For a generation the Lost Battalion exemplified the best of America’s involvement in World War I. Until World War II pushed the Lost Battalion out of the national memory with its own scenes of horror and heroism, mention of the unit’s name summoned up what America admired in its soldiers: unpretentious courage, dogged resistance, and good cheer and adaptation under adversity.
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“[In October 1918] the Seventy-seventh American Division attacked in the Argonne. One mixed battalion of companies from two regiments got as far as it could. Germans closed in the rear, surrounding 600 men. Six days later, after incredible hardships, the wounded and an unharmed 194 were relieved. . . . [The authors] have reconstructed every dramatic hour of the six-day siege. . . . Correcting myths, cleaning up official whitewashes, Johnson and Pratt succeed in telling a more dramatic story than all the myths and official embroideries put together.”—New York Times
(New York Times )
About the Author
Thomas M. Johnson was a newspaperman and author who covered World War I. Fletcher Pratt was a historian and prolific author. Edward M. Coffman is a professor emeritus of history at the University of Wisconsin at Madison and the author of several books, including The War to End All Wars: The American Military Experience in World War I.
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25 of 31 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
The Power of Passive Resistance,
By
This review is from: The Lost Battalion (Paperback)
The Lost Battalion was originally written in 1938 and has been re-issued with minor editing in 2000. For those readers seeking a companion volume to the 2000 A&E film by the same title, this book is more than a bit disappointing. However, the lost battalion is an interesting journalistic account of the seven companies of the American 77th Infantry Division who found themselves cut off behind German lines for six days during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive in the First World War. About 550 US soldiers under the command of Major Charles Whittlesey were trapped in a small river valley under constant German fire. As the authors point out, the unit was neither a single battalion nor was it ever "lost," merely isolated. By the time that Whittlesey's command was finally relieved, the unit had suffered 65% casualties. Whittlesey himself was awarded the Medal of Honor for his stubborn defense. Yet the main lesson of this tale of combat heroism is that, "the human capacity for endurance, for mere passive defense, exceeds all belief and possibility as long as there be a leader to say, don't give up, we're not licked yet." The book is divided into chapters that cover each day from 2-8 October 1918, with events arranged chronologically. Edward M. Coffin, a modern-day historian at the University of Wisconsin who arranged for the work to be re-printed, provides a short effortless forward. There are several photographs and a few totally inadequate maps that supplement the text, but only weakly. Unfortunately, Mr. Coffman made little effort to update or augment the original narrative and while the story flows smoothly, a lazy and jingoistic style might annoy after awhile. The authors are comfortable with using non-words like "ploying," or "funk-hole" [i.e. foxhole] and attacks that "corkscrew (the soldiers twirl around while advancing?). Readers expect a hero may be perplexed by Major Whittlesey. Initially, the Harvard-educated lawyer seems comparable to Joshua Chamberlain, the soldier-scholar who won the Medal of Honor at Little Round Top in 1863. Certainly this book paints Whittlesey as a man devoted to duty, who was the only battalion commander to reach his objective and then refused to be budged off by repeated German counterattacks. While Whittlesey demonstrated determination and obstinacy, his actual command abilities are less certain because there were few decisions for him to make after his initial un-opposed occupation of the objective. Thereafter, Whittlesey's role became rather passive - encouraging resistance and vigilance - but not making any critical decisions. Furthermore, Whittlesey's post-war suicide three years later compared poorly with Chamberlain who went on to live a long, productive post-war life. The author's allude to Whittlesey's post-war guilt, particularly sentiments he expressed that his unit's sacrifices served no useful purpose. If this was so, then why did Whittlesey not retreat before the German ring closed around his unit? Having been ordered not to give up ground without direct orders from the division commander, Whittlesey was content to await rescue, but he demonstrated little initiative or imagination. Certainly Whittlesey 's actions merited a Medal of Honor, but the accusations that the price of two virtually destroyed battalions was hardly worth the moral victory that was achieved bears consideration. Apparently Whittlesey himself doubted the value of this sacrifice. Given the inability of Whittlesey to live with the decisions he made and the losses his unit suffered, it is also possible that Whittlesey was fundamentally un-suited to making the kind of life-or-death decisions required of a combat leader. While some of these questions are addressed in the book, the reader should recognize that important questions about combat ethics and psychology have been given short-shrift in the interest of story-telling. Certainly one of the most interesting aspects of the book is the perspective provided from the German side. The authors were able to obtain interviews with many of the Germans who fought against the Lost Battalion and their side of the story indicates that desperation was not unique to Whittlesey's intrepid band of doughboys. In fact, the German front was beginning to crumble and they never had sufficient reserves to crush Whittlesey. Indeed, while German attacks were constant, the worst damage to the Lost Battalion was done by friendly artillery fire and hunger. One odd omission in this account is that the author's fail to mention that Corporal Alvin C. York of the 82nd Division won his Medal of Honor in the attempt to relieve the Lost Battalion. Modern readers should also recognize the subtle anti-military bias, common to America in the 1930s, which pervades these pages. The authors want to honor these men as heroes, but not as soldiers. In trying to put the Lost Battalion incident in perspective, the author's conclude, "that the men of the 77th Division lacked not for courage, intelligence, patriotism or any other fundamental quality, but simply that they were poorly trained and insufficiently experienced. Seen from this angle the ultimate responsibility rests on the Washington authorities who sent such soldiers to a major war, and the lesson is that democracies should not engage in mass wars, for when they seek a universal competence they tend to lose democracy." This pro-isolationist hogwash asserts that despite the heroism of soldiers such as Whittlesey, military effort and preparedness fundamentally threatens and debases democracy. In fact, the lesson of Whittlesey and Alvin C York should be that democracies can produce soldiers every bit as good as totalitarian states, but without the need for militarized cultures. Unfortunately, America's enemies also failed to note our ability to produce heroes such as Whittlesey and York and instead perceived the United States as soft and unwilling to sacrifice. Three years after the Lost Battalion was published, the Axis powers demonstrated what happens to democracies that eschew military preparedness.
