Customer Reviews

The Mask of Command: A Study of Generalship

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Keegan analyzes the idiosyncrasies of four very different commanders in order to characterize the nature of command and how it has evolved over time. He emphasizes the impact of technology and cultural change on the nature of command. Using four unique vignettes of Alexander, Wellington, Grant and Hitler, Keegan portrays the evolution of generalship from the heroic days of physical leadership to the nuclear age. I found the part on Hitler very interesting. Below are some of Keegan's illustrations.

Alexander - the importance of physical courage, leading at the tip of the spear, and animating a theatrical quality, which inspires the soldiers.

Wellington - still on the front lines, but not leading the charge. Keegan describes Wellington's careful orchestration of the conflict with Napoleon on the fields of Waterloo. He begins to make the case for the impact of technology (gunpowder and muskets) on the general's ability to influence the fight from the front.

Grant - and "unheroic" leadership, as Keegan describes his style. The author praises Grant throughout the narration, especially how the Union General understood the changing nature of war better than most. Keegan cites instances of Grant's bravery (at Palo Alto and elsewhere) and refers favorably to Grant's Memoirs. This praise contrasts with the next case study, that of Hitler.

Hitler - beginning with Hitler's service in World War I, Keegan demonstrates the impact of the Great War on Hitler's leadership style and understanding of war. Keegan highlights Hitler's mistrust of many of his "staff" generals, given his own insight from the front as a messenger during WWI. Most of the general staff officers never served near the front since technology had rendered the front so lethal that generals, invested with tremendous talent and education, did not wander there. Hitler derided them at every opportunity.

This is applied history at its best. I found the piece on Hitler the most fascinating aspect of the book. Read The Mask of Command if you are a student of military history or enjoy reading about leadership.

Dr. Keegan has another masterpiece. This book details leadership styles and techniques by answering a very simple question: "In front? Always, sometimes, never?" The historical perspective on the question is provided in 4 fascinating biographies of Alexander the Great, Wellington, Grant, and Hitler. Amazingly little changed in terms of how war was fought between Alexander and Wellington and yet the cultural impact of their societies had profound impact on their power of authority and the means in which they wielded it. I personally found the biography of Grant to be the most interesting and how the influence of rifled muskets and the large presence of cannon drove commanders farther from the front line and how democratic society supported that removal of "shared risk". Hitler's biography clarified a great deal of history and myth that I had not read previously: Hitler actually had a much more distinguished career as a soldier than I had previously understood and that had a profound effect on his understanding and misunderstanding of the circumstances of the Second World War. Hitler appeared to understand a large portion of the mechanisms of leadership and warfare but misunderstood the key lessoned to be learned from the First World War: that the leader on the scene is often capable of the best decisions.
The text effortless weaves these historical perspectives into a short, concise study of leadership styles and requirements and then presents a clear thesis on leadership in the nuclear age. This thesis is truly terrifying in light of the implications of history; our origins appear to contradict the requirements for future survival. This text is as much a study in leadership and management styles as it is a military science text. It is well written and highly enjoyable. If only we could get Dr. Keegan to add an addendum to leadership in the age of stateless terror.

As The Face of Battle provided us with a foundation for military history/strategy, The Mask of Command accomplishes the same task concerning leadership. The main idea explores the concept of the heroic ideal, and how it has shaped leadership on the battlefield, and in the command tent throughout history. The layout of the book is classic Keegan, analyzing four leaders: Alexander, Wellington, Grant, and Hitler. He brings out their good and bad qualities, and supports his conclusions with conviction. The section on Wellington is particularly well-done. After reading about heroism for 300 pages, I was surprised at his conclusion in the final chapter (Post-Herioc: Command in the Nuclear World). Overall, this is an excellent treatise, and a perfect follow-up to The Face of Battle. Highly Recommended.

I have always viewed fans of military history with suspicion, having known too many who are weapon-fetishists, power-worshippers or simply ghouls. Fortunately for me, a sane, gentle friend read and recommended this book (thanks Mike Malcolm, where ever you are), introducing me to a now favorite author. MASK analyzes and contrasts the military leadership of four men: Alexander, Wellington, Grant and Hitler. Each profile is fascinating in itself, but what impressed me profoundly was the final chapter, in which Keegan brings everything together, enumerating the "imperatives" of military authority throughout history, and finally asking how those imperatives can be met in the nuclear world, where the civilian population is on the front lines and generals must necessarily "lead" from behind. I recommend this book (and all Keegan's work) wholeheartedly to anyone who would never dream of reading "military history".

The Face of Battle is a very hard act to follow and I think any reader will understand that as he begins The Mask of Command. This is a study of four leadership styles of famous generals as they evolved through different periods in history. So much has already been written about Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant and Adolf Hitler, it is hard to imagine how succinct and enlightening Keegan's presentation can be. He is a superb writer of military history and in this case, of biography and theory. Keegan always seems to succeed in escaping from the customary and, by now trite, eulogies and strikes out into new territory. If you would like to find out about Alexander the Great's sex life, how the Iron Duke really felt about the "scum of the earth" that fought for him, why Grant drank like he did and more, buy this book! Seriously, there is no one writing thought-full military history like John Keegan. The last chapter (Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis) is pretty scary but you have to have this book.

