34 of 37 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
An interesting analysis--but some issues emerge, July 16, 2008
Tom Carhart makes the argument in this book that Robert E. Lee's decision to have General George Pickett's division, and 13,000 troops in all, attack the center of the Union line at Gettysburg was not an error, but a part of a three-pronged plan that--if successful--could have led to the destruction of the Army of the Potomac and a Confederate victory in the Civil War. In short, an example of Lee's military brilliance. While he makes a a good case for this, there are a series of problems that lead this to be less satisfying than otherwise.
The three prongs? The Pickett-Trimble-Pettigrew assault on Cemetery Ridge; a simultaneous attack on the fish hook at Culp's Hill by Richard Ewell's forces of the Second Corps; and a mass cavalry charge, to be led by JEB Stuart, against the Union rear on Cemetery Ridge. Indeed, it is pretty clear that Lee did want a coordinated attack, but that plan fell to pieces early on Day Three. Still, the book is modestly compromised by a number of factors.
For one thing, he argues that this idea that Stuart was intimately involved in the planned assault has been seldom recognized. However, two of the classic books on Gettysburg make the same point. Coddington notes on Page 521 of his remarkable work on the battle that Stuart and Lee had spoken about swooping down on the rear of the Union forces. Likewise, Sears in his recent account of the battle notes that Stuart was to attack the Union rear (although his description is somewhat vague). Sears also notes that the firing of four cannons by Stuart was a signal to Lee that he was in position, as does Carhart. So, it is clear that other writers have viewed Stuart's presence on the 3rd day as a direct threat to the rear of the Union army and that this is not itself especially new information. The one real and genuine contribution that Carhart makes here is the much fuller documentation of the plan to have Stuart hit the Army of the Potomac from behind.
There are also some annoying errors here and there in the volume. On page 24, he says that Abraham Lincoln lost his seat due to his opposition to the Mexican War. In fact, as I understand it, his retirement from the House of Representatives was a part of Byzantine Whig politics in Illinois. I also think that he overestimates the amount of military strategy and tactics taught at West Point (Page 30 and Page 55). He describes Hancock and his troops as paralyzed on the Peninsula (Page 73). As I recall, this was the fight when Hancock earned his nickname "Hancock the Superb," when he was let down by his superiors who refused to let him take the aggressive action that he had requested. I think that it is quite a stretch to argue that Morgan was consciously using Hannibal's tactics from Cannae when he met Tarleton's forces at Cowpens in the Revolutionary War (Page 129). My reading of this battle was that Morgan was trying to figure out how to get some mileage from militia who did not stand up to British forces, and conjured up a plan to make a strength of a weakness. I had not understood that Buford's forces "sustained heavy casualties" on July 1 (Page 138; compare with Sears' discussion on page 249 of his "Gettysburg"). Indeed, some commentators think that it was a foolish decision to send Buford's division off the field after the first day. I sincerely doubt that (Page 155) "Lee probably asked Stuart [before Day Three] if he remembered Napoleon's smashing victory over Wurmser at Castiglione in 1796."
Some of the language seems inappropriate. He notes on page 3 that Meade "cowered," "awed by the myth of Lee's invincibility." Carhart also says that "[Meade] was no better than those who had preceded him." In fact, he was measurably better. He did not adhere to a foolish plan of action like Burnside; he was not timid, refusing to throw in what he had as McClellan; he did not flail around blindly as Pope had; he did not go into a shell like Hooker. He performed competently, and by doing that, he exceeded the performance of his predecessors. Further, Lee had a bad habit of bleeding his forces to death, as critics have pointed out. Gettysburg was another battle where he sent his troops off on frontal assaults and saw his rank-and-file and officer cadres both bled down further.
So, the author's thesis is pretty well constructed and supported. But the thesis is not an insight that had escaped others. And there are annoying questions about some of his contentions. So, this is an interesting take on Gettysburg, but I'm not convinced that there is a revolutionary interpretation here.
