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Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam

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Complaining bitterly to Dean Acheson about the public affection that had surrounded John Kennedy and the coolness toward him, Lyndon B. Johnson wondered aloud why people didn't like him. "Mr. President," Acheson replied, "you're not a very likeable man."

Contrary to Acheson's opinion, shared by most contemporaries and by many subsequent historians, Johnson emerges from this thoroughly researched and well-crafted study, not only as a shrewd politician, an able negotiator and a skillful foreign-policy leader, but also as an almost likeable person.

Schwartz finds that LBJ, after he settled into office, became "an astute and able practitioner of alliance politics," one who developed a keen understanding of the perspectives and preoccupations of European leaders and who dominated the foreign policy process. His policy toward Europe, the author writes, was "one of the most important achievements of his presidency." Schwartz unravels a series of complex negotiations-over arms control, the future of NATO, a Multilateral Force, and international economic issues-, and asserts that LBJ, determined to combat nationalism and unilateralism, effectively pursued his vision of a further integration of Europe and a relaxation of cold war tensions.

What makes Johnson an engaging character are the many quips and axioms of popular wisdom that he brought to a foreign policy realm traditionally dominated by soft-spoken diplomats and cosmopolitan personalities. When his advisors reminded him that America was committed to the creation of a Multilateral Force and had to find a compromise even though the Europeans didn't really want it, Johnson proposed to drop the idea altogether by remarking: "While you're trying to save face, you'll lose your ass." This Texan brought up in a German-American community developed a good friendship with Chancellor Eckard but advocated the following course of action toward his ally: "There's only one way to deal with the Germans. You keep patting them on the head and then every once in a while you kick them in the balls".

He resisted the advice to react strongly to the public attacks by de Gaulle by remarking that he didn't want to get into a "pissing match with the French" and, commenting on de Gaulle's decision to exit NATO's integrated defense system and have American troops evacuate France, noted soberly: "When a man asks you to leave his house, you don't argue; you get your hat and go." He also brought fresh ideas to international economic policy debates, bringing the Kennedy Round to completion and salvaging the Bretton Woods system, although he rarely talked publicly about those issues - he once told John Kenneth Galbraith that "making a speech on economics is a lot like pissing down your leg: it seems hot to you, but it never does to anyone else."

Indeed, Schwartz makes the case that LBJ's gut feelings and instinctive understanding of power politics often trumped the judgment of more experienced foreign policy experts and made him a natural leader of the Atlantic alliance. The book opens with a reference to Lyndon Johnson as "the Ugly American" and concludes with a quote from Charles de Gaulle, who once said that "Roosevelt and Kennedy were masks over the real face of America. Johnson is the very portrait of America. He reveals the country to us as it is, rough and raw." The quote wasn't intended as a compliment, but may be taken as one.

A reexamination of Johnsons European foreign policy, that puts him successfully at the helm

In contrast to the traditional view, Prof. Schwartz presents a convincing and extremely well written case that President Johnson successfully guided American foreign policy towards Europe. The book tells a story of a talented power politician whose astute understanding of his allies and foes domestic political environments, enabled him to hold NATO and the Atlantic Alliance together, while maintaining a viable global economic system and effectively moving towards détente with the Soviet Union.

The book weaves together the complexities of Johnsons personality and the dynamics of his inherited administration into a compelling and clear historical narrative shedding new light on the usual uninspiring vision of the president.

The book attempts to break away from the Vietnam bias of historical accounts of Johnsons foreign policy. However even for someone interested in Vietnam, this book provides many missing pieces of the puzzle and clarity of insight into the functioning of the Johnson Administrations foreign policy that are invaluable in understanding the era.

Well worth the read!

"Lyndon Johnson and Europe" provides a fresh reassessment of Johnson's foreign policy. Thoroughly researched and clearly written, "Lyndon Johnson and Europe" uses solid historical analysis to tear down the notional, knee-jerk response that Johnson's presidency put the U.S. in a foreign policy funk. Schwartz also avoids overstating his point. Johnson was not perfect, but, like every President, he worked within the international context in which he found himself. In Johnson's case, Schwartz provides enough evidence to show that given the circumstances, Johnson actually enjoyed a good measure of success. On one level, Schwartz's work is an academic revisionist history of Johnson's foreign policy with Europe, attractive in and of itself. But more broadly it reads as a diplomatic/political history of America, its friends, and its foes, during the turbulent 1960s. Easily forgotten cross-Atlantic spats (the Multilateral Force, France's break with NATO, the Kennedy Round, Prague Spring, et al.) all spring back to the relevancy that they held during Johnson's presidency through Schwartz's skilled hand. Schwartz's ability to capture the big picture while proving his point make this book not only an important reappraisal of Johnson's foreign policy, but also of great use to every student of American history, politics, and diplomacy.

