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Maestro : Greenspan's Fed and the American Boom

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After reading a review of two new books about Alan Greenspan, I was eager to learn more about this enigmatic man. The question: which book? The long and short of it is that I bought both, and here's why I enjoyed Justin Martin's Greenspan far more than Bob Woodward's new book that is receiving a fair amount of fanfare. Martin's book gives us a vivid picture of Greenspan's early years and the winding path he took to becoming the most powerful economic force on Earth. At each turn, you realize that Greenspan's decisions, while primarily personally motivated, ultimately led Greenspan to a position, which has great influence over our lives today. What would the "new economy" look like if Greenspan had stuck it out as a professional Saxophonist? To me, it is far more interesting to learn about what made the man than to follow a detailed narrative on the Fed (Woodward's book) most of which is recent history and well documented. When Martin explains Greenspan's policy, its implementation and its ultimate influence on the world's economy, we feel we know the man behind it all. If you're really interested in Greenspan (like I am) it wouldn't be a mistake to buy both books, but, by all means, be sure to read Martin's first.

I thought it was never going to happen after reading a series of books about Alan Greenspan and The Federal Reserve. Prior books seemed to have had as their goal convincing any reader that a PHD in Pure Math was required to understand The Federal Reserve. Those who felt readers needed to have the English Language explained to them authored a book I recently reviewed. Just as I believe there are literally millions of Americans who have learned more about The Electoral College in the last 10 days than they did during how ever many years of school they attended, anyone who reads this book will find that The Federal Reserve while far from a simple agency performing simple tasks, it is understandable to anyone who has an interest in learning.

Mr. Bob Woodward has assembled a highly readable book, together with a brief index of terms, which makes this work invaluable. This would be so at any point in our History. But as we now have more Families and individuals whose finances are directly related to the financial markets, the book is important for everyone to read.

During the campaigns the voters are warned/scared into thinking of the evil that will befall them if a given Candidate becomes President, and appoints Supreme Court Justices. The congress that will assemble in January is so balanced, especially the Senate, that no matter who eventually wins, what was an election and now is a disgrace, is not going to get any judges confirmed that are at either end of Constitutional Interpretation.

But what of The Chairman Of The Federal Reserve? Mr. Greenspan is currently in the midst of a remarkable 4th term as Chairman, and many would argue a Chairman whose performance has been unprecedented. At 74 years of age how much longer will he want this position? He comments that having the job "is like eating peanuts" in that a person cannot stop, and I hope he does not. However I don't believe immortality is amongst his skills, and whoever is President when he ceases to be The Chairman, is going to have a huge problem.

Mr. Woodward explains why this is so by using some of the very public, and some not so public events/crises that any reader will have knowledge of, if not all, then some of the events he describes. October 1987 is familiar, it also moved into the background rather quickly for such an event. This book will rewrite those days of 1987, and explain just how close to a true financial disaster it was. After you read what went on to restore the markets, you will be pleased that firstly, you didn't know how bad it really was, and secondly, that Mr. Greenspan was at the helm.

Other events that are reviewed are, Mexico's idea of running an economy, and the US Bankers that lent your money to the Country, and how that situation was delicately finessed. The LTCM near disaster, while perhaps not as familiar to some, lays bare the wonderful world of arbitrage. For it is here that 5 cents gets you a dollar, winning is spectacular, and the consequences of losing are almost difficult to fathom. If you count stocks as a form of gambling, arbitrage make stocks look as safe as keeping the money in your mattress.

The book is full of actual transcriptions of various Federal Reserve meetings. This brings the reader into the room as a witness to a Chairman who not only clearly understands the economy better than anyone, but who is also a master politician and consensus builder. Universally liked he is not, as several Vice Chairman learned. The Federal Reserve has become Mr. Alan Greenspan, and since he was first appointed by President Reagan, then President Bush, and finally President Clinton, you will learn why.

I found his relationships with the Presidents he served to be fascinating, and I was surprised by the President he felt best understood the economy. The material if accepted by the reader may cause one to reevaluate some long held beliefs about a variety of powerful Washington figures.

This book works as Bob Woodward is as knowledgeable about Washington D.C., and has access to the players that is possibly without peer. He has earned the credibility he brings to his work over decades of writing, and the meticulous notes he includes give even more validation to the reader who requires it.

A book for all to read, for when was the last time a specific Supreme Court case directly and immediately affected your life? When was the last time The Chairman of The Federal Reserve changed your net worth with 2 words?

