Customer Reviews

Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler's Most Brilliant General

5 star:		(32)
4 star:		(14)
3 star:		(8)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

By the end of WWII, General von Manstein was widely recognized by most German soldiers as the Wehrmacht's most brilliant strategist, a man of honor, and easily the most obvious choice for the Wehrmacht's Commander-in-Chief. Manstein was responsible for formulating most of the strategy that won Germany its great early victories using blitzkrieg tactics in Poland, France, and the Crimea. From Fall 1942 - Spring 1944, Manstein's heroic efforts against hugely overwhelming odds consistently frustrated every attempt to cut off and destroy Germany's armies in the Ukraine. With tight battlefield coordination, he focused his armies' efforts on the decisive point in each desperate Russian Front battle and ALWAYS snatched a tantalizingly close victory away from huge encircling Russian army groups.

Manstein recalls the internal struggles within the Wehrmacht regarding strategy formulation, internal organization, and resource allocation. He was apparently one of the few German generals to seriously and openly challenge many of Hitler's decisions. His analysis of Hitler as a military leader is quite fascinating and unusually balanced. Manstein actually gives Hitler some credit in his strategic analysis. But, Manstein also rightfully and strongly critiques Hitler's disorganized, dictatorial leadership and his increasingly blind faith in the power of will versus massive, well-supplied Soviet armies. Time and time again, Hitler's interference in Manstein's army group operations left much of Manstein's forces perilously exposed to Soviet encirclement. By Spring 1944, Hitler tired of Manstein's repeated demands for a Wehrmacht C-in-C and feared his increasing personal prestige - forcing Manstein's resignation and retirement from the army.

I've read several other books on the Eastern Front, as well as books on the Wehrmacht's internal organization, and I still learned a lot about the Russian Front battles. Manstein analyzes Poland, France, the Crimea, Stalingrad, Operation Winter Storm, the fighting withdrawal from the Caucasus, Kursk, and his desperate battles in the Ukraine. Sometimes the action is difficult to follow. While there are several maps, the text often refers to locations not indicated on the map. (My standard gripe - not enough detailed maps to go with the text.) Overall, a well-written, informative, and excellent account of most of Germany's main war efforts by the man who was there leading them.

The five stars is for what it is supposed to be-- a detailed military memoir by an exceptional leader of German armed forces. Manstein was by any judgment a first rate staff officer, who excelled with troops and shone in use of combined force tactics and strategy on a large scale. His impact in WWII was immense -- on both the Western and Eastern Front.

He was also convicted for war crimes and served four years of an 18 year sentence noted in a 1981 introduction. That is not noted in the original edition which I also have. He was not a political general, i.e. he was not a Nazi Party member and had long credentials as a professional soldier and offspring of professional soldiers. He had Hitler's ear frequently and stood up to him more than most. Evidence (from other sources) indicated that one of his orders referred to a need to eliminate "Jewish Bolshevism" once and for all. There's no point in retrying his case here,but it does affect the way some of his writing is interpreted. Some of his comments should be read knowing that he had only recently been released from prison.

Manstein had a stellar reputation before the war, although he angered some old guard when he waffled on a plan to confront Hitler. In a critical phase at the opening of the war, he was chief of staff to von Rundstedt and took part in military planning. Some of his innovative proposals were passed over.

As the Germans planned their attack into France, the Belgians captured some of the Fall Gelb, or Code Yellow plans, essentially another revision of the basic Schlieffen used in WWI. The allies were pleased because it confirmed their basic planning in reaction to such an invasion. The Germans, however, knew that the Allies knew. So the plan was revised again. Rundstedt and Manstein had already been pushing for the plan.

An interview was arranged with Hitler. Manstein describes a HItler who was engaged, understood the concepts and had an excellent grasp on technology. Manstein immediately by memo recounted Hitler's agreement with his plan and the final order included its elements. No military plan for large troop movements is ever simple. A critical element in Manstein's plan was sending a major force with tanks through the Ardennes, something thought too difficult. If the plans early phases were successful, the Allies would have little chance to recover.

