Customer Reviews

Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome

5 star:		(1)
4 star:		(5)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

This is a collection of essays by experts that are outstanding. It is meant to fill in part of the "gap" left by Peter Paret's Makers of Modern Strategy which omits classical warfare. Each of the selections is complete with footnotes and an up to date bibliography.

The selections are :Tom Holland on the Persian Wars and a Persian view of the conflict aganst a "terrorist state"; Donald Kagan on Thucydides and Pericles' attempt to defend the Athenian Empire; David L Berkey's brilliant essay on The Fortifications of Athens and how these enabled her to have a vigorous role in foreign policy; Hanson writes on Epaminondas and the use of preemptive war by Thebes to weaken Sparta and spread democracy. A very valuable essay as Epaminondas and Theban democracy are almost totally ignored by the historical community. Hanson as might be expected vigorously compares this to US policy in the post 9/11 world; Ian Worthington on Alexander the Great and nation building and dealing with a large multi-ethnic empire; John W I Lee on the neglected topic of Urban Warfare in the Classical Greek World; Susan Mattern on Roman Counterinsurgency; Barry Strauss on the messianic nature of Slave Wars; Adrian Goldsworthy on Caesar; and finally Peter Heather on Frontier defense and the Later Roman Empire, which rejects Luttwak's theories of a passive defense in depth in favor of a more "offensive" policy of raids and expeditions to punish or support client states, and how over the course of time this interaction resulted in stronger hostile neighbors.

All of these essays have conclusions that relate the topics to the modern world, and Lee's essay would be particularly useful for those who serve in the modern military. Whether you accept them or not is another matter. This collection should not be missed with those that have an interest in the classical world, and would be an excellent selection for a classical history course which wishes to defend its "relevance.

Hanson belongs firmly in the old school historian camp who seek to extrapolate contemporary meaning from the analysis of history. This book is a series of essays largely on elements of Greek and Roman military strategy and their parallels to modern day conflicts. Sometimes this works, often it does not. The essays are largely interesting and informative, and yes they do presuppose at least a general working knowledge of ancient history, but the application of historical principle is often specious at best--sometimes a simple afterthought--as if the author wrote the essay and then thought "Oh yeah, Hanson said I should include analysis."

As with most volumes of this type, there are hits and misses. I found the essays on the Greco-Persian Wars, Alexander the Great and nation building, and Julius Caesar and the General as State to be particularly worthwhile.

Hanson's own essay on Epaminondas and the Theban doctrine as applied to Sparta, an oft-overlooked area of study, is one of the best here, yet he just can't keep himself from trying to tie it in to the Iraqi conflict, and actually to some effect. The problem is that other historians are not as adept at making this transition as Hanson is. I'm not necessarily against this type of "lessons learned from history" approach, it just has to be done with extreme caution and with the proper qualifiers.

If you have an interest in the ancient world, this volume is worthwhile, just be aware of the limitations of this type history going in.

Like many historical essay collections, "Makers of Ancient Strategy" has some good essays and some mediocre ones. As a book on ancient history this is an excellent collection; even as a book that has historians trying to provide insight into strategy the book succeeds. Where a few of the essays suffer is where the author tries to specifically link ancient history to today's problems in the Middle East. Rather than this effort coming across as insightful, the tendency is for the author to appear as if he's reaching beyond his area of expertise (ancient history) into fields where he doesn't understand the concepts, or even the vocabulary, of strategy or modern warfare.

Having said that, the collection does a good job of presenting insight into ancient strategy. For example, although I think her use of the term "insurgency" is too broad, Susan Mattern's essay on "Counterinsurgency and the Enemies of Rome" is an excellent overview of how Roman diplomacy, personal connections, social mechanisms, and force were used to subdue rebellions and keep the empire in line. At the same time Peter Heather's essay "Holding the Line" presents what I feel is a complementary analysis of Rome's offensive strategy that fits with Luttwaks's defensive theory in "The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third." (Despite Heather's contention that Luttwak's theory is "mistaken," I believe offensive and defensive options can, and did, both exist.)

At the same time, essay's such as John W. I. Lee's "Urban Warfare in the Classical Greek World," and David L. Berkey's "Why Fortifications Endure" cover types of warfare that tended to be overshadowed by more famous ancient set piece battles at sea and on land.

All-in-all, a very nice collection of essays that address strategy in the ancient world.

The book is a series of essays on several ancient military/political topics/strategies. I enjoyed the book, and learned a lot of new things. However, I think it would be very useful for the reader to have a decent general knowledge of ancient Greek and Roman history, in order to fully enjoy the book. For someone with no knowledge of that history, I think the book could be difficult to follow in parts, and might be less enjoyable.

I have gone through a lot of Victor Davis HAnson books lately . I think I've read five or six this summer. I feared that one more would be one to many - but no. I enjoyed this book too. Of course he's just the editor not the author. Still I'm surprised by just how many insights about the modern world can be had in Greek and Roman history.

It's sad that Victor Hanson whose "War Like No Other" was quite good should have allowed himself to be wrangled into editing this group of mediocre historical essays with a grandiose but misleading title. "The Makers of Ancient Strategy" is supposed to be compared to Paret's masterpiece of military history. There is nothing new in these essays and certainly very little about the development of military strategy and tactics on the Paret level.

To me the essays read as weak attempts to create lessons from the ancients that in some cases just aren't there. As a result you end up with Holland's silly notions of the Persian Empire's failure to invade Greece as a case of imperialistic overreach.

Unless you are a real neophyte to history you won't find these essays particularly enlightening or interesting. If you are of a military bent of mind you'll strain to find anything about the development of military theory or processes. Instead you'll be treated to the idea of military history as psycho-social drivel. Hopefully this poor offering will be the place where this approach to military history and the study of the development of strategy is finally abandoned for want of interest.

It seemed to end a bit too fast. It completely left out China and Japan, and only Grazed of Persia. Other than that, a great book.
As a Monarchists, I find I have an automatic disdain of Ancient Greek civilization; the portion of text where the writer states " Western Civilization without a doubt finds it political ancestry in ancient Greece" was a disliked and sad fact.