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40 of 48 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
Whoa there, Carhart, November 15, 2005
This review is from: Lost Triumph: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg--and Why It Failed (Hardcover)
Theory of book is on Day 3 of Gettysburg Confederate General Lee sent "Jeb" Stuart and Cavalry Division on left wing attack to strike Union rear as Pickett's Charge went forward, and Pickett's cue was four cannon salvo fired by Stuart's horse artillery on Cress Ridge, north of Wolf Hill on Union right. Stuart was stopped by G.A. Custer in cavalry "battle royal."
Pretty wild and speculative and a bit lite on the known facts about Gettysburg. Way too much jibberish about Jomini, Napoleonic battles, et al and the supposed coordination with Longstreet's attack made famous as Pickett's Charge. According to Coddington and others, the preparations actually approved by Lee and made the night before called for a combined attack on the Union right and left at dawn. The attack on the right, a continuation of the evening attack on Culp's Hill Day 2 that took a portion of the Union works, went off as planned at dawn and was continued into the morning of Day 3. But the attack on the left by Longstreet using Pickett's fresh Brigades didn't go off, prompting Lee to visit Longstreet and order him to attack. Preparations did begin for a dawn attack, attested by Porter Alexander who was up at 3 am positioning his batteries but Longstreet didn't cooperate with Lee. Thus the alleged afternoon signal from Stuart as part of a grand plan is pure fantasy-- Ewell's attack had already been repulsed with great loss by the time Pickett's assault went forward. The repulse was due to reinforcement of the Union right in the night, unbeknownst to Lee or Ewell. The Culp's Hill line extended down into the area of Spangler's Spring (a marshy area) between Culp's and Wolf Hill on the Union right. Thus the right wing where Stuart was to operate was hardly a weak area of the Union line on Day 3.
I tracked down the source of the rumor the cannon shots fired by Stuart on Cress Ridge were a signal to Gen. Lee to begin Pickett's Charge. It began with Major McClellan, Stuart's adjutant and biographer who guessed that was the explanation for Stuart firing one gun in four directions. A guess is hardly a fact. And it can't be right. S. Foote puts Stuart on Cress Ridge at 2:30 pm or well after the cannonade supporting Pickett's Charge began. It is absurd to suggest the alleged signal could be heard over the din of that cannonade by Lee on Seminary Ridge, or more cogently, by Longstreet miles away at his HQ near the Peach Orchard. The latter is cogent because it was Longstreet, not Lee, who gave the order to start the cannonade as well as the assault (although Porter Alexander has it that Longstreet never actually gave Pickett a direct order to start). It is hardly plausible Maj. McClellan way off on the left was privy to the doings at Longstreet's HQ and obviously didn't know Longstreet had responsibility for the order. Thus a basic premise of the book, the idea Pickett's assault (the Pettigrew, Trimble, Pickett Charge) was fired off by a lanyard in Stuart's hand, so to speak, signalling to Lee Stuart's cavalry was in position for an attack on the Union right and rear, is incorrect in light of known facts. Longstreet not Lee was responsible for Pickett's start time.
I could go on since Longstreet tried to foist responsibility for the assault onto Alexander, so that just who would actually launch Pickett was highly undertain until Pickett himself decided to go, but enough said. There was no signal to Lee and no plan for Stuart to attack in concert with Pickett.
The recounting of the cavalry clash that did take place also suffers from an attempt to demonize Gregg with, again, speculative inferences from sparse records. I can agree Custer and Gregg's troops did defeat Stuart that day, in blocking his actions, and preventing at the least a flanking cavalry thrust, in a tactical draw. But given the well documented poor condition of Stuart's toops and horses, and the uncertainty of how many combat ready men he actually had on hand, it is difficult to accept he had the ability to swing all the way around Wolf Hill into the Union rear. The presence of Union cavalry in force was well known to Lee and the likelihood of a clash would tend to militate against making such a charge essential to the operations on Day 3. Indeed, as it was, Stuart was spotted and Pleasanton sent Gregg's Division to replace Custer's Brigade and cover him, albeit Custer stayed to fight.