He and most authorities credit the Ardennes drive, orchestrated by Rundstedt and Guderian and not without difficulty, as the major factor in the utter defeat of the Allies in Northern Belgium. Germany held back its armor, leaving mopup to infantry and aircraft. That allowed the evacuation of nearly 340-thousand troops including 26,000 French to be evacuated. Manstein cites three possible reasons; Goring's ego
and m aking peace with Britain were two. The third is currently considered the most likely, that Hitler acceded to his generals who wanted to save their armor for the second phase of the French campaign.

As Manstein points out, despite the loss of their equipment, the success of the the Dunkirk evacuation later allowed Brittish troops to fight in Africa and Italy. Despite all the success, Manstein thought more could have been achieved. It is here that he sums up Hitler's ultimate weakness, one that worsened. HItler had a firm grasp of operational problems, but lacked the professional training to know when large risks should be accepted.

In part because Americans have developed a self-righteous attitude abouut all things French, it's worth repeating Manstein's comment that even had better judgment and energy been shown, the French would have still been destroyed/defeated. Manstein's 38 Corps played a minor role in the battle for France.

Manstein deals in detail with the rivalries and factions as Germany turned toward Britain and an invastion in a "between campaigns chapter. After the decision was made to invade Russsia instead of Britain, Manstein moved to 56 Panzer Corps as commander in the early phase Panzer Dash. He praises the quality of the Waffen SS troops and termss it a terrible mistake to have set them up as a separate military organization. He argues that their casualties were disproportionate to their gains ... and that they drained the Army of potential NCOs.

Manstein's victory in the Crimea and the annihilation of a powerful Soviet force --Freeing up the 11th Army -- was in his high water mark. He was made field marshal -- and Hitler soon ordered him to take his Army to join the seige of Leningrad, but having had little effect in tthe ill-advised move, Hitler ordered 11 Army to begin moving south again. By this time, Manstein had lost some close associates and his oldest son had been killed and he was shortly named commander of the Don Army Group.

Although a Hitler favorite for being a winner, Manstein had not previously reported directly to Hitler. He comments until that point he had felt Hitler's influence on the military only indirectly and from far away. That changed. In the 50s, it had already been fashionable to blame Hitler for everything and he became a cartoon character.

Manstein puts a different light on a much more complex man but the end result is no more favorable to Hitler. His analysis of Hitler as strategist and warlord is complex and far reachingg. There is a chapter dedicated to "Hitler as Supreme Commander" including his adoption of Stalin's strategy of holding on to every piece of ground.

From this point, Manstein's tale (amid some triumphs) is on a downward trajectory. Stalingrad. Another winter in South Russia and the defensive battles of 1943 and 1944. Manstein drives close enough to encircled Stalingrad to make a breakout possible, but Hitler orders it held at all costs. Paulus and his army are lost and the relief is in vain.

The lost victories, those won and those that could have been won, are adding up. But Hitler rejects every plan that might bring victory or at least a stalemate. German troops continue to inflict fearsome casualties on the Russians, The quality of their troops kept declining, but there were always more. This is not a technical book, but it is dense with military thought and considered criticism of Hitler. It must all be in a context. It is one man's view -- and one that is considered by military historians.

It will probably be in print as long as there is a military.

While HItler would not have used the phrase "Stay the Course" but he said the equivalent in idiom Except that he didn't want to talk to anyone and began isolating himself.When people saw him, he lashed out.

He made the mistake and everyone else paid the price. The shame is that it still continues. I cannot regret these lost victories any more than I can wish that my native South had won that war. It's probably a coincidence but still ironic that a new book about Stonewall Jackson is called "Lost Victories.

It is possible to understand the pangs of lost victories ... without wishing for a change in result.

What is more difficult is to understand why wars that cannot be won are fought -- why the course must be stayed -- why criticism of the leadership is so bad. If the best Germany could hope to achieve against the Soviet Union, planning for that should have started before millions of people lost their lives -- for nothing.

