Mao: The Unknown Story (Paperback)

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Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review

In the epilogue to her biography of Mao Tse-tung, Jung Chang and her husband and cowriter Jon Halliday lament that, "Today, Mao's portrait and his corpse still dominate Tiananmen Square in the heart of the Chinese capital." For Chang, author of Wild Swans, this fact is an affront, not just to history, but to decency. Mao: The Unknown Story does not contain a formal dedication, but it is clear that Chang is writing to honor the millions of Chinese who fell victim to Mao's drive for absolute power in his 50-plus-year struggle to dominate China and the 20th-century political landscape. From the outset, Chang and Halliday are determined to shatter the "myth" of Mao, and they succeed with the force, not just of moral outrage, but of facts. The result is a book, more indictment than portrait, that paints Mao as a brutal totalitarian, a thug, who unleashed Stalin-like purges of millions with relish and without compunction, all for his personal gain. Through the authors' unrelenting lens even his would-be heroism as the leader of the Long March and father of modern China is exposed as reckless opportunism, subjecting his charges to months of unnecessary hardship in order to maintain the upper hand over his rival, Chang Kuo-tao, an experienced military commander.

Using exhaustive research in archives all over the world, Chang and Halliday recast Mao's ascent to power and subsequent grip on China in the context of global events. Sino-Soviet relations, the strengths and weakness of Chiang Kai-shek, the Japanese invasion of China, World War II, the Korean War, the disastrous Great Leap Forward, the vicious Cultural Revolution, the Vietnam War, Nixon's visit, and the constant, unending purges all, understandably, provide the backdrop for Mao's unscrupulous but invincible political maneuverings and betrayals. No one escaped unharmed. Rivals, families, peasants, city dwellers, soldiers, and lifelong allies such as Chou En-lai were all sacrificed to Mao's ambition and paranoia. Appropriately, the authors' consciences are appalled. Their biggest fear is that Mao will escape the global condemnation and infamy he deserves. Their astonishing book will go a long way to ensure that the pendulum of history will adjust itself accordingly. --Silvana Tropea

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10 Second Interview: A Few Words with Jung Chang and Jon Halliday

Q: From idea to finished book, how long did Mao: The Unknown Story take to research and write?
A: Over a decade.

Q: What was your writing process like? How did you two collaborate on this project?
A: The research shook itself out by language. Jung did all the Chinese-language research, and Jon did the other languages, of which Russian was the most important, as Mao had a long-term intimate relationship with Stalin. After our research trips around the world, we would work in our separate studies in London. We would then rendezvous at lunch to exchange discoveries.

Q: Do you have any thoughts about how the book is, or will be received in China? Did that play a part in your writing of the book?
A: The book is banned in China, because the current Communist regime is fiercely perpetuating the myth of Mao. Today Mao's portrait and his corpse still dominate Tiananmen Square in the heart of Beijing, and the regime declares itself to be Mao's heir. The government blocked the distribution of an issue of The Far Eastern Economic Review, and told the magazine's owners, Dow Jones, that this was because that issue contained a review of our book. The regime also tore the review of our book out of The Economist magazine that was going to (very restricted) newsstands. We are not surprised that the book is banned. The regime's attitude had no influence on how we wrote the book. We hope many copies will find their way into China.

Q: What is the one thing you hope readers get from your book?
A: Mao was responsible for the deaths of well over 70 million Chinese in peacetime, and he was bent on dominating the world. As China is today emerging as an economic and military power, the world can never regard it as a benign force unless Beijing rejects Mao and all his legacies. We hope our book will help push China in this direction by telling the truth about Mao.

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Breakdown of a BIG Book: 5 Things You'll Learn from Mao: The Unknown Story

1. Mao became a Communist at the age of 27 for purely pragmatic reasons: a job and income from the Russians.

2. Far from organizing the Long March in 1934, Mao was nearly left behind by his colleagues who could not stand him and had tried to oust him several times. The aim of the March was to link up with Russia to get arms. The Reds survived the March because Chiang Kai-shek let them, in a secret horse-trade for his son and heir, whom Stalin was holding hostage in Russia.

