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Mao's Generals Remember Korea

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MAO'S GENERALS REMEMBER KOREA is a collection of primary sources translated and edited by Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu, published by the Univ. Press of Kansas in 2001, 303 pages hardcover.

As a child, my first memories are of radio commentary by "Gabriel Heater and the News" broadcasting about the Korean War. I was six years old. Eisenhower had been elected on a promise to bring the soldiers back home and that may be the most many Americans remember about this forgotten U.N. "police action." If M*A*S*H had not become a hit, many in the current generation would not even know we fought in Korea (although it has never really ended-we technically remain only in a continuous state of cease fire). We fought in this U.N. "police action" along with many Western allies, although the predominant forces were American. However, media coverage of the Vietnam War has given many Americans the understanding that we do not always fight in black-and-white situations, where we are always good and the enemy is always bad. Interestingly, the war-cynical M*A*S*H series served through fictional episodes to paint the Korean War in the ambiguity that it deserves.

For the new People's Republic of China, this was their first challenge to enter an external war in the aid of an ally. This book provides access to the perspective of China's generals in memoirs only now available and long after our Western generals had described our perspective. These are the primary sources: the view of Marshals Peng Dehuai, Xu Xiangqian, and Nie Rongzhen, Generals Du Ping, Hong Xuezhi, and Chai Chengwen. The maps at the end of the book clearly track the progress of the war. To call any of these entries "propaganda" is to fall back in nationalistic ethnocentrism. Some of the Chinese generals write to speak to logistic details; others write to describe the political and military reality of that time, as they saw it, to a future generation who will have difficulty understanding the context.

The Chinese officials overestimated the enemy killed, just as we over-reported deaths in Vietnam. But the war technology superiority we held provided far less advantage than we expected. Chinese generals describe the soil literally plowed by the impact of small munitions to the point any handful of dirt would hold bullets and shell fragments, and yet they survived such bombardment to emerge and drive the UNF to the 38th parallel. Begun barely a year after the consolidation of China under Mao, this war looms as just as important in PRC history as WWII holds in U.S. history-as the editors note. If we are ever to understand why North Korea still marshalls the fifth-largest standing army in the world, we must understand this history. This war still lingers in the memory of the eldest North Koreans and permeates into the next generations' storyline.

Meanwhile China has moved on. Although the perspective of the new market-economy China toward modern North Korea today is completely different than in the early 1950s, it is obvious that this war shaped China's military perspective toward superior Western military technology (you can still win against more modern technology and enemy control of the air, but at great human cost).

Walk through the Korean War Memorial in Washington DC some cold winter day. Our memorial statues, in contrast to the attitudes of generals on both sides, rightly show there is no glory in this war. The contrasting perspectives shown by such books as this reveal how history is written differently.

John Richard Schrock

Those who believe that this book is nothing more than communist propaganda have a point. But that's the importance of this book. For those interested in the Korean War who want to understand how the Chinese viewed the war, this book is essential reading. The Korean War was more than just an American war. It was fought by Americans, Koreans, Chinese, and even Russians. Without getting an insight into how all sides viewed that conflict, we end up with only a partial story of "The Forgotten War."

This is a series of essays by Generals of the Chinese People 's Volunteers. There is, unfortunately, not alot which is new here. A lot of the book emphasizes logistics, but Charles Schrader's book "Communist logistics in the Korean War" is far more analytical and has far less of the ideological baggage woven in with the text.
According to Bin Yu, Stalin used Korea because he was concerned about China, not the USA. China's hasty intervention in North Korea worked well in the northwest [where the US 8th army was routed at Kunu Ri]; but in the east was really a disaster: the author heaps praise on the 1st Marine division. There was tremendous pressure from civilian leaders back in China and the USSR to achieve 'quick victory.' UN Air operations made Korea different from the Chinese civil war: food, clothing, shelter and materiel were destroyed so the peasant soldiers could not resupply themselves from the land as they hoped. The fifth campaign --both impulses-- was a disaster.

Marshall Pen Dehaui's story is worthless ideological spew. He is speaking to history, not on behalf of his soldiers. What a pity: there is no mention of the savage cold near Chosin and and how it wreaked havoc with his attack plans; no words from his mouth about how his frozen Legions (as Fehrenbach would call them) performed so well, given the circumstances. He does, grudgingly, mention his army's poor equipment and logistics.

Marshall Nie Rongzhen continues the ideological pap. His essay is tiresome, uninformative, and provides little detail. The Chinese rotation plan in 1952 improved the supply situation and enabled new soldiers to gain field experience. Rongzhen's comments on logistics vary from the informative ("ship food to regions, rather than to units") to worthless ("soldiers uniforms should be neither to thin nor too thick").

Lieutenant General DuPing's essay was a refreshing change. He felt that China would win in korea for two sets of reasons. Militarily, they had superior numbers (4 million); greater morale from a clear mission; better logistics because they were adjacent to Korea while the US was across the pacific; God and justice was on their side; and DuPing assigned zero probability to a nuclear strike: he knew it would never work in a country already devastated and as rural as Korea was.

On the political side, initially commanders overestimated US Soldiers willingness to fight (I am sure that disappeared after Kunu Ri); chinese soldiers were more politically indoctrinated to fight (the Campaign to Resist Amerika and Assist Korea, or CRAAK); there was a propoganda victory gained in their initial treatment and release of POW's (example was T.F. Drysdale near the Chosin); and the Chinese were encouraged to respect the local Korean peasantry.

