Customer Reviews

Man in the Shadows: Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Director of Israel's Mossad

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It is true that this book is not riddled with "cloak and dagger fireworks" but, it is not at al true that it is nothign more than a self-glorifying account of a man's own actions, as one reviewer has said.

Halevy describes how events over the last 10-20 years have unfolded in the middle east, and in the process relates how the individual characteristics of the various leaders invovled helped to shape them. His accounts of the larger than life life people he describes are plain, to the point, and overall extremely insightful. He recounts, with much insight, the victories and successes of the last 2 decades. He furthermore, does not shy from describing, in detail, both his own failures and those of others.

This book is an excellent read for those truly interested in the actuall manner and circumstance of the unfolding of history.

i love this kind of books .as a person who is living in the middle east which lived a lot of wars and conflicts between the arabs and the israeles i alaways search on the books talk about such a topic . this man mr halevy because his possision as a post leader of mossad explains and clears every thing about the middle east crisis. in a good degree of objectivety in a way that gives the reader who does not no any thing about the middle east a good background he is simple , clear , no complcations as he is chating with you or as when our moms told us stories before sleeping when we were young . it is a book you can read in the week end , in the holiday , in the tunel before going to the work >

Yes, it is true. There are no cloak-and-dagger fireworks. Go to the paperback section for that. Every few dozen pages there is some repetitive item. Never mind, skip it. Here and there you'll come across a sentence you just cannot parse, no meaning. Skip again.

But in its totality it is a tremendous read! It conveys a vivid and clear picture how events get shaped. It is an extraodinarily low key and high quality education in appreciating that everyday history is crucially dependent on the character, qualities and frailties of the people participating in the events. So much, once more, for the marxist delusion of "historical necessity" and irrelevance of personalities.

Perhaps this is the crux and lesson and even, chance for optimism, of this book. As much as many (most?) miseries and catastrophies came from the many and various follies of man, perhaps one could hope that wise conversation might avert some future catastrophies.

The first - review of this book is by Victor Ostrovsky who accuses Halevy of betraying the 'Mossad' by revealing its decision- making process. But Halevy is a long- term Israeli civil- servant who published only those stories which Israeli intelligence approved the publication of. He probably tells in this book only a small percentage of all that he really knows. He above all insists that he is now ' out of the loop' and really does not have up-to- date information on many of the current problems facing the Mossad. Ostrovsky on the other hand is considered by the Israeli public to be a ' deserter, opportunist and traitor' who sold ' secrets' he obtained in his low- level intelligence position.
Halevy in an interview with David Horowitz editor of ' The Jerusalem Post' indicated that the major theme of this work is providing warning to the West about the danger of Islamic radical terrorism. Halevy believes that ' the worst is yet to come' and that Western governments are not really planning properly , not coordinating their efforts properly in facing the danger.
He however quite surprisingly to me, downplays the Iranian nuclear threat to Israel, and believes that eventually the discontented, youthful population of Iran will overthrow the present regime of Mullahs. He believes that Israel has the means to prevent Iran from using its nuclear weapons and missiles against it. Here I believe he is far too optimistic, and too places too much trust in coordinated world - action against Iran. I do not believe he reads correctly the Iranian-Chinese- Russian connection and the danger it presents to the free world in the future.
Despite this and overall, Halevy is a knowledgeable and insightful veteran Intelligence hand. He provides insights into the way situations are evaluated and decisions made at the highest level.

Efraim Halevy could as well had added the following subtitle to his book: "My War Against Shimon Peres". The leitmotif of the first part of the book is the constant popping up of Shimon Peres's name in every possible circumstance where Shimon obstructs, deceives and schemes against literally everybody to assuage his thirst for glory. There is little doubt that Shimon richly deserved the overt animosity coming from Efraim Halevy. One can only sympathize and empathize with Halevy since the object of his dislike continues to scheme to this day.

It is by no means easy to write a book on intelligence, especially so soon after leaving office. Everything you write may be used against your country. Therefore Halevy writes about people who are out of office or dead (the exception being Peres) , his contribution to the Israeli - Jordanian Peace Treaty and about general principles that are applicable at any time and therefore do not divulge anything of immediate value. His portraits of Israeli prime ministers are interesting in that he rehabilitates Shamir, is complimentary of Netanyahu, Rabin and Sharon, much less so of Barak and the premiership of his nemesis Peres does not even register. The ultimate snub.

Halevy's observations about the work in intelligence are logical : "On issues of life and death the intelligence officer must always err on the side of the threat and not on the side of the optimist".

To me the most significant part of the book are the last two chapters in which Halevy talks of WWIII, i.e. the war against Islamic terror. This is the part in which his weight as the ex head of the Mossad may have some impact on the `powers that be' of today. He correctly defines it as Islamic terror and not `war on terror' and warns that the West does not cooperate enough to confront the common threat. He is fully aware of the dangers of Al Qaeda and the way things may eventually turn: " Government and their senior executive officials will take action, the like of which has rarely ever been dreamed in the past." Halevy should be given credit for being one of the rare ex government officials who does not obfuscate in naming the enemy.

