10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A Thorough Analysis of Luftwaffe Doctrinal Development, February 23, 2001
This review is from: The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940 (Hardcover)
The focus of this book is on the interwar development of German air operational doctrine. Corum demonstrates that the Luftwaffe was not just a ground support air force but capable of strategic operations, including air transport (Franco's troops in 1936) and airborne assaults. In fact, he points out that Anglo-American obsession with strategic bombardment hindered their operational doctrines until 1942-3. Corum points out the biggest German deficiencies as lack of a true naval air arm that could have been decisive in fighting Britain, Udet's obsession with dive-bombers that delayed the deployment of the He-177 and the Ju-88 and strategic misdirection from Goering/Hitler. There are two interesting chapters on lessons from the First World War and the Spanish Civil War. Also interesting is discussion of how the Germans were able to develop not only doctrine, but new fighter and bomber designs under the noses of the Allied occupation forces. The one area in which the Allies succeeded in inhibiting the Luftwaffe was in limiting the German civil aviation industry's engine development programs; when the Luftwaffe went public there were very few engines to choose from and these were less-advanced than Allied models. Weak engines plagued a number of German aircraft designs. There are no maps.
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9 of 10 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
THE MAKING OF THE LUFTWAFFE, October 14, 2002
This review is from: The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940 (Hardcover)
James S. Corum has written a scholarly study of German air power ideas and operational doctrine in a well-researched history of the German air power from 1918-1940. In addition, the text provides an understanding of the human dimension in the development of the Luftwaffe beyond the usual stories of Herman Goring and the Nazis.
The author notes, "In the years immediately following World War I, it looked to the world as if Germany had been completely disarmed as an air power. On the surface, this was so. Yet, in the long-term view, the Allied powers failed miserably in their effort to disarm Germany." While their air power was disarmed, the Germans could not be stopped from thinking and studying. The text narrates how "General Hans von Seeckt and his small group of airmen succeeded in keeping air power as a central aspect of warfare." After WWI, a select group of German officers made a detailed analyzed of WWI army and air power experience. Foreign air power developments and doctrine were also studied with foreign articles and manuscripts on air power translated into German.
Corum notes "Although Germany was denied an air force, it was not denied civil aviation or aviation technology by the Versailles Treaty. This gave the Germans an inherent advantage in the air, for Germany in the interwar period was a world leader in aircraft design and technology."
By 1925 German air power operational doctrine was well advanced so that aircrew training and aircraft developed was needed. Most interesting was the text's description of the formation of the "Shadow Luftwaffe." In 1925, under a 1922 treaty with Russia, a German air base was built at Lipetsk, Russia. From 1929-1933, several hundred officers, NCOs, and civilian employees were there as students, instructors, ground staff and test pilots. Airmen at Lipetsk would test tactics and doctrine by dropping live bombs on simulated targets. Fifty modern fighter aircraft were smuggled in from the Fokker factory in Holland. The text notes that an advantage of the Shadow Luftwaffe was the close and effective cooperation between those who developed doctrine for the aerial war, those who developed and built weapons and prototypes and finally the actual producers of the weaponry.
When the Nazi party came to power on 30 January 1933 and rearmament openly began, the text notes, "a new group of air leaders came to the fore" and inheriting "a sound foundation and built on it." The author states, "the years 1933-1936 were of foundation-building. Several major personalities dominated the Luftwaffe organization and played vital roles in creating new concepts of air power..."
The text narrates the discussions of air power philosophy and doctrine. By 1934 an effective operational doctrine for a small to medium-sized German air force was developed. Contrary to Post-WWII Allied historians, the Luftwaffe was not limited to being "merely a tactical air force geared to army support operations." On page-139, the author states "Regaining control of the air by defeating the enemy air forces was the primary objective" and Lieutenant-General Wever, Luftwaffe chief of staff, stated "Only the nation with strong bomber forces at its disposal can expect decisive action by its air force."
Lack of a German air force in the 1920s pushed "German military personnel and civilians to seriously consider how one might conduct a passive defense that would minimize the effect of a strategic bombing campaign..." As WWII Allied bomber crews would sadly learn, flak would "become the core of German homeland defense". Effective flak artillery was developed with flak battalions placed under Luftwaffe command. Civil defense was also a part of air defense doctrine with civil defense drills being conducted as early as 1936. However, the core of the Luftwaffe's air defense doctrine remained an offensive air campaign in order that home defenses would not be put to the test.
The book's account of the Luftwaffe's 1936-1939 involvement in the Spanish Civil War is fascinating noting "For a relatively modest investment, the German high command reaped some substantial strategic gains from its involvement in Spain." For example, they learned that even in circumstances of general air superiority bombers must be escorted by fighters; a lesson that the Eight Air Force learned at great cost in 1942-1943. Also in Spain, "Air power strategy, tactics and doctrine were tested and corrected so that when WWII began, the Luftwaffe was better prepared for war than any other major air force. Interestingly, while widely covered and reported in the press, France, Britain and America paid little attention to the lessons Germany was learning in Spain.
The book states in the early years, "Goring let the seasoned professionals do their job, while he provided an inexhaustible supply of fund." However, in the late 1930s politics became prevalent resulting in some poor appointments such as Jeschonnek, 1939-1943 air chief of staff, who overemphasized the dive-bomber at the expense of developing the heavy bomber and strategic air warfare. Equally disastrous was the appointment of Ernest Udet chief of the Luftwaffe Technical Office and who was totally unqualified for his position.
Author Corum notes "Rather than being a weakness, the Luftwaffe's doctrine of war developed painstakingly during the interwar period was one of the strengths of the Wehrmacht." The text closes stating "Despite the failure to develop a naval air doctrine and the poor guidance of Hans Jeschonnek, the Germans were able to gain the aerial advantage over the Allied powers in the first years of the World War II not because they had overwhelming numbers of aircraft, but because their conception of a future air war and the training and equipment required for such a war was far more accurate than their opponents' air power vision."
Students of military history will enjoy the text. However, today's military planners should consider the basis lessons from how the Luftwaffe was developed 1918-1940.
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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Another outstanding contribution, October 3, 2006
This review is from: The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940 (Hardcover)
Another outstanding contribution to 20th Century military history by the Univ. of Kansas Press. God bless them, they publish some great monographs. Proessors Corum and Muller of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Mawell A.F.B. know more about the Luftwaffe than any people in the world, except maybe Horst Boog in Germany. And since all you can get by Boog is the incredibly expensive volume he worked on in the WWII history they are writing in Germany, I am very happy with Profs. Corum & Muller. I wonder if they are happy at Maxwell A.F.B. or would rather be at some Big 10 school writing their stuff? Anyway, Corum's book is an excellent look at how the German operational air war was created. Quite readable, it has flat out some of the best general discussion on the Spanish Civil War I have ever read, going beyond just air operations. Corum understands that air operations necessarily include strategic, tactical, and naval operations, and goes into German naval air operations even while the Kriegsmarine itself put so little effort into a fleet air arm. Good discussions of all of the key characters, and this is another book that makes it clear that someone has to get around to writing a book on Manfred von Richtofen. This book is not for the casual WWII reader, and coming to it with some knowledge of German air types is helpful. All in all I enjoyed the book, and would recommend it to students of the Luftwaffe or WWII air operations in general.
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