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Maneuver Warfare Handbook

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This primer should be on the reading list of every combat arms and combat support officer and NCO in our armed forces. Bill Lind, a civilian without any military experience, has demonstrated an extraordinary understanding of the art of war. His book has become the "underground bible" for Maneuver Warfare proponents. In this book he discusses the theory of Manuever Warfare and its origins, the principles and techniques required to employ maneuver warfare properly, and the education and training required to make it possible. Much of his work is a 'sort-of' adaptation of the sucessful Blitzkrieg theory. He even discusses the differences of bloody, Attrition Warfare (WWI Trenches) versus the more efficient, life-preserving Maneuver Warfare (Desert Storm). Mr Lind puts these thoughts in the simplest terms even a 'butter-bar' lieutenant could understand. He completes his discussion with a series of lessons written by an experienced USMC Field Grade Off! icer on each principle. Following easy lesson is a brief "homework" exercise designed to test your knowledge and understanding of each principle. William Lind's Maneuver Warfare Handbook is a must read for any serious-minded, professional soldier who wishes to become an exceptional leader and tactician.

This is a truly influential book. It explains the concept of "Maneuver Warfare" and contrasts it with the US Army's attrition based "AirLand Battle Doctrine". It covers topics such as mission orders, recon pull, decision cycles and tempo, use of the reserve, commander's intent, and other key concepts that teach a junior military leader HOW (vs what) to think.

Based on Boyd's revolutionary OODA cycle theories, it shows how a quick acting, agile force can constantly beat larger, heavier equipped foes. After reading this book you will understand exactly why the German Army of 1940-1941 was so effective against the larger and better equipped French-British, and Soviet Armies.

The book is divided into two halves. The critical part is the first half which explains in clear, understandable terms how maneuver warfare works. The second half is a series of tactical decision games that offer practical examples to teach junior leaders these concepts.

This ideas in this small book were adopted almost verbatim by the USMC for their land war doctrine. This doctrine was so effective in combat against the Iraqi's in 1990 that the US VII Corps had to move up its attack by approx 48 hours to prevent the Iraqi's from completely escaping before the marines pushed them completely out of Kuwait.

This book has served for years as an underground "bible" by maneuver warfare officers looking for a resource to help train junior leaders critical maneuver warfare concepts. While many look to technological answers to 4th Generation Warfare, this book give ideas that apply instead to people and tactics. It leaves the reader with a solid understanding on how men make decisions in combat, as well as how to translate that knowledge to a military advantage. It is a MUST HAVE book for Combat Arms officers and junior leaders.

This is a truly influential book. It explains the concept of "Maneuver Warfare" and contrasts it with the US Army's attrition based "AirLand Battle Doctrine". It covers topics such as mission orders, recon pull, decision cycles and tempo, use of the reserve, commander's intent, and other key concepts that teach a junior military leader HOW (vs what) to think.

Based on Boyd's revolutionary OODA cycle theories, it shows how a quick acting, agile force can constantly beat larger, heavier equipped foes. After reading this book you will understand exactly why the German Army of 1940-1941 was so effective against the larger and better equipped French-British, and Soviet Armies.

The book is divided into two halves. The critical part is the first half which explains in clear, understandable terms how maneuver warfare works. The second half is a series of tactical decision games that offer practical examples to teach junior leaders these concepts.

This ideas in this small book were adopted almost verbatim by the USMC for their land war doctrine. This doctrine was so effective in combat against the Iraqi's in 1990 that the US VII Corps had to move up its attack by approx 48 hours to prevent the Iraqi's from completely escaping before the marines pushed them completely out of Kuwait.

This book has served for years as an underground "bible" by maneuver warfare officers looking for a resource to help train junior leaders critical maneuver warfare concepts. While many look to technological answers to 4th Generation Warfare, this book give ideas that apply instead to people and tactics. It leaves the reader with a solid understanding on how men make decisions in combat, as well as how to translate that knowledge to a military advantage. It is a MUST HAVE book for Combat Arms officers and junior leaders.

Professor Terry Tucker, Senior Doctrine Developer, Saudi Arabian NG Modernization Program;
This book is an important and must have classic. For those that think that contemporary maneuver war has been replaced by post-modern insugency, don't bet the farm on it just yet. Certainly Mr. Lind in recent years has taken serious heat for his unconventional views ( no pun intended) on warfare; and if you are familiar with some of the controversy or have read his material you must set all that aside and buy this book anyway.
Despite the fact that this author does not have military experience, in hindsight, as a career soldier, I wish now that I would have had the benefit of this book when it was first published in 1985. This book is clearly written, provides first class examples and is the best book on manuever warfare, bar none.
If you are exploring insurgency and asymmetrical warfare you will still need this book.
For students of insurgency and terrorism you will need to buy this book and think about what the author conveys in terms of asymmetrical warfare, you will have new and wonderful revelations about the conduct of insurgency if you do.

