Customer Reviews

Lost Triumph: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg--And Why It Failed

5 star:		(45)
4 star:		(15)
3 star:		(12)
2 star:		(4)
1 star:		(17)

 

 

Tom Carhart makes the argument in this book that Robert E. Lee's decision to have General George Pickett's division, and 13,000 troops in all, attack the center of the Union line at Gettysburg was not an error, but a part of a three-pronged plan that--if successful--could have led to the destruction of the Army of the Potomac and a Confederate victory in the Civil War. In short, an example of Lee's military brilliance. While he makes a a good case for this, there are a series of problems that lead this to be less satisfying than otherwise.

The three prongs? The Pickett-Trimble-Pettigrew assault on Cemetery Ridge; a simultaneous attack on the fish hook at Culp's Hill by Richard Ewell's forces of the Second Corps; and a mass cavalry charge, to be led by JEB Stuart, against the Union rear on Cemetery Ridge. Indeed, it is pretty clear that Lee did want a coordinated attack, but that plan fell to pieces early on Day Three. Still, the book is modestly compromised by a number of factors.

For one thing, he argues that this idea that Stuart was intimately involved in the planned assault has been seldom recognized. However, two of the classic books on Gettysburg make the same point. Coddington notes on Page 521 of his remarkable work on the battle that Stuart and Lee had spoken about swooping down on the rear of the Union forces. Likewise, Sears in his recent account of the battle notes that Stuart was to attack the Union rear (although his description is somewhat vague). Sears also notes that the firing of four cannons by Stuart was a signal to Lee that he was in position, as does Carhart. So, it is clear that other writers have viewed Stuart's presence on the 3rd day as a direct threat to the rear of the Union army and that this is not itself especially new information. The one real and genuine contribution that Carhart makes here is the much fuller documentation of the plan to have Stuart hit the Army of the Potomac from behind.

There are also some annoying errors here and there in the volume. On page 24, he says that Abraham Lincoln lost his seat due to his opposition to the Mexican War. In fact, as I understand it, his retirement from the House of Representatives was a part of Byzantine Whig politics in Illinois. I also think that he overestimates the amount of military strategy and tactics taught at West Point (Page 30 and Page 55). He describes Hancock and his troops as paralyzed on the Peninsula (Page 73). As I recall, this was the fight when Hancock earned his nickname "Hancock the Superb," when he was let down by his superiors who refused to let him take the aggressive action that he had requested. I think that it is quite a stretch to argue that Morgan was consciously using Hannibal's tactics from Cannae when he met Tarleton's forces at Cowpens in the Revolutionary War (Page 129). My reading of this battle was that Morgan was trying to figure out how to get some mileage from militia who did not stand up to British forces, and conjured up a plan to make a strength of a weakness. I had not understood that Buford's forces "sustained heavy casualties" on July 1 (Page 138; compare with Sears' discussion on page 249 of his "Gettysburg"). Indeed, some commentators think that it was a foolish decision to send Buford's division off the field after the first day. I sincerely doubt that (Page 155) "Lee probably asked Stuart [before Day Three] if he remembered Napoleon's smashing victory over Wurmser at Castiglione in 1796."

Some of the language seems inappropriate. He notes on page 3 that Meade "cowered," "awed by the myth of Lee's invincibility." Carhart also says that "[Meade] was no better than those who had preceded him." In fact, he was measurably better. He did not adhere to a foolish plan of action like Burnside; he was not timid, refusing to throw in what he had as McClellan; he did not flail around blindly as Pope had; he did not go into a shell like Hooker. He performed competently, and by doing that, he exceeded the performance of his predecessors. Further, Lee had a bad habit of bleeding his forces to death, as critics have pointed out. Gettysburg was another battle where he sent his troops off on frontal assaults and saw his rank-and-file and officer cadres both bled down further.

So, the author's thesis is pretty well constructed and supported. But the thesis is not an insight that had escaped others. And there are annoying questions about some of his contentions. So, this is an interesting take on Gettysburg, but I'm not convinced that there is a revolutionary interpretation here.