Manstein makes the point well, that just because the political arm can order something does not make it right or wise. From a Nazi general yet!

Forget the "colorful" writings of subordinates to other more "popular" military figures, Manstein wrote from the heart. His style was not meant to entertain, merely to inform. Military historians of a serious vein know that his is a matter-of-fact dialogue with the reader. His Crimean campaign was a masterpiece, yet receives no attention as does such Allied operations as Torch or Overlord. He did his best as an officer, and served the military and his nation (unfortunately for a pathetic cause). His insights on the French and Polish campaigns, as well as his take on Hitler's unfortunate victorious political gambles that paid off and fed his ego, should be required reading for any who wish to understand the true nature of Hitler's success. If you want entertainment of the trivial sort that plays to blood guts and amusing or gastly anecdotes, this is not for you. If you want to satisfy a true intellectual understanding of an outstanding general and what really happened in the opening campaigns of the Second World War, you have found a definitive work.

Having first read this book in 1988 I find that it is still one of the best military memoirs of WW2. It stands next to 'Panzer Leader' by Heinz Guderian, 'Neither Fear Nor Hope' by General F. Von Senger Und Etterlin and 'The Rommel Papers'. The book is very easy to read and is valuable to any one who wishes to understand 'the other side of the hill'. His accounts of the various actions he was involved in during the War are excellent and his views on Hitler and German strategy make this a great book.

Field Marshall Manstein has written a very readable, yet technically accurate history of his 'Grand Operational' command in the Second World War. Never as popular as Rommel in person or Guderian in print, he is considered by many to be Germany's most proficent General of the war. Manstein's skill was obvious, even to der Fuhrer: no other General dared the insubordination he often displayed. Manstein was required to consider facets of war (unity of command, morale, logistics) that few other commanders have had to contend with. Of note is his enlightened handling of the people in occupied Crimea, allowing them to police and protect themselves. This was so effective that Stalin interred many Crimeans after the war. This book is well balanced between his personal relationships starting early in life and changing perceptions of battle. Starting WW 2 as an Infantry Division Commander in Poland, he is promoted to command 30 Inf Corp in France and finally to Field Marshall of almost 400,000 men in Army Group South. His narrative of the latter as the tide turned against the Reich is irresistable as his tenacity, skill and sense of impending doom is conveyed not by lucid prose, but by thorough analysis of options, often bad and worse. Dark humour in his devious handling of 'Hitler's stand fast order' is balanced with news of the death of his son in battle. And yet most memorable passages are from "the happy times", when Barborrossa was first launched and he commanded the 56th Pz Corps. Elan matches skill as he proudly notes his unit sliced through 200 miles of Russian territory in only 4 days. Although a manifestly German point of view containing facts now challenged by releases from Russian sources, this is must read. Manstein's account is objective in description of battle yet subtly personal as the war takes its toll. Anyone half serious about military history should consider this worthwhile volume.

It is generally recognized that the greatest military mind produced by any nation during World War II belonged to Erich von Manstein. His qualifications for such a laurel are numerous, and include the detailed plan which lead to the conquest of France in six weeks in 1940, the conquest of the Crimea in 1942, and Germany's last major victory on the Eastern Front, the recapture of Kharkov in 1943. It is Manstein's record as a "defensive" general, called in to restore the collapsing southern wing of the Eastern Front after Stalingrad, however, which cemented his reputation. Any general can win brilliant victories with first-rate troops, air superiority and unlimited supplies, but it takes a very special type of brain to be able to repeatedly fight off a numerically superior enemy who enjoys all these advantages. As von Moltke the Elder once commented, when told by an admirer that he was destinted to go down as one of the greatest marshals in all history: "No, for I have never conducted a retreat." Manstein did, under the most difficult circumstances imaginable, and in doing so probably saved the whole southern wing of the German army in Russia from annihilation.