Remember "Irrational Exuberance"?

I found the book Maestro an easy read, but in the end I came away with the impression Woodward's attempts to liven up the often dry matter of macroeconomics as off the mark. To me it reflected another mixed attempt at livening up the dismal science, and the major source of its weakness. For instance, there were severeal references to instances where Greenspan would be concerned that if a certain policy action did not happen, the whole system would "crack" or fall apart. While the 1987 crash and events surrounding the LTCM failure in 1998 were in that category, attempts to sensationalize many other policy dilemmas in this manner between 1987 and 2000 implies either Woodward's lack of a grasp on how complicated economic policy is on an ongoing basis, or is just an attempt to stir the reader's attention.

The other major flaw in the book is the author's numerous attempts to portray Greenspan as some kind of statistical and probability driven humanoid. The (sad?) truth is that every well-trained economist thinks in the mathematical and probabilistic way described, and the good policy economist is one who can temper it with judgment, based on the unseen. Greenspan's genius to me is not his logical style of thinking, but rather his ability to temper it with a good dose of common sense and judgment. And his other genius us clearly his political savvy. Woodward does not emphasize enough the relative importance of these two attributes. The author instead seems enthralled by Greenspan's logical thought process, which to any economist or scientist is only a necessary but not sufficient condition for sound analysis. In any event, Greenspan's policy choice is unidimensional, of raising or lowering interest rates, to maintain growth with low inflation, in a country that has the best available economic data in the world. His genius is not in figuring out what the correct policy is, but rather in seeing the correct policy implemented and building a consensus around it.

What the book does do quite well is demystify the man behind the myth, and shows his insecurities as well as his dilemmas. At some places, it alludes to things that can not be proven (such as his role if any in Felix Rohatyn's failed bid to be Vice Chairman but strongly suggesting Greenspan may have pushed some levers). This comes across as more a starry eyed fan's perpetuation of a mythical figure rather than a hard journalistic hypothesis that we would expect from someone with the immense stature of Bob Woodward.

Overall, the book is interesting to read, but not satisfying in understanding either Greenspan's economic skills, or his ability to carry out policy.

You have to wonder about folks who slam a book without reading it based on personal ideology alone. Regardless of ideology, Woodward reveals the workings of the Federal Reserve in a way which does not require a degree in economics. While the nation is riveted on a partisan struggle for control of the presidency, it is fascinating to understand the degree to which this agency affects our economy and our lives. Woodward decodes the system for the lay reader, revealing the power of the Fed and Greenspans significant power within.

The conduct of monetary policy in the US is important to the US and the rest of the world. Alan Greenspan is an interesting figure of historical significance. This book sheds little light on either subject.

The book is hampered by its episodic nature, and, apparently, limited range of sources. Woodward tries to sustain a narrative based largely on the twin themes of Greenspan's ability as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to manipulate the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) which sets an important benchmark interest rate, and whether that instrument, the federal funds rate, is moved up or down.

The first theme is of questionable interest: the institutional structure of the Fed gives the chairman enormous power. It is not at all clear than another chairman, with a different substantive agenda and a different personality, could have just as effectively dominated the institution. Despite Woodward's efforts, it is not at all clear that Greenspan is a "maestro" - on the contrary, he comes across as a mildly unpleasant character who treats his colleagues shabbily.

As for the second theme, well, it doesn't exactly make for a page turner.

These flaws alone would not earn the book such a low rating. The real problems are sloppy writing and factual inaccuracy. To give one example: Woodward tells us that Greenspan was born in 1926. After graduating from high school, he attended Julliard School of Music for two years and then dropped out to join a touring big band. He then quit the band, went back to school, and graduated from NYU with a degree in economics in 1948 . Woodward writes that Greenspan received a masters degree in economics from NYU in 1950 and then entered the Columbia Phd program but quit before completing his dissertation. In the 1970s, NYU then "finally awarded" him what amounted to an honorary doctorate

This description begs more questions than it answers. How did Greenspan spend two years in a conservatory, tour with a band, and graduate with a degree in economics at the age of 22? What about military service? Greenspan would have been of prime draft age for the Second World War. Did he get some kind of exemption? If so, for what reason? And why would NYU "finally award" the doctorate if the work had been done at Columbia?

