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The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam During the Kennedy Era

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Halberstam's work is a classic, outlining the dilemma that Vietnam posed to American policymakers in the early 1960s, and written in lucid, newspaper-reporting style. The author's perceptiveness is particularly striking when one considers that he wasn't even 30 years old when he covered Vietnam.

Unfortunately, this McGraw-Hill edition abridges Halberstam's masterpiece. Most of the essential pieces of the story remain, but much of the rich, colorful narrative, which makes this such a fascinating book, is lost. Hopefully, a complete version will return to print soon.

Before reading this book, my knowledge of the Vietnam war was limited to the movies I had seen on the subject, until recently when a friend recommended this book to me after a brief discussion of the war, its political agenda and its intrigue. Making of a quagmire is an extensive and thourough account of the events in 1961 and 1962 that lead to the eventual full american involvemnt in Vietnam. Halberstam provides an unbeleivable and at times jaw-dropping first hand account of the political and military events of the period, and translates with remarkable skill the frustration of the vicious circle that was the american policy in Vietnam. A must read for any one with even a slight interest in the subject

If one wants to understand the debacle or "quagmire" know as the Vietnam War, look no further than this riveting account! In "The Making of a Quagmire," David Halberstam pin points all of the failures of the system years before the first official U.S. troops splash ashore at Danang, Vietnam. His account, a collection of observations about Vietnam under the Diem presidency, is refreshing while at the same time shocking in its findings. While many observers insisted that efforts in Vietnam were progressing so well from 1961-63, Halberstam sees the light. His expose of all the failings of the system includes candid words about the inept south Vietnamese leadership and the American advisors who grow increasingly frustrated with their mission. Most importantly though, Halberstam offers a glimpse into the life of a journalist caught in his own war of censorship.

In the early 1960s, David Halberstam was a New York Times correspondent who initially viewed the U.S. political and military-advisory roles in South Viet Nam as a necessary stance against the Communist menace (as defined by Dwight Eisenhower's "domino theory" in Southeast Asia).

But his pessimism grew during tours of the nation, interviews with American military advisors and his concerns surrounding the corrupt South Vietnamese government of President Ngo Dinh Diem. His criticism became so much of a problem to the Kennedy Administration that the president himself lobbied NYT editors to have Halberstam yanked out of South Viet Nam if his reporting continued to run contrary to the government's optimistic pronoucements.

The abridged edition - to make the text more accessible to those not familiar with this history - is a classic retrospective on how Halberstam grew to question the policies of Diem and Kennedy. It also importantly takes the reader through a journey on how he had to walk gingerly through the web of censorship that is played out between the government & the news media.

This is an eye opener for those who, like me, were not aware that our involvement in Vietnam began with financial support of the French struggles with the Vietminh in the early 1950s, well before Dienbienphu. As the French fell from power we Americans threw our money and might behind a beleagured government that was more French than Vietnamese and an Army (ARVN) of the South that was quickly being defeated from within by the National Liberation Front (NLF). The latter because the NLF worked with the people and identified with the people's desire to rid themselve of the bourgois government of Saigon, that was now supported by American advisors, money, and munitions. Halberstram reveals the NLF's simple plan of working with the locals, providing medical aid and military support enamored them to the common people. In contrast the ARVN troops often antagonized the common man, arbitrarily killing villagers whom they thought were collaboraters with the NLF, without tangible evidence. In response the NLF did perform selective executions of local leaders who collaborated with those in Saigon. The NLF's actions in this effort provided the local villagers with a modicum of protection and a healthy amount of fear, the fear that collaboration with Saigon would be costly. As the NLF fought a profoundly effective political and military war, the US supported ARVN forces were being defeated in their attempt to build a nation. The ARVN's efforts effectively hindered future American efforts to wage a political war, a war that was lost before it began. This is an important read given our own governments current plain of COIN in Afghanistan. Same ineffectual policy, different people...

Halberstam was in South Vietnam from the early sixties through the fall of Diem's Government in 1963 and into 1964. He returned in 1967 and adds an epilogue. His story is told from the none partisan eye of a reporter. Vietnam is an enigma to the Western eye. We can't get into the minds of the Vietnamese no matter how hard we try. The country is majority peasant farmers with strong ties to their ancestry and, their common focus, is feeding their families and tilling the same land their ancestors did.

Halberstam explains with great clarity the tumultuous early 60's in Saigon where ruled an almost hermit like reluctant mandarin president Diem. Diem, quiet, secluded and isolated was, in essence, a puppet of his narcissistic, sociopath brother Nhu and his wife Madame Nhu.

Having given himself almost total power over the Government, Nhu, and his outspoken wife, ran roughshod over the populace in order to feed their voracious appetite for personal wealth and prestige. Also, despite receiving millions in U.S. aid, the Nhu's and Diem denounced and blamed America at any opportunity for their own failings knowing that America was too entrenched in Vietnam to cut aid and withdraw. Quagmire is the perfect word to describe the situation.

Halberstam went out on patrol with the ARVN mainly in the Mekong Delta. Realistic Vietnamese Generals reported to Halberstam that conservatively, the Southern Government maybe held 10 - 20% of the region and, the remainder were under Vietcong rule. The Saigon government wouldn't hear any of this and constantly reported to Washington that their policies were working and the South was winning the war. One infamous policy of Nhu's was the strategic hamlet program whereby, the farmers and their families were moved from their ancestral lands to fortified villages. This again proves the disconnect between the Saigon Government and its people. The program was supposedly for the betterment and safety of the people as opposed to the the real reasons, power of and control.

Halberstam's writing style is very objective and he explains, with just the right amount of detail, the run up to the most defining events of the early 60's Vietnam that eventually toppled the Diem Government. Each of the chapters is broken into clearly marked sections enabling you to put the book down and pick it up again without having to read back a few lines.

There is a forward by Daniel J. Singal that somewhat summarizes the book and adds insight, though not too much, from a hindsight perspective. This version has also been edited and condensed to appeal to the more contemporary reader.

It seems Halberstam was somewhat prophetic in his writings insomuch as, we (The USA), were there in conflict not only with the communist North but also with the majority of the people we were fighting for. Ours was a cold war logic which mattered very little to the population we were supposedly protecting.

This is fascinating stuff for me and feeds my thirst for Vietnam material post 1957 through 1965.

Well worth the money and well worth the time.

The entire tone of this book is that the Saigon Press Corp were the smartest people in the world. They had all the answers, but nobody would listen to them. They could see the diaster coming, but nobody else could see it coming. The government and military (both American and Vietnamese) were incompetent and not listening to the right people. Chapter 11 "The Saigon Press Controversy" is devoted entirely to this theme, and should be eliminated as it does not relate to American involvement in the Quagmire.
I was disappointed there was no followup on Madame Nhu, given the amount of venom directed at her in the first part of the book. And no mention of her during the coup. I learned from other sources she was out of the country during the coup, and still lives(?) in Italy.
Chapter 10 "A Slow Change in American Policy" shows a very limited view of the situation. President Kennedy as early as August 1963 was considering the removal of Diem, and Lodge the day before the coup offered Diem safe passage out of the country.
Perhaps the biggest disappointment is the Epilog. Halberstam wrote it after returning to VietNam in late 1967, and gives his views on the situation as it stood then. This is dated even before the Tet Offensive occured. The editor, Mr Singal should write an Epilog II that covers Halberstam's insights for the future of the country, and highlights at least the following 10 years of unimaginable misery and bloodshed in VietNam.

I read this book when I was a Cadet at West Point. It changed the way I looked at U.S. policy.