Theory of book is on Day 3 of Gettysburg Confederate General Lee sent "Jeb" Stuart and Cavalry Division on left wing attack to strike Union rear as Pickett's Charge went forward, and Pickett's cue was four cannon salvo fired by Stuart's horse artillery on Cress Ridge, north of Wolf Hill on Union right. Stuart was stopped by G.A. Custer in cavalry "battle royal."

Pretty wild and speculative and a bit lite on the known facts about Gettysburg. Way too much jibberish about Jomini, Napoleonic battles, et al and the supposed coordination with Longstreet's attack made famous as Pickett's Charge. According to Coddington and others, the preparations actually approved by Lee and made the night before called for a combined attack on the Union right and left at dawn. The attack on the right, a continuation of the evening attack on Culp's Hill Day 2 that took a portion of the Union works, went off as planned at dawn and was continued into the morning of Day 3. But the attack on the left by Longstreet using Pickett's fresh Brigades didn't go off, prompting Lee to visit Longstreet and order him to attack. Preparations did begin for a dawn attack, attested by Porter Alexander who was up at 3 am positioning his batteries but Longstreet didn't cooperate with Lee. Thus the alleged afternoon signal from Stuart as part of a grand plan is pure fantasy-- Ewell's attack had already been repulsed with great loss by the time Pickett's assault went forward. The repulse was due to reinforcement of the Union right in the night, unbeknownst to Lee or Ewell. The Culp's Hill line extended down into the area of Spangler's Spring (a marshy area) between Culp's and Wolf Hill on the Union right. Thus the right wing where Stuart was to operate was hardly a weak area of the Union line on Day 3.

I tracked down the source of the rumor the cannon shots fired by Stuart on Cress Ridge were a signal to Gen. Lee to begin Pickett's Charge. It began with Major McClellan, Stuart's adjutant and biographer who guessed that was the explanation for Stuart firing one gun in four directions. A guess is hardly a fact. And it can't be right. S. Foote puts Stuart on Cress Ridge at 2:30 pm or well after the cannonade supporting Pickett's Charge began. It is absurd to suggest the alleged signal could be heard over the din of that cannonade by Lee on Seminary Ridge, or more cogently, by Longstreet miles away at his HQ near the Peach Orchard. The latter is cogent because it was Longstreet, not Lee, who gave the order to start the cannonade as well as the assault (although Porter Alexander has it that Longstreet never actually gave Pickett a direct order to start). It is hardly plausible Maj. McClellan way off on the left was privy to the doings at Longstreet's HQ and obviously didn't know Longstreet had responsibility for the order. Thus a basic premise of the book, the idea Pickett's assault (the Pettigrew, Trimble, Pickett Charge) was fired off by a lanyard in Stuart's hand, so to speak, signalling to Lee Stuart's cavalry was in position for an attack on the Union right and rear, is incorrect in light of known facts. Longstreet not Lee was responsible for Pickett's start time.

I could go on since Longstreet tried to foist responsibility for the assault onto Alexander, so that just who would actually launch Pickett was highly undertain until Pickett himself decided to go, but enough said. There was no signal to Lee and no plan for Stuart to attack in concert with Pickett.

The recounting of the cavalry clash that did take place also suffers from an attempt to demonize Gregg with, again, speculative inferences from sparse records. I can agree Custer and Gregg's troops did defeat Stuart that day, in blocking his actions, and preventing at the least a flanking cavalry thrust, in a tactical draw. But given the well documented poor condition of Stuart's toops and horses, and the uncertainty of how many combat ready men he actually had on hand, it is difficult to accept he had the ability to swing all the way around Wolf Hill into the Union rear. The presence of Union cavalry in force was well known to Lee and the likelihood of a clash would tend to militate against making such a charge essential to the operations on Day 3. Indeed, as it was, Stuart was spotted and Pleasanton sent Gregg's Division to replace Custer's Brigade and cover him, albeit Custer stayed to fight.

For my money, Lee did what he did at Gettysburg in a series of ad hoc decisions because for three days he operated under the delusion that all of the Union Army was not up, and was attempting to strike and destroy such parts of it as he thought were present. I doubt he knew the Sixth Corps was present for example until after the battle. His 'command and control' problems exemplified by the dispute with Longstreet made ill informed decisions even worse. The Confederate belief their butternuts could break through a Yankee line any day, any time of day, also informed his decisions and the net result was a cost of many gallant lives in pointless assaults on Day 3.

