Jung Chang's Wild Swans was an extraordinary bestseller throughout the world, selling more than 10 million copies and reaching a wider readership than any other book about China. Now she and her husband Jon Halliday have written a groundbreaking biography of Mao Tse-tung. Based on a decade of research, and on interviews with many of Mao's close circle in China who have never talked before - and with virtually everyone outside China who had significant dealings with him - this is the most authoritative life of Mao ever written. It is full of startling revelations, exploding the myth of the Long March, and showing a completely unknown Mao: he was not driven by idealism or ideology; his intimate and intricate relationship with Stalin went back to the 1920s, ultimately bringing him to power; he welcomed Japanese occupation of much of China; and he schemed, poisoned and blackmailed to get his way. After Mao conquered China in 1949, his secret goal was to dominate the world. In chasing this dream he caused the deaths of 38 million people in the greatest famine in history. Combining meticulous history with the story-telling style of Wild Swans, this biography makes immediate Mao's roller-coaster life, as he intrigued and fought every step of the way to force through his unpopular decisions. The reader enters the shadowy chambers of Mao's court, and eavesdrops on the drama in its hidden recesses. Mao's character and the enormity of his behaviour towards his wives, mistresses and children are unveiled for the first time. This is an entirely fresh look at Mao in both content and approach. It will astonish historians and the general reader alike.
Mao: The Unknown Story
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Amazon.com Review
In the epilogue to her biography of Mao Tse-tung, Jung Chang and her husband and cowriter Jon Halliday lament that, "Today, Mao's portrait and his corpse still dominate Tiananmen Square in the heart of the Chinese capital." For Chang, author of Wild Swans, this fact is an affront, not just to history, but to decency. Mao: The Unknown Story does not contain a formal dedication, but it is clear that Chang is writing to honor the millions of Chinese who fell victim to Mao's drive for absolute power in his 50-plus-year struggle to dominate China and the 20th-century political landscape. From the outset, Chang and Halliday are determined to shatter the "myth" of Mao, and they succeed with the force, not just of moral outrage, but of facts. The result is a book, more indictment than portrait, that paints Mao as a brutal totalitarian, a thug, who unleashed Stalin-like purges of millions with relish and without compunction, all for his personal gain. Through the authors' unrelenting lens even his would-be heroism as the leader of the Long March and father of modern China is exposed as reckless opportunism, subjecting his charges to months of unnecessary hardship in order to maintain the upper hand over his rival, Chang Kuo-tao, an experienced military commander.
Using exhaustive research in archives all over the world, Chang and Halliday recast Mao's ascent to power and subsequent grip on China in the context of global events. Sino-Soviet relations, the strengths and weakness of Chiang Kai-shek, the Japanese invasion of China, World War II, the Korean War, the disastrous Great Leap Forward, the vicious Cultural Revolution, the Vietnam War, Nixon's visit, and the constant, unending purges all, understandably, provide the backdrop for Mao's unscrupulous but invincible political maneuverings and betrayals. No one escaped unharmed. Rivals, families, peasants, city dwellers, soldiers, and lifelong allies such as Chou En-lai were all sacrificed to Mao's ambition and paranoia. Appropriately, the authors' consciences are appalled. Their biggest fear is that Mao will escape the global condemnation and infamy he deserves. Their astonishing book will go a long way to ensure that the pendulum of history will adjust itself accordingly. --Silvana Tropea
10 Second Interview: A Few Words with Jung Chang and Jon Halliday
Q: From idea to finished book, how long did Mao: The Unknown Story take to research and write?
A: Over a decade.
Q: What was your writing process like? How did you two collaborate on this project?
A: The research shook itself out by language. Jung did all the Chinese-language research, and Jon did the other languages, of which Russian was the most important, as Mao had a long-term intimate relationship with Stalin. After our research trips around the world, we would work in our separate studies in London. We would then rendezvous at lunch to exchange discoveries.
Q: Do you have any thoughts about how the book is, or will be received in China? Did that play a part in your writing of the book?