One might overlook these flaws (even in biography) but they carry on into the more substantive sections of the book. To give another example: Woodward's chapter 12 description of the Korean financial crisis of 1997. He argues that the US government wanted US bankers to rollover their loans to Korea; that the bankers would have been able to resist pressure from Bob Rubin and Larry Summers of the Treasury, but not from the Greenspan Fed; and that Greenspan stood back while the Treasury jawboned the bankers. This account is deeply flawed.

The critical rollover meeting was convened on 22 December 1997 by New York Federal Reserve President Bill McDonough in his office and attended by the heads of JP Morgan, Chase Manhattan, Citibank, Bank of NY, Bank of America, and Bankers Trust. McDonough convinced the six money center banks to rollover their Korean loans, and having whipped the US banks into line, he then successfully brought the Europeans and Japanese on board. The 22 December meeting was arguably the turning point in the crisis.

So why no mention of it in Woodward's account? Its hard to believe that the author is unaware of it. One is tempted to surmise that he deliberately omitted it from the narrative to set-up his interpretation in the succeeding chapter of the next crisis Greenspan encountered - the near collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Credit Management. Again, there is a financial crisis, and again, the head of the New York Fed uses his office to jawbone US financial institutions to act against their own narrow interests. However, in Woodward's telling, this is an unprecedented event, and Greenspan stands (well, actually sits) shoulder to shoulder with McDonough in the face of hostile Congressional critics. Why this portrayal of the Fed's action in the LTCM case as being unique? Is it because that action was seen as stopping a threat to the US economy, while the earlier intervention merely saved Korea (and did not save Russia and Brazil which subsequently encountered similar problems)?

At root, the problem with this book is as a rather hagiographic biography, it simply does not address the broader, and to my mind, more interesting questions such as whether it is desirable to have monetary policy conducted by an institution with little democratic accountability steered by the "pains in the stomach" of its chairman?

Perhaps this is unfair. In the end, we don't expect journalists to be deep-thinkers. But we do expect them to get their facts straight. Inaccuracies and heavy reliance on unnamed sources (from the man who, in a prior work, gave us Nixon talking to the White House paintings) makes me deeply skeptical of the value of this book either as biography, as an examination of the Fed, or as an analysis of monetary policy.

I am quite taken with this book, which at 234 pages is "just right" and well crafted and edited to tell an important story. This is a story about applied intelligence in the finest sense of the word. It is a story about a man well-versed in traditional economic research, traditional models, traditional assumptions about the marketplace, who was put into the most important position in the global financial system at just the right time. His intuition allowed him to detect unexplained changes in productivity and to direct new lines of research that helped persuade more conventional authorities to follow his strategy. This is also a story about a uniquely successful partnership between a Republican central banker and a Democratic President-the very heart of the story centers around Greenspan's ability to persuade a very smart President that deficit reduction was the critical ingredient for a long-term restoration of American prosperity. Aided by an equally smart Secretary of the Treasury, Rubin, it was the President's initiative to reduce the deficit by over $140 billion dollars that allowed all else to follow. There is a clear message here for those who would reduce taxes before finishing the job of eliminating the deficit. As a professional intelligence officer, I am very very impressed by the author's recounting of how Greenspan actually "does" the job of intelligence collection and analysis at his level-the Central Intelligence Agency could learn a great deal from this man. The integration of constant (every fifteen minutes) monitoring of key indicators, the preparation of detailed research and statistics reports, and-by far the most important element-the continuous cycle of direct telephone calls and personal meetings across all sectors of the economy and around the globe, define what must be the most efficient and effective and valuable directed intelligence operation in the world-and one that does not steal the information it needs! There are a number of observations throughout the book that are helpful at a strategic level: 1) deficit reduction is the single best thing any President can do-that enables the Fed to be effective; 2) we forget so quickly how desperate the American economy was in the late 1980's-in a volatile world it would be all too easy to enter a recession or have a major financial panic; 3) structured decision-making is extremely dependent on the models and the data-Greenspan's place in history is assured because he had the intellect and the patience and the gut instincts to realize that the data was incomplete or too aggregated and the modeling assumptions were dated and no longer sufficient to plot the course of the new economy; 4) the psychology of the marketplace is at least as important as the reality, and is likely to be hurt by loose-cannon White House elements with good intentions but out of bounds; 5) even the so-called best and brightest in any Presidential administration will categorize new ideas they do not understand as "incoherent if not idiotic", as Greenspan's emerging new ideas were labeled by the top Treasury economists; 6) the concept of wealth redistribution fails to understand that even if $1 trillion from the 225 richest people in the world were redistributed to the poorest of the earth, this would only give them $1 a day for a year-Greenspan's focus is on underlying structural changes and the advancement of capitalism such that wealth can be created for the poor on a sustained basis; and 7) there will always be wild cards, such as the Savings & Loan crisis, the LTCM (Long Term Capital Management) crisis, and the Mexico crisis, that require a financial management or central banking network able to capitalize on personal relationships and deep knowledge to find impromptu solutions. On the latter note, it makes one realize that in an increasingly volatile marketplace, there should probably be much stricter limits on "leveraged" actions, where the majority of the money for gambling on the stock market or in the bond market-as much as 95% of the money-is borrowed and therefore likely to be defaulted if the wrong bet is placed. There is nothing in the book regarding any steps that Greenspan has taken or is considering in order to bring added stability to the marketplace. If I have one criticism of this otherwise superb book, a book that sheds light on many aspects of the Fed and its Chairman, it is that there is no hint here of what Greenspan has learned that might lead him to suggest legislative or regulatory changes intended to improve public transparency of key economic transactions, limitations on risk intended to prevent one rogue elephant (e.g. LTCM) from bringing down the market, and so on. I would have liked to see a summation, even a two-page appendix, on the "before" and "after" economic models that Greenspan helped to change, and also some sense in the conclusion of what needs to be changed to keep future market crises within the bounds that can be managed by the Fed-Greenspan clearly has broad shoulders and a broad mind, but he can't carry the load forever and this book fails to focus on what changes are needed to institutionalize the Greenspan wisdom.

