Customer Reviews

Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

This is a must read book for combat arms officers. It explores many of the fundamental concepts involved in maneuver warfare, and why small, agile armies usually beat bigger, slower enemies. The arrangement of various topics covered by several authors results in an interesting and intriguing read. Far superion to Leonhards similar maneuver book. The only books that explore this important topic as well are "Maneuver Warfare Handbook" by Bill Lind, and the superb "Warfighting" by Hayden. If you are an Army officer or Marine officer this needs to be on your shelf.

"Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology", edited by Richard D. Hooker, Jr., although aimed largely at an audience intimately connected to, or embedded in, the US military system, is a worthy read for almost any serious student of military history. What makes this book worth reading? Two issues in particular: 1) it's relative breadth of coverage of the topic at hand, namely the value of maneuver warfare as a doctrine for the US Army to adopt, and 2) as a piece that clearly illustrates one of the BIG issues facing WWII military historians and readers, namely Wehrmacht envy.

In terms of breadth of coverage of the topic of maneuver warfare, Hooker has assembled a vast expertise of contributors to this anthology. The reader is treated to discussions on theory, history of maneuver warfare (both infantry and armored), psychology of war, teaching of warfare doctrine, and 'evolutionary' processes necessary to implement such doctrine within the US Army institution. Each of the chapters presented have inherent value though readers are likely to 'enjoy' more some than others. This reviewer found the chapter on the psychological aspects of warfare interesting but at times a bit too soft-science to take away any great wisdom. Unfortunately not all is 'milk-n-cookies'. For example, while the Introduction suggests that the reader will be treated to varying view points, both in favor and opposed to adoption of maneuver warfare as doctrine in the US Army, in reality all but a single chapter are VERY pro-maneuver warfare. This leads us to the second 'value' of "Maneuver Warfare" as a book for broad audiences - illustration of Wehrmacht envy.

Wehrmacht envy may not be familiar to all readers so a brief description is worthwhile. In its most basic sense Wehrmacht envy can be characterized as the holding of the German army of WWII (the Wehrmacht) up above all others in history as having a clear sense of tactical and operational level control. In the context of maneuver warfare, nearly all of the contributors to the present book hold the vaunted Wehrmacht up as absolute masters of maneuver warfare; if you will, the first modern practitioners of the doctrine proponents wish the US Army to adopt. It is important for the reader to attempt to separate the topic of maneuver warfare as a potential US Army doctrine from Wehrmacht envy whenever possible, or at least to be aware of issues of Wehrmacht envy. This reviewer is not suggesting that the Germans were not tactically and operationally proficient - they certainly were - or that they did not utilize maneuver warfare - they did; rather readers should be aware of a trend in modern military history (and even within the US armed forces ranks themselves) to idealize the German army of the Second World War as something much more than they were, while also downgrading (often, not always) the accomplishments of the US Army in WWII. It is hard to argue so forcefully for the implementation of maneuver warfare as US Army doctrine because outnumbered and outgunned forces can force defeat upon opponents because they utilize the 'idea of maneuver warfare' to attack enemy weakness (gaps) rather than strength (surfaces) to force collapse of the opposing force from within, while claiming that the Wehrmacht was defeated only by attrition warfare doctrine employed by the US Army who possessed overwhelming numbers and firepower but inferior tactical and operational control. This is truly the epitome of hypocrisy. Readers simply beware and approach the arguments with caution.

In the end, "Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology" is a solid 4 star read despite some of its taint (strong Wehrmacht envy).

This book is a gold mine of the nuances of the on-going development of maneuver war doctrine. Read it if you want to see the future of combat on the battlefield.

Though written in 1993, the Anthology still stands especially when you read Col Bolger's warning that maneuverism will not work against a defense-in-depth and LTC Grossman's study on the psychology of war. The other chapters express the desire to collapse enemies with maneuver rather than try to attrit/wipe them out. What we need today is a sequel where we explain 4th generation war, how we need both forces that can collapse enemies with Air-Mech 3-D maneuver AND 2-D firepower/mechanical advantage to overcome enemies in cities; combining Bolger with the other authors into a stronger whole.

These authors are the best thinkers in the U.S. military today and it would be great to see them unite again with some of the new military theorists for a sequel.

Airborne!