A: The book is banned in China, because the current Communist regime is fiercely perpetuating the myth of Mao. Today Mao's portrait and his corpse still dominate Tiananmen Square in the heart of Beijing, and the regime declares itself to be Mao's heir. The government blocked the distribution of an issue of The Far Eastern Economic Review, and told the magazine's owners, Dow Jones, that this was because that issue contained a review of our book. The regime also tore the review of our book out of The Economist magazine that was going to (very restricted) newsstands. We are not surprised that the book is banned. The regime's attitude had no influence on how we wrote the book. We hope many copies will find their way into China.
Q: What is the one thing you hope readers get from your book?
A: Mao was responsible for the deaths of well over 70 million Chinese in peacetime, and he was bent on dominating the world. As China is today emerging as an economic and military power, the world can never regard it as a benign force unless Beijing rejects Mao and all his legacies. We hope our book will help push China in this direction by telling the truth about Mao.
Q: From idea to finished book, how long did Mao: The Unknown Story take to research and write?A: Over a decade.
Q: What was your writing process like? How did you two collaborate on this project?
A: The research shook itself out by language. Jung did all the Chinese-language research, and Jon did the other languages, of which Russian was the most important, as Mao had a long-term intimate relationship with Stalin. After our research trips around the world, we would work in our separate studies in London. We would then rendezvous at lunch to exchange discoveries.
Q: Do you have any thoughts about how the book is, or will be received in China? Did that play a part in your writing of the book?
A: The book is banned in China, because the current Communist regime is fiercely perpetuating the myth of Mao. Today Mao's portrait and his corpse still dominate Tiananmen Square in the heart of Beijing, and the regime declares itself to be Mao's heir. The government blocked the distribution of an issue of The Far Eastern Economic Review, and told the magazine's owners, Dow Jones, that this was because that issue contained a review of our book. The regime also tore the review of our book out of The Economist magazine that was going to (very restricted) newsstands. We are not surprised that the book is banned. The regime's attitude had no influence on how we wrote the book. We hope many copies will find their way into China.
Q: What is the one thing you hope readers get from your book?
A: Mao was responsible for the deaths of well over 70 million Chinese in peacetime, and he was bent on dominating the world. As China is today emerging as an economic and military power, the world can never regard it as a benign force unless Beijing rejects Mao and all his legacies. We hope our book will help push China in this direction by telling the truth about Mao.
Breakdown of a BIG Book: 5 Things You'll Learn from Mao: The Unknown Story
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
1. Mao became a Communist at the age of 27 for purely pragmatic reasons: a job and income from the Russians.
2. Far from organizing the Long March in 1934, Mao was nearly left behind by his colleagues who could not stand him and had tried to oust him several times. The aim of the March was to link up with Russia to get arms. The Reds survived the March because Chiang Kai-shek let them, in a secret horse-trade for his son and heir, whom Stalin was holding hostage in Russia.
3. Mao grew opium on a large scale.
4. After he conquered China, Mao's over-riding goal was to become a superpower and dominate the world: "Control the Earth," as he put it.
5. Mao caused the greatest famine in history by exporting food to Russia to buy nuclear and arms industries: 38 million people were starved and slave-driven to death in 1958-61. Mao knew exactly what was happening, saying: "half of China may well have to die."
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
From Publishers Weekly
Jung Chang, author of the award-winning Wild Swans, grew up during the Cultural Revolution; Halliday is a research fellow at King's College, University of London. They join forces in this sweeping but flawed biography, which aims to uncover Mao's further cruelties (beyond those commonly known) by debunking claims made by the Communist Party in his service. For example, the authors argue that, far from Mao's humble peasant background shaping his sympathies for the downtrodden, he actually ruthlessly exploited the peasants' resources when he was based in regions such as Yenan, and cared about peasants only when it suited his political agenda. And far from having founded the Chinese Communist Party, the authors argue, Mao was merely at the right place at the right time. Importantly, the book argues that in most instances Mao was able to hold on to power thanks to his adroitness in appealing to and manipulating powerful allies and foes, such as Stalin and later Nixon; furthermore, almost every aspect of his career was motivated by a preternatural thirst for personal power, rather than political vision. Some of the book's claims rely on interviews and on primary material (such as the anguished letters Mao's second wife wrote after he abandoned her), though the book's use of sources is sometimes incompletely documented and at times heavy-handed (for example, using a school essay the young Mao wrote to show his lifelong ruthlessness). Illus., maps. (Oct. 21)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an alternate Hardcover edition.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to an alternate Hardcover edition.
