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MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines

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All the Seven Deadly Sins are here, rolled into one man, the American Caesar, the Actor, Doug-out-Doug MacArthur. This man should have been court-marshaled after he allowed the Japanese to attack on December 8, 1941, without resistance. His vanity and over-weaning pride always stood in the way of his making correct decisions, and not just in the Philippines. The author gives us the whole sordid story of MacArthur's sorry performance in the Philippines, prior to, and after the Japanese attacked. No stone is left unturned as we learn that he was only interested in himself; even at graduation from West Point, selecting the Engineers, just because he had been told (wrongly) that it would help him rise rapidly in rank. He was a mama's boy, (she lived near the Plain at West Point, in order to keep an eye on him). MacArthur was so paranoid, that he saw others as either inferiors or competitors. He had the ability to talk nonsense with confidence, which served not only to delude others, but also himself. He was a man of impulses and moods, often insensitive to reason and logic; temperamental to the last degree...a prima donna of the first order. He was adroit and dramatic, and knew exactly how to play his cards to win his public. His persona was everything, having persuaded Philippine President Quezon to bestow on him the title "Field Marshal" with another uniform of his own design. He was so inept, and tried to fool President Quezon that the Japanese wouldn't want to attack the Philippines. After the war, he would insist that it was the boldness of his defense plans which had prompted the Japanese attack!

Connaughton lays the ground work early in his book, by looking at MacArthur's malfeasance in WWI. The description of another of his self-made uniforms (one of his nicknames was the "Beau Brummell of the AEF": he wore no helmet, carried no gas mask or weapon, except a riding crop!); is an appropriate inclusion here, in addition to descriptions of his buck-passing mentality, while serving under General Pershing. Over and over, through carefully researched and documented incidents, we get a sense of a man who was obsessed with his own public image, in his vindictive performance dealing with the Bonus Army. I have consistently used the word "performance," because, in my opinion, that's what he was good at: acting.

Of course, he was good in the bedroom as well, having a mistress, "Dimples" Cooper, who he brought back with him from an early Philippine tour, and had her ensconced in a Washington area apartment; later having to pay big bucks to get back his love letters from her. Further instability of his family life is evidence by his divorce from a woman, who herself, was previously divorced, (a woman who had been a mistress of General Pershing); and his later re-marriage, which produced one son, who, we must suppose, was so humiliated by his father's antics, that he later changed his surname, and now lives in obscurity in New York City. Rumor has it he is gay.

That MacArthur had an affair is not surprising, given the leniency he allowed his enlisted troops to have while on their single un-accompanied tours in the Philippines: they were allowed to live with native women away from the barracks. Many of the men, on second tours, lived with Filipino girls in their villages. Enlisted men bought or built for $50.00 their own "nipa" huts. MacArthur thus allowed and condoned his men to live with an unmarried woman in the villages. Alcoholism and venereal disease were reported as endemic in the 31st Infantry. Living off the base with a temporary partner served, in his mind, to reduce the incidence of both, and so a food allowance was paid to encourage this adulterous form of cohabitation.

The book also includes details about the Japanese spies that abounded everywhere, and what was not done about them. Attention is paid to MacArthur's hand-picked staff; one that provided him loyalty over expertise. It was more of a court than a staff. A number of them mentioned in the book, had shared characteristics: each carried a chip on both shoulders, each was sometimes childishly sensitive, and each was convinced that MacArthur was the greatest man who ever lived.

His relations with Roosevelt were condescending, and with the Navy brass, they were worse. This was the exact opposite of the situation in Hawaii, where there was an excellent relationship between Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Power and authority both within the Philippine Commonwealth and its links to America, were tangled, exacerbated by the continuous and trivial machinations of MacArthur. Many documented cases are given of MacArthur's projected mannerisms when dealing with those he disliked in the civilian and military government. Out of his blazing ego poured a steady torrent of self-centered oratory: elegant, polished and sculpted. Visitors stated that his voice crackled and shuddered with taut emotion, lightning flashed from his eyes as he paced nervously, leaving his visitors to listen with apprehensive dismay and discomfort.

The author gives many, well-researched, instances of MacArthur's pettiness. If he did attend a dinner with Quezon, which was rare, he would not attend if the seating arrangements were not to his liking. He quibbled over any felt slight, including whether Quezon was entitled to a 21-gun salute. He plainly relished idolatry. He stayed in his ivory tower of the Manila Hotel penthouse; visitors reported that his skin had pallor; had trembling hands; and the vanity which required him to comb his thinning black hair from left ear to right, thereby covering a large bald spot. MacArthur was a showman and his only salvation from forced retirement came, when the Philippine Army was called into the service of the United States. MacArthur was like the proverbial Phoenix rising from the ashes; called to command; there was no one else available on-site.