In this book, John Keegan examines the lives of four well-known commanders and analyzes their command through the lens of what he terms "the heroic." He argues that the first armies began to organize themselves under the command of someone who met this heroic ideal, and demonstrates that, throughout history, successful commanders have adapted this ideal to suit their individual needs given the circumstances of the time.

Keegan looks at the lives of Alexander, Wellington, Grant, and Hitler for his study. Each lived in different societies and fought different kinds of wars, yet each portrayed a variation of the heroic ideal. Alexander was the true heroic type-Keegan points out that he learned command from reading Homer, and therefore led from the front line and gave no orders once he himself joined the fray. Instead he led by example, being wounded many times and fighting ferociously for his life in every engagement.

To Grant and Wellington Keegan ascribes a sort of anti-heroic leadership style. Both men exposed themselves to danger at times, yet neither actually fought during their respective campaigns. They were, however, nearly always on the battlefield. Wellington, in fact, rode the line of his battle back and forth, constantly giving orders and dealing with crises along the line as they appeared. Ranged warfare, says Keegan, influenced the way these men led and forced them to differ from Alexander, Grant having to depart more from the heroic ideal because the range of rifled weaponry made it unsafe for him to be too close to the action. Grant, as the head of a democratic army, had to also adapt his style of heroic leadership (Keegan uses Vicksburg, when Grant's men wanted to assault the city and he let them, despite his better judgment, as an example) and did so with great success.

Hitler is the ultimate false hero, using his propaganda machine to perpetrate the image of comrade in arms yet commanding from hundreds of miles away. Each of these men are vastly different, yet as Keegan holds each up to the standard of heroic leadership the contrast is fascinating. Looking into the future Keegan analyzes the hero of the nuclear age and points out that, ironically, the heroic commander must be the one least exposed to danger. Many studies have been done on each of these men, but this comparison of them is certainly refreshing nonetheless. This is not light reading, but it is very, very satisfying.

Its title comes from a theatrical metaphor, Keegan examining what a commander chooses to reveal of himself to his troops, what he conceals, and what he sometimes invents.

But the book is much more than that. Through an examination of the armies, times, and personalties of four commanders -- Alexander the Great, Wellington, Grant, and Hitler (with a brief look at the command style of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missle Crisis) -- he shows us how command tactics and theatrics have evolved from Alexander's leading by example in the thick of battle, an heroic example, to the decidely unheroic and distant Hitler and Kennedy.

You'd expect, in a book like this, some look at the politics, military structure, and arms surrounding each leader. And that's present as well as a look at the mechanics of battlefield communication. We're also shown how each of the above leaders personifies some leadership style.

As with his The Face Of Battle, Keegan makes some of his most memorable points through telling details. We hear of how Alexander's leadership was constricted by the dust of battle, the impossibility of directing combat while heroically hacking at the foe himself; we see how Wellington was distanced from the battlefield by cannons, his vision even more clouded by the gray smoke of guns than Alexander's was by dust, and his intuitive estimation of how fast troops could move against enemies who had just discharged a volley; Keegan talks about the importance of clear and concise dispatches in 19th century battles and how Grant and Wellington's command of English served them well off the battleground; we read transcripts of a micromanaging Hitler who had far better recall of various weapons' characteristics than his commanders but a notable deficeit in strategic thinking.

I found it interesting that all the commanders Keegan chose were political leaders, half unifying military and political commands at once, the other half pursuing political careers after their generalships were over. He doesn't explicity say why this is so, but a concluding chapter on "post-heroic" leadership over nuclear forces implicitly argues for a new style of command by our current military-political leaders.

Whether you want a biography of any or all of the commanders studied in this book, a history of how warfare and the process of command changed through millennia, or a look at how a war leader must manipulate his followers with the right mix -- for his society and time -- of love, alienation, fear, and respect, this book is worth reading.

Professor John Keegans Mask of Command is a far-reaching study of the military leadership through history. Keegan provides a study of the styles of 4 generals  heroic leadership of Alexander the Great, non-heroic examples of Duke of Wellington and US Grant, and a pseudo-heroic dictact of Adolph Hitler. Each individual study paints a quick picture of the personality of a general, reviews political situation, military technology and the prevailing warfare doctrine, reviews major battles fount and lessons learned. Of a particular importance, as is always with Keegan, are factors of technology and personality. Each of the generals will answer the question of the personal involvement and his place in battle in a different way. Alexander in always the front, in the first raw of the phalanx, mounted on a white horse, or the first scaling the walls of the besieged town. For him a general attains trust and leadership by personal example. He is the first of his men. Wellington and Grant are directors of the battle, whose purpose is to provide logistics and advise on tactics. Hitler, although he paints himself the first soldier of the Reich is a psychologist and a technocrat, who seeks to provide moral leadership via demagoguery alone.

This book reads like a breeze. Mostly impressive, in my own opinion, are reconstruction of the battles of Alexander from sometime scant historical evidence, insightful analysis of the unassuming leadership style of Grant, and the analysis of Wellington as an aristocrat of the battle. Great read!!!