3. Mao grew opium on a large scale.

4. After he conquered China, Mao's over-riding goal was to become a superpower and dominate the world: "Control the Earth," as he put it.

5. Mao caused the greatest famine in history by exporting food to Russia to buy nuclear and arms industries: 38 million people were starved and slave-driven to death in 1958-61. Mao knew exactly what was happening, saying: "half of China may well have to die."

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--This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

From Publishers Weekly

Jung Chang, author of the award-winning Wild Swans, grew up during the Cultural Revolution; Halliday is a research fellow at King's College, University of London. They join forces in this sweeping but flawed biography, which aims to uncover Mao's further cruelties (beyond those commonly known) by debunking claims made by the Communist Party in his service. For example, the authors argue that, far from Mao's humble peasant background shaping his sympathies for the downtrodden, he actually ruthlessly exploited the peasants' resources when he was based in regions such as Yenan, and cared about peasants only when it suited his political agenda. And far from having founded the Chinese Communist Party, the authors argue, Mao was merely at the right place at the right time. Importantly, the book argues that in most instances Mao was able to hold on to power thanks to his adroitness in appealing to and manipulating powerful allies and foes, such as Stalin and later Nixon; furthermore, almost every aspect of his career was motivated by a preternatural thirst for personal power, rather than political vision. Some of the book's claims rely on interviews and on primary material (such as the anguished letters Mao's second wife wrote after he abandoned her), though the book's use of sources is sometimes incompletely documented and at times heavy-handed (for example, using a school essay the young Mao wrote to show his lifelong ruthlessness). Illus., maps. (Oct. 21)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

See all Editorial Reviews

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Product Details Paperback: 864 pages Publisher: Anchor (November 14, 2006) Language: English ISBN-10: 0679746323 ISBN-13: 978-0679746324 Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.1 x 1.8 inches Shipping Weight: 2.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies) Average Customer Review: 3.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (281 customer reviews) Amazon.com Sales Rank: #6,828 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books) Popular in these categories: (What's this?) #12 in  Books > History > Asia > China #31 in  Books > Biographies & Memoirs > Leaders & Notable People > Political #69 in  Books > Biographies & Memoirs > Historical