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
662 of 679 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Indeed, "an atom bomb" but beware of radiation,
By
This review is from: Mao: The Unknown Story (Paperback)
As many reviewers here have said, the book is a sea of controversy, challenging a number of important generally-accepted arguments about Mao and his rule.
Some of the most prominent claims: Mao's China was Stalin's creation; Mao had received money from the Soviet Union early in his career, and later served basically as Stalin's puppet (though a cunning one at that). Mao's rise to power would have been impossible without the Soviet backing after 1945. Personally, I think the authors fail to come up with enough evidence to support this argument. On the whole the book seems to misrepresent the Soviet actions and motives. There is plenty of evidence in the materials, to which the authors had full access (Stalin-Mao correspondence, Mikoyan talks in 1949 etc) to at least raise serious questions about Stalin's real preferences in China; in fact, much evidence suggests that after 1945 Stalin was initially willing to trade in his special relationship with Mao for a broader agreement with the Guomindang. To this end, and probably not to confuse the "imperialists", he sponsored CCP-GMD peace talks, handed over territory to the GMD, agreed to suppress anti-GMD rebellion in Xinjiang and Altai, etc. The general tilt of Soviet foreign policy in 1945-46 - not only in China but elsewhere - points to Stalin's willingness to compromise with the West, rather than a propensity towards endless expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. A related question: the authors argue that the GMD collapse in the Civil War was a result of infiltration by communist spies and of Jiang Jieshi's kind-hearted treatment of the Soviet "moles" in his ranks. The authors then point to various Soviet "sleepers", in whose ranks they include people like Zhang Zhizhong, in my view downplaying internal reasons for GMD disunity. After all, one did not have to be a Soviet "sleeper" to want to play on the Jiang-Mao conflict to maximize personal benefits. Even if some of the so called "sleepers" in fact did, as the authors claim, had contacts with the Soviets before, this need not mean that they would act on Soviet behalf in China or carry out Stalin's orders. Another major pillar of the book - the role of "ideology" in Mao's rule. The authors emphasize that Mao was moved first and foremost by considerations of power and prestige, not by fears about "revisionism" in China, etc. I happen to completely agree with the authors on this point; their argument, backed by detailed evidence, goes a long way to remedy a certain disbalance in favor of the "ideological" school especially popular since Chen Jian's path-breaking Mao's China and the Cold War. Portrayal of the Cultural Revolution as basically a power struggle is fairly convincing, though one cannot help but have second thoughts. Other authors, including notably Roderick MacFarquhar, admit that there was indeed a power struggle, and yet could there be something else, or why would Mao continue the campaign beyond 1966? In their effort to portray Mao as a cynical manipulator, do the authors overlook his genuine concerns about China's future path? An interesting thesis comes towards the end: Sino-US opening was not a result of Mao's fear of Soviet invasion, but of his effort to regain international prestige after the failure of Maoization of the world. This is a very important argument for what it tells us about Mao's delusion of grandeur, though it probably downplays Mao's fear of the Soviet Union. Yang Kuisong in a well-known article in 2000 issue of Cold War History journal argued that it was precisely Mao's reaction to Zhenbaodao in 1969 that prompted him to rethink relations with the US. This claim has been advanced in other books, for example, Li Zhisui's Private Life of Chairman Mao. Speaking of the Soviet angle, the authors advance a controversial claim that Malinovsky's drunken remark to Zhou Enlai and He Long in November 1964 about ousting Mao was actually a carefully planned act of official policy. There is no evidence for this. In fact, drunken orgies were a common practice in the Soviet leadership ranks, so Malinovsky could well say rash things without any instructions. Indeed, if the Soviet leadership wanted to probe Zhou and He Long about removing Mao, why not do so privately, rather than in the presence of foreign diplomats, including those from Western countries. Furthermore, it was He Long who approached Malinovsky to make remarks, and not the other way around. Of course, there are many episodes that are still impossible to document properly. The verdict is out, but this book gives interesting interpretations. Regarding Lin Biao, the authors subscribe to the well-known version that the plane crashed in Mongolia because it ran out of fuel. This is one example of mysteries-still-to-be-solved. Indeed, a