But two aspects of his recommendations are questionable. The first is to squeeze in anti- terror legislation as soon as possible while the country is recovering from a major terror attack. Would it not be more reasonable to be entirely frank with the population, stop avoiding the truth and minimizing the threat, and educate the population so that it can support anti- terror measures in full clarity of what is being done?

The second is his differentiation between Al Qaeda on the one hand and Hamas and Hezbolah on other. Hamas is, according to Halevy, different because "Hamas is not solely a terrorist group. It has political and social interest" "`In their own way, they aspire to be part of the system and not as Al Qaeda aspires, to destroy it ".

Yes, but part of what system does Hamas want to be a part of? Exactly the same one Al Qaeda is fighting for! Allegiance to Islam tops any local self interest. Efraim Halevy and the intelligence community in Israel should be well advised to read up on Islam in the works of Ibn Warraq, Bat Ye'or, Serge Trifkovic , Robert Spencer and Daniel Pipes.

What should one expect when picking up a book with a subtitle that reads: "Inside the Middle East Crisis with a Man Who Led the Mossad"? Surely this is going to be a real-life rendering of a Tom Clancy novel, or at the very least, a John Le Carre one? Well, not exactly. Efraim Halevy, who was at the helm of Israel's notorious and legendary secret service organization for five years, is not your typical cloak-and-dagger type. Far from it. I happened to have met him personally on a couple of occasions many years ago, and if anything, he reminded me of Sir Humphrey in the TV show "Yes Minister": the quintessential British civil servant, with impeccable manners and the Queen's English.

"Man in the Shadows" is more of a political memoir than an account of the Mossad's activities. Halevy played a dominant role as the secret envoy of several Israeli prime ministers (Shamir, Peres, Rabin, Netanyahu, Barak and Sharon) and as such was privy to many negotiations that shaped the region's politics in the 1990s. He writes of these experiences in a low-key and level-headed manner; rarely does he lapse into the emotional zone and when he does so it usually, and suprisingly, concerns Shimon Peres and/or the Israeli foreign services. Although not stated in so many words, it is clear that Halevy has little sympathy for Peres. He speaks fondly of other prime ministers he served under, but for Peres he has nothing but scorn and distrust. As for the foreign office diplomats, he makes them out to look like total amateurs.

A lot of attention is given to Jordan and to its late king, Hussein. This is understandable given Halevy's special relationship with the Hashemite kingdom and the late monarch. His involvement in bringing about the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel was substantial. His account of the Khaled Mashal incident - a botched attempt by the Mossad to kill a Hamas leader in Amman that brought about a serious crisis between the two countries - is probably the most fascinating chapter in the book. Halevy is well aware of this "Jordan bias" of his and admits to it; nevertheless, he remains of the opinion that Jordan plays a pivotal role in the Middle East, well and above what most observers will admit to.

Halevy also devotes many pages to how he views the intelligence community and its interaction with its political masters. I found these parts of the book to be more interesting than the historical accounts (especially as there are no new revelations anyway). Halevy laments the decline of the special standing of the intelligence community, especially in the US, in the aftermath of the 9/11 structural shake-ups. He believes that in the current war of the civilised world against global terrorism - a war he calls "World War 3" - the West cannot win if it does not accord its intelligence organs the proper standing and freedom of operation they deserve.

This book consists of some interesting recollections from Efraim Halevy, who served as the director of Israel's Mossad.

We readers see how the First Gulf War, in 1991, Israel fared poorly. Yes, the United States helped defend Israel from Iraqi missile attacks. However, Halevy makes the point that most knowledgeable Israelis "did not believe that the United States was doing its best to apprehend the missile launchers" and for that reason, many Israelis are very suspicious of how much help the United States will ever give Israel should its survival be at stake.

Israel did indeed agree not to join in the attack on Iraq, which may have saved the coalition against Iraq but the author shows that this did Israel very little good. While Iraq, a serious enemy of Israel, was indeed weakened, Israel quickly came under severe pressure from its friends to appease its remaining enemies.

Israel has always needed peace, and this has made it susceptible to bogus offers of peace. Halevy explains how this affected negotiations that involved covert channels. As he says, rather than being a way to discuss issues regarding Israel's future, keeping Israel's interests in mind, the covert talks "evolved into a strategy designed to enable the devoted negotiators to engage in dreams of peace rather than to confront the true facts of life and to grapple with them."