"Lost Victories" is Manstein's own testament of his involvement in the Second World War. He makes no attempt to discuss the events before the war or the after his own removal from command, and generally keeps his pen focused on his own personal experiences: his struggle to get the "Ardennes Plan" accepted by the High Command prior to the invasion of France; his own minor role in the invasion; his march on Leningrad in 1941; his conquest of the Crimea; his abortive attempt to relieve Stalingrad; the long, brutal defensive battles which followed. His criticisms of various generals and leaders are frank but usually well-balanced: luckily for the reader, he includes a whole chapter on "Hitler as Supreme Commander" which is the most interesting of the book. The Field Marshal often warred with his Leader about what strategy Germany should be using to stave off defeat, and the "might have beens" if Manstein's strategy of "exhaustion" (using mobile defensive to wear down the Soviets, rather than "holding every yard of ground") had been followed during the period 1943 - 1944 are fascinating.

Manstein's prose is very Germanic, which is to say repetitious. He may not have liked Hitler (and vice-versa) but as writers they shared the philosophy of "Why say something once when you can say it three or four times?" Like Adolf he also tends towards wordiness, drawing out his conclusions over many more pages than were necessary. Nevertheless, he has a brilliant mind and a fine sense of humor, and both qualities translate to the written page. On an editing note, I would like to point out that, as with the memiors of Wilhelm Keitel, the editor has made a number of arbitrary and in my view, stupid cuts to the text. Nearly all of Manstein's personal anecdotes have been eliminated, including humorous passages which might have presented him as a less cold-blooded and calculating individual. Strangely enough, what might be the most crucial chapter, on the Battle of Kursk, was completely cut and replaced with a short, substanceless essay on the same subject which Manstein wrote for an American military magazine after the war. No explanation for this is given save for the original chapter was too long. Excuse me, but what is an editor for? I could understand substituting a fluff piece like this for wordy unimportant chapters, but not for a decisive moment such as Kursk, which might have been the decisive battle of the Second World War.

The book's one real weakness is the author's disingenuity on certain hot-button topics, such as the General Count von Spoeneck affair (his execution has been laid at Manstein's feet) or Manstein's complicity or non-complicity in the "war crimes" he was later convicted of. Like all memior-writers, the Field Marshal is writing as much to protect his legacy as to contribute objectively to history, and the reader must use additional sources to decide for himself when he's telling the unvarnished truth or merely a butt-covering version of it.

It could be argued that Manstein had been named as either Commander-in-Chief of the German Army or Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front, Germany might well have forced Russia out of the war before D-Day - an event whose effect on history could hardly be exaggerated. Of course, there was never any real chance of this happening: Hitler respected Manstein and even (in Keitel's words) "feared him to a degree" but he could scarcely stand to be around him: the Field Marshal was too blunt, too stubborn, and too unintimidated by Hitler's presence to become part of the dictator's inner military circle. In the end, Manstein proved to be "too good for his own good" and was put out to pasture more than a year before the war ended. General von Mellenthin, author of "Panzer Battles" and a fine strategic brain in his own right, said of this loss: "Naturally we were very concerned at the removal of Manstein, the one man whose strategic genius might have frustrated the Russian masses." For my money, of all the generals produced by Germany during WW2, Erwin Rommel ranks as the best tactical field commander, Hermann Balck the best operational-level commander, and Albert Kesselring the finest overall defensive commander; but over all of these is Manstein, a strategic genius to stand among the finest in all history.

Let me first say, that I am one of those who considers Field Marshal Erik von Manstein one of the best operational minds to have fought in the Second World War. His achievment in the post-Stalingrad months (Dec 1942- Feb 1943) will go down as a classic in mobile warefare. Enough has been written about his 1939 operational plan to invade France to fill a volume. In short, he was the consumate military professional.