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More About the Authors

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Jung Chang

Jon Halliday

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Customer Reviews

281 Reviews 5 star:  (117) 4 star:  (48) 3 star:  (28) 2 star:  (25) 1 star:  (63)           Average Customer Review 3.5 out of 5 stars (281 customer reviews)		Share your thoughts with other customers:
Most Helpful Customer Reviews 575 of 582 people found the following review helpful: 4.0 out of 5 stars Indeed, "an atom bomb" but beware of radiation, July 7, 2007 By  Sergey Radchenko (Pittsburg, KS USA) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)    As many reviewers here have said, the book is a sea of controversy, challenging a number of important generally-accepted arguments about Mao and his rule. Some of the most prominent claims: Mao's China was Stalin's creation; Mao had received money from the Soviet Union early in his career, and later served basically as Stalin's puppet (though a cunning one at that). Mao's rise to power would have been impossible without the Soviet backing after 1945. Personally, I think the authors fail to come up with enough evidence to support this argument. On the whole the book seems to misrepresent the Soviet actions and motives. There is plenty of evidence in the materials, to which the authors had full access (Stalin-Mao correspondence, Mikoyan talks in 1949 etc) to at least raise serious questions about Stalin's real preferences in China; in fact, much evidence suggests that after 1945 Stalin was initially willing to trade in his special relationship with Mao for a broader agreement with the Guomindang. To this end, and probably not to confuse the "imperialists", he sponsored CCP-GMD peace talks, handed over territory to the GMD, agreed to suppress anti-GMD rebellion in Xinjiang and Altai, etc. The general tilt of Soviet foreign policy in 1945-46 - not only in China but elsewhere - points to Stalin's willingness to compromise with the West, rather than a propensity towards endless expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence. A related question: the authors argue that the GMD collapse in the Civil War was a result of infiltration by communist spies and of Jiang Jieshi's kind-hearted treatment of the Soviet "moles" in his ranks. The authors then point to various Soviet "sleepers", in whose ranks they include people like Zhang Zhizhong, in my view downplaying internal reasons for GMD disunity. After all, one did not have to be a Soviet "sleeper" to want to play on the Jiang-Mao conflict to maximize personal benefits. Even if some of the so called "sleepers" in fact did, as the authors claim, had contacts with the Soviets before, this need not mean that they would act on Soviet behalf in China or carry out Stalin's orders. Another major pillar of the book - the role of "ideology" in Mao's rule. The authors emphasize that Mao was moved first and foremost by considerations of power and prestige, not by fears about "revisionism" in China, etc. I happen to completely agree with the authors on this point; their argument, backed by detailed evidence, goes a long way to remedy a certain disbalance in favor of the "ideological" school especially popular since Chen Jian's path-breaking Mao's China and the Cold War. Portrayal of the Cultural Revolution as basically a power struggle is fairly convincing, though one cannot help but have second thoughts. Other authors, including notably Roderick MacFarquhar, admit that there was indeed a power struggle, and yet could there be something else, or why would Mao continue the campaign beyond 1966? In their effort to portray Mao as a cynical manipulator, do the authors overlook his genuine concerns about China's future path? An interesting thesis comes towards the end: Sino-US opening was not a result of Mao's fear of Soviet invasion, but of his effort to regain international prestige after the failure of Maoization of the world. This is a very important argument for what it tells us about Mao's delusion of grandeur, though it probably downplays Mao's fear of the Soviet Union. Yang Kuisong in a well-known article in 2000 issue of Cold War History journal argued that it was precisely Mao's reaction to Zhenbaodao in 1969 that prompted him to rethink relations with the US. This claim has been advanced in other books, for example, Li Zhisui's Private Life of Chairman Mao. Speaking of the Soviet angle, the authors advance a controversial claim that Malinovsky's drunken remark to Zhou Enlai and He Long in November 1964 about ousting Mao was actually a carefully planned act of official policy. There is no evidence for this. In fact, drunken orgies were a common practice in the Soviet leadership ranks, so Malinovsky could well say rash things without any instructions. Indeed, if the Soviet leadership wanted to probe Zhou and He Long about removing Mao, why not do so privately, rather than in the presence of foreign diplomats, including those from Western countries. Furthermore, it was He Long who approached Malinovsky to make remarks, and not the other way around. Of course, there are many episodes that are still impossible to document properly. The verdict is out, but this book gives interesting interpretations. Regarding Lin Biao, the authors subscribe to the well-known version that the plane crashed in Mongolia because it ran out of fuel. This is one example of mysteries-still-to-be-solved. Indeed, a recently leaked document (investigation by the Mongolian KGB) concludes that the plane had plenty of fuel on board. This evidence was not available to the authors at the time of writing; it shows though that many of the arguments advanced in the book will be challenged and possibly overturned when new evidence emerges. Many reviewers have said that the book blames everything on Mao. That is true to some extent. Clearly, the authors emphasize the role of one man over the faults of the system. However, I feel the authors take a fairly bold line in condemning Zhou Enlai, whose "myth" is perhaps more wide-spead than the myth of Mao. Zhou, Liu Shaoqi and many other cronies willingly participated in Mao's purges. For some reason, Peng Dehuai is spared criticism in the book, as if he was the only saint in the leadership. Deng Xiaoping receives light treatment, too, though one might ask where he was in the late-1950s at the height of the economic mess? Did he not also advance Mao's foreign policy program rigidly, for example in Moscow in July 1963, where he was more outspoken against "revisionism" than even Kang Sheng? The amount of work that went into this book is simply colossal. It must be the best-researched book on Mao ever written, and it does offer a great deal of new scraps of evidence, though some of it comes from highly questionable sources such as "interviews with a Russian insider" (???). It is impressive how the authors were able to memorize (!) documents in the Chinese archives and then quote from them. The level of interviewees (presidents of different countries etc.) makes me wonder how the authors pulled this off. Overall, I am very impressed by this book. It is exceptionally well written. Are the arguments too far-fetched? It is hard to say. Almost every major and many minor claims of the book could be easily challenged as I showed above. And yet... The final words somehow ring true: "His [Mao's] mind remained lucid to the end, and in it stirred just one thought: himself and his power" (p. 616). I walked away with a mixed feeling about this book, but it sure made an impression. 1,069 of 1,094 people found the following review helpful: 2.0 out of 5 stars A Vendetta, March 5, 2008 By  Robert J. York "Wordsmith" (Seoul, South Korea) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)    One shouldn't doubt that Jung Chang has reason to despise Mao, having lived through the effects of his reign. Mao himself certainly left plenty of evidence of his tyranny. The problem is that the vendetta is so obvious that it reaches self-parody after a couple hundred pages. The authors purport to know Mao's actual thoughts at specific times, suggest that he deserves the blame (if that's the proper word) for Stalin's death, and take an obvious relish in describing Mao's incompetence regarding such as language acquisition and management. Don't base all of your knowledge of the subject on this single source. 4,793 of 4,929 people found the following review helpful: 1.0 out of 5 stars Totalitarian mode of argument, January 10, 2007 By  Prof, USA - See all my reviews This review is from: Mao: The Unknown Story (Hardcover) Jung Chang's young intellect was formed in an environment where totalitarian propaganda substituted for reason and evidence. After she came west, she was unable to make the adjustment. She still thinks and argues the same way. Her ram-it-down-your-throat approach, strained interpretations, and outright distortion of sources make it look as if she does not trust the reader to make up his or her own mind. She should stick to reminiscences, at which she is adept, and leave history to competent historians. There are much better arguments against Mao than this. Philip Short, in just one example, makes an equally scathing case against Mao, but uses reason and an honest appraisal of sources. It is a compelling case. Chang's totalitarian mode of argument is so silly that it actually undermines the case against Mao by making it the subject of mockery. She thus gives comfort to the Maoists. Nobody except fanatics can take this book seriously, and the case against Mao should be taken seriously. As for Halliday, he should know better. "What does it profit a man...?"		Ad feedback   Most Recent Customer Reviews 1.0 out of 5 stars Thumbs down I was kind of disappointed. It's not really the "untold" story, more like the same old retold politically correct story about "Mao killed millions" based on crudely faked... Read more Published 20 days ago by John A. Stege 5.0 out of 5 stars The Real Mao Jung Chang's "The Unknown Story: Mao" is one of the best books about Chinese Communism ever written. Read more Published 24 days ago by Keith W. Browb 5.0 out of 5 stars What is Strong, Wins I suspect that the Twentieth Century will be a genuinely memorable period for as long as humans ponder the past. Read more Published 28 days ago by Keith A. Comess 5.0 out of 5 stars An eye opener I know about Chinese history, but after reading this book, now I know a whole bunch more. For the life of me I cannot understand some of the negative reviews except... Read more Published 1 month ago by BullDog 4.0 out of 5 stars Mao the Unknown Monster... but how did he rise to power? Very enlightening book about a horrific period of history. Mao was certainly looking out for himself and no one else. Read more Published 1 month ago by Ashok Nimgade 2.0 out of 5 stars Wished I'd read something else first I have to say I'm a bit disappointed in this book. It's an easy read - I only have about 40 pages left. Read more Published 1 month ago by John Hilgedick 5.0 out of 5 stars Rule of Fear Along with Hitler, Stalin and Saddam Hussein, Mao Tse Tung was one of the most evil men of the 20th century, as anyone with respect for human life will attest. Read more Published 2 months ago by Gary Selikow 5.0 out of 5 stars A Lesson for Today's Leaders Early in their book (page 13) Jung Chang and Jon Halladay include a citation from a commentary Mao Tse-tung wrote as a student in 1918 on a book called "A System of Ethics," by... Read more Published 2 months ago by jlem 4.0 out of 5 stars Mao the selfish From the outset, it is clear that the authors' are not fond of Mao. He is cast in an extremely negative light as somebody who does just what is in his own best interest, with no... Read more Published 3 months ago by J. Hubble 1.0 out of 5 stars Fictional claims clouded by a personal greed This is just a book with a lot of subjective opinions and anecdotal hearsays rather than historical facts. Read more Published 3 months ago by MJ Search Customer Reviews Only search this product's reviews

