Marketing Democracy: Power and Social Movements in Post-Dictatorship Chile [Paperback]

Julia Paley (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: April 2, 2001 | ISBN-10: 0520227689 | ISBN-13: 978-0520227682 | Edition: 1

Amid protests against the Pinochet regime, a group of población(shantytown) residents came together in 1984 to challenge poor health care in their community and to denounce military rule. How did their organization respond seven years later when Chile's transition to democracy brought an end to dictatorship but no clear solution to ongoing health problems? Marketing Democracy shows how the exercise of power and the strategies of social movements transformed with the transition from a military to an elected-civilian regime in Chile. The term "marketing democracy" refers first to how contemporary democracies are shaped by transnational market forces, and second to how politicians have promoted democracy with the twin goals of attracting foreign capital and diminishing social movements.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"In joining activism and fine ethnography, Paley enables us to appreciate the profound complexity of the links between civil society and public institutions." - Charles Briggs, author of Disorderly Discourse: Narrative, Conflict, and Inequality "An insightful and fascinating exploration of the shifting meanings of democracy for the Chilean state and for shantytown activists across the Pinochet dictatorship and through the contradictory democratic politics of the 1990s. The marketing of democracy is a highly relevant issue for societies and states throughout the world." - Kay Warren, author of Indigenous Movements and Their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala "This will be an important book, and a powerful exemplar for the growing numbers of anthropologists who seek to place such things as democracy, citizenship, and neoliberalism under an ethnographic lens." - James Ferguson, author of Expectations of Modernity"

From the Publisher

winner of the American Ethnological Society's 2001 Sharon Stephens prize --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 315 pages
• Publisher: University of California Press; 1 edition (April 2, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0520227689
• ISBN-13: 978-0520227682
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.1 x 0.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #477,832 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #60 in Books > History > Americas > South America > Chile

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5.0 out of 5 stars Exactly as Promised!! Very Happy, September 22, 2010

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This review is from: Marketing Democracy: Power and Social Movements in Post-Dictatorship Chile (Paperback)

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1 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Democracy by other means?, March 23, 2005

By 

Erik Cooke (Washington, D.C.) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: Marketing Democracy: Power and Social Movements in Post-Dictatorship Chile (Paperback)

War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means."
- Karl von Clausewitz, On War

The stunning violence and repression of the Pinochet regime in Chile often overshadows the stability and economic prosperity that it was engineered to accomplish. Julia Paley's assessment that Pinochet's "repression was not the raison d'être of the military government...rather, it was a means to an end," is an accurate characterization. For when does repression and extreme violence ever exist unless to someone's advantage? In this way, the repression of the Pinochet regime becomes the modus operandi to achieve stability that Allende was unable to deliver for Chile.

General Augusto Pinochet was a hard-handed military man and likely studied Clausewitz. Clausewitz very concisely describes the mentality that guides military dictatorships. Force and the threat of force are the modus operandi of the military and therefore it follows that Pinochet would use such tactics to accomplish any goal. The influence of National Security Doctrine over the Southern Cone in the 1960s and 1970s was evident in other regimes, such as in Argentina. The military view that the democrats were selling the country down the river was a moral affront to the national identity and a threat to stability. Indeed, Allende was unable to use democratic institutions and methods to foster a healthy national economy or to promote stability. Pinochet viewed this as the failure of democracy, and a heavy hand was the only remaining option to save the nation.

However, Paley's argument seems to suggest that had there been another means that would have allowed Pinochet to implement his economic program that he would have pursued it; i.e. negotiations with Allende supporters or an economic summit of some sort. At some point the debate over whether or not the violence was the means or the end becomes a futile discussion. The more salient discussion concerns the enduring impacts on the structure of contemporary Chilean politics and economics that Pinochet continues to exert. The irony of Pinochet is that even though he was replaced more than a decade ago, he continues to shape political and economic discourse today.

The health of the Chilean economy, ironically, keeps alive the danger of Pinochet supporters claiming a moral victory of sorts. By pointing to a record of the lowest unemployment, lowest inflation, healthy exports, and stability, especially relative to Argentina, Peru, and other regional economies, supporters of the Pinochet regime have empirical evidence to justify that government's repression. It weakens the authority of Allendistas and democrats because the clear break from Allende and democracy resulted in a strong economy. In essence, Pinochet has framed the political culture in terms of an effective-ineffective dichotomy, where Pinochet's repressive regime occupies the former and Allende's democratic government occupies the latter.