Which is why it pains me to offer only a 3 rating to his memiors. Don't get me wrong. The memior reads very well; the translation is excellent, and the prose is easy. My main complaint lies with the memior's content. I first read Lost Victories twenty years ago and took most of what Manstein wrote as fact. However, as I read more and more about not only the Wehrmacht, Germany, and Hitler, I began to doubt the narrative that von Manstein and the Feld Herren as a whole have been put to paper. This memior is long on ommisions, and short on introspection. Like other senior officers, Manstein piles the blame on the most senior Wehrmacht leadership while conviently excusing himself. The sad fact remains that von Manstein rarely vocalized any complaints concerning the Nazis treatment of men like Fritsch or Bloomberg (his former superiors sacked by Hitler), the introduction of the swatiska on thier uniforms, the establishment of the Waffen SS, or the treatment of Polish civilians, Jew, or captured officers. In his memiors, Manstein does take a few pages to offer his criticisms of Keitel (OKW) and von Braunstisch (OKH), yet not once did he explicitly critique in name the poor tactical generalship of either General Hoepner -the 4th Panzer Army Commander and his immediate commander during the initial stages of Barbarossa, or Field Marshall von Leeb -the overall commander of the Northern Army Group. This I thought was rather odd considering that these 2 men at that stage of the war still excercised complete freedom of movement. Manstein vaguely critiques the "High Command" (ie either the OKH or Hitler himself). Like other generals, Manstein leveled his stongest critiques on those that were dead, and thus couldn't defend themselves.

The Chapters covering Stalingrad at the battles along the Don are the most dramatic of the memior. Many do find fault with Manstein's decision not to relieve General Paulus of command of the 6th Army in November-December 1942. This was a period of high drama and emotion, when as most experts believe that the 6th Army could have broken out of Stalingrad. It was also the period of greatest danger when the entire front was collapsing back to Rostov. Manstein's reasons for not relieving Paulus are clear enough -namely he didn't have the authority to do so. The other reason, which he barely skirts around is the fact that the Soviets had nearly a half million men, 3000 guns, and 2000 tanks around Stalingrad. If the 6th Army did breakout, this vast force would be unleashed and the entire Don Bend as well as von Kleists Army Group in the Kuban would have been become a giant tomb for the Germans. Manstein after the war could have offered this terrible but truthful fact to the public, but instead said the sacrifice of the 180,000 men of the 6th Army was never an option. Somehow I do not believe him.

The last area of criticism is leveled at von Manstein's decision to back Zeitzler's (OKH) and Hitler's decision to strike at Kursk. In his memiors, he does say he strongly desired to wait until the Soviets struck first and then offer a counter blow on "the back hand". That is, he wished to conduct another mobile counter attack like he did earlier in March at Kharkov - this time from the Northwest and drive the Soviets offensive forces Southward into the Black Sea. This operation, brilliant in conception and most probably would have had sufficient motorized forces to execute was never considered. Hitler couldn't stomach the idea of giving another inch of territory (Manstein's plans included a planned withdraw initially so he could spring his trap), instead followed Zeitzler's idea of a pincer attack on the Kursk sailent. For some reason, von Manstein allowed himself to initially concur. Again, I find this strange. Manstein never was one to keep quiet when considering other people's failures. OKH's Kursks attack lacked imagination, was totally predictable and lacked any strategic value. On paper it looked like the "safe" plan. Even if it was successfull, Manstein, Zeitzler, Guderian, and most of all Hitler knew the Soviets had sufficient strength to bleed the outnumbered German's white. Manstein's plan, on the other hand, had all of the makings of a classic battle of annihilation, which could have bought Hitler another year, or maybe even a stalemate in the East.Yet, Manstein offered little defense of his plan.

Finally, von Manstein like Guderian, Halder, Kluge, Rundstedt, et als. said he had no prior knowledge of the Final Solution, Russian Slave Labour, and the killing of POWs. He says very little, but does offer up evidence of the Soviet's own crimes while he commanded the 56th Panzer Corps in the Courland. As time goes by, I find this harder and harder to believe.