Excellent research is presented giving the reader a very detailed review of the nine hours following the attack on Pearl Harbor...after MacArthur had been notified, and directed BG Sutherland not to allow MG Brereton in to see him with his request to send up the air force, and attack the Japanese on Formosa, before they did the same to Clark Field, et.al. The loading of bombs had to await MacArthur's orders, which were not forthcoming until 11 am....too late. After the war, MacArthur of course, denied Brereton's version of events, but the papers and files, since discovered, tell the real truth.

Despite many hours advance warning, and having had the Magic intercept and decoding means (which Admiral Kimmel and General Short were denied by Washington), U.S. air power in the Philippines was virtually neutralized on the first day of the war! MacArthur continued to state that his was to defend the Philippines, not attack! He was under the delusion that the Philippines would remain neutral. This is also confirmed by the author in the discovery of a conversation between Quezon and General Eisenhower in Eisenhower's papers. Some Clare Boothe Luce papers recently found, also confirm MacArthur's refusal to act. Another author, William H. Bartsch, has also explored MacArthur's inability to act. December 8, 1941: MacArthur's Pearl Harbor (Texas A&M University Military History Series, 87.)

As the author states, there should have been a high level investigation of MacArthur following the Philippine debacle on December 8th. Other generals were called to account for their shortcomings in the first months of the Pacific war, but he never was.

His "I shall return" became an obsession. His insistence on conquering all of the Philippines in 1945, ended in a needless effort that cost thousands of lives and much damage. Manila was destroyed in order to be saved: for every Japanese defender, ten natives in the city died...the majority to American firepower. His vision was distant, remote, suspicious, and egocentric. In his thinking, in his performance, he was a 19th century imperial warrior; a self-proclaimed expert on Far Eastern affairs. His self-delusion would remain throughout his years, including the Korean Conflict. But, even as Eisenhower would admit, America was in the early stages of a war, and needed a hero, and MacArthur was handy.

This book makes an excellent contribution to a chapter of history that has been overlooked. Connaughton shows that the seeds of a possible US-Japan confrontation in the Philippines were sown decades earlier. Could it have been anticipated? MacArthur's career has many examples of his military brilliance and personal bravery which are at odds with his dismal performance in the Philippines between December 1941 and April 1942. MacArthur had five years to prepare for the defense of the Philippines and his strategic plan called for Japan to land troops at Lingayen, exactly where they did. Yet lack of co-ordination among his senior military commanders and the US Navy, together with sudden changes to long developed defense plans allowed the Japanese to land virtually unopposed, making defeat inevitable.

It is intriguing to speculate how a successful defense, which should have been possible given the fact that the Japanese landed exactly where MacArthur expected them to, might have changed the course of World War II.

MacArthur is fortunate that widespread US setbacks early in the war neccesitated a national hero and allowed him the opportunity to restore his reputation. Even today there are many people who cannot accept the idea that MacArthur made any mistakes, as other reviews of this book make clear. Perhaps another writer will one day tell us why MacArthur was so convinced that the Chinese would not attack across the Yalu during the Korean war. This mistake resulted in a massive setback for the UN forces and added years to that war.

Richard Connaughton examines General Douglas MacArthur's military involvement in the Philippines before and during the early activities of US involvement during World War II. MACARTHUR AND DEFEAT IN THE PHILIPPINES is the prequal to Connaughton's THE BATTLE FOR MANILA, a straightforward assessment of the liberation of the Philippines in February 1945, and captures a more detail depiction of MacArthur's experience in Manila and what brought him to the islands as a child when his father was military governor as well as his last visit as Lieutenant General of the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). The most important aspect of the book centers on the different stages and steps in which MacArthur made at an attempt to build up the Philippine Army and his alliance with Philippine president, Manuel Quezon. But Connaughton suggests, in spite of the strenuous efforts to build a standing army in one area of confict, the Philippine military simply could not measure up to the strength of the Japanese military by the time the Philippines was attacked on December 8, 1941, a day after Pearl Harbor, which would leave one of many destructions to hit the islands before the war's end.