Prior to the publication of "The Face of Battle", much of military history focused on leaders and not on the led, set pieces and "macro" developments. With "The Mask of Command", Keegan returns from the raw shellshock of combat and furnishes four accounts of famous military leaders. However, his focus is not on strategic or tactical decisions, but on how these men led, the theatre and persona that these leaders cultivated to provide the trust and moral fiber which motivated their men. This is what Keegan means by "the mask" -- the image, the spirit, the incarnation of what subordinates needed to believe in order to fight. It is in some sense combative to claim that this persona is a "mask" -- that is, an artifice contrived to motivate and not strictly who these leaders "were". To some extent, it is impossible to know what any historical figure actually "was", or simply what we even "are", but in any event, these particular leaders had very interesting masks and Keegan does a superb job in each account.

Clearly, if a leader is to be effective he must have the respect and trust of his men. The problem is that the mechanisms for gaining this respect are either fraught with personal peril, require the embodiment of a cause which is rarely stain-free, or rest upon a non-trivial ideological framework. The simplest starting point, then, is to answer Keegan's question, "In front: always, sometimes, or never". "In front" always has the advantage of pressing home the point to the men that the leader is bold, unafraid to assume the same risks as his men for a purpose in which he must clearly believe. "In front" also has the disadvantage of placing the leader in mortal danger. So a complication arises, namely, that good leaders are rare and precious, that losing them does a belligerent no good, but that to eschew personal risk is to court mistrust. Alexander, Keegan's first case study, chose "in front". He was able to do so in part because early warfare did not have the lethality of later warfare -- arrows rarely hit their mark and skill at arms could tell in the local heat of combat. Alexander could thus afford it, but he too felt it incumbent to act more and more heroically, i.e., to take increasingly greater risks the more he demanded of his men, finally risking too much and losing his life. Wellington opted for "sometimes", rushing about from regiment to regiment at Waterloo, courting stray musket balls and grapeshot at every turn, exhorting and directing at all times. Still, he did not lead from the front, which was probably a wise decision when impersonal bullets could kill men in swaths. Grant more-or-less chose "never", as did Hitler.

The issue then arises for all leaders, but especially for those leaders who chose "never", to find other means of gaining trust and belief. Alexander would engage in dramatic antics, spending days in his tent in peevish anticipation of apology, and would don fabulous armor for engagements. Oration and rhetoric were vital to his success as he attempted to hearten at least a portion of his men. Wellington cultivated the persona of the stoic gentleman warrior, an iron will of perfection, fair to all but intolerant of sloppiness. Grant cultivated the image of being "one of the boys" -- surrounding himself with home-town friends, spurring his men by honestly showing them his hangdog vulnerability, and by relying on his men's belief in the justice of the Union cause - they were, after all, citizen-soldiers, volunteers, men of conviction.

Hitler's leadership required the constant bolstering of a seductive ideology, endless infusions of propaganda. Belief in his command was cemented by the ceaseless exhortations of Goebbels. Like the uncreative and largely ineffective generals of WWI, Hitler hid in secret bunkers while his men died far away. That Hitler could get away with it for so long and so successfully was largely due to the dramatic improvements in communications, but also through the constant retelling of the Fuhrer's heroism in WWI. Ultimately, Hitler was not a hero, but a false god whose command withered with the monstrous dream of the Third Reich and his distance from the realities of the front. Here, Keegan does a particularly fine job detailing Hitler's neurotic infantilism, his growing separation from reality, his insecure sense of isolation, and his final ignominious demise.

"The Mask of Command" is readable, compelling, and perhaps the most flawless of all of Keegan's histories. Quality, not quantity is the motto here. A brilliant and absorbing treatise.

The Mask of Command is a fun read with plenty of good ideas to go around but the casual reader needs to be very careful as Keegan sometimes gets things just plain wrong.

Take for example the essay on Grant, called "Unheroic Leadership". Analyzed as such because Grant subscribed to the idea of never leading from the front (mainly because leading from the front was both impossible and foolish by the beginning of the America Civil War), Keegan digs into what made Grant an especially fine general. While some of his finds are clever and his psychological assessment of Grant seems to hold water, his understanding of Grant as a particularly adept technocrat who adapted to the changing role of technology in the war is downright wrong.

I direct those of you who are interested in the truth to both Charles Dana's accounts of the civil war and to Lincoln's writings. Both of these men found Grant's use of the telegraph paltry and Lincoln was many times found wanting more information from Grant's camp. Indeed, Keegan assumes that Grant's use of the telegraph was a key ingredient to his unheroic leadership because he harnessed new technology to direct troops appropriately, but this is patently false as Grant despised sending telegraphs to anyone at all. It is much more likely that Keegan was sniffing the right path in declaring Grant as extremely proficient in his ability to surround himself with capable men such as Sherman and McPherson proved to be.

As I said, the careful reader will find quite a few discrepancies and a little digging will result in Keegan getting caught with his pants down, but there is also much to like about the book - just be careful with it because Keegan isn't.

Three stars is a bit harsh, but four stars would be too much. 3 1/2 is about right.