Bob Woodward doesn't know much economics and worships Alan Greenspan. These are the two main things that readers will learn from this book. If it wasn't apparent from the title, this book is essential a tribute to the wisdom of Alan Greenspan. Woodward presents an account where Greenspan's judgement is shown correct at every turn, and the doubters are all proven wrong. The result is the best economy in thirty years.

Unfortunately, the history (and economics) is a bit more complex than Woodward would have us believe. To take the most obvious example, it is not clear that the U.S. economy is presently the bright shining star that Woodward assumes. The low unemployment, rapid economic growth, and low inflation are all good news, but there are serious clouds on the horizon. Specifically, the over-valued stock market and the over-valued dollar threaten the economy with a double whammy which could leave the economy reeling for years to come.

Even with the recent decline in the stock market, price to earnings ratios are still close to double their historic average. The Congressional Budget Office (the agency that makes all the projections for the budget that everyone uses in political debates) projects that real corporate profits will actually shrink by about 10 percent over the next decade. This implies that the market is over-valued by 100 percent, or more. A decline of this magnitude would destroy approximately $10 trillion in wealth, or $70,000 for an average family.

Similarly, the United States is running a huge trade deficit which is leading it to borrow $450 billion a year from abroad. A trade deficit of this magnitude is no more sustainable than a budget deficit of $450 billion, as Alan Greenspan and every other economist knows. Reversing this deficit will inevitably require a large drop in the value of the dollar, perhaps by as much as 30 percent. A decline in the dollar of this magnitude will crimp living standards in the United States, as the price of imported goods rise, and also lead to more inflation.

While the fault for the over-valuation of the stock market and the dollar may not lie entirely at Greenspan's feet, he does bear a large share of the responsibility. Back at the end of 1996 (when the market was about half its recent highs), Greenspan did warn about the possibility that irrational exuberance had overtaken the stock market. But most of his subsequent comments were more oblique, leaving open the possibility that stock prices could make sense. Given the seriousness of the problem, it would have been entirely appropriate for Greenspan to use his bully pulpit at the Fed to warn of the consequences of a seriously over-valued stock market. He could have presented lectures on this topic in his Congressional testimony, in the same way that he has lectured about the dangers of budget deficits on numerous occasions. Given Mr. Greenspan's standing in financial circles, it is hard to believe that such lectures would not have had an effect. The same applies to the over-valuation of the dollar.

Woodward is almost completely oblivious to this set of issues. While the possibility of a stock bubble is mentioned at several points, it is never treated as though it were a serious problem. The history of the Great Depression and the current example of a Japanese economy left to stagnate for a decade after the collapse of its bubble in 1989 should have been sufficient to get Woodward's attention.