I found "Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam" to be insightful and relevant to U.S. policy toward Europe. In light of this last conflict over war in Iraq, I believe Mr. Schwartz provided a thought-provoking narrative of a previously unknown and volitile time in U.S. politics. Lyndon Johnson was brought to life skillfully and with obvious attention to detail. I would highly recommend this book, not only for students and history buffs, but for everyone who should understand more about Lyndon Johnson and his administration.

Professor Schwartz has taken a balanced, even-handed approach towards the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. The result is a thoroughly researched accout of one of the worst- and best- periods in American history. Professor Schwartz aptly describes Johnson's reputation as the "Ugly American" and "quintessential provencial," an ethnocentric with no taste for foreign affairs. However, Professor Schwartz also extensively discusses Johnson's effective diplomatic strategy and role in Europe at a time when the early turbulent years of the Cold War began to close, and there was a criticalneed for a more permanent, lasting policy.
To be frank, this book basically accomplishes a miracle. It is extraordinarily well-researched, with a complete framework of domestic, foreign and social issues examined for each country examined, so that any historian would be satisfied. Yet, the language and clear communication make Johnson's presidency come alive for every reader. The language is rich and colorfu, with "cigar chomping" Ludwig Erhard and "mercurial" Khruschev.
A different picture of Johnson, one that is much more well-rounded and balanced, emerges from "Lyndon Johnson and Europe". It truly is a fantastic read!

This history focuses on LBJ's policies toward Western Europe (primarily Germany, France and Britain) during his presidency, and seeks to overturn the prevailing academic view that the Johnson administration failed to make progress on key issues with the Europeans. Schwartz claims that Johnson's troubles in Vietnam as well as his preference for domestic policy have overshadowed his very real accomplishments in this area of foreign policy.

LBJ was faced with several overlapping problems in Europe. Britain was enduring an economic crunch that hurt its ability to maintain military forces in Germany, the Middle East and SE Asia, and thus help the U.S. provide security for the Cold War; Under De Gaulle, France was actively challenging U.S. hegemony in Western Europe; meanwhile, Germany's self-confidence was reviving, allowing it to push for more say on the alliance's nuclear weapons and on German reunification. As a whole, Europe was moving towards more economic and political integration -- a process that the U.S. both encouraged and hoped to manage.

Schwartz does a fine job explaining the different European issues and how they interacted. He is also good at explaining the motivations and constraints LBJ faced when making European policy. I thought his reassessment of Johnson's performance at the end of the book, however, a little too glowing. There doesn't seem to be anything about Johnson's policies that Schwartz finds fault with. A reassessment should be a reassessment, not a whitewash.

While neither George W. Bush nor Jacques Chirac nor Gerhard Schroeder is mentioned one time in this history, the book still has a surprising contemporary relevance. As a professional historian, Schwartz maintains his focus on LBJ and the Europe of the mid-60s. But for the general reader, it is hard not to see the similarities between that time and today's cross-Atlantic relationships.

Like Bush, Johnson faced a Europe unsympathetic to one of his primary foreign policy goals (the war in Vietnam for Johnson; the war in Iraq for Bush). Like Bush, Johnson's main European challenger was France, and that challenge was vigorous. Like Bush, Johnson's style was perceived by Europeans as too crude (both were unfortunate to follow presidents who were very popular in Europe, and who were considered bright and sophisticated men).

Some events and rhetoric from the 1960s look as if you could just change the dates and names and insert them into an article today. When the U.S. escalates the war in Vietnam, De Gaulle calls American foreign policy "more and more threatening for the peace of the world". The Vietnam War is also among the chief causes for a precipitous drop in German public opinion towards the U.S.: when asked if the basic interests of their country are in agreement with the U.S., only 16% of Germans in 1966 answered yes, compared to 70% just a year earlier. Some in the German leadership were also upset with what they felt was a lack of consultation on the part of Johnson. There are numerous examples like this in the book. Even if you have no interest in LBJ's foreign policy, you still might find this book valuable in looking at Bush's foreign policy by way of comparison.

While I usually don't like to read books about myself, I thought this one was ok. Many books about me tend to portray me in a negative light which I don't like. This one however seems a bit more balanced as far as chracterization of me goes. However, seeing as how I'm in a unique position to critique the book's historical accuracy (its about me) I think I should point out some stuff. First of all, just about the whole book is a fabrication. Many of the names, places and events seem to have been made up by the author. For instance, he says that in 1967, I went to Europe to discuss a treaty with the Soviets. WHAT? I've never even been to Europe. There are many other instances of stuff like this. Finally, and perhaps most strangely, the guy in the cover is not me. I admit he does look like me, but if you look closely, its obvious that it is NOT me. This just seems like sheer laziness on the author's part. There are thousands of pictures of me that can be found everywhere. Furhtermore, it was probably more difficult to find a guy who looks like me and then stage of a photo for the book than to just use an already existing picture. I guess the only reason I can think of is that he wanted a picture of me with that guy on the left of the picture (is it the author?). Anyway, I'd reccomend this book highly even though most of its just made up.