In fact, Pinochet did receive justification for his economic policies from the newly elected democratic government in 1990. The pacted transition from Pinochet to Aylwin fixed the new civilian government in terms of Pinochet's 1982 constitution. In the end, Paley says, "the economic program instituted by Pinochet's regime gained legitimacy from being administered by an elected government."

The enduring lesson for Chilean politicians seems to be stability at any cost. Because democracy can be messy and uncertain, Pinochet viewed it as a threat. The signals from the United States have been unhelpful in terms of fostering democracy also. In the 1970s, Pinochet enjoyed the support of the U.S. in overthrowing Allende and leading Chile, and during the 1980s the U.S. also supported Pinochet in his campaign against the Socialist reformers. The neoliberal economic system that Pinochet constructed during the 1970s, with the support of the U.S., which has outlasted Pinochet, is the context in which democracy currently operates. But it is a very limited form of democracy. Structurally, the rollback of social programs and focus on the macroeconomic picture automatically excludes the poorest in Chile and advantages the wealthiest. This democracia con apellidos has become the new modus operandi for stability in democracy.

Paley argues that the privatization of services that has resulted from both the outright repression of Pinochet and the more subtle repression of neoliberalism essentially limits democracy. When nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) offer services to citizens, instead of the state, important decisions are beyond the scope of the public's ability to participate.

The health of the Chilean economy should be a point of pride. However, the danger of focusing on the macroeconomic picture presents for democracy and governance is the temptation to return to repression as a stabilizing force. There has been no contemporary example to demonstrate to Chileans that democracy is favorable to an exclusionary or repressive government, especially in times when stabilization is necessary. To return to Paley's argument, the raison d'être of Chilean politics, then, is stability and the modus operandi, at least in terms of Pinochet, is violent repression. Thus, we see an inherent paradox within Chilean democracy. Although Pinochet's repressive, anti-democratic regime is no longer the engine of government, through the wholesale manipulation of the structure of government, it still ensures that its paradigms and priorities are the law of the land.

A question that needs to be answered in post-Pinochet Chile is whether or not Chile can enjoy stability in a truly democratic context, and if so whether it will endeavor to do so. Currently, the macroeconomic picture is positive. From 1992 to 2002, GDP per capita rose from $9080 to 10,373; unemployment dropped nearly one percent; and the percentage of the national economy that is public debt held even. (Economist 23 June 2003). Troublesome is that the political culture of Pinochet's bureaucratic-authoritarian regime holds specter over today's political climate, which proves problematic because repression remains a temptation and a tendency for Chilean politicians, but it keeps the focus on the macroeconomic.

Pinochet in many ways was the vanguard of neoliberalism in Latin America, and since the wave of its structural adjustments has passed over the region, it is clear that governments are forced to cater toward positive macroeconomic indicators. By monitoring GDP, for example, one cannot get a clear view of individual prosperity, because Latin America is the most unequal region in the world. Therefore, the government is never truly democratic (democracia con apellidos) because so many actually fare so poorly in a healthy macroeconomic situation.

A hopeful message in Paley's book is that democratic impulses can and do grow in a democratically ambivalent political framework, even if they are not the norm. The Llareta group created a democratic space within an environment where the term "participation" had been co-opted by the state to legitimize its abdication of responsibility. Paley states, "Llareta and other social organizations in La Bandera actively contested the meaning of participation and attempted to reclaim it in the service of revitalized mobilization."

Although the impacts of Pinochet's rule are obviously still felt today, the outlook is unclear. If Chile remains as it is today, a relatively stable and prosperous country, the tendency toward Pinochet will likely be weak. However, there is a danger in this as well. Should the strength of democracy remain untested, its roots into the political culture may not grow deep, either. But, if Chile develops a history of facing crises of stability and also protecting democratic institutions, then the likelihood that democracy will endure is much greater. It seems as though, and Paley concurs on this point, the structural adjustment program requirements on Latin American nations are not democracy-friendly.

Should the international community truly wish to commit itself to fostering democracy and preventing the rise of another Pinochet in Chile, it might do well to untie the hands of political leaders who need to cater to positive macroeconomic goals. By doing so, the halting of the state's retreat will encourage more citizens to become engaged and truer stakeholders in the Chilean state. Perhaps then, democracy will be more than a marketing slogan in Chile.