Mao's Generals Remember Korea [Hardcover]

Xiaobing Li (Translator), Bin Yu (Translator), Allan Reed Millett (Translator)

Book Description

ISBN-10: 0700610952 | ISBN-13: 978-0700610952 | Publication Date: June 20, 2001 | Edition: First

Fifty years after the Korean conflict, what is a forgotten war for some Americans is an aching memory for China. With over a million casualties out of the three million soldiers sent into battle, that war looms as large for the People's Republic of China (PRC)--barely a year old when North Korea invaded the South--as World War II does for most other countries. It was the first international war fought by the Chinese Communist regime to halt counterrevolution; it was also a war that the Chinese fully expected to win, by virtue of not only superiority of numbers but also their soldiers' superior "political quality." This book presents a mosaic of memoirs by key Chinese military commanders from that war, drawing not only on their personal papers but also on still-classified archives and on Chinese-language sources unavailable in English. It offers an uncensored, behind-the-scenes story of the Communist campaign, from the decision to intervene through the truce negotiations, that discloses new information on such facets of the war as strategy and tactics, use of propaganda, and mobilization of the Chinese population. It also reveals the generals' concerns about the possible use of nuclear force and the alleged use of biological and chemical weapons by the United States. The book contains a wealth of new materials on the Chinese intervention, including combat operations, logistics, political control, field command, and communications. Among those whose recollections are recorded, then-acting Chief of Staff Nie Rongzhen reveals how party leadership decided on intervention, Commander in Chief Peng Dehuai provides personal accounts of major battles and communications with Mao, and General Yang Dezhi shares secrets of Chinese military strategy and tactics, discussing how the army orchestrated each battle to contend with the better equipped UN forces. The volume also features an updated short history of the PRC's conduct of the war based on Chinese sources, plus rare photos from Chinese archives that put readers behind the lines from the Chinese side. Mao's Generals Remember Korea demonstrates that the PRC continues to draw military, diplomatic, and strategic lessons from the war it fought fifty years ago with the world's most powerful military force. It offers valuable insight into the Chinese way of war and the military mind of Mao that will be a rich resource for Asian and military scholars.

Editorial Reviews

From the Back Cover

"A fascinating volume offering insights into what remains one of the most emotional and still controversial issues in modern Chinese history-the Chinese experience in the Korean War. Until now the recollections of China's top military personnel, among them the most colorful and powerful in the Chinese Communist leadership, have been inaccessible to most Americans. This volume helps us now to begin reconstructing the views of the 'other side' in the not so Cold War."--Gordon Chang, author of Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972

"Essential reading for military and diplomatic historians as well as students of Chinese politics."--William Stueck, Jr., author of The Korean War

"Provides valuable insight into Chinese perspectives on the Korean War truce negotiations."--Warren Cohen, author of America's Response to China

About the Author

Xiaobing Li is professor of history and geography at the University of Central Oklahoma. He is coeditor of a number of books on China, including China and the United States: A New Cold War History.

Allan R. Millett is Mason Professor of Military History at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University and author of Semper Fidelis.

Bin Yu is professor of political science at Wittenberg University and a former soldier in the People's Liberation Army, Beijing Military Region (1968-1972). He is the editor of The Northeastern Pacific Quadrangle Fifty Years After.

Product Details

• Hardcover: 344 pages
• Publisher: University Press Of Kansas; First edition (June 20, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0700610952
• ISBN-13: 978-0700610952
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.4 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.6 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.7 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (6 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,556,584 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

4.0 out of 5 stars PR China's First War--Their General's View, December 30, 2011

By 

John Richard Schrock - See all my reviews

This review is from: Mao's Generals Remember Korea (Hardcover)

MAO'S GENERALS REMEMBER KOREA is a collection of primary sources translated and edited by Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu, published by the Univ. Press of Kansas in 2001, 303 pages hardcover.

As a child, my first memories are of radio commentary by "Gabriel Heater and the News" broadcasting about the Korean War. I was six years old. Eisenhower had been elected on a promise to bring the soldiers back home and that may be the most many Americans remember about this forgotten U.N. "police action." If M*A*S*H had not become a hit, many in the current generation would not even know we fought in Korea (although it has never really ended-we technically remain only in a continuous state of cease fire). We fought in this U.N. "police action" along with many Western allies, although the predominant forces were American. However, media coverage of the Vietnam War has given many Americans the understanding that we do not always fight in black-and-white situations, where we are always good and the enemy is always bad. Interestingly, the war-cynical M*A*S*H series served through fictional episodes to paint the Korean War in the ambiguity that it deserves.

For the new People's Republic of China, this was their first challenge to enter an external war in the aid of an ally. This book provides access to the perspective of China's generals in memoirs only now available and long after our Western generals had described our perspective. These are the primary sources: the view of Marshals Peng Dehuai, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen, Generals Du Ping, Hong Xuezhi, and Chai Chengwen. The maps at the end of the book clearly track the progress of the war. To call any of these entries "propaganda" is to fall back in nationalistic ethnocentrism. Some of the Chinese generals write to speak to logistic details; others write to describe the political and military reality of that time, as they saw it, to a future generation who will have difficulty understanding the context.

The Chinese officials overestimated the enemy killed, just as we over-reported deaths in Vietnam. But the war technology superiority we held provided far less advantage than we expected. Chinese generals describe the soil literally plowed by the impact of small munitions to the point any handful of dirt would hold bullets and shell fragments, and yet they survived such bombardment to emerge and drive the UNF to the 38th parallel. Begun barely a year after the consolidation of China under Mao, this war looms as just as important in PRC history as WWII holds in U.S. history-as the editors note. If we are ever to understand why North Korea still marshalls the fifth-largest standing army in the world, we must understand this history. This war still lingers in the memory of the eldest North Koreans and permeates into the next generations' storyline.