Overall, the reader will have to judge for himself. Of all the memiors, this one is the best written, and there are many times where one can see Manstein's genius as he discusses in his cool, rational prose the many tactical and strategic problems he faced. He is also very kind when ever he writes about the enlisted soliders who served under him, especially the German NCOs. He was never an "armchair" general. Both as commander of the 38th Infantry Corps, and the 56th Panzer Corps he led from the front, and made his decisions based upon first hand knowledge. It was also heartbreaking to read about the death of his only son in 1943. While Erik von Manstein had many faults, he was anything but the stiff, monocoled Prussian caricture that some in the West like to paint of the Prussians. He was a brilliant yet flawed general. His memiors should be read, but critically so. While reading the memiors it is also good to keep in mind that her served one of the cruelist dictators of the 20th Century.

General Feld-Marshall Erich von Manstein explains the personality of Hitler and the essential differences between the OKH (oberkommando des heer) and the Fuhrer. Beginning with the Polish campaign, the Feld-Marshall explains how the OKH became subordinated to the central high command (OKW) or oberkommando des wehrmacht. This cripples the German Army leadership and places it at Hitler's heel for the entire war, with disastrous consequences for the Eastern Front and the West as well. Von Manstein demonstrated his abilities with his plan for the attack on the West and his near salvation of 6th Army at Stalingrad. In fact, his alternative plan at Kursk, to attack straight into the salient rather that on its flanks might have spelled German victory. This is a must read for historians interested in the ground war in Europe, especially the early war in the West and the war on the Eastern Front.

Manstein's "Lost Victories" has value for the reader for at least two different reasons. One, it is a first hand history of events in World War II from a key German general's perspective. Two, it is an intriguing, unself-conscious reflection on good people carrying out their tasks for the worst possible causes (in this case, Adolf Hitler's horrific vision of a Third Reich).

As Martin Blumenson notes in his "Introduction" (pages 10-11): "The tragedy for all thoughtful, knowledgeable, and sensitive soldiers like Manstein was the dilemma of trying faithfully to serve their country while disapproving the Fuehrer's aims and methods. True to their tradition of obedience, most of them, again like Manstein, kept their gaze unswervingly on the military role they were expected to play even as they deplored the growing vacuum of direction at the political top." B. H. Liddell Hart, in his "Foreword," speaks of Manstein's career well. And, finally, Manstein, in his "Author's Preface," oddly enough speaks to Blumenson's comment when he notes that (page 17): "This book is the personal narrative of a soldier, in which I have deliberately refrained from discussing political problems with no direct bearing in the military field." However, could one separate the political diabolism of Hitler from the military actions? This shows a blindness, amply commented upon by many others, of German generals.

The book itself focuses largely on Manstein's military experiences. Perhaps the most telling descriptions are the foolish strategy dictated from Hitler of attacking the Soviet Union on a far too broad front, given the limited military resources of the German army. There is great poignancy in Manstein's recalling the desperate situation in Stalingrad, as General Paulus followed Hitler's stupid order to defend at all costs. There is poignancy in his depiction of German troops and tanks fighting far superior Soviet armies to a standstill, before they would have to, ultimately, retreat before overpowering odds. And, in this context, of Hitler's orders not to retreat, despite the desperate strategic situation in which the German forces found themselves.

A fascinating commentary from a central actor in the German military. This book is usefully read in conjunction with the work by Heinz Guderian, "Panzer Leader." The most fascinating element of this work (and that of other commentaries about German military leaders) is their sense of duty for a cause that was not worthy of them. And their inability to see that fundamental disconnect.

Anyone who wants to study the largest and most violent conflict in history (the Eastern Front in WW2)...just has to read the Manstein and Guderian autobiographical accounts as a matter of course. I read this book in its original German so I could get the feel of what it was like inside the German High Command (I learned, for instance, that the Germans used the word Operation and not Unternehmen to name Operation Barbarossa, Operation Zitadelle, etc).

