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If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War: An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy

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There are many books telling what happened in individual battles or to particular ships. This book tries to grade the thinking of those who determined where forces went into battle and why.

Mostly it succeeds at describing the strategic goals and thinking (or lack thereof!) of the admirals in charge of the Pacific War on both sides. Yamamoto gets failing grades for not ensuring that his brilliant and risky gambles were sufficiently followed through; King gets consistently fairly high grades; a number of characters on both sides are criticized for various flaws.

One flaw in this book is the over-use of hindsight; the author judges various strategic ideas as if everyone should have understood at the time things that did not become clear until much later; for instance, the total dominance of the aircraft carrier over the battleship, or the inability of high-altitude bombers to hit anything in motion. He several times criticizes admirals for not understanding that their cherished goal should only have been the means to an end (e.g., Ugaki's desire to take Guadalcanal) but does not realize that his somewhat repetitive chanting of "Never divide the fleet" or "Sink the carriers" are both ends toward maintaining control of the sea. (He probably should at least have looked at some of Sir Julian Corbett's criticisms of Mahan's work.)

That said, there are many excellent gems of observation, and quite a lot of good analysis, in the book. To experienced naval strategists, they will come as no surprise; to the vast majority of the human race and Pacific War buffs who are not, this will be a very useful learning course. Readers will probably want some previous acquaintance with the history of World War II in the Pacific, but given such acquaintance this is a challenging and rewarding analysis.

Highly recommended.

Having read extensively on this topic for research on two Pacific wargames I was very impressed with this book. Mr. Adams clearly understands how to analyze and discuss strategy in a way that many books attempt, but few achieve. The author has done an excellent job of presenting the strategic debate that both sides engaged in during the war. As a wargame designer I am always trying to challenge the players with historically valid choices to consider. What I especially liked was the way this book described the"paths not taken", which is usually missed or left out of most accounts. Using Mahan's principles as a basis for comparing historical choices gives the reader a clear point of strategic comparison.

My only small reservation about the book is the author's view on the relative values of carrier based air power versus land based air power. I heartily endorse his view that the US for organizational vice strategic reasons unnecessarily invaded too many Japanese positions. Having said this, I believe that Mr. Adams undervalues the ability of land based air to sustain operations over long periods of time. The author's point that the US high command did not fully exploit the potential for carriers to move deep into the Japanese defense perimeter is well made, but he underestimates the carrier wings limitation for sustained high tempo operations without rest and refit, a limitation I might add that still exists. Based on this point, some island invasions were necessary if only to allow land based air to stage to certain locations.

These points aside, I strongly recommend this book for anyone who wants a fresh and well documented discussion of Pacific War strategy.

I've read many books on the WWII Pacific Theater, but I'd never before come across a book that takes this particular approach. The author judges the various commanders at all levels from national leaders down to operational/tactical commanders by the standards of Mahan. Since Mahan was the be-all, end-all naval theorist as of WWII, the naval commanders on both sides had studied his writings in great depth. This would lead the reader to think that each commander faithfully applied Mahan's teachings. Not so. Many factors impinged on commanders execution of doctine, everything from political pressure to personal fatigue. When you add in Army commanders few of whom had studied Mahan, the situation got really confusing. In the author's view, Admirals King and Nimitz come out best and General MacArthur looks like an ego-driven stumblebum.

I found the book to be an easy read and fast paced while still thought provoking. The author made his points clearly, albeit with too many repetitions of fictional comments from Mahan. There were enough typos in the book to create a bit of confusion and irritation. The maps were well done and properly located - not always true of naval histories. Overall, this is an excellent introduction to how war doctrines are created and carried out.

Using Mahanian theory to examine the War in the Pacific allowed the author to point out clearly where practice followed and deviated from Mahan's main point: destroy the enemy fleet. His analysis of MacArthur's disruptive goals reinforces other studies that show most of MacArthur's campaigns could have been dispensed with. Perhaps Roosevelt should have left MacArthur on Corregidor and evacuated Wainright. The conclusion that Tarawa was unnecessary was an analysis I had not seen expaneded upon previously. It is generally agreed that Peleliu was unnecessary. MacArthur's influence in diverting the Navy's effort to destroy the Japanese fleet was clearly demonstrated. The possibility that the Philippine campaign could have been avoided and the war shortened is well presented. The analyses of Spruance's and Halsey's actions in the Marianas and Philippines as related to Mahanian theory are direct and to the point.
A most interesting and readable analysis of the entire war in the Pacific. Highly recommend it.

