Mars Learning: The Marine Corp's Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940 [Paperback]

Keith B. Bickel (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: December 1, 2000 | ISBN-10: 0813397758 | ISBN-13: 978-0813397757 0

Keith B. Bickel challenges a host of military and strategic theories that treat particular bureaucratic structures, large organizations, and elites as the progenitors of doctrine. This timely study of how the military draws lessons from interventions focuses on the overlooked role that mid-level combat officers play in creating military doctrine. Mars Learning closely evaluates Marine civil and military pacification operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua, and illuminates the debates surrounding the development of Marine Corps’ small wars doctrine between 1915 and 1940. The result is compelling evidence of how field experience obtained before 1940 played a role in shaping the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual and elements of doctrine that exist today. How the Marines organized lessons at that time provides important insights into how doctrine is likely to be generated today in response to post-Cold War interventions around the globe.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"A wonderful book about experts, mavericks, leaders, vision, tolerance, intellectual freedom and how an organization deals with an uncertain future." -- Robert E. Lee, Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps former Commandant, The Basic School

"By looking back to history, Mars Learning provides helpful reminders for the future." -- Gary W. Anderson Colonel U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.) former Director, Marine Warfighting Laboratory

About the Author

Keith B. Bickelis a military and business strategist in Washington D.C. He has served in the Office of Net Assessment, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD/NA), and with the White House budget office where he oversaw financing of Pentagon operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and the Persian Gulf. He received his Ph.D. in Strategic Studies from the Johns Hopkins University, SAIS.

Product Details

• Paperback: 214 pages
• Publisher: Westview Press (December 1, 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0813397758
• ISBN-13: 978-0813397757
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.4 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,495,763 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #72 in Books > History > Americas > Caribbean & West Indies > Dominican Republic

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Marines are learning machines, April 9, 2001

By 

Laurence Zuriff (New York, New York United States) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Mars Learning: The Marine Corp's Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940 (Paperback)

This is a fine study of early twentieth century marine corps tactical and operation military history. Recommend to any serious military history buff!

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars How the Marines learned counterinsurgency operations, December 12, 2008

By 

Michael A Neulander "Political Philosophy" (VA) - See all my reviews
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This review is from: Mars Learning: The Marine Corp's Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940 (Paperback)

This was required reading for a graduate course in the history of American military affairs. Keith Bickel's book Mars Landing, The Marine Corps' Development Of Small Wars Doctrine, acutely explored the Marine Corps' arduous and slow task of doctrine formation for its "small wars" missions that it conducted in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua between the two World Wars. It was interesting to note that Bickel's research showed a similarity between the Army's methods for fighting against the Philippines' insurgency, and with the Marine Corps' methods used to combat the insurgencies they faced between the World Wars. Yet, since the Marines relied on Army training manuals for most of its existence up to World War I, and though the Army had plenty of experience in counterinsurgency operations, it did very little in the way of publishing counterinsurgency doctrine or conducting formal training in its schools for it. Thus, Bickel's main thesis was that the Marines were forced to develop their own small war doctrine based on lessons learned through direct experience in the field. Bickel's thesis was well supported by his exhaustive search of primary and secondary sources, including oral history collections, and student papers to produce a detailed accounting of how the lessons learned by Marines in campaigns were finally amalgamated into formal doctrine.

One of the key venues that Bickel researched to determine where Marine officers could turn to read about small war operations before they embarked for duty in Haiti in 1915, was the Army's professional journals. However, "...of over 850 professional journal articles during the period 1898-1915, only twenty-nine (3 percent) dealt with small wars problems" (43). Fortunately for the Marines, Bickel found that it did not take them long to learn the "military arts" and civil affairs measures that were required to successfully subdue the Haitian insurgency. Unfortunately, had their been a good record of lessons learned from the Philippines War and formal education in the Marine Corps' schools, then they would not of had to have relearned lessons such as; dividing the country into military districts, conducting night operations, using local guides, and creating a constabulary force. In fact, the Marine experience in Haiti was so similar to the Army's experience in the Philippines that Bickel noted, "The only measure that the Marines did not engage in was the reconcentration of the populace" (92).

Despite the Marine Corps' experiences in small wars, Bickel noted through his extensive research of the Marine Corps' school curricula that it was giving short shrift to training officers for what they would spend the vast majority of their time engaged in between the World Wars. Between 1924 and 1940, small wars comprised seven percent of the Company Officers' Course, and ten percent of the Field Officers' Course. Even more amazing is the fact that the Marine Corps did not publish its first doctrinal manual on small wars until 1935! In addition, by the time the Marine Corps' Small Wars manual was published, small wars doctrine was receiving less attention as the Marine Corps' mission requirements went through a fundamental shift to amphibious landing operations in the Pacific, as dictated by "Plan Orange." Bickel's book is a "must read" for anyone interested in understanding the agonizingly slow development of military doctrine.

Recommended reading for anyone interested in military history, and American history.

1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Worthwhile text, November 2, 2009

By 

Makkabee - See all my reviews

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This review is from: Mars Learning: The Marine Corp's Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940 (Paperback)

This is a valuable look at how the military studies and trains for counterinsurgency operations, with emphasis on "institutional memory" -- how the military choses what information to preserve and how it passes it on. It's a bit esoteric, but a fine addition to a course of study on military history or military science.