Just as fantastic as the signal idea is the idea Lee planned a strike at well fortified and heavily gunned Washington DC after defeating the Army of the Potomac. Assume Lee won Gettysburg-- he would have had a victory but only 45000 effective troops left at best count or less than the garrison at Washington and no siege train plus a long support train with thousands of wounded burdening his movement. As it was he left over 4500 men too badly wounded to move on the field by some estimates.

If there is an example of Jominian tactics in the campaign I'd say the movement started by Hooker and completed by Meade in moving the Army of the Potomac north in corps columns spread over many roads in search of the enemy is a true example of the Napoleonic fan, and the abandonment of existing plans for deployment and rapid concentration of forces taking advantage of terrain by Meade after initial contact, is another. Certainly fighting with the interior lines permitting Meade's rapid movement of troops behind his line to plug gaps or move up reserves of artillery and infantry to meet Lee's attacks is classic Jominian fighting albeit defensive.

Last, the Michigan Brigade had the highest casualty count of any Union Cavalry Brigade in the Civil War- over 525. Several Union and Confederate infantry REGIMENTS had that many casualties at Gettysburg. To posit the outcome of what was then one of the largest land battles ever fought in the history of warfare turned on one cavalry engagement with (for that battle) minor casualties is not credible.

Not Least: I noted the reference to the author's Vietnam combat service in one review, and I do sincerely salute his service to his country. But I suspect the apparent popularity of this book derives from yet another excuse for Robert E. Lee's mistakes. 2 stars because you can't apply a theory unless there are facts that fit it.

I defy any reader with an open mind not to agree that the author of this book has presented a compelling--if controversial-- case for his thesis. And more than a compelling thesis, it is a downright gripping read. Tom Carhart is a West Point graduate, a combat veteran of Vietnam, a lawyer, a Ph.D. in American history, and a military historian with several books to his credit. He draws on all of these backgrounds to explore and explain "what went wrong" on that 3rd day at Gettysburg, where Lee--arguably the most astute and ingenious field general in the nation's history--allowed the so-called Pickett's charge to go forth. Drawing on meticulous research into every document that has any bearing on the subject--many of them documents never studied with such close attention to the details--he slowly marshals his evidence and arguments to support his theory: the disaster that resulted from Pickett's charge cannot be dismissed as simply a blunder, a bad day for Robert E. Lee, but was the result of a master plan that was foiled by the daring bravery of another of America's best known military leaders, George Custer Armstrong. (Just to cite one of the more original and fascinating sources he draws on: Carhart looks at accounts of historical battles that Lee would have studied and then describes those battles and their relevance to Lee's conduct at Gettysburg.) Although a few historians have vaguely suggested that there might be some link between Pickett's charge and some cavalry action elsewhere that day, Carhart is the first to lay this all out in detail. One need not be 100% convinced that this is what happened that fateful day, but Carhart's account deserves a reading by all with any interest in the Civil War and miltary history.

On July 3, 1865, at the very height of the Battle of Gettysburg, Confederate General Robert E. Lee did the unthinkable when he launched 13,000 infantrymen across an open field towards the Union lines, where they unsurprisingly butchered. General Lee was considered to have been one of the greatest generals that America has ever produced, if not the greatest, so the question naturally arises as to what he was thinking when he ordered the charge. Up until now, the standard response is that Lee had an off day.

In this fascinating book, author and historian Tom Carhart gives a plausible explanation for what really happened at Gettysburg and why. According to Mr. Carhart, Lee's plan did not simply rely on an infantry charge across open terrain, towards an entrenched enemy, but instead counted on a cavalry attack on the Union rear, just at the moment that the Union soldiers would be watching the beginning of Pickett's Charge. Using a wealth of available information, including the massing of all of the Confederate cavalry well beyond Lee's left flank, and numerous first-hand report, he makes an excellent case for his contention.