Similarly, Greenspan gets the final, and often only, word on the disputes of the past. For example, we get the account of his decision to raise interest rates in 1994-5 to head off inflation. Woodward tells us about the objections raised within the Clinton Administration to a policy which slowed the economy and cost jobs. However, at the end of the day, Woodward tells us that inflation remained under control, and the unemployment rate eventually fell to its current levels of close to 4.0 percent.

Woodward seems to feel that this history vindicated Greenspan's rate hikes, when the reality is the opposite. Greenspan raised interest rates because he accepted the prevailing view within the economics profession at the time, that unemployment rates below 6.0 percent would lead to higher inflation. The subsequent history showed that there was no necessary link between the unemployment rate and inflation, and that the unemployment rate could fall far below 6.0 percent without triggering inflation. Had Greenspan not raised interest rates in 1994 and 1995, the economy would have grown faster in these years and the unemployment rate would have dropped more quickly. Millions of people needlessly went unemployed in these years, and the economy lost more than $100 billion in output. History has shown that Alan Greenspan was wrong.

There are many other places where Woodward's naive hero worship and ignorance of economics lead him to go astray. The Greenspan story is certainly an interesting one which deserves to be told. It is unfortunate that this book could not have been written by someone with more understanding of the subject matter and a more open mind on the subject.

Before commenting on the book, let me state that Dr. Alan Greenspan has been the best chairman of the Federal Reserve that we have had. He has risen well to every challenge and the current record-setting economic expansion is partly a testament to his skill both as an economist and as a government leader. I give Dr. Greenspan far more than five stars for his handling of the market meltdown in October 1987, persuading the Clinton administration to lead on cutting the budget deficit, nursing sick banks back to health, in keeping a sharp focus on inflation fighting, for being vigilant about the frothy levels of stock prices, getting us through the Mexican, Asian, and Russian financial crises, and for vastly improving the methods used to track the economy.

To the potential reader of this book, let me give you two cautions. If you like exciting reading, go elsewhere. Economics and monetary policy are pretty boring stuff, and the way they are treated here makes them more boring than they have to be. Second, if you want to learn about the significance of Dr. Greenspan's role at the Federal Reserve, skip this book. It misses the target in that area.

Mr. Woodward, by comparison, is lucky I gave him 3 stars. The man treats biography as though he is uncovering the Watergate scandal, and the end justifies the means. For example, he does not cite sources. This means that the reader cannot judge for her- or himself what bias may be present in the material being quoted. For example, the first pages of the book slam James Baker in every possible way short of accusing him of being a pedophile. Who is this source (or sources) who is (are) providing the dirt? What do they have to gain by blackening Mr. Baker's reputation? I would like to know before I take the information seriously. Any other biographer or historian would tell you.

The second problem is that Mr. Woodward does not seem to know very much about economics or the Federal Reserve System. For there is little about either subject in a book that primarily focuses on Dr. Greenspan's role at the Fed. For example, the book does not even describe all of the legislative objectives that have been set for the Federal Reserve by Congress. The Humphrey-Hawkins legislation about encouraging full employment is first mentioned more than half-way through the book. Those who are not familiar with the subject wouldn't have guessed that Dr. Greenspan was supposed to be addressing this subject and was reporting to Congress regularly on it as Mr. Woodward reports on what Dr. Greenspan was doing to fight inflation.

Now, most will agree with me that economics is a pretty difficult subject to write about. But Mr. Woodward could have written about someone else rather than Dr. Greenspan. In this book, economic events, thoughts, and analyses are usually treated as either minor background events or as gossip items to reflect on personal qualities. As such, the economic events and implications are greatly oversimplified. For example, I doubt if many readers can understand the obscure references in the book to Dr. Greenspan's successful search for the missing service productivity measurements. At a minimum, Mr. Woodward needed a coauthor who is an economist to add some depth related to the book's treatment of Dr. Greenspan's work.

A third major problem with the book is that Mr. Woodward makes a great deal out of unused contingency planning in crises. These are dropped on the reader to suggest we were a hairs-breadth away from financial Armaggedon. That is like reporting the fact that we always had bombers in the air with nuclear weapons during the Cold War as suggesting that we were always about to bomb the USSR. All government agencies are always preparing for contingencies that will never occur. That doesn't mean that the contingencies are imminent. Mr. Woodward, for example, tries to make a case for having us think that President Reagan might have closed down the New York Stock Exchange in 1987 and that it could have taken a week to reopen. This is pure sensationalism in my view. It probably helps sell books.