Although everyone can view history with 20/20 hindsight after reading this book you realize that the Imperial Japanese Navy made some tactical decisions that cost them the war. The author starts the book off by stating "if the US Navy sinks ten ships (capitol ships) they win the war". Some how the Japanese leadership did not think in these terms even though they were students of Mahan. At the start of the war Japan had the supieor Navy, but they never took advantage of their position.

John Adams convincingly argues that Japan could have avoided war with the US after the US oil embargo. He then outlines how the Japanese should have won the battles of the Coral Sea, Midway and Guadalcanal. He also describes how General MacArthur's Island hopping campaign prolonged the war, and how the battle of Peleliu and Iwo Jima were unnecessary. The book introduces the reader to some of Mahan's theory's and it explains how theses theories, if properly employed, would have changed the outcomes of several WWII battles. This is an excellent book for anyone interested in WWII history.

Very interesting book. The author examines the entire strategic and operational history of WWII in the Pacific through the lens of Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. King and Nimitz come off very well indeed while Yamamoto gets blasted for poor follow up of his operations. And it is very difficult to judge MacArthur since he was fighting his only little war which was only peripherally involved with the one the rest of us were fighting.

During the course of the book three key themes emerge:

First, although the initial Japanese plans to destroy the American fleet so as to gain time and a free hand to exploit the Southern Resource Area was brilliant it did not go nearly far enough in preventing the reconstitution of the American fleet. They really needed to do something about Pearl either destroying or occupying the installations. The author makes the point that whatever the level of resources required for this job they were justified, because locking the Americans out of the Pacific for 2-3 years means the Japanese can reap the benefits of their victory with minimal effort.

Second, Two axis of advance for the Americans was a pointless waste of resources, MacArthur contributed nothing vital to the destruction of Japanese power.

Third even in the vital Central Pacific drive, the Americans were strangely unfocused. By 1944 the "Big Blue Fleet" could go anywhere it wanted to and bring its own aircover. It no longer needed to seize air bases every 250 miles. But the Naval commanders never seemed to realize this and persisted in executing ultimately unnecessary and bloody amphibious invasions that didn't strategically advance US forces. The author feels that the lesson that American planners should have extracted from Tarawa was to avoid Japanese held islands whenever possible, and it was almost always possible. Unfortunately I don't have the expertise to judge whether or not he is correct, but I am aware of recent work by Capt Burrell USMC in the Journal of Military History suggesting that the invasion of Iwo Jima was not only unnecessary, but that it was primarily the result of inter-service rivalry. Definitely a topic for further reading.

Another amusing affectation of this book was the authors more or less continuous assertions of Mahan's opinions of the actions of the various commanders. Apparently, Mahan would have nodded at Spruance's not chasing the Japanese after Midway, and been horrified at Halsey's aggressiveness both at Santa Cruz (where it sorta worked) and at Leyte (where it sorta didn't).

Anyway, this is an outstanding book, but it does a assume a basic familiarity with the Pacific War. Fortunately I read it after reading Costello's The Pacific War. Anyway, an outstanding book.

The book's subtitle perfectly describes the book. This is "An Analysis of World War II Naval Strategy" first and foremost. Further, it is an analysis of the naval strategy of both the major combatants, the US and Japan. In fact, it has something of the feel of a Mahan book. Not that the writing style of Mahan and Adams are alike or anything. It's just that one has the same feeling that one is reviewing events of the distant past. I've never felt that way about the Second World War. No doubt such feelings will become more and more common as World War II continues to pass out of living memory.

The book is quite absorbing. Although I didn't always agree with the author's conclusions I found myself so interested that I kept on reading, sacrificing sleep and other activities to get to a chapter's end.

Here are a few observations and criticisms.

I really didn't like the author's use of Mahan as a sock puppet. Throughout the text Adams has Mahan constantly despairing or approving of decisions, giving grades in imaginary classes, whispering in ears, etc. The device gets old in a hurry and it's quite presumptuous of Adams to assume the role of Mahan's spokesman. I think it would have sufficed if Adams just refered to Mahanian doctrine without putting words in Mahan's mouth.