Meanwhile China has moved on. Although the perspective of the new market-economy China toward modern North Korea today is completely different than in the early 1950s, it is obvious that this war shaped China's military perspective toward superior Western military technology (you can still win against more modern technology and enemy control of the air, but at great human cost).

Walk through the Korean War Memorial in Washington DC some cold winter day. Our memorial statues, in contrast to the attitudes of generals on both sides, rightly show there is no glory in this war. The contrasting perspectives shown by such books as this reveal how history is written differently.

John Richard Schrock

3 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent book, September 25, 2003

By 

Victor S. Kaufman "VSK" (Florence, SC United States) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Mao's Generals Remember Korea (Hardcover)

Those who believe that this book is nothing more than communist propaganda have a point. But that's the importance of this book. For those interested in the Korean War who want to understand how the Chinese viewed the war, this book is essential reading. The Korean War was more than just an American war. It was fought by Americans, Koreans, Chinese, and even Russians. Without getting an insight into how all sides viewed that conflict, we end up with only a partial story of "The Forgotten War."

8 of 13 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars Relatively little here is new material, October 28, 2002

By 

Gary J. Jakacky "nagaisan" (Pittsfield, Ma United States) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Mao's Generals Remember Korea (Hardcover)

This is a series of essays by Generals of the Chinese People 's Volunteers. There is, unfortunately, not alot which is new here. A lot of the book emphasizes logistics, but Charles Schrader's book "Communist logistics in the Korean War" is far more analytical and has far less of the ideological baggage woven in with the text.
According to Bin Yu, Stalin used Korea because he was concerned about China, not the USA. China's hasty intervention in North Korea worked well in the northwest [where the US 8th army was routed at Kunu Ri]; but in the east was really a disaster: the author heaps praise on the 1st Marine division. There was tremendous pressure from civilian leaders back in China and the USSR to achieve 'quick victory.' UN Air operations made Korea different from the Chinese civil war: food, clothing, shelter and materiel were destroyed so the peasant soldiers could not resupply themselves from the land as they hoped. The fifth campaign --both impulses-- was a disaster.

Marshall Pen Dehaui's story is worthless ideological spew. He is speaking to history, not on behalf of his soldiers. What a pity: there is no mention of the savage cold near Chosin and and how it wreaked havoc with his attack plans; no words from his mouth about how his frozen Legions (as Fehrenbach would call them) performed so well, given the circumstances. He does, grudgingly, mention his army's poor equipment and logistics.

Marshall Nie Rongzhen continues the ideological pap. His essay is tiresome, uninformative, and provides little detail. The Chinese rotation plan in 1952 improved the supply situation and enabled new soldiers to gain field experience. Rongzhen's comments on logistics vary from the informative ("ship food to regions, rather than to units") to worthless ("soldiers uniforms should be neither to thin nor too thick").

Lieutenant General DuPing's essay was a refreshing change. He felt that China would win in korea for two sets of reasons. Militarily, they had superior numbers (4 million); greater morale from a clear mission; better logistics because they were adjacent to Korea while the US was across the pacific; God and justice was on their side; and DuPing assigned zero probability to a nuclear strike: he knew it would never work in a country already devastated and as rural as Korea was.

On the political side, initially commanders overestimated US Soldiers willingness to fight (I am sure that disappeared after Kunu Ri); chinese soldiers were more politically indoctrinated to fight (the Campaign to Resist Amerika and Assist Korea, or CRAAK); there was a propoganda victory gained in their initial treatment and release of POW's (example was T.F. Drysdale near the Chosin); and the Chinese were encouraged to respect the local Korean peasantry.

Hong Xeushi commented on logistics. Like DuPing, he felt the Chinese soldiers felt theirs was a just cause. His soldiers were combat ready and used to hardships at home and in the field. They were mobile and flexible, running ridges and hillsides with ease. Chinese soldiers were able to carry more than their US counterparts and made better use of trucks and waggons. One aspect which hurt was the UN tactic of a 'no-grain- area between the 38th and 37th parallel, starving the Chinese troops hoping to forage in the fields.

Xiang Quian faced the difficult task of securing materials from the Russians, who not only distrusted the Chinese (fearing Titoism from their massive neighbor) but also wished to play the game of "let's you and him fight.' Told they would would provide enough materials for 16 division, in the event enough for 10 was provided. The Russian's stonewalled on expanding China's defense industries. Of course, China didn't know about many of Russia's problems. Russia had big-country/superpower arrogance (wow, i thought that was just an american trait!); many of the rifles and equipment they supplied was inferior. He might have added that Russia never provided the promised air support, either.

Yang Dezhi emphasized the concept of mobility in the Chinese defense, which included the massive tunnels and 'cats ear' shelters used to protect their forces and allow them to observe the enemy. They were immune from bombing and were invaluable at the battle of Shanggangling, which Mr. Dezhi apparently feels was as meaningful a turning point for the Chinese as Chipyong'ni was for the UN forces.

Chai Chong'wens' article on the Truce negotiations started out with a good description of the participants and early issues like the number of reporters and other early snafus. Of the five issues in the talks, items (1) thru (3)--agenda, demarcation line, and armistice details-- went quite smoothly. Much less is said on the repatriation issue, which is unfortunate since it tied up the talks for so long; all Chong'wen has to say is that 'thousands of communists refused to be repatriated because they were spies.' Issue (5), the post armistice politcal conference on Korea, was largely a non-event by the time it took place, anyway. Still, the negotiations were so complex that it would have been better if Chong'wens' article were either omitted completely, or given the massive treatment and detail it deserved, much akin to a separate text like Turner Joys "How Communists Negotiate."

Overall a disappointment.