Overall, I found this to be a fascinating book. While the author does admittedly fill the book with copious amounts of background information, he does succeed in keeping it from dragging on too long. Instead, I think it went a long way towards proving his case. I too have never understood the logic behind Pickett's Charge, but now I feel that I do.

Plus, it was quite fascinating to see who Mr. Carhart identifies as the real hero of Gettysburg - Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer! I always knew that in times past Custer was revered as a Civil War hero, and now I understand why.

So, if you are interested in a new theory about the battle of Gettysburg, then you must get this book. Heck, even if you are just interested in the American Civil War, then this book is for you. It gives a wealth of information about several key participants in that war, plus it includes many details about the cavalry battle that occurred near Gettysburg that is often left out of other history book.

I give this book my highest recommendations!

I'm just a Civil War afficionado, hardly a serious scholar, but I think the logic the author applies to the circumstances is compelling. It is incredible to me that no one has previously put forward this idea of what Lee was trying to accomplish on the third day of Gettysburg. This book deserves much, much wider circulation than it seems to have enjoyed to date.

As a longtime student of the Civil War, I would have to say that this book is an outstanding attempt to explain what was in the mind of Robert E. Lee on that fateful day in Gettysburg. Carhart astutely demonstrates a clear understanding of the ancient and modern battles that shaped Lee's military thinking. He combines this with an intriguing account of Lee's experience during the Mexican American War, explaining how that further shaped Lee's miltary brilliance. He then combines all this with an insightful analysis of what likely happened well-grounded in primary research.Up unitl now, I would have agreed with many people that Gregg was central to the cavalry battle at Gettysburg. Certainly this has been the common wisdom. But, thanks to Carhart's careful elucidation of the primary source material, I would have to say that I agree that it was Custer, not Gregg, who was central in combating Stuart's forces and that Stuart wasn't simply looking to pick up stragglers or make some sort of flanking maneuver, but that he was, in fact, a central piece of Lee's plan for victory on that fateful day. Any student of Gettysburg should give this book a serious read.

This was an interesting book and it certainly is thought provoking. The author seems to have thought that the conventional wisdom regarding Lee's actions at Gettysburgh are just wrong. He just seems not to accept that Lee, the master of the Civil War battlefield, couldn't come up with anything better than Picketts Charge (which was doomed by itself) and left the rest of his force just idling around the battlefield. It is a good question and I've wondered the same while reading other histories.

The basic premise is that Lee did have a better plan, but that it didn't come off and given the inaccuracies of after battle reporting by the officers involved, there are only vague allusions to this "greater plan". Maybe? We'll never really know.

It is an interesting book the way the author takes other sources to task for inaccurate retelling of events that were never well substantiated in the first place and the author's knowledge of the source material is certainly impressive. On the other hand, it doesn't make for the most stimulating reading.

If you're a Gettysburg fan, it is certainly worth a reading. It is truly a piece of original scholarship and not just some repackaging of what we've already read before.

I have just finished reading Tom Carhart's "Lost Triumph," and would like to congratulate him for finally bringing to light Lee's true tactical plan for the attack on the Union lines at Gettysburg on 3 July 1863.

In November 1944, as a teenager, I had the honor of spending a day with Mr. Rodensteel (I do not recall his first name), the son of the builder of the original Electric Map in the National Museum at Gettysburg. Mr. Rodensteel, like his father, was a lifelong student of the Battle of Gettysburg, and for several hours that day he shared with me his views on the fighting that took place there. Specifically, he emphasized that GEN Robert E. Lee's plan for the third day included not only an infantry attack against the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge and resumption of the frontal attack on Culp's Hill, but also an attack by cavalry forces under the command of MG J.E.B. Stuart around the Union right flank.

According to Mr. Rodensteel, Stuart's flanking move was to commence before the Confederate cannonade began at 1300 hours (1:00 PM), with the objective of striking the rear of the Union lines on Cemetery Ridge and the Union forces on and about Culp's Hill. Lee estimated that Stuart would reach the Union rear at approximately 1500 hours (3:00 PM), the very hour that BG Henry J. Hunt, Meade's artillery commander, anticipating a Confederate infantry frontal assault on Cemetery Ridge, ordered the Union artillery to cease its fire; that halt would allow the gun barrels to cool and the Union artillerists to replenish their ammunition supplies.