recently leaked document (investigation by the Mongolian KGB) concludes that the plane had plenty of fuel on board. This evidence was not available to the authors at the time of writing; it shows though that many of the arguments advanced in the book will be challenged and possibly overturned when new evidence emerges. Many reviewers have said that the book blames everything on Mao. That is true to some extent. Clearly, the authors emphasize the role of one man over the faults of the system. However, I feel the authors take a fairly bold line in condemning Zhou Enlai, whose "myth" is perhaps more wide-spead than the myth of Mao. Zhou, Liu Shaoqi and many other cronies willingly participated in Mao's purges. For some reason, Peng Dehuai is spared criticism in the book, as if he was the only saint in the leadership. Deng Xiaoping receives light treatment, too, though one might ask where he was in the late-1950s at the height of the economic mess? Did he not also advance Mao's foreign policy program rigidly, for example in Moscow in July 1963, where he was more outspoken against "revisionism" than even Kang Sheng? The amount of work that went into this book is simply colossal. It must be the best-researched book on Mao ever written, and it does offer a great deal of new scraps of evidence, though some of it comes from highly questionable sources such as "interviews with a Russian insider" (???). It is impressive how the authors were able to memorize (!) documents in the Chinese archives and then quote from them. The level of interviewees (presidents of different countries etc.) makes me wonder how the authors pulled this off. Overall, I am very impressed by this book. It is exceptionally well written. Are the arguments too far-fetched? It is hard to say. Almost every major and many minor claims of the book could be easily challenged as I showed above. And yet... The final words somehow ring true: "His [Mao's] mind remained lucid to the end, and in it stirred just one thought: himself and his power" (p. 616). I walked away with a mixed feeling about this book, but it sure made an impression.
722 of 743 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Mindless bashing,
By Jake "Liberty and Justistice for all." (Dallas, Tx, USA) - See all my reviews
This review is from: Mao: The Unknown Story (Paperback)
I enjoyed the book in the sense that it provided an enormous amount of detail and precise anecdotes to back up it's thesis. It provided a well written and interesting account of Mao's rule. I read the book rather briskly as I found some of the detail to be ecessive or tedious. Much of the book was not comprised of things that were unheard about the story of Mao sofar as the invasion of by Japan etc.
What was original and rather interesting about the book was the connection made with Soviet Russia. The authors used the relatively recently released Soviet (92 i believe) archives to the best of their abilities and provided an interesting connection between Moscow's communism and Mao's. While I found the book to be longwinded at times it presents new information as well as old in an interesting and engaging manner. It is definetly not a quick read by any means but can definitely be worth it for those interested in the origins of Chinese communism and are willing to sift through 700 (ish) pages of matierial.
1,212 of 1,253 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
Nobody is 100% evil or 100% good.,
By M. Xu (Beijing, China) - See all my reviews
This review is from: Mao: The Unknown Story (Paperback)
Every man is a complex being. If one does not acknowledge this simple truth, he or she is unworthy to write books on topics like this.
It's true that millions of people have died as a result of Mao's policies either directly or indirectly. But many things were beyond his control at the time. Things may not have been what he originally hoped for. I'm not trying to defend Mao, but to say that everything was caused by him and him alone is not only absurd but also childish. Mao is a controversial figure and deserves a far more complex treatment. I simply cannot agree with Chang's one-sided portrait of the character. I can imagine why this book is so successful in America and Europe. It's because many people already had a pre-formed judgment on Mao and Communism before they read this book, and this book simply said what they had in mind or what they wanted to hear. 4 stars for the effort; 2 star for its value. Average is 3. (I changed my original rating. I'll give credit to the extensive research done by the author. She deserves it.) P.S. I believe the Cultural Revolution was a collective crime, a crime against the mass and carried out by the mass. Every Chinese man and woman who lived through that period ought to repent. Yes, Mao is to blame for the atrocities, but so are the other party leaders, the propaganda machine, the Red Guards, the butchers, the informers and the bystanders!
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