This book clearly explains the basic concepts of maneuver warfare, and does much to clear away the numerous misconceptions that surround the subject. This book should should be read by anyone seeking to better understand maneuver warfare theory.

Though never a U.S. Marine himself, Bill Lind has done more to safeguard the Marine rifleman than any living general. During the Corps unsuccessful attempt in the late 80's to tactically evolve at the squad level, Bill Lind was the Commandant's personal adviser. His book-Maneuver Warfare Handbook-formed the backbone of that effort. It was required reading throughout the Corps at that time. As that tactical evolution has yet to occur, the book is still vitally important. It takes self-sufficient light-infantry squads to beat guerrillas/insurgents.

A short, well-written exposition of maneuver warfare theory, as explained by one of its most well-known advocates. The book was originally written during the 1980s as a capstone piece for the U.S. Marine Corps' self-conscious transition to a new warfighting doctrine emphasizing out-maneuvering the enemy, as opposed to wearing him down through attritional warfare and firepower. The theory portion itself consists of about half the book, with the rest containing various case studies for the reader to outline what he would do in a given situation, and after which Lind presents his own comments.

Reader should obviously keep in mind that, as with all theory, the books message is not necessarily going to be the definitive solution to every military problem. That depends on the army and the circumstances.

If you are looking to understand what maneuver warfare is (and isn't), this is the book you are looking for. I've read a lot about maneuver warfare on the internet and in other books (e.g. Leonard's crappy book) trying to make sense of it, but Bill Lind has done a terrific job putting it all together and explaining the ideas completely and straightforwardly in this thin book. He ties the ideas of Boyd's OODA loop, auftragstatik, surfaces and gaps, and schwerpunkt together so that the reader can CLEARLY understand what the central ideas of maneuver warfare idea. These buzzwords are thrown around in virtually every source about maneuver warfare, but this is the only one that I've read where the author really understands what they all mean and how they relate to the whole. One thing that Lind states over and over is that warfare (and particularly maneuver warfare) is an art, not a science. There are many general ideas that one should be aware of, but the application of these ideas can vary from situation to situation. It is the difference between being a cook and a chef. A cook can follow the recipe, but a chef understands the ingredients and can combine them in different ways to make interesting and unique dishes each time. So it is with maneuver warfare. Lind explains the general ideas, the kinds of things a military leader should be thinking about, but not a hard set of rules that must be followed slavishly. There are also some real world military problems at the end of the book to put the ideas that you learned in the first half into practice. Lind uses many historical examples to elucidate various points, with heavy emphasis on the WWII German army and the pre-73 Israeli Army. From my amateurish armchair, there is one question I'd like to ask Lind regarding one potential weakness of maneuver warfare. In particular, it seems to me that this decentralized philosophy of fighting requires a certain type of leadership up and down the ranks. At the lower levels, the leaders must be aggressive and intelligent, but not too aggressive (which could lead to catastrophic mistakes) nor too intelligent (which generally leads to too much introspection and hesitation). At higher levels, the command must allow their subordinates some latitude and accept some mistakes. A maneuver warfare doctrine instituted in the wrong leadership could be catastrophic. The selection and training of the officer core appears paramount in this doctrine - an issue that Lind doesn't really address. I might even go so far as to say that the national culture of many countries would prevent the use of maneuver warfare. In any case, this is a great book, the only one you'll need. If you have an interest in or professional need to study this subject, this is a no-brainer to add to your permanent collection.

Bill Lind has written the bible of manuever war. This consise little book is used as a text by the US Marine Corps. They must know something and you would be well-advised to follow their example. Get this book, otherwise manuever war will be just another phrased you will hear from talking heads.

I stumbled across this book in Afghanistan as a Lieutenant. It completely changed the way I thought about doctrine and planning, and most importantly-thinking. Later, as an instructor at the Maneuver School at Ft. Benning, it became an unofficial textbook in my class. The young officers loved it. I would strongly recommend any combat arms officer buy this book for all his subordinate officers and have regular intellectual discussions and practical exercises on the thought processes espoused in it. Additionally, the annotated bibliography is full of incredible books that should also be read to put the book in greater perspective. Another good supplement to this book is the biography of John Boyd (Boyd, the Fighter Pilot that Changed the Art of War - by Rober Coram). The second half of Coram's book is a great history of how Boyd came to the type of thinking that led to this book by Lind.