Customer Reviews

MAGNIFICENT DISASTER: The Failure of Market Garden, The Arnhem Operation, September 1944

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3 star:		(3)
2 star:		(3)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

This account of Market-Garden does not measure up to others in spite of a good try. The narrative is somewhat difficult to follow, and the sweep of the battle is lost in the details. Some of the photos are good, but sometime, somewhere, someone will produce a book showing photos of all of the bridges, crossing sites, road features and general terrain features so the battlefield can be truly be pictured by the reader. Unfortunately, this does not happen in this book, nor are the maps sufficiently detailed to be of much use.

The author's assessment of Montgomery's fecklessness in attempting to plan this operation in a single week while ignoring the 15th Army on his left shoulder and neglecting to clear the Scheldt is not only accurate but welcome. The supply problem was of Montgomery's making, not as he attempted to imply, that he lost the battle because the Americans did not support his sufficiently or that Patton siphoned off supplies that he (Montgomery) should have received. The whole plan was a fantasy, as was the idea of a subsequent drive on Berlin by Montgomery at the head of his troops.

The author makes a number of points that improve and validate his presentation. He makes clear that against composite units thrown into the battle by the Germans, none above battle group size, the British were outfought and simply too slow in going from one phase of the battle to another. Horrocks did not lead from the front, and he failed to urge his troops forward at any time in the battle. As always, a lack of leadership brings failure. By contrast, the two American airborne divisions acquitted themselves extremely well under close, "up front" leadership, and it was due to their heroics that the operation accomplished as much as it did. The treatment of General Sosabowski by Essame, Myers, Taylor (of the DCLI), Horrocks, Browning and Montgomery was horrible, and they actively attempted to use him as a scapegoat for their own deficiencies. Even worse was Montgomery's spreading of falsehoods with respect to the Polish Brigade's performance.

I still recommend Ryan's "A Bridge Too Far" for the Allied side, and Robert Kershaw's "It Never Snows In September" for the German side. Author Bennett does a creditable job, but with the poor editing and the impossibility of following the action with sufficient spatial cognition to make the reader feel like he understands what's happening, I cannot go higher than three stars.

This is a fairly detailed tactical account of operation Market Garden, the allies attempt to establish a bridgehead over the Rhine in late 1944 by capturing a series of bridges using massed airborne forces.

On the positive side, the author, who from his bio appears to be an amatuer military historian, offers a detailed account of the operation primarily from the allied viewpoint but using sufficient German material to give a sense of the "other side of the hill". The narrative is often a little jerky, jumping around rapidly from unit to unit. However this is probably inevitable when describing a battle that involved three separate airborne areas of operation and a ground force component. The author offers his opinions freely during the text, though none of these are particularly suprising to anyone who has studied this battle.

The flaw in the book and the reason for my mediocre rating is the lack of any detailed maps. The author provides three high level maps which do little to assist the reader in visualizing the events described in the text. When describing action at the detailed, tactical level good maps are essential and their absence seriously degrades the book's value as a battle history. Other flaws include: very little background on the strategic situation, although this would not be a problem for anyone who is already familiar with the miltary history of WWII; minor but irritating editorial errors; and one or two apparent errors of fact. An example of the latter occurs on pages 75-78 where the author states that the British had around 750 men at the Arnhem road bridge. Yet earlier he had stated the Frost's battalion (the main unit at the bridge) had only 481 men and only two of his three companies (300-350 men) actually arrived at the bridge. Despite the author noting that other units later arrived at the bridge it is not completely clear where the additional 400 men came from.

In summary, if you have a high degree of interest in Market Garden this book may be useful to you in providing a more detailed account than is available in other works and by providing at least a little of the German viewpoint, but it is compromised by the lack of maps to support the text.

This is not a book for the "Bridge Too Far" novice. It is not a complicated book and indeed was a pleasure to read. Either by default or design A MAGNIFICENT DISASTER assumes the reader already has a fairly good understanding of the battle. To gain anything from this fine book it is best if you have already studied Operation Market Garden and thus have some familiarity people, places and action. The book is also sadly lacking detailed maps. I found myself referring to maps in other books, as well as the Michelin Map I bought in Arnhem, to keep current with the narrative.

The strength of A MAGNIFICENT DISASTER is in its myth debunking. As such Bennett focuses on key events and decisions and does not provide smooth continuity with regard to the story of the overall operation. A BRIDGE TOO FAR does a better job with the chronological story. Criticisms aside, I enjoyed reading this book particularly as I had just finished two other volumes about the battle. In many ways Bennett's study of Market Garden is akin to well assembled end notes fashioned into a narrative. While reading the book and the amassed personal accounts I was yet again amazed how so many soldiers and civilians, witnessing the exact same event, can come away with such divergent recollections as to what happened, when it happened, how many were involved, who was present, and so on.