14 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Great Read - Less Than Perfect History,
By
This review is from: The Lost Battalion (Paperback)
If you are at all interested in WWI or the US Army and it's traditions, read this book. It was written in the 30's based on documentation and interviews with the living participants. One of the writers was a correspondent. They spin a very lively tale about the "Lost Batallion", a group of men that advance "without regards to their flanks" during an offensive in WWI and get cut-off. The story is grand. It's filled with heroism, cowardice, triumph and tragedy. Now, on to the history. While the story is a great read and very good supporting documentation comes with the book. Sometimes the story telling gets in the way of the history. Also, the author's didn't explain the physical location of the events well enough to visualize and the pictures provided are, while interesting, unhelpful. These are the only things preventing this from being a 5. It's interesting that the sort "cauldron" battle that takes place is similar to the one that the Germans one on the Eastern Front, Tannenburg. It also brings into mind all the cauldron battles that were to take place during WWII. It's a shame these authors didn't write this book after that war, just to see if they compared and contrasted the different events.
5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Dated Account, Authoritative, Interesting, Needs More Analysis and Research,
By
This review is from: The Lost Battalion (Paperback)
Mr Forczyk's review is definitive and excellent, and rather than going over the same ground, I would like to add only a few points, all of them critical.
There was little or no editing and updating done in this 2000 edition of the 1938 original. Terms and descriptions could have and should have been updated for the contemporary reader or footnotes added explaining such terms. More material needs to be added from the German side now that the German archives are accessible to American researchers. The relief came only when the Germans retreated due to Allied advances in other sectors, and had the Germans possessed a modicum of reserves available to this sector, Whittlesey's battalion would have probably been annihilated. The battalion was extremely low on ammunition from the beginning, and a determined push by a superior force would most likely have been successful. But the Germans suffered from a lack of manpower, and were never able to devote more troops to the elimination of the pocket than Whittlesey possessed in defense. Instead, the Germans cordoned off the pocket and waited for attrition and the lack of supplies to do their work for them. The maps were not useful, and one actually added to the confusion. Another half dozen detail maps would have materially added to this work. There was no way to discover the route actually taken by the relief company, nor exactly where the failed relief attacks took place. A sketch of the pocket showing the disposition of companies and their commanding officers would be extremely helpful. The aspect of Whittlesey's command activities inside the pocket was relatively undeveloped. In light of his suicide three years later, one would like this complex character to have been developed more fully. The roles of American higher commanders needed much more development. It must be emphasized that Whittlesey's command was the only group (with an additional company) to achieve a breakthrough, but that higher headquarters failed to exploit this breakthrough with reserves. Indeed, higher commanders were unable even to maintain communications with Whittlesey -- a situation more the fault of higher commands than Whittlesey. Why was the American planning so poor? Where were the reserves to exploit the breakthrough? Why would Whittlesey be given a command that if he retreated he would be court-martialed? When a commander like Whittlesey is given an order to push forward without regard for his flanks or rear, higher headquarters assumes the responsibility for those flanks and rear. Why did higher headquarters fail in meeting that responsibility? Why, when Whittlesey had provided the coordinates of his position, were his coordinates not given to the artillery instead of the ones that were? Why did the American Army depend on the French when it was well known that the French were played out and letting the Americans carry the load? There is much to criticize here, but this book lets all those above Whittlesey off the hook. In short, Major Whittlesey achieved a breakthrough with 550 men, but his command was unsupported by his regiment, brigade, division, corps and army, and the Germans were allowed to re-establish their lines behind him with inferior forces. As far as higher headquarters were concerned, Whittlesey's battalion was "lost", not in the sense that no one knew knew where it was located (except the artillery), but in the sense that the command was being thrown away or sacrificed due to the inability and poor planning by higher-ups to support the battalion. There is definitely a five-star book here if someone will flesh it out and answer the above questions and add the necessary material.
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