The strength of the book is based on the fact that the Federal Reserve releases the transcripts of its deliberations. Mr. Woodward has liberally used these transcripts to give you a flavor of the consensus-building process he uses to lead in creating policy and interest rate decisions by the Fed. This raw material in interesting, even if Mr. Woodward's characterizations of these transcripts frequently are not. He makes a great deal about differences between Alan Blinder and Dr. Greenspan. That is much ado about nothing, and simply makes the book longer. Achieving consensus in Dr. Greenspan's Fed is a lot like the EDS television commercial about cowboys herding cats, especially after President Clinton began making appointments to the Fed.

One of Dr. Greenspan's great strengths is his approach to preparing for decisions. He is unusually open-minded, willing to listen, and eager to get better information. This makes others more willing to listen to him, and to pay attention to this views. It also allows him to improve his own views in useful ways. The book does a reasonably good job of exposing the benefits of this approach.

In two other minor areas, the book is clearly deficient. Mr. Woodward fails to discern the usefulness of Dr. Greenspan's complicated communications. You can read whatever you want into them. The Federal Reserve chairman is required to make more speeches, deliver more testimony, and to answer more questions than just about any other public official. Usually, the best result is to have to no impact on the financial markets. Dr. Greenspan is brilliant in performing these tasks in a neutral way. To listen to Mr. Woodward, you get a sense that Dr. Greenspan's convoluted communications are solely some sort of genetic defect acquired from his father.

Mr. Woodward does notice that stock price levels are high, but fails to fully appreciate how much the surging markets reflect a failure of Fed policy. Clearly, the interest rate raises we have going on now have been aimed more at the stock market (in a preemptive strike against future inflation) than against anything else. How will it all turn out? Much of Dr. Greenspan's final reputation will be determined by this open chapter in the story. I wish him well.

After you have finished reading this book, I suggest you consider the next biography you plan to read. Ask yourself these questions: What does the biographer have to know about to be competent in this area? Who would be an ideal biographer? How much time needs to pass before a reasonably objective and complete biography can be done? As a result, you may find your choice of subjects more limited than you like. Certainly, this book would fail these tests.

As for Mr. Woodward, please go back and write about crooked politics. You do that well, and your methods and skills are more appropriate there.

From the prespective of 2008, this book is almost laughable. Its a fawning tribute to a man and an era that proved to be about constructing an illusion rather than building an economy.

In the overheated smokey world of the book, Alan Greenspan is "Maestro". The great humanitarian economist who can create music with an instrument or with an economy. In 2008, Alan Greenspan is a man who created two enormous asset bubbles in the world economy and led the entire world financial system to the edge of collapse.

The book is in most aspects a perfect reflection of the faults of the man and the era. Its a book more of the imagination than reality. Its a book that doesn't want to look to deeply or ask difficult questions. Its a book about wanting to believe rather than looking behind the curtain.

Rather than the truth that Greenspan is a Ayn Rand trained objectivist devoted to the idea that human events and behavior can be taimed by mathematics, the book wants to paint a picture of greenspan the jazz sax man who makes decisions based on hunches. Rather than question Greenspan's reinterpretation of economic data to make "bad" trends "good", the genius of greenspan in finding the hidden meaning in productivity figures is explained.

The greatest fault of Bob Woodward the writer is that he allows himself to be used by his subjects. Rather than reporting or analysis, Woodward is about backslapping, favors and access. It was as true at the time of this silly book promoting Greenspan as genius as it later was when Woodward started selling the Iraq War for the white house.

The book is useful for amusement purposes only. It should not be taken seriously.

Forget the negative reviews others have posted about this book. It is well worth the $15 price that Amazon is currently charging for it.

There are numerous insights into Alan Greenspan, the economy, interest rate hikes, and other issues that can be learned from reading Bob Woodward's work. The book is very well researched, and has dozens of references at the end.

I found the story of the early 1990's recession very interesting. Interest rates were raised much higher back then. It looks like Alan and the Fed learned their lessons during the last episode.

Among the more human interest items in the book, did you know that Alan Greenspan was a skilled jazz musician and could play multiple instruments before he became an economist? Or that he married NBC White House correspondent Andrea Mitchell?

Order the book. If you really want to learn more about Greenspan, you won't be disappointed at this price.