The maps were excellent. The only improvement would have been a few more.

Adams' "Kauai Alternative", although interesting, seemed far-fetched and quite beyond Japanese capabilities.

Admirers of MacArthur will not like this book, although they should read it. Adams has little use for MacArthur and views the whole Southwest Pacific theater as little more than a costly waste. Adams makes his case well and you don't have to be convinced to enjoy his analysis.

Adams is a little shaky on the materiel of the war. He seems confused at times over what aircraft were available when and what was known about what when. For example, US intelligence had no inkling that the Yamato was armed with 18" guns until after the war. But there is nothing that undermines his points.

All in all, highly recommended for anyone interested in Pacific operations in WWII.

Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) was an American naval officer, historian and theorist whose writings on the importance and use of naval power were influential on both sides of the Atlantic and in Japan. Among his theories was that a great nation must possess a powerful navy capable of controlling the sea lanes needed for global commerce. Further, that in time of war, a navy's goal should be destruction of the enemy fleet, after which one's navy can go where it wishes. In order to effect this destruction, Mahan theorized, it is critical never to divide the fleet for secondary objectives, but to strive for the decisive fleet action, wherein one's whole fleet can engage the enemy's, at a time and place to one's own advantage. In his book entitled, "If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War," author John A. Adams does an analysis of high-level Pacific war strategy and asks: since both Japanese and American naval strategists were heavily influenced by Mahan's writings, to what extent did leaders of both sides follow Mahan's precepts?

On the Japanese side, Yamamoto is found wanting. Ozawa and Ugaki are deemed more favorable, but unable to influence long-term IJN strategy. On the U.S. side, King fares best, followed by Nimitz. Spruance does not fare well in the strategic category, although his handling of forces in the heat of battle is commendable. Although not a naval officer, MacArthur is examined, due to his position as a theater commander. MacArthur's fixation on the Philippines, combined with his political clout, persists as an un-Mahanian thorn in the side of U.S. strategic planning.

A major principle of Mahan's doctrine is to avoid of diversion resources in order to accomplish what Adams calls "suboptimal" goals, that is, goals not contributing to the main goal of defeating the enemy fleet. Adams makes good cases for declaring Tarawa, Peleliu and Iwo Jima unnecessary diversions. The first two have long been recognized as such. The third, Iwo Jima, has had more support from historians. Nevertheless, Adams takes exception to the stock explanation of providing a base for P-51 escort and emergency landing strips for B-29s. Also called into question is MacArthur's Operation Cartwheel, the continued encirclement of Rabaul, rendered superfluous in Adams' analysis once Truk had been neutralized. There is much food for thought in Adams' book for the experienced Pacific war reader. As hard as it is to imagine the war against Japan without Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Peleliu or even the recapture of the Philippines, it is nevertheless instructive to follow the author's reasoning, even if the reader doesn't always agree with Adams' conclusions.

The main shortcoming of If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War has to do not with the writing, but the editing. There are a few typos, and it appears that the final version prior to printing was not reviewed by anyone knowledgeable of the subject matter. Commodore Perry, who helped open Japan in 1853, is called "Dewey." John Bulkeley, the PT boat commander that took MacArthur off Corregidor, has his name rendered, "Bulkey." Admiral Pownall is called, "Pownell," and Nauru Island is called, "Mauru." Despite these mistakes, Adams' book will prove an absorbing read to anyone already familiar with the overall course of the war in the Pacific.

This study could be used as an organizational management text book in a business school class. The author begins with a review of Mahan's principles, e.g., focus on the most essential task, never divide your fleet, and then applies these principles to the history of the Pacific War. Familiar historical episodes illustrate how difficult sticking to these simple principles is in practice. In the real world, competing demands from diverse power centers -- and competing personalities -- easily makes loss of focus and dilution of effort the more likely outcome. By the end of the book, we learned some lessons applicable to daily life, as well as some history. The writing style is engaging and non-technical. The reader need not possess detailed knowledge of history or military affairs. At the same time, endnotes are plentiful and probably helpful to more academic readers.