Mr. Rodensteel told me that when Lee heard the Union artillery cease its fire at that time, he attributed it to the disorder that Stuart's forces were undoubtedly creating after their arrival in the Union rear. Believing that Stuart had succeeded in his assigned mission as part of a combined arms attack against the Union lines, Lee ordered the infantry forward, with devastating results.

I am gratified to find that Doctor Carhart's conclusions from his exhaustive research appear to validate what Mr. Rodensteel shared with a 13-year-old teenager on that cold and rainy November day almost sixty-one years ago. During these years I have unqualifiedly accepted Mr. Rodensteel's views, despite not finding other historians of that great battle who have highlighted the importance of Stuart's flanking attack as part of Lee's overall plan, i.e., until Doctor Carhart came along.

The gist of Dr. Carhart's book is that Lee's "real plan" at Gettysburg on July 3, 1863 involved more than Pickett's Charge, and the "real plan" was thwarted by Custer's opposition to Stuart in a cavalry action east of Gettysburg.

There is a suggestion that this is a new theory. Any idea that the cavalry action itself has been ignored by historians is wrong. Wert's "Gettysburg Day 3" covers the cavalry action in detail in Chapter 14, and Wert was not the first to discuss the matter. Moreover, any idea that the potential significance of the cavalry action was unexplored is also wrong. Steven Leonard wrote in Military Review of a 2002 book by Paul D. Walker:

In The Cavalry Battle that Saved the Union:
Custer vs. Stuart at Gettysburg, Paul D. Walker
reveals the apparent genius behind the plan:
Confederate General Robert E. Lee's grand scheme was
to attack with infantry from the front while
Confederate General J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry swept into
the rear of the Union formations.

One can also note the article by Eric J. Wittenberg, East Cavalry Field: Battle of Gettysburg, July 3, 2003.

D. Scott Hartwig was correct in stating: "Carhart is not the first to advance this notion of Lee's plan for July 3. It has been around for many years, but lacks evidence to support it."

Carhart's book probably overemphasizes Custer's role at the expense of other Union officers who were involved in the cavalry action. David Gregg was on site and giving orders to Custer. However, it is true that it was Custer's men (armed with Spencer rifles) who heard the discharge of cannon by Stuart before noon on July 3 and deployed north of the Hanover Road. If Stuart's movement were meant as a surprise, why was the Louisiana Guard firing shells before noon? Further, Oliver Howard and David Gregg were aware of the Confederate cavalry by noon.

Although Carhart's book suggests that the true significance of Stuart's foray was covered up in later reports, there seems to have been enough to motivate writers prior to Carhart. Placing the "real plan" in the perspective of pre-Civil War course work at West Point is a nice touch, but does not make up for the lack of evidence for Carhart's conjecture.

Having long wondered how someone as brilliant as Lee could have launched Pickett's Charge across a wide open field expecting the men to attack Union troops along Cemetery Ridge, I am delighted to find a book which at last poses a good answer. In Lost Triumph, Carhart makes great use of solid primary source material, a detailed understanding of the nature of Lee's military experience and training at West Point, and a solid understanding of battlefield tactics. Whether you agree or disagree with his argument, the thesis is terrifically compelling. And, unlike many academic books, it is presented in fluid, readable prose. Civil War traditionalists, rattle your swords! Those who have difficulty accepting that Lee, who consistently demonstrated creativity and brilliance on the battlefield, had no more in mind than a suicide mission across open ground, or was unexplainedly "let down" by JEB Stuart, will find themselves enticed by -- if not in full agreement with -- Carhart's argument.

The forward by James McPherson, pulitzer prize-winning author of Battle Cry of Freedom, says it all: "Thanks to Tom Carhart's painstaking and absorbing reconstruction of events, we now have a clear comprehension of what Lee planned for July 3 -- and why it went wrong. . . .Given the vast number of writings on Gettysburg, it seems impossible to come up with new information and insights about the battle. But Tom Carhart has done it."