Well written book, but totally lacking in maps. Detailed explanations of complex manuvers and tactical dispositions are not supported by maps. Even if you know where Einhoven, Driel and Arnhenm are located, make yourself a sketch map to follow the dialogue. If you are unfamiliar with the locations of these cities get a good road map and follow the narrative. The author also mixes his discussions with the names of American, British, Polish and German force actions. While a technique to keep the reader interested, it can be confusing without a map and diagram of the given orders of battle. His description of the action as British forces close on the Rhine is superb and very detailed. I only wished that he would have supplemented his text with maps and diagrams.

A Magnificent Disaster
by David Bennett

"No body of men could have fought more courageously and tenaciously than the officers and men of the 1st Parachute Brigade at Arnhem Bridge." Maj.Gen John D. Frost CB., DSO., MC

"The British 1st Airborne Division (that) landed in Arnhem was an elite unit. It's performance, especially at the road bridge was, in the last analysis, acknowledged as really heroic." Waffen-SS-Standartenfuher Walther Harzer

Those are the words of two senior military men from opposing sides who were there. David Bennett was neither there or a military man, but in this first attempt at authorship, he goes to great length to rubbish those who were.

'A Magnificent Disaster' refers to operation Market Garden, which was an attempt by the Allies to secure a crossings of the Rhine and then head for the Ruhr, thereby shortening the second world war. It did not work - it almost did, but in war, almost doesn't cut it. Bennett's work explains in the greatest of detail why it was ill advised to attempt it, and why it went wrong. It will be to our eternal regret that Mr. Bennett was not there to give the general's the benefit of his sage advice.

It failed: that is a fact. But there were a number of very experienced people who thought it was worth a try; Churchill and Eisenhower among them. Even Carl von Clausewitz said "If the leader is filled with high ambition and if he pursues his aims with audacity and strength of will, he will reach them in spite of all obstacles." But then von Clausewitz did not have the benefit of Mr. Bennett's advice either.

In 260 pages we are reminded of every little thing that went wrong. The opinions of disgruntled officers like Gen Hackett, and Gen Sosabowski are given excessive weight. Hackett has always been unhappy that he was not given more prominence in the multiplicity of books that have been written about Mkt-Gdn. Gen.Sosabowski always had his oar in the water, and negative to everything. He left the army in disgrace and was a failure in everything he did in civilian life. It is small wonder that his opinion enjoyed little respect among allied generals.

Notwithstanding the above, this book fails because Bennett could not hide his animosity for the British. I don't know if they kept him in after school when he was educated in England, but he really hates the Brits. Every good thing they did was bad, and every bad thing was worse. Fortunately everyone else was great. They did not "...retreat in disorder.' (p112), or shoot their friends (p113), and their hastiness of retreat wasn't "...perilous and unprofessional." (113). If that was not bad enough, "...the fact remains that the German's outfought the British." (p193), and "...the British Army was incapable of carrying out the Arnhem operation". (p194). If all that is true, I wonder why Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS Wilhelm Bittrich said, "In all my years as a soldier, I have never seen men fight so hard." And he knew a thing or two about fighting as he fought in both WWI and WWII. Dare I say perhaps a little more than Mr. 'Labor Leader' Bennett?

On a technical note it is difficult to follow the action without maps. I do not know what the publisher was thinking to release a book about a military operation without maps.

If you are an Anglophobe, and enjoy reading about how dreadful the British Army was in WWII, then you will enjoy this volume. If, on the other hand you really want to learn about a battalion that fought with the utmost gallantry, in inconceivably difficult conditions, and denied the use of a vital Bridge to the enemy for 80 hours, then find another author.
643 words

I hate having to give a negative review on a subject I care very much about but this is one of the very few WWII history books that I have given up reading without finishing in 30 years. I have even tried to make myself read it and could not. Disjointed, hard to follow, no maps, seems I am only echoing the comments previous reviewers have made, unfortunately for this book I totally agree with their comments. "A Bridge Too Far" and "It Never Snows in September" would be much better choices.

This is an awful book. If you are looking for dry, disjointed and confusing descriptions of troop movements and dispositions that rarely include first person accounts, anecdotes or, frankly, anything of interest, this is the tome for you. If you want good writing, interesting personal accounts by soldiers who fought this battle, and insight, buy Ryan's A Bridge Too Far. Come to think of it, the one star I give it is too charitable. I want my 5 hours back.

This is a disorganized account with completely inadequate maps, and apparently no editor. Look elsewhere for Market-Garden information.