Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General [Paperback]

Erich von Manstein (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: January 7, 1994

Indispensable for understanding the condition and circumstances of Hitler's war. --Martin Blumenson

Editorial Reviews

Review

Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2006

"Generals don't make the best memoirists, mainly because they embellish while writing for posterity; the higher the rank, the worse the tome. The exception is the breathtaking autobiography of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, the brilliant author of many Germany victories against the Soviets in World War II. Dismissive of oft-cited ‘turning points,’ such as the German defeat at Stalingrad, von Manstein contends that the war was never winnable for Germany because of the leader prosecuting it. As for Hitler's once much-vaunted kinship with regular soldiers, he says the Fuehrer had ‘as little in common with the thoughts and emotions of soldiers as had his party with the Prussian virtues which it was so fond of invoking.’ Coming from Hitler's greatest general, it's a most effective filleting.”

WWII History, December 2005

“Manstein’s Lost Victories is definitely one of the more interesting and informative German autobiographies to emerge from World War II. New publisher Zenith Press is to be commended for republishing it.”

--This text refers to an alternate Paperback edition.

Product Details

• Paperback: 592 pages
• Publisher: Presidio Press (January 7, 1994)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0891415254
• ISBN-13: 978-0891415251
• Product Dimensions: 8.3 x 5.4 x 1.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (56 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,441,484 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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63 of 67 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Gen. Manstein's Own Account of His Amazing WWII Victories, April 19, 2005

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George Coppedge (Czech Republic) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General (Paperback)

By the end of WWII, General von Manstein was widely recognized by most German soldiers as the Wehrmacht's most brilliant strategist, a man of honor, and easily the most obvious choice for the Wehrmacht's Commander-in-Chief. Manstein was responsible for formulating most of the strategy that won Germany its great early victories using blitzkrieg tactics in Poland, France, and the Crimea. From Fall 1942 - Spring 1944, Manstein's heroic efforts against hugely overwhelming odds consistently frustrated every attempt to cut off and destroy Germany's armies in the Ukraine. With tight battlefield coordination, he focused his armies' efforts on the decisive point in each desperate Russian Front battle and ALWAYS snatched a tantalizingly close victory away from huge encircling Russian army groups.

Manstein recalls the internal struggles within the Wehrmacht regarding strategy formulation, internal organization, and resource allocation. He was apparently one of the few German generals to seriously and openly challenge many of Hitler's decisions. His analysis of Hitler as a military leader is quite fascinating and unusually balanced. Manstein actually gives Hitler some credit in his strategic analysis. But, Manstein also rightfully and strongly critiques Hitler's disorganized, dictatorial leadership and his increasingly blind faith in the power of will versus massive, well-supplied Soviet armies. Time and time again, Hitler's interference in Manstein's army group operations left much of Manstein's forces perilously exposed to Soviet encirclement. By Spring 1944, Hitler tired of Manstein's repeated demands for a Wehrmacht C-in-C and feared his increasing personal prestige - forcing Manstein's resignation and retirement from the army.

I've read several other books on the Eastern Front, as well as books on the Wehrmacht's internal organization, and I still learned a lot about the Russian Front battles. Manstein analyzes Poland, France, the Crimea, Stalingrad, Operation Winter Storm, the fighting withdrawal from the Caucasus, Kursk, and his desperate battles in the Ukraine. Sometimes the action is difficult to follow. While there are several maps, the text often refers to locations not indicated on the map. (My standard gripe - not enough detailed maps to go with the text.) Overall, a well-written, informative, and excellent account of most of Germany's main war efforts by the man who was there leading them.

61 of 66 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Not for everyone, July 7, 2006

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In the Middle of the Road (Connecticut) - See all my reviews

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This review is from: Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General (Paperback)

The five stars is for what it is supposed to be-- a detailed military memoir by an exceptional leader of German armed forces. Manstein was by any judgment a first rate staff officer, who excelled with troops and shone in use of combined force tactics and strategy on a large scale. His impact in WWII was immense -- on both the Western and Eastern Front.

He was also convicted for war crimes and served four years of an 18 year sentence noted in a 1981 introduction. That is not noted in the original edition which I also have. He was not a political general, i.e. he was not a Nazi Party member and had long credentials as a professional soldier and offspring of professional soldiers. He had Hitler's ear frequently and stood up to him more than most. Evidence (from other sources) indicated that one of his orders referred to a need to eliminate "Jewish Bolshevism" once and for all. There's no point in retrying his case here,but it does affect the way some of his writing is interpreted. Some of his comments should be read knowing that he had only recently been released from prison.

Manstein had a stellar reputation before the war, although he angered some old guard when he waffled on a plan to confront Hitler. In a critical phase at the opening of the war, he was chief of staff to von Rundstedt and took part in military planning. Some of his innovative proposals were passed over.

As the Germans planned their attack into France, the Belgians captured some of the Fall Gelb, or Code Yellow plans, essentially another revision of the basic Schlieffen used in WWI. The allies were pleased because it confirmed their basic planning in reaction to such an invasion. The Germans, however, knew that the Allies knew. So the plan was revised again. Rundstedt and Manstein had already been pushing for the plan.