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Product Details

• Paperback: 864 pages
• Publisher: Anchor (November 14, 2006)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0679746323
• ISBN-13: 978-0679746324
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.1 x 1.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (281 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #6,828 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

  Popular in these categories: (What's this?)

  #12 in	Books > History > Asia > China
  #31 in	Books > Biographies & Memoirs > Leaders & Notable People > Political
  #69 in	Books > Biographies & Memoirs > Historical

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

575 of 582 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Indeed, "an atom bomb" but beware of radiation, July 7, 2007

By	Sergey Radchenko (Pittsburg, KS USA) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

As many reviewers here have said, the book is a sea of controversy, challenging a number of important generally-accepted arguments about Mao and his rule.

Some of the most prominent claims:

Mao's China was Stalin's creation; Mao had received money from the Soviet Union early in his career, and later served basically as Stalin's puppet (though a cunning one at that). Mao's rise to power would have been impossible without the Soviet backing after 1945.

Personally, I think the authors fail to come up with enough evidence to support this argument. On the whole the book seems to misrepresent the Soviet actions and motives. There is plenty of evidence in the materials, to which the authors had full access (Stalin-Mao correspondence, Mikoyan talks in 1949 etc) to at least raise serious questions about Stalin's real preferences in China; in fact, much evidence suggests that after 1945 Stalin was initially willing to trade in his special relationship with Mao for a broader agreement with the Guomindang. To this end, and probably not to confuse the "imperialists", he sponsored CCP-GMD peace talks, handed over territory to the GMD, agreed to suppress anti-GMD rebellion in Xinjiang and Altai, etc. The general tilt of Soviet foreign policy in 1945-46 - not only in China but elsewhere - points to Stalin's willingness to compromise with the West, rather than a propensity towards endless expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence.

A related question: the authors argue that the GMD collapse in the Civil War was a result of infiltration by communist spies and of Jiang Jieshi's kind-hearted treatment of the Soviet "moles" in his ranks. The authors then point to various Soviet "sleepers", in whose ranks they include people like Zhang Zhizhong, in my view downplaying internal reasons for GMD disunity. After all, one did not have to be a Soviet "sleeper" to want to play on the Jiang-Mao conflict to maximize personal benefits. Even if some of the so called "sleepers" in fact did, as the authors claim, had contacts with the Soviets before, this need not mean that they would act on Soviet behalf in China or carry out Stalin's orders.

Another major pillar of the book - the role of "ideology" in Mao's rule. The authors emphasize that Mao was moved first and foremost by considerations of power and prestige, not by fears about "revisionism" in China, etc. I happen to completely agree with the authors on this point; their argument, backed by detailed evidence, goes a long way to remedy a certain disbalance in favor of the "ideological" school especially popular since Chen Jian's path-breaking Mao's China and the Cold War.

Portrayal of the Cultural Revolution as basically a power struggle is fairly convincing, though one cannot help but have second thoughts. Other authors, including notably Roderick MacFarquhar, admit that there was indeed a power struggle, and yet could there be something else, or why would Mao continue the campaign beyond 1966? In their effort to portray Mao as a cynical manipulator, do the authors overlook his genuine concerns about China's future path?

An interesting thesis comes towards the end: Sino-US opening was not a result of Mao's fear of Soviet invasion, but of his effort to regain international prestige after the failure of Maoization of the world. This is a very important argument for what it tells us about Mao's delusion of grandeur, though it probably downplays Mao's fear of the Soviet Union. Yang Kuisong in a well-known article in 2000 issue of Cold War History journal argued that it was precisely Mao's reaction to Zhenbaodao in 1969 that prompted him to rethink relations with the US. This claim has been advanced in other books, for example, Li Zhisui's Private Life of Chairman Mao.