There is a long and interesting section on how Israel and Jordan managed to sign a peace treaty. And we also see what Halevy thinks of several famous people of the region. One is the notorious Yassir Arafat, who Halevy mentions was a "compulsive liar" who "would never honor a commitment and rarely would have anything but contempt for his peers." I remember being flabbergasted by the fact that rather than arresting, trying, and executing this thug, leaders of Western nations often showed esteem for him. But Halevy says that Arafat did pay a political price in 2000 and 2001 for refusing to make a deal at Camp David and then for lying about the Karin A arms smuggling to the president of the United States. Once again, I'm shocked that it took all this to discredit such a horrible person.

We also see Halevy's puzzlement at Israel's acceptance, even under pressure, of the infamous "road map" proposed by the quartet of the United States, Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations. This document "was deemed a nonstarter and a real danger to Israel's interests for a variety of reasons." And these reasons included allowing the quartet to determine if the Arabs had fulfilled their obligations on issues such as ending terror. That would pretty much let the Arabs do what they pleased.

In this book Halevy often makes the point that one ought to honor one's word and build up one's credibility. I agree. And I think that means needing to resist pressure to make agreements that one can not or will not fulfill.

I enjoyed reading this book and I recommend it.

I bought (or got) this book 'cause I've always liked spy stories (I'm a John LeCarre man myself)and I had some expectations of a "show and tell" book by a former head of the Mossad. I also had some respect, as a citizen consumer of the news, of this official who had,somehow, something more European and dignified than the "average" Israeli macho security hero. Halevy was also Israel's ambassador to Jordan and very instrumental in brokering the peace agreement with Jordan.

I found the book rather tiresome with a great deal of muted self-glorification and almost no revelations or juicy bits. Halevy comes across as a very loyal and careful technocrat with clear views (which I don't subscribe to) about the "War on Terror" being the central stuggle of our times.

As a mature student of Intelligence Services I expected a well edited book of substance and at least some specifics. it was not to be.

How any reputable publishing house would led its name to this vainglorious diatribe is beyond me. Halevy spends most of the book looking in the mirror and saying how beautiful and marvellous is the image he sees.If there is a window in his life that looks out into the real world, it does not appear here,

His banal mantras of the "free world" sound like a parrot without knowledge of its environment.Free by his description is obviously not anyway who disagrees with the rampant racism of Israel, or its thuggery and war crimes against a countries who are its neighbors.

I read it to the end to justify my wasted expediture in buying it.If potential readers want to know about Mossad, give this a miss and read Victor Ostrosvky, Gordon Thomas or Seymour Hersh.

This book is rubbish, from a man obssessed with his own importance and his most myopic of views of the world and even his own neighborhood.

Efraim Halevy spent his working career in Mossad (except for the two years he spent as Israel's ambassador to the E.U.). He rose up through its ranks to become Mossad's Director in 1998, retiring in 2002. In MAN IS THE SHADOWS, he writes a history of the Middle East from approximately the end of the Iran-Iraq War to the modern day.

Halevy may be a spymaster extraordinaire, but as a writer and as a historian, he is merely adequate. Not good, not bad, merely adequate. A good historian would have a theme to the book, and that theme would have permitted events to be set out in some kind of logical order, rather than in the haphazard manner in which they are presented. The book does get a big leg up at about page 50, when Halevy introduces himself into the story. With his appearance, the story takes on a much more personal and interesting feel.

One major disappointment in the book is the lack of any cloak-and-dagger spy stories. There are some covert operations, but they are in the nature of secret diplomacy (which left me wondering why these missions were not carried out by members of the Foreign Ministry rather than by Mossad).

The apex of the book occurs when Halevy is summoned back from his ambassadorial duties in Brussels when a Mossad-assassination attempt of a terrorist leader goes horribly wrong in Jordan. Two Mossad agents are in custody, four more have taken refuge in the Israeli embassy, and the Jordanian King is so furious he is on the verge of abrogating the Jordan-Israeli peace treaty and closing down the Israeli embassy. When the mess is dumped in Halevy's lap, he quickly boards a plane to Amman because he alone realizes than none of Israel's problems can be addressed until the King's reputation is restored. Halevy's out-of-the-box thinking and his insight into human nature saves the situation and demonstrates why he was such a major force in the Middle East.

The nadir of the book occurs in its last two chapters, where Halevy advises the U.S. and Europe to handle the struggle against al Qaeda by subjecting their Muslim minorities to the same repressive tactics used by the Israelis upon the Palestinians. Halevy attempts to justify these draconian and anti-democratic methods by arguing that the West is in a struggle for its very survival. He fails to notice that the rag-tag collection of homicidal maniacs which make up al Qaeda have been so ineffectual that they have inflicted fewer casualties during their entire history, than is suffered each year because of the tobacco industry and the internal combustion engine. The West does not need to destroy its freedoms in order to save them. Halevy argues al Qaeda wants to establish a worldwide Califate, but he fails to realize that the only conceivable way that could ever happen is if the Western atrocities drive the Muslim world into al Qaeda's camp.

There is some good stuff in these pages, but you have to work to tease it out. Ignore the last two chapters; they are a waste of ink.