MACARTHUR DEFEAT IN THE PHILIPPINES is well-documented research. However, Connaughton includes accounts of MacArthur's personal life in the preceding chapters, which had been previously mentioned in other biographies, and provides an image behind the heroic figure in a way to exhibit his weaknesses as a military leader, especially during the conflict on Corregidor. Connaughton suggests that MacArthur's leadership style may have been something of the past -- a nineteenth-century style military leader who's time had come to make room for the changing of the guard; this may have been one of many reasons for the defeat on the islands and the overshadowing presence of Eisenhower. Despite numerous assumptions about MacArthur's leadership, one thing remains true, MacArthur`s undying love with the Philippines and his effort to protect the island and its people.

MACARTHUR AND DEFEAT IN THE PHILIPPINES is an essential addition for those interested in understanding the conflict in the Philippines during World War II as well as for General MacArthur history buffs. Although the book is not a definitive study, it provides a little more information that had not been previously published.

I found this work on McArthur the best objective opinion of this military "icon" written to date. It was appropriate and necessary for such a work to be written by an academic historian who was not an American in order to obtain an objective view of such a controversial man in American history. I would like to see the author write a similar analysis of McArthur's generalship in the Korean conflict. I think the author could have gained a more complete understand of the reduction of the Air Corps forces if he had reviewed the fine article by Richard Slater found in the November 1987 issue of Airpower Magazine.

I have always found it interesting that historians are afraid to attack the MacArthur myth of invincibility. Much like Custer,MacArthur's reputation has only grown over the years into one of almost mythic status as the victor of the war in the Pacific and the battle of Inchon in the Korean War. The facts are that a 100,000 strong U.S.-Filipino Force fighting a defensive battle over difficult terrain was defeated by a Japanese force of 20,000 and MacArthur somehow came out a hero because of his thousands of communiques stating that millions of Japanese were swarming over his tiny band of ill-trained (due to him) troops. The funniest/strangest tidbit in the book regards that fact that MacArthur's HQ listed German pilots in Messerschmits attacking them because of course Japanese couldn't have built a proper attack plane much less fly it with their poor eye sight! The commander at Pearl Harbor wasn't a hero or the British commander at Singapore. Those men were castigated and in the case of the British commander interned. Should MacArthur have taken responsibility and allowed himself to be captured? A good question. FDR thought it would have been humiliating for the country and so the architect of the biggest US defeat ever? was saved. This book traces all of MacArthur's disasterous missteps that led to the U.S.'s terrible and in no way inevitable defeat. The fact that MacArthur left the islands with $500,000 of the locals money is sad and distasteful. Thank god Truman put this crazy, egomanic in his place when he did.

This is another in a long line of dispise MacArthur books.
Here are a few of its misconceptions:
1. Mac Arthur was a great hero of World War I - virtually the only general officer who actually led his troops into action on the Western front. His personal courage was unquestionable, and should not have been called into question during the battle for the Philippines.
2. At that time (1941/42) he was the Commanding General of the allied forces in the Philippines, just as Eisenhower was in Europe in 1944/45. How much time did Ike spend on the beaches of Normandy in June of 1944 or in Belgium during the Battle of the Bulge? Yet MacArthur was called "Dugout Doug" for not managing the defense of the Philippines from a fox hole on Bataan. This has always been utter nonsense!
3. In December 1941 MacArthur was as bereft of intelligence information from the War Department as were his counterparts in Hawaii.
4. His defensive operations were dictated by "War Plan Orange," - originally developed by the War Department during the 1920's and still in effect in 1941/42 - which required a retreat into the Bataan Peninsula until the Philippine defense forces could be relieved by reinforcements from the U.S., following a victory over the Japanese Navy in the mid Pacific. Pearl Harbor forclosed such a naval victory for six months and thereby doomed the defense of the Philippines.
5. In spite of their mutual dislike President Roosevelt ordered MacArthur out of the Philippines to command allied forces in Australia. He, at least, recognized MacArthur's inestimable value as a military commander.
6. Against all odds the Philippines held out for five months, until May 6, 1942 - the day of the Battle of the Coral Sea, and one month before the great American naval victory at Midway, which was the turning point of the war in the Pacific. The British surrendered Singapore in February 1942, within two months of the Japanese invasion of Malaya.
7. Ultimately the criticisms of MacArthur come down, as usual, to the claim that he was "arrogant." Well, so what? Was not Alexander the Great arrogant? Was not Julius Caesar arrogant? How about Napoleon? Wellington? Field Marshall Montgomery? George S. Patton? Even Washington was accused by his enemies of being aloof and arrogant. Only U.S. Grant is remembered as a humble soldier. There is no particular military virtue in humility. Douglas Mac Arthur was one of the four or five truly great strategic geniuses in American military history. He desreved his pride. What's more, his self confidence was, without doubt, an essential element in his military genius. It's time to stop criticising him for being who he was.