For my money, Lee did what he did at Gettysburg in a series of ad hoc decisions because for three days he operated under the delusion that all of the Union Army was not up, and was attempting to strike and destroy such parts of it as he thought were present. I doubt he knew the Sixth Corps was present for example until after the battle. His 'command and control' problems exemplified by the dispute with Longstreet made ill informed decisions even worse. The Confederate belief their butternuts could break through a Yankee line any day, any time of day, also informed his decisions and the net result was a cost of many gallant lives in pointless assaults on Day 3.
Just as fantastic as the signal idea is the idea Lee planned a strike at well fortified and heavily gunned Washington DC after defeating the Army of the Potomac. Assume Lee won Gettysburg-- he would have had a victory but only 45000 effective troops left at best count or less than the garrison at Washington and no siege train plus a long support train with thousands of wounded burdening his movement. As it was he left over 4500 men too badly wounded to move on the field by some estimates.
If there is an example of Jominian tactics in the campaign I'd say the movement started by Hooker and completed by Meade in moving the Army of the Potomac north in corps columns spread over many roads in search of the enemy is a true example of the Napoleonic fan, and the abandonment of existing plans for deployment and rapid concentration of forces taking advantage of terrain by Meade after initial contact, is another. Certainly fighting with the interior lines permitting Meade's rapid movement of troops behind his line to plug gaps or move up reserves of artillery and infantry to meet Lee's attacks is classic Jominian fighting albeit defensive.
Last, the Michigan Brigade had the highest casualty count of any Union Cavalry Brigade in the Civil War- over 525. Several Union and Confederate infantry REGIMENTS had that many casualties at Gettysburg. To posit the outcome of what was then one of the largest land battles ever fought in the history of warfare turned on one cavalry engagement with (for that battle) minor casualties is not credible.
Not Least: I noted the reference to the author's Vietnam combat service in one review, and I do sincerely salute his service to his country. But I suspect the apparent popularity of this book derives from yet another excuse for Robert E. Lee's mistakes. 2 stars because you can't apply a theory unless there are facts that fit it.
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24 of 31 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Challenging New Explanation of the 3rd Day at Gettysburg, May 3, 2005
This review is from: Lost Triumph: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg--and Why It Failed (Hardcover)
I defy any reader with an open mind not to agree that the author of this book has presented a compelling--if controversial-- case for his thesis. And more than a compelling thesis, it is a downright gripping read. Tom Carhart is a West Point graduate, a combat veteran of Vietnam, a lawyer, a Ph.D. in American history, and a military historian with several books to his credit. He draws on all of these backgrounds to explore and explain "what went wrong" on that 3rd day at Gettysburg, where Lee--arguably the most astute and ingenious field general in the nation's history--allowed the so-called Pickett's charge to go forth. Drawing on meticulous research into every document that has any bearing on the subject--many of them documents never studied with such close attention to the details--he slowly marshals his evidence and arguments to support his theory: the disaster that resulted from Pickett's charge cannot be dismissed as simply a blunder, a bad day for Robert E. Lee, but was the result of a master plan that was foiled by the daring bravery of another of America's best known military leaders, George Custer Armstrong. (Just to cite one of the more original and fascinating sources he draws on: Carhart looks at accounts of historical battles that Lee would have studied and then describes those battles and their relevance to Lee's conduct at Gettysburg.) Although a few historians have vaguely suggested that there might be some link between Pickett's charge and some cavalry action elsewhere that day, Carhart is the first to lay this all out in detail. One need not be 100% convinced that this is what happened that fateful day, but Carhart's account deserves a reading by all with any interest in the Civil War and miltary history.
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