The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual [Paperback]

Sarah Sewall (Introduction), John A. Nagl (Foreword), David H. Petraeus (Foreword), James F. Amos (Foreword)

Book Description

Publication Date: July 4, 2007 | ISBN-10: 0226841510 | ISBN-13: 978-0226841519 | Edition: 1

When the U.S. military invaded Iraq, it  lacked a common understanding of the problems inherent in counterinsurgency campaigns. It had neither studied them, nor developed doctrine and tactics to deal with them. It is fair to say that in 2003, most Army officers knew more about the U.S. Civil War than they did about counterinsurgency.

The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was written to fill that void. The result of unprecedented collaboration among top U.S. military experts, scholars, and practitioners in the field, the manual espouses an approach to combat that emphasizes constant adaptation and learning, the importance of decentralized decision-making, the need to understand local politics and customs, and the key role of intelligence in winning the support of the population. The manual also emphasizes the paradoxical and often counterintuitive nature of counterinsurgency operations: sometimes the more you protect your forces, the less secure you are; sometimes the more force you use, the less effective it is; sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction. 

An new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, places the manual in critical and historical perspective, explaining the significance and potential impact of this revolutionary challenge to conventional U.S. military doctrine.
An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come.
 
The University of Chicago Press will donate a portion of the proceeds from this book to the Fisher House Foundation, a private-public partnership that supports the families of America’s injured servicemen. To learn more about the Fisher House Foundation, visit www.fisherhouse.org.
 

Editorial Reviews

Review

“The book to begin with in looking for a revised 21st-century strategy [in our war on terror] is, unexpectedly, the landmark U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. It was released as a government document in December 2006, but owing to its enormous popularity . . . it has now been published by a university press, with a provocative, highly readable new foreword and introduction that testify to the manual’s ‘paradigm-shattering’ content. . . . Sarah Sewall, a former Pentagon official who teaches at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard . . . has contributed an introduction that should be required reading for anybody who wants to understand the huge demands effective counterinsurgency will place on the military and the voting public."—Samantha Power, New York Times

(Samantha Power New York Times 20070729)

“Just in time for the renewal of the war debate in Congress, the University of Chicago Press has released The U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. . . . It’s a nifty volume, not only because it gives you a sense of what our most highly regarded military theorists are thinking but because sometimes what they’re thinking is the last thing you’d expect. Especially interesting is a section called 'Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations,' which tells us: 'Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction' and 'Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.'”—David L. Ulin, Los Angeles Times

(David L. Ulin Los Angeles Times 20070713)

"The military doctrine set forth in our field manual matters, but because it is usually only available to those in the military, it is not widely known or available outside that small audience. . . . By publishing the new Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual, the U. of C. is correcting that situation with this, probably the most important piece of doctrine written in the past 20 years. . . . It is also, probably, the single most important document one can read to make sense out of what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan."

(Robert Bateman Chicago Tribune )

"An attempt by our military to redefine itself in the aftermath of 9/11 and the new world of international terrorism, [the Manual] will play a vital role in American military campaigns for years to come."

(Freshfiction.com )

"[This] book has helped make counterinsurgency part of the zeitgeist. It has become a coffee-table staple in Washington. . . . In short, this is not your parents' military field manual."

(Colin H. Kahl Foreign Affairs )

Product Details

• Paperback: 472 pages
• Publisher: University of Chicago Press; 1 edition (July 4, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0226841510
• ISBN-13: 978-0226841519
• Product Dimensions: 5.9 x 1 x 9.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.6 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (36 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #63,045 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #3 in Books > Education & Reference > Encyclopedias > Military
  • #31 in Books > Professional & Technical > Engineering > Reference
  • #100 in Books > History > Military > Strategy

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

163 of 173 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Counterinsurgency Field Manual August 23, 2007

By Joseph P. Martino

Format:Paperback

This book has become famous or notorious (take you pick) because it was written under the direction of Gen. David H. Petraeus, as of this review the commanding general of American forces in Iraq. I want to prescind from the Iraq question and address the book on its own merits.

First, my qualifications. I am a retired Air Force Colonel (non-flying). During the Vietnam war I was heavily involved in Operations Research on counterinsurgency. For five years I was Chairman of the Special Warfare Working Group of the Military Operations Research Society. I spent 20 months in Thailand and Vietnam, running tests on electronic equipment for use by US and allied forces battling insurgents, and gathering and analyzing data on insurgency in Vietnam and Laos.

What's in this book?

Chapter One is a historical survey of insurgency and the problems of countering it. It draws heavily from the Vietnam experience, but goes as far back as the ethnic struggles in England (Welsh, Scots, Irish) against the Crown. While the historical coverage is broad, it does not, and is not intended to, give coverage in depth.

Chapter Two discusses the need for integration of the civilian and military activities in counterinsurgency. What's new about this? Nothing. I wrote the same things (though perhaps not as well) while in Southeast Asia over forty years ago. The fact that it's not new doesn't mean it's not important. It's critical. The fact that it's now in a Field Manual is highly significant.

Chapter Three deals with intelligence gathering in counterinsurgency. While the military commander is always in need of intelligence about the enemy (who, where, what, when), the problems of gathering this intelligence for counterinsurgency are very different from those of conventional war. This chapter is heavy on the "what" of intelligence, but a bit weak on the "how." This is probably inevitable, since intelligence about insurgents depends on human sources, and the avalabiliity of these is very dependent on the nature of the society under attack by insurgents. One problem briefly mentioned in the chapter is the fact that Americans won't speak the language of the locals. The problems of linguistic support for the counterinsurgency operation are covered in an appendix. My own experience, though, is that it's difficult to work through an interpreter, and you never know if the interpreter really is working for the insurgents.

