you have read Stephen Ambrose & Cornelius Ryan, you also want to read Alistair Horne!

Allistar Horne provides a superbly informative look at the disastrous Allied collapse in May 1940. The author devotes about half these pages to the shaky political and social division within France between the wars (1918-1939), problems that contributed to the disaster. We also learn about calcified military thinking on the part of the French, epitomized by both their foolhardy Maginot Line, and more importantly their Maginot mentality. The latter chapters look at the actual six-week battle, which was largely decided in the first few days after the German armor broke through at Sedan. Readers see how the Allies were not only fooled, but slow to react or improvise, and troubled by chain-of-command problems that ran all the way to the top. Readers also see how in the last few days before the German attack, French commander Maurice Gamelin did nothing despite solid intelligence showing the Germans shifting resources sourthward towards the Ardennes Forest (and thus Sedan). It was if the French command was incontrovertibly wedded to their faulty River Dyle Plan. Additionally and contrary to perception, the Allies (France, plus Britain and Belgium) had more soldiers in the field than their Nazi counterparts, and the heavy French tanks (Char B and Somura) were superior in armor and firepower to the German panzers. As the author shows, this defeat had many causes, and was far from inevitable.

The author has done an excellent job here, and readers should also consider COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC by William L. Shirer, plus SIXTY DAYS THAT SHOOK THE WEST by Jacques Benoist-Mechin.

As with the first two books of his Franco-German trilogy (the first two are The Seige of Paris and the Commune, dealing with Paris in 1870-71, and The Price of Glory, about the Battle of Verdun in WWI), Horne provides an authoritative and eminently readable account of the events as hey unfolded (very rapidly), and you get a good feel for the key players on each side of the conflict and how they acquitted themselves (one surprise: I finished with more respect for Lord Gort, the British commander, than I thought I would).

It's unfortunate that this book is out of print; hopefully, it can be reissued and packaged with the first two volumes of the trilogy in the near future.

Readers who want a first-rate examination of the political, cultural, and military issues that produced Germany's rapid defeat of France in May 1940 will certainly enjoy TO LOSE A BATTLE. In TLaB, this information is primarily conveyed in Part One, this book's first eight chapters, where analysis strikes the perfect balance between overview and detail. Illustrating the level at which Alistair Horne approaches this material are the section heads, which in Chapter 3, "Fortune Changes Sides," are: Hitler Rearms; The `Revolutionary' Wehrmacht; Anti-Militarism in France; Political Scandals; and Beginnings of Civil War.

In contrast, Part Two of TLaB examines the Battle of France as it unfolds. In this section, each of the first eight chapters (pages 257-510) follows the battle developments on a single day. For example, Chapter 11, "On the Meuse", examines the situation on May 12. Its section heads are: The Low Countries; Guderian Across the Semois; Second Army; Guderian at Sedan; Reinhardt; Ninth Army Cavalry Withdraws; and so on. These sections, in other words, convey what a particular general or army was experiencing during a certain tactical moment in the battle. Here, Horne's command of detail is impressive. Still, the actual evolution of events was not always easy to follow. I'd suggest more maps.

After the detailed battle analysis of Part Two, I found the final chapter, "Aftermath", to be a welcome jump back to the macro level, where Horne delivers great insights about the after-effects of this battle. These include:

o "But Hitler... had thought no further ahead...; no contingency plan had been prepared whereby a tottering Britain might be invaded immediately after success had been achieved in France... The Germans had missed the bus...Britain would remain at war, inviolate."

o "After France, the mighty warrior nation... had been overthrown with such ease, what nation on earth could stand up to the Wehrmacht? So Hitler in 1941 was convinced that...without furnishing his cohorts with any winter equipment, he could knock out Russia in one lightning campaign."

o "Even more lethal to the Germans than their self-assuredness derived from easy success in France was the supreme reliance Hitler now placed in his own infallibility. He saw himself as having been proved right in his audacity over the cautiousness of his professional advisers..."

Recommended.

Alastair Horne's book "To Lose a Battle: France 1940" is a wonderful work of military history that details the German boldness and Allied incompetence that led to the Third Reich's greatest military victory of the war. Horne portrays the Allied generals as bickering and indecisive, jealous of command authority yet unwilling to take responsibility for their actions. By contrast the Germans, outmanned and outgunned, and using clever military propaganda, overwhelmed the French, British, and Belgium forces by a shock and awe campaign that was more bluster than blitzkrieg. Horne's condemnation is well taken- if only the Allies had planned better, been more open to improvisation, had a more clearly detailed command structure, and had they not given in to the overstated myth of German military might, they could have repulsed the Wehrmacht handily. This is a great book that reads like a novel. I highly recommend it.