Speaking of the Soviet angle, the authors advance a controversial claim that Malinovsky's drunken remark to Zhou Enlai and He Long in November 1964 about ousting Mao was actually a carefully planned act of official policy. There is no evidence for this. In fact, drunken orgies were a common practice in the Soviet leadership ranks, so Malinovsky could well say rash things without any instructions. Indeed, if the Soviet leadership wanted to probe Zhou and He Long about removing Mao, why not do so privately, rather than in the presence of foreign diplomats, including those from Western countries. Furthermore, it was He Long who approached Malinovsky to make remarks, and not the other way around.

Of course, there are many episodes that are still impossible to document properly. The verdict is out, but this book gives interesting interpretations.

Regarding Lin Biao, the authors subscribe to the well-known version that the plane crashed in Mongolia because it ran out of fuel. This is one example of mysteries-still-to-be-solved. Indeed, a recently leaked document (investigation by the Mongolian KGB) concludes that the plane had plenty of fuel on board. This evidence was not available to the authors at the time of writing; it shows though that many of the arguments advanced in the book will be challenged and possibly overturned when new evidence emerges.

Many reviewers have said that the book blames everything on Mao. That is true to some extent. Clearly, the authors emphasize the role of one man over the faults of the system. However, I feel the authors take a fairly bold line in condemning Zhou Enlai, whose "myth" is perhaps more wide-spead than the myth of Mao. Zhou, Liu Shaoqi and many other cronies willingly participated in Mao's purges. For some reason, Peng Dehuai is spared criticism in the book, as if he was the only saint in the leadership. Deng Xiaoping receives light treatment, too, though one might ask where he was in the late-1950s at the height of the economic mess? Did he not also advance Mao's foreign policy program rigidly, for example in Moscow in July 1963, where he was more outspoken against "revisionism" than even Kang Sheng?

The amount of work that went into this book is simply colossal. It must be the best-researched book on Mao ever written, and it does offer a great deal of new scraps of evidence, though some of it comes from highly questionable sources such as "interviews with a Russian insider" (???). It is impressive how the authors were able to memorize (!) documents in the Chinese archives and then quote from them. The level of interviewees (presidents of different countries etc.) makes me wonder how the authors pulled this off. Overall, I am very impressed by this book. It is exceptionally well written.

Are the arguments too far-fetched? It is hard to say. Almost every major and many minor claims of the book could be easily challenged as I showed above. And yet... The final words somehow ring true: "His [Mao's] mind remained lucid to the end, and in it stirred just one thought: himself and his power" (p. 616).

I walked away with a mixed feeling about this book, but it sure made an impression.

1,069 of 1,094 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars A Vendetta, March 5, 2008

By	Robert J. York "Wordsmith" (Seoul, South Korea) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

One shouldn't doubt that Jung Chang has reason to despise Mao, having lived through the effects of his reign. Mao himself certainly left plenty of evidence of his tyranny. The problem is that the vendetta is so obvious that it reaches self-parody after a couple hundred pages. The authors purport to know Mao's actual thoughts at specific times, suggest that he deserves the blame (if that's the proper word) for Stalin's death, and take an obvious relish in describing Mao's incompetence regarding such as language acquisition and management. Don't base all of your knowledge of the subject on this single source.

4,793 of 4,929 people found the following review helpful:

1.0 out of 5 stars Totalitarian mode of argument, January 10, 2007

By	Prof, USA - See all my reviews

This review is from: Mao: The Unknown Story (Hardcover)

Jung Chang's young intellect was formed in an environment where totalitarian propaganda substituted for reason and evidence. After she came west, she was unable to make the adjustment. She still thinks and argues the same way. Her ram-it-down-your-throat approach, strained interpretations, and outright distortion of sources make it look as if she does not trust the reader to make up his or her own mind. She should stick to reminiscences, at which she is adept, and leave history to competent historians. There are much better arguments against Mao than this. Philip Short, in just one example, makes an equally scathing case against Mao, but uses reason and an honest appraisal of sources. It is a compelling case. Chang's totalitarian mode of argument is so silly that it actually undermines the case against Mao by making it the subject of mockery. She thus gives comfort to the Maoists. Nobody except fanatics can take this book seriously, and the case against Mao should be taken seriously. As for Halliday, he should know better. "What does it profit a man...?"