Chapter Four covers designing a counterinsurgency campaign. Again, it's strong on the "what" but weak on the "how," because this is strongly dependent on the situation.

Chapter Five covers executing counterinsurgency operations. Its main point is that "Counterinsurgency operations require synchronized application of military, paramilitary, political, economic, pshychological, and civic actions." Nothing new here. We knew that in Vietnam. The British knew it in Malaya. What's encouraging is that it's finally in a Field Manual.

Chapter Six covers developing host nation security forces (army and police). That's not easy. The British achieved it in Malaya; we didn't achieve it in Vietnam. One of the problems the Manual really slides over is that the recruits to the host nation army know the individual Americans will go home after a year, while they are in it "for the duration." This makes a big difference in the degree of aggressiveness of the host soldiers as compared with the American counterinsurgency forces.

Chapter Seven covers leadership and ethics for counterinsurgency. This is the first Field Manual I've seen that gives any attention to the Just War criteria of Discrimination and Proportion. Although these are addressed in only two pages, that's still an improvement. (Full disclosure: I teach Just War Doctrine at Yorktown University.)

Chapter Eight covers logistics for counterinsurgency. This becomes a critical issue. Ever since World War Two, the US has preferred to fight "dumb rich" wars as opposed to "smart frugal" wars. We overwhelm the opponent with materiel. Unfortunately, the host nation usually can't do this. Leaving a stable society behind when we "declare victory and go home" means the host nation has to be capable of defending itself on a much lower level of resources than we used. If we don't train them to do this, they won't last long.

One specific criticism I have of the Manual is that it tends to focus on "boots on the ground" and shortchange the role of air power. This is probably inevitable, since it's an Army manual. Nevertheless, it's a shortcoming. Despite that, I think the Manual is a big step forward in doctrine for counterinsurgency. It lays out the lessons we should have learned forty years ago.

The University of Chicago edition has an Introduction by Sarah Sewall. She makes the observation that the book was written by the wrong people. It was written by the military, not by the political branch of government. As Clausewitz wrote, "War is the continuation of policy by other means." Counterinsurgency, of all types of war, must especially be governed by political objectives and considerations. Sewall's observation is correct. In the absence of any national counterinsurgency doctrine that covers the political and economic aspects as well as the military, the Army has tried to fill the gap. For the most part, the Army did a good job. It will be unfortunate if the effect of this book is one more case of "we won the war but lost the peace."

66 of 72 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars More Then a Reprint!!! July 25, 2007

By Troy A. Lettieri TOP 1000 REVIEWERVINE™ VOICE

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

This is a reprint of the Army/Marine Counter-Insurgency (COIN) manual. But this book is more then a reprint and is worth the money just for the multiple forewords and the Introduction to this edition. All were written by subject matter experts in their field. One foreword in particular is written by John Nagal author of the COIN cult "Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife" re-released as "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam," what makes this so interesting is that Nagal had a hand in developing and writing the manual with a group of renowned COIN experts. I am not sure if the others helped develop this manual for the military, but their forewords are just as interesting. For the content of the manual it will soon become the bible of COIN warfare/operations, it is by far the most detailed manual on the subject. It covers theories, tactics, techniques and procedures as used by various countries from various conflicts and lays these methods out within the current U.S. military context. This book is not meant to be specific to the Iraq or Afghanistan insurgency but is meant to be a "tool bag" of methods and ideas to be adapted to various conflicts. Finally the manual was reformatted in to an oversized handbook with a laminate type card cover with rounded corners that make it perfect to slip into a kit bag or rucksack. This is a must own for all soldiers (E1 and up!), politicians and concerned citizens.

20 of 20 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Very suprised March 9, 2008

By Matthew Smith

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

I actually bought this book some months back but I kept putting off picking it up because I assumed this would be a dense work filled with military jargon and more acronyms than one could shake a stick at. I assumed that it would be a tedious and difficult read so I found reasons to put it off, but when I finally forced myself to begin this book I was quite shocked. The book is very easy to read and very well written. The book has just a few acronyms that I had memorized within a couple of pages after their introduction, and the book is very well laid out with impeccable organization (as should be expected I guess). I dare say I thoroughly enjoyed reading this book on all levels. Of course the information and the knowledge to be gleaned from this work is extremely important.

I think if this book were to become required reading for students then I think we could prevent some costly misadventures in future because this book really details what an occupation requires. Everyone would understand that military action will require a deep level of commitment for the military and on all levels of civil society as well.

I also think it is the least we can do as citizens to educate ourselves on what our military men and women are doing and attempting to implement in situations where they face this type of conflict. One gets a sense of what a soldier goes through and the huge load that is put on the ordinary soldier. It is an extremely difficult task they are asked to perform in these situations, and they are asked to perform this task with honor and discretion in the face of terrible situations.

There are some good reviews here that speak more to the content of the work by people obviously more versed in the topic than myself, so I will just say that this book is very well done and an easy read. If you are like me and are putting off reading or buying this book, then let me just say go ahead. It is worth the money and the effort. I highly recommend this book.