An interview was arranged with Hitler. Manstein describes a HItler who was engaged, understood the concepts and had an excellent grasp on technology. Manstein immediately by memo recounted Hitler's agreement with his plan and the final order included its elements. No military plan for large troop movements is ever simple. A critical element in Manstein's plan was sending a major force with tanks through the Ardennes, something thought too difficult. If the plans early phases were successful, the Allies would have little chance to recover.

He and most authorities credit the Ardennes drive, orchestrated by Rundstedt and Guderian and not without difficulty, as the major factor in the utter defeat of the Allies in Northern Belgium. Germany held back its armor, leaving mopup to infantry and aircraft. That allowed the evacuation of nearly 340-thousand troops including 26,000 French to be evacuated. Manstein cites three possible reasons; Goring's ego
and m aking peace with Britain were two. The third is currently considered the most likely, that Hitler acceded to his generals who wanted to save their armor for the second phase of the French campaign.

As Manstein points out, despite the loss of their equipment, the success of the the Dunkirk evacuation later allowed Brittish troops to fight in Africa and Italy. Despite all the success, Manstein thought more could have been achieved. It is here that he sums up Hitler's ultimate weakness, one that worsened. HItler had a firm grasp of operational problems, but lacked the professional training to know when large risks should be accepted.

In part because Americans have developed a self-righteous attitude abouut all things French, it's worth repeating Manstein's comment that even had better judgment and energy been shown, the French would have still been destroyed/defeated. Manstein's 38 Corps played a minor role in the battle for France.

Manstein deals in detail with the rivalries and factions as Germany turned toward Britain and an invastion in a "between campaigns chapter. After the decision was made to invade Russsia instead of Britain, Manstein moved to 56 Panzer Corps as commander in the early phase Panzer Dash. He praises the quality of the Waffen SS troops and termss it a terrible mistake to have set them up as a separate military organization. He argues that their casualties were disproportionate to their gains ... and that they drained the Army of potential NCOs.

Manstein's victory in the Crimea and the annihilation of a powerful Soviet force --Freeing up the 11th Army -- was in his high water mark. He was made field marshal -- and Hitler soon ordered him to take his Army to join the seige of Leningrad, but having had little effect in tthe ill-advised move, Hitler ordered 11 Army to begin moving south again. By this time, Manstein had lost some close associates and his oldest son had been killed and he was shortly named commander of the Don Army Group.

Although a Hitler favorite for being a winner, Manstein had not previously reported directly to Hitler. He comments until that point he had felt Hitler's influence on the military only indirectly and from far away. That changed. In the 50s, it had already been fashionable to blame Hitler for everything and he became a cartoon character.

Manstein puts a different light on a much more complex man but the end result is no more favorable to Hitler. His analysis of Hitler as strategist and warlord is complex and far reachingg. There is a chapter dedicated to "Hitler as Supreme Commander" including his adoption of Stalin's strategy of holding on to every piece of ground.

From this point, Manstein's tale (amid some triumphs) is on a downward trajectory. Stalingrad. Another winter in South Russia and the defensive battles of 1943 and 1944. Manstein drives close enough to encircled Stalingrad to make a breakout possible, but Hitler orders it held at all costs. Paulus and his army are lost and the relief is in vain.

The lost victories, those won and those that could have been won, are adding up. But Hitler rejects every plan that might bring victory or at least a stalemate. German troops continue to inflict fearsome casualties on the Russians, The quality of their troops kept declining, but there were always more. This is not a technical book, but it is dense with military thought and considered criticism of Hitler. It must all be in a context. It is one man's view -- and one that is considered by military historians.

It will probably be in print as long as there is a military.

While HItler would not have used the phrase "Stay the Course" but he said the equivalent in idiom Except that he didn't want to talk to anyone and began isolating himself.When people saw him, he lashed out.

He made the mistake and everyone else paid the price. The shame is that it still continues. I cannot regret these lost victories any more than I can wish that my native South had won that war. It's probably a coincidence but still ironic that a new book about Stonewall Jackson is called "Lost Victories.

It is possible to understand the pangs of lost victories ... without wishing for a change in result.

What is more difficult is to understand why wars that cannot be won are fought -- why the course must be stayed -- why criticism of the leadership is so bad. If the best Germany could hope to achieve against the Soviet Union, planning for that should have started before millions of people lost their lives -- for nothing.

Manstein makes the point well, that just because the political arm can order something does not make it right or wise. From a Nazi general yet!

55 of 60 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Favorable, with little or no reservations., May 25, 1999

By A Customer

This review is from: Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General (Paperback)

Forget the "colorful" writings of subordinates to other more "popular" military figures, Manstein wrote from the heart. His style was not meant to entertain, merely to inform. Military historians of a serious vein know that his is a matter-of-fact dialogue with the reader. His Crimean campaign was a masterpiece, yet receives no attention as does such Allied operations as Torch or Overlord. He did his best as an officer, and served the military and his nation (unfortunately for a pathetic cause). His insights on the French and Polish campaigns, as well as his take on Hitler's unfortunate victorious political gambles that paid off and fed his ego, should be required reading for any who wish to understand the true nature of Hitler's success. If you want entertainment of the trivial sort that plays to blood guts and amusing or gastly anecdotes, this is not for you. If you want to satisfy a true intellectual understanding of an outstanding general and what really happened in the opening campaigns of the Second World War, you have found a definitive work.