That said...this is an extremely dry book which doesn't really create much of a feeling for the amount of killing and dying described. I would agree with a reviewer above that this kind of guy was an aristocrat, bribed with an estate, who didn't seem to care too much about his men (he never showed remorse for casualties) and who openly admitted (documented elsewhere) that he didn't care for the Jews and what might be happening to them behind his lines (some would say that he just disliked Jewish communists). Manstein avoids even the mention of atrocities that were happening on his front lines (Hausser's treatment of the civilians in Kharkov for instance), although he does at least try to justify his "scorched Earth policy" for the retreat behind the Dnieper that got him a commuted 18 year prison term after the war (he says that most Ukrainians hated the Soviet communists and wanted to move with the Germans to help in the fight).

In his book, von Mansfield makes it clear that he understands what seizing the initiative, having balls of steel and maintaining momentum means. I am sure this book was read by the commanders who took the Baghdad Airport and then, the next day, raced into the center of Baghdad to take the Presidential Palace. Mansfield clearly describes how the American invasion of Sicily convinced Hitler to call of the Battle for Kursk and how Mansfield could have won that battle if Hitler hadn't been spooked enough to want to bring the SS Division that was actually in the process of winning...immediately out of the battle and down to Italy (the men were moved to Italy, not the tanks - but I had to learn this from other sources because Manstein makes it seem like the actual tanks were taken out of the battle and driven to Italy).

This account, especially of the Battle of Prokhorovka (the largest tank battle in history, occuring in the southern pincer of the German attack), is "must reading". If Hitler hadn't gotten spooked by the Americans landing in Sicily and taken the Leibestandard Adolf Hitler Division's personnel out of the Prokhovorka Battle...Manstein could have possibly given Germany and extra year or two of survival.

That being said...let me point out the book's short-comings:

1) This book is so dry that Manstein never points out that his 3 SS-Divisions in the Battle of Prokhovorka are "Das Reich", "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" and "Totenkopf". You have to go to the Internet and other sources to understand just how famous and important and lethal these divisions really were. You have to go to other sources to find out the personalities of many of the Iron Cross holders in these units, especially Michael Wittman and Pieper (sic) the latter of whom killed American soldiers at Malmedy later in the war.

The Battle of Prokhovorka, especially on July 12th, 1943, was monumental. Soviet tanks would pop up over ridges in groups of 40-50 and try to ram Tigers on an open plain (farmland, hay fields and cornfields). Even much better accounts than Manstein's still come across as too dry when you consider that it was the bloodiest one-day battle in history. Today, a beautiful chapel tower stands where the carnage had been at its height.

If you don't get a lump in your throat, if not a tear in your eye, at the thought of what really happened just west of Prokhovorka...you're not as human as you might consider being.

But this book just matter-of-factly states that the 12th of July was one in which the Germans chewed up the Soviet reserve force (5th Guards Army)...and could have gone on to victory if Hitler hadn't stupidly called for the personnel of the unit in the middle of the battle to leave the battle and go to Italy.

All true...but it leaves the reader thirsty for a more human description of that day's casualties on both sides. I will be looking for individual soldiers' accounts of the battle.

2) The personal "taste of war" that you get from this general is how nice the monks were at his field HQ near the Polish border at the start of the war...and how pleasant the wooden buildings were at his forward HQ in the birch forests of Vinnica, Ukraine on the Bug River. Manstein shows his "bravery" when he mentions how the Russians broke to within 35 kilometers of where he and Hitler were meeting and then Hitler flew away.

You aren't going to get the feel for how the lack of night vision goggles ended battles around 10PM each night, when tanks would pull back from each other and medics on both sides would let each other drag wounded in opposite directions. You will have to go to other sources to get a feel for what life on the Eastern Front (Ostfront) was really like.

Most of all...you are not going to get a good account in this book comparing equipment...and showing how the Soviets in the Battle of Prokohovorka were often literally driving oversized pieces of metal at advanced Tiger tanks...and getting slaughtered...but holding the Germans long enough to spook Hitler into calling off the whole operation.

Strategically...Manstein also doesn't adequately explain why he didn't take Pskov in the first two weeks of the war, which could have led to the capture of Leningrad in July instead of the unsuccessful attack on that "Gorod Geroy" in September.