Hong Xeushi commented on logistics. Like DuPing, he felt the Chinese soldiers felt theirs was a just cause. His soldiers were combat ready and used to hardships at home and in the field. They were mobile and flexible, running ridges and hillsides with ease. Chinese soldiers were able to carry more than their US counterparts and made better use of trucks and waggons. One aspect which hurt was the UN tactic of a 'no-grain- area between the 38th and 37th parallel, starving the Chinese troops hoping to forage in the fields.

Xiang Quian faced the difficult task of securing materials from the Russians, who not only distrusted the Chinese (fearing Titoism from their massive neighbor) but also wished to play the game of "let's you and him fight.' Told they would would provide enough materials for 16 division, in the event enough for 10 was provided. The Russian's stonewalled on expanding China's defense industries. Of course, China didn't know about many of Russia's problems. Russia had big-country/superpower arrogance (wow, i thought that was just an american trait!); many of the rifles and equipment they supplied was inferior. He might have added that Russia never provided the promised air support, either.

Yang Dezhi emphasized the concept of mobility in the Chinese defense, which included the massive tunnels and 'cats ear' shelters used to protect their forces and allow them to observe the enemy. They were immune from bombing and were invaluable at the battle of Shanggangling, which Mr. Dezhi apparently feels was as meaningful a turning point for the Chinese as Chipyong'ni was for the UN forces.

Chai Chong'wens' article on the Truce negotiations started out with a good description of the participants and early issues like the number of reporters and other early snafus. Of the five issues in the talks, items (1) thru (3)--agenda, demarcation line, and armistice details-- went quite smoothly. Much less is said on the repatriation issue, which is unfortunate since it tied up the talks for so long; all Chong'wen has to say is that 'thousands of communists refused to be repatriated because they were spies.' Issue (5), the post armistice politcal conference on Korea, was largely a non-event by the time it took place, anyway. Still, the negotiations were so complex that it would have been better if Chong'wens' article were either omitted completely, or given the massive treatment and detail it deserved, much akin to a separate text like Turner Joys "How Communists Negotiate."

Overall a disappointment.

Why did the Chinese Communist intervene in Korea in 1950?

How did the Chinese Communist Forces fight the war?

What lessons did the Chinese learn from their combat experience?

These are the key questions that editors Xiabing Li, Allan R. Millet and Bin Yu seek to answer from the Chinese perspective in this groundbreaking narrative of the Chinese intervention in the Korean War.

When Communist China intervened in the Korean War in 1950 it did so on a massive scale. According to Chinese statistics, more than 2.3 million combat troops entered Korea and engaged in the war. By the time China withdrew its forces from Korea in 1958 some twenty-five infantry armies, sixteen artillery divisions, ten armored divisions, twelve air force divisions (consisting of 672 pilots and more than 59,000 ground service personnel) and six security guard divisions had participated in the war.

China also mobilized some 600,000 laborers for the war. Thus a total of 3 million Chinese Volunteers eventually fought in the Korean War.

Chinese casualties from October 1950 to July 1953 totaled more than 1 million men, including 152,000 dead, 383,000 wounded, and 450,000 hospitalized, as well as almost 22,000 prisoners of war and 4,000 missing in action. The was cost China more than $3.3 billon and Chinese forces consumed 5.6 million tons of good and supplies during their invention, including the loss of 399 aircraft and 12,916 vehicles.

We know all of this because the Chinese military leadership at the time of the war tell us so in this brilliant new history of the Korean War.

This collection of memoirs of the Chinese generals involved in the war is, for the most part, largely issue-oriented and focuses on matters such as decisino-making, operational plans, battle commands, field communications, combat organizations, political mobilization, logistical service, and truce negotiations.

"Mao's Generals Remember Korea" is thus the updated short history in English, based on Chinese sources, of the Chinese army's operations in the Korean War. It is an important work because it demonstrates that the People's Republic of China has drawn and continues to draw military, diplomatic, and strategic lessons from the war it fought fifty years ago with the world's most powerful military - the United States armed forces.

An absolutely valuless read, consisting of hyperbole, communist propaganda, and self adulation. Nothing of value for the serious investigator. A disappointment of the first order. And this is the best I can say about it.

This fascinating book tells us how a group of Chinese generals saw the Korean War. They tell us why the People's Republic of China decided to intervene in Korea, how the Chinese People's Volunteers Force was formed and mobilised politically, how it organised its strategy and tactics, how it was supplied, how it bought arms from the Soviet Union, how they saw their command experience, and finally how the truce was achieved.
The PRC had warned the United Nations that she would not allow the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to be destroyed. The UN ignored the warning and on 7 October 1950, US troops invaded the DPRK, threatening both the DPRK and the PRC's northeastern frontiers. At this point, the US government believed that the war was won and that they had entered the `mopping up' phase (they recently believed the same of another land war in Asia, in Afghanistan earlier this year). The next day, the Chinese volunteer forces entered the war.
The UN forces fought a most brutal and dirty war against Korea. The United States Air Force dropped 7.8 million gallons of napalm on the country. US General Curtis LeMay boasted, "We burned down just about every city in North and South Korea both ... We killed over a million Koreans and drove several million more from their homes." The American historian Bruce Cumings later wrote that this war "was the worst of American postwar interventions, the most destructive, far more genocidal than Vietnam."
But the Korean and Chinese forces defeated the US plans to occupy all Korea, to invade the PRC and start World War Three. The Volunteer Forces' forward defence of Manchuria successfully shielded it from attack and kept the war limited. Chinese forces inflicted upon American arms the most decisive defeat they suffered in the whole twentieth century. `Truman's war' became so unpopular in the USA that it led to the President's political demise. No wonder that George W. Bush fruitlessly wants to reverse this verdict.