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6 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
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the place of religion in Shi'i Islam culture, December 25, 2004
This review is from: The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran (Paperback)
The Shi'i branch of Islam makes up only about 15 percent of the religion. But counting for nearly the entire population of Iran and 60 percent of Iraq's, the Shi'i have a crucial influence on Middle East and world affairs from their numbers in these strategically important countries. A professor of Islamic and Iranian history at the U. of Texas-Austin, Aghaie gives a view of Shi'i culture in Iran that is eye-opening and germane for Western readers. Basically, one sees that for the Shi'i there is no clear, or even worthwhile, distinction between religion and other aspects of society, including most significantly government. Whereas such a distinction is a part of the foundation of the U. S. and other democracies, Shi'i culture was founded with the defeat of the Prophet Mohammad's grandson Hoseyn and the massacre of his family by the caliph Yazidin in the 680AD battle of Karbala. Shi'i religious ceremonies, motives for behavior, social purposes, and community goals grew out of this defeat. A special intensity and commitment, as well as sacrifice, was called for so Islam as expressed by Mohammad and his descendants would not be lost. This branch of Islam faith is distinguished from that reflected in the institutional rule of the caliphs came about throughout most of the Middle East. Aghaie's subject is the relationship between Iranian leaders from the Qajars of the 19th and early 20th century through the Shah of Iran to today's Islamic Republic and the symbols and rituals of Shiism. The Shah of Iran was overturned in a revolution because in an effort to modernize Iran, he sought to minimize the symbols and rituals. The work brings an insight into the Shi'i culture that is timely and germane considering current events in Iran and Iraq and U. S. ambitions to institute democracy in this area.
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1 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Eye-opening, October 6, 2009
This review is from: The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran (Paperback)
Professor Aghaie is my professor at The University of Texas at Austin and he's amazing! His book depicts eye-opening facts about the battle and is just as good as his teaching!
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1 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Karbala Rituals Shia Shiite, November 28, 2006
This review is from: The Martyrs of Karbala: Shi'i Symbols and Rituals in Modern Iran (Paperback)
This book is the premiere comprehensive analysis of how the battlefield death of the Shiite's third Imam Hoseyn/Hussain at Karbala, Iraq, led to the development of Shiite religious rituals that were used by the Shiite imams in influencing their successful dethronment of Iran's Mohammed Reza Shah in late 1978. This book is really about the historical development of Shiite symbols and rituals commemorating the martyrdom of Hoseyn, rather than an expansive history of the 1970s-era of student demonstrations against the shah of Iran. The battle resulting in Hoseyn's martyrdom occurred on 10 October 680 C.E. (Ahsura Moharram 352 A.H.). The author presented two reasons as to why Hoseyn started his ride towards his martyrdom. The author clearly opined that Hoseyn rode towards Damascus to at least upbraid the new Muslim caliph Yazid for being cruel and despotic to his Muslim minions. [Yazid's father, Muawiyah had moved the Muslim government from Mecca to Damascus in 661-662.] This makes Hoseyn's adventure look really unselfish, and even highly moralistic. However, what is obliquely mentioned in the book (on pages 7 and 93), but not as clearly portrayed, is the contention that Hoseyn really rode forth in an armed coup attempt to unseat Yazid. Briefly, when the Muslim prophet Mohammad died, his successors were: (#1) caliph Bakr (Sunni), (#2) caliph Umar/Omar (Sunni), (#3) caliph Uthman/Othman (Sunni), and (#4) caliph Ali (while all Sunni respect Ali has the fourth caliph, as the Shiites regard Ali as the first proper successor to his uncle Mohammad, Ali is the first Shiite imam). As Ali attempted to consolidate his rule, he was opposed by the military-governor of Damascus: General Muawiyah/Moaviyeh (who had been appointed governor of Syria by #2 Sunni caliph Umar in 640). Following the Battle of Saffin, Ali defaulted rule to Moaviyeh, but with the alleged understanding/treaty/deal/agreement that upon Moaviyeh's death, the Islamic caliphcy would return to Ali's clan. Ali's oldest son Hassan/Hasan (the second Shiite imam) was championed by Ali's clan in becoming his successor. However, after realizing that the three previous caliphs had been assassinated while serving as caliph, Hassan apparently wasn't as divinely inspired as his predecessors had been, and decided that he really didn't want to be caliph. Thus, Hassan figuratively resigned and passed the Shiite-caliph baton to his younger brother: Hoseyn/Hussain/Husayn. Recognizing the weakness in Ali, power-hungry Muawiyah of Damascus agreed to become the ruling caliph. Muawiyah, most likely, had the hidden design of eventually turning the caliphcy over to his son Yazid, instead of returning it to the Ali lineage to Ali's grandson Hoseyn. Anyway, upon Muawiyah's death, his son Yazid seized the title of the caliphcy over all Muslims -- and ignored the 'agreement' to return power to Hoseyn. For power is what we are really talking about here; power to control the tax-treasury of the Muslim community. Muslims are required to pay 10% of their annual wealth by an annual tax to the Muslim treasury. Literally watching the coinage of the Muslim treasury slip through their fingers to Yazid, Hoseyn's clan took umbrage with Yazid's seizure of power and urged Hoseyn to travel to Damascus and remind Yazid of his father's 'deal' that Hoseyn was to be recognized as the next rightful caliph. However, as Yazid had no desire of turning the tax-treasury over to Hoseyn, Yazid sent a large army under the command of general Omar ibn Saad to repulse Hoseyn's upcoming 'invasion' of Damascus. When Hoseyn tried to parley with Omar at Karbala, he and most of his small retinue of 80 soldiers were surrounded and killed. While Hoseyn's youngest son Ali Asghar was killed, his older son Zayn al-Abedin (who was ill and incapacitated during the battle), Hoseyn's wife, and a number of other newly minted widows and orphaned children where captured and taken to Yazid. As radio personality Paul Harvey would say: "Now you know the rest of the story" -- and a very important part of it. Part of Hoseyn's motive in talking to Yazid to resign as caliph was most likely due his being repulsed by Yazid's highhandedness, but the clear motive was to restore and secure power for Hoseyn-Ali's lineage in controlling the caliphcy to control the Muslim treasury. This is my one little snit here that I believe the author "short changed" the coup explanation for Hoseyn's journey. Otherwise, Prof. Aghaie superlatively analyzed how the Karbala battle was ritualized into annual public performances (rowzeh khanis) and parades (dasteh) that were later used as rallying demonstrations for the Shiite imams to reassert their political power that the Pahlvai shahs had tried to curtail through their liberal Westoxification of Iran. Also, see the author's related book: "The Women of Karbala: Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourses in Modern Shi'i Islam."
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