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11 of 13 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
World War II's Greatest (Axis) Commander, July 12, 1998
Field Marshal Fritz Erich von Manstein's (born Lewinski,) credentials as the most successful Axis Commander and strategist of World War II and are impeccable: as Chief of Staff of Army of Group South in the Polish invasion in 1939, he directed the decisive German Armies in the first blitzkrieg. The Manstein Plan was the Battle of France in 1940, resulting in the 6 weeks' defeat of France, and the banishment of Manstein to the command of an Infantry Corps, for his forceful advocacy (of the plan). As commander of the 56th Panzer Corps he led the dash to Leningrad in the Russian invasion of 1941, consistently outrunning more powerful neighbouring formations. Made commander of 11th Army in the Crimea later that year, he was promoted to Field Marshal after successfully concluding this campaign in 1942. 11th Army was then moved north to Leningrad at the very time of the main German offensive in the south in 1942. After the Stalingrad encirclement of November 1! ! 942, Manstein was again moved south to command Army Group Don, and would have been successful in relieving the encircled Sixth Army, had Hitler allowed it to meet its rescuers halfway! After the disaster, Manstein held open the escape route for Army Group A, which was almost trapped in the Caucasus, and whose destruction would have led to an early German defeat. He counterattacked around Kharkov in spring 1943, regaining that major Soviet city and stabilizing the long Southern front. As Commander of Army Group South, which formed the Southern Pincer in the gigantic armoured battle of Kursk in summer 1943, Manstein reached most of his objectives while the northern pincer faltered. Hitler again lost his nerve when the Allies invaded Sicily, calling off the attack when Manstein said victory was at hand. The initiative in Russia was ceded to the Soviets after Kursk, with Manstein destined to fight defensive battles until relieved by Hitler in 1944. A critic of the dictat! ! or's military views, even in his presence, Manstein's pers! istent urging of Hitler to appoint a military commander in the East finally led to his downfall. This book reveals Hitler's military shortcomings from the very beginning of the war: 1-The successful Polish campaign was devoid of interference by Hitler. 2-The successful invasion of Norway in 1940 was Admiral Raeder's idea, not Hitler's. 3-The original plan for the French campaign in 1940 was aborted by the allies' capture of the original German plan; Manstein seized the opportunity to present his own plan to Hitler, which became the instrument of victory in the stunning 6 weeks-defeat of France and Britain. At Dunkirk, Hitler deliberately halted the panzers and allowed the British Army to evacuate. 4-The Battle of Britain: lost because of not having a plan. Even after the failure to win the air battle, an invasion of the island presented a high probability for a war-ending victory; conversely a German defeat would not have been decisive. 5-Barbarbarosa: the 1941 Inva! ! sion Plan in Russia was without decisive military objectives. The delay caused by Mussolini's invasion of Greece with the consequent Yugoslav campaign, cost the Germans time and resources. The push to Moscow was repeatedly delayed by Hitler's pursuit of less decisive targets. 6-The 1942 Summer German Offensive had divergent objectives: Stalingrad and the Caucasus; the first political, the latter economics; neither decisive; Germany had not the strength for both. 7-Stalingrad: Hitler insisted on no retreat, even though the military means to hold the city did not exist, and after the encirclement would not allow the trapped 6th army to fight its way out.8-Post-Stalingrad: Manstein, the master of deception, saw the seeds of victory in the defeat itself. He postulated drawing the attacking Russians into the very trap that they visualized for the Germans: a feigned retreat followed by a riposte, driving them against the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov into a modern battle of! ! Cannae. 9-Kursk: the Summer 1943' largest armored clash o! f the war: Hitler called off the attack in the middle of the decisive battle because of the invasion of Sicily, to transfer forces there, even though timely intervention was impossible. 10-Post-Kursk: Manstein advocated drawing on the unusually large occupation forces in France and Norway to fight a decisive battle in Russia, before the opening of the second front. Hitler again refused, violating the principle of concentrating decisive forces in favor of "being strong everywhere". IN SUMMATION: Hitler consistently refused to utilize Germany's strengths and consistently played into its weaknesses. After World War I's trench warfare, the only participant to benefit from that failure and paralysis was Germany. Its well-trained army together with an unusually large number of commanders who had mastered the tactics of operational mobility, was the weapon which allowed it to win such stunning early victories against larger opponents. These early victories were ! ! free of Hitler's interference. Far from being a world conqueror, Hitler is revealed as a shortsighted petty tyrant rather than another Napoleon or Alexander. After the Invasion of Russia, Hitler took over personal command of the Army. Time and again, Hitler made the greatly outnumbered German army fight static defensive battles, in the depths of Russia, where the vast expanses of conquered territory could have been used in battles of manoeuvere where the German Army had no peer. The German manpower disadvantage was worsened by Hitler's insistence on forming new divisions, Luftwaffe Divisions and SS Divisions rather than using them as replacements for seasoned Army formations, where experienced leadership would have greatly mitigated casualties. Germany was also at a great disadvantage industrially, with Russia alone able to out-produce it several times over. Contrary to popular myth, the Reich began the war at a materiel disadvantage, in quantity and quantity;! ! not until the war was almost lost did they produce that su! perior weaponry which became the stuff of legend. Had Hitler appointed Manstein Commander-in-Chief, as many in the German Army wanted, the outcome of the war in Europe would almost certainly have been different.
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by Heinz Guderian
by Basil H. Liddell Hart
DVD ~ Norman Rose
by Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart
