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Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years 1942-1944

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Eminent historian, biographer and author Nigel Hamilton has produced a series of three books which trace Montgomery's entire life. They are; Monty - The Making of a General (1887-1942), Monty - Master of the Battlefield (1942-1944) and Monty - The Field Marshall (1944-1976). Confusingly, my original review for the first of these titles, however, also appeared against others! That review is now revised to include all three books and I hope the reader finds this useful.

No detail has been spared in providing as complete a picture as possible of this great man - with each volume being in the order of 400-500,000 words and standing pre-eminent because of previously unpublished supporting photographs and other material. With access to his private letters, diaries and other papers, in "The Making of a General" he takes the reader from the birth of Montgomery in 1887 to his promotion to Lt General and command the Eighth Army in 1942. This is a fine account of the years in question. Pictures of Montgomery as a child, boy, young officer, family man, and in every rank up to Lt General are an important part of the history of this man. As an example, of the many thousands of officers and soldiers present, how ironic that a "Lt Colonel" Montgomery should be photographed standing in front of Winston Churchill during a Victory Parade in 1918. Elsewhere, the numerous other historic photographs include a young Major A. E. Percival (who as Lt General Percival surrendered Singapore to inferior Japanese forces in 1942!) to name but one.

In "Master of the Battlefield," the depth of research and revelation continues as Hamilton provides a truly extraordinary analysis of Montgomery's time at the forefront of WW2 in Europe and the Mediterranean. From his time as Army Commander in charge of some 180,000 soldiers through to his responsibility for the planning of D-Day - which time he commanded over 2 million Allied Troops. As Hamilton freely admits; this story reveals "the true torment, frustration, misunderstanding and dissatisfactions that are the hand-maidens of those who make history." For me, the work is also an exceedingly fine account of what was easily Montgomery's most difficult, yet worthwhile, years on earth.

In the third and final part of the trilogy (Monty - the Field Marshall) we have the difficult years of Montgomery having to live with his achievements - from the closing stages of WW2 right up to his death in 1976. Montgomery was promoted Field Marshal on 1 September 1944 - in time to take command of the liberation of Europe. Nothing is overlooked in this exposé which provides an understanding of why there were the bitter disagreements with other senior Allied commanders. His time as Military Governor of post-war Germany, his appointment as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (Head of the British Army), his attempts to provide the British Labour government obsessed with retreat from the country's Imperialist past with a clear plan for the defence of the Realm, his battles with that government, his role as architect and founder of NATO and, above all, his continued propensity for antagonising both his Allies and his superiors.

Field Marshall Bernard Law Montgomery was finally transferred to the inactive list (British 5 star officers never retire!) in 1958 as he approached his 71st birthday. This milestone, however, heralds yet another chapter in the life of a busy man which, in this work, was revealed for the very first time.

Hindsight is, of course, a fine science, and there are many interesting events which the historian (and even the amateur psychologist!) might now regard as the reason why Montgomery became what he became and did what he did. There was his strict upbringing as the son of a Reverend (later Bishop) both at home and abroad, public school, formative years in an army of Empire and the events of World War 1 which almost claimed his life. In 1936 there was the tragic death of his wife. In this series of three books, Hamilton reveals the very best that Montgomery ever was whilst also providing the reader with an understanding of his difficult side. Commendably, he has not allowed his personal friendship for his much older subject to blur his objectivity and thus provides a full and fine account of a great man. In so doing, these 3 books have become an important contribution to both British history and the history of the Second World War. More importantly for some, they are also an excellent read.

NM

This, and it's companion book, "The Making of a General" are two of the best biographies that I've read as well as being brilliant biographies of Montgomery, perhaps the most experienced and professional of all the allied generals in WWII. As well as one of the most denigrated. The author is not at all hesitant to point out Montgomery's failings, which, as a person were considerable. However, Montgomery as a strategist and commander of the allied forces up to and through the Normandy landings was brilliant. American authors and Generals have tried to criticize him and puff up the American players but the Americans were inexperienced amateurs with truly inflated senses of their own competence. This is especially true given their lack or minimal amount of combat experience. The great Marshall felt that America should have immediately invaded Europe and felt hood-winked by the British who kept putting it off. However, had the Americans not gotten experience, the hard way, through their blundering in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, an early invasion would have been a catastrophe.

Montgomery put his experience as the only successful allied commander into use by revamping and organizing the floundering Normandy invasion preparation. His strategic vision was perfect and his dedication to that vision against the vacillation of Eisenhower, Churchill and others and the plotting of rivals was exemplary and the reason for the success of the invasion. As Americans our propaganda machinery has downplayed the Commonwealth effort and glorified the American effort and it's leaders. This book is a good dose of reality. I've read biographies of Patton, Bradley, Marshall, Eisenhower and Churchill and it is clear that this biography fills in the gaps, omissions, oversights and falsifications of the shared events covered by all these players.

There is a third book in this series of biography that I haven't yet read and I consider it to be a must read: "Monty, The Field Marshall 1944-1976" because it covers the period where Montgomery was relegated to being in charge of only the Commonwealth armies after the Normandy break through and when he made some truly staggering errors, Arnhem being the most familiar. I want to get the author's insight into Montgomery during that period.

Master of the Battlefield: Monty's War Years 1942 -1944 was the best book of the Trilogy on Montgomery by Nigel Hamilton. Once again Nigel Hamilton does a super job of describing the events on the battlefield and Montgomery's reactions to them. The book takes the reader through the long pursuit of the Panzer Army Africa across North Africa. When one reads Hamilton's excellent account one begins to realize that the long pursuit was really a series of failures on Monty's part to fix and destroy the Panzer Army. It reminds one of inept Union Generals trying to trap Lee in Virginia. The destruction of Panzer Army Africa would finally be accomplished by General Anderson's First Army in Tunisia not Monty's Eighth Army. It was at this time when Monty realized the final prize would go to First Army that, as Hamilton puts it, Monty selflessly offered to let the First Army take Tunis while he would prepare for the upcoming invasion of Sicily. This would be a recurring theme for Montgomery, when his plans would go awry he would give up and try to get involved in the upcoming operation. He did it again in Sicily when he as Hamilton puts it "selflessly "offered to let Patton take Messina while he would prepare for the Invasion of Italy. Then when his operations bogged down in Italy he began to maneuver for Command of the cross channel invasion and ended up leaving Eighth Army in Italy when he returned to England. All of this is fully explained by Hamilton as examples of Monty's selflessness. Hamilton gives an excellent account of Monty's operations in Sicily where Eighth Army became bogged down while executing Monty's plan. Monty of course blames this on Alexander and Patton as nothing was ever Montgomery's fault. He then blames the bogging down of Eighth Army in Italy on Alexander and Eisenhower. One incident in Italy that Hamilton describes is the failure of Monty to aid the Fifth US Army in the landing at Salerno. He was ordered to do so by Alexander when the Fifth US Army was in danger of being thrown back into the sea. Monty deliberately stalled and got nowhere near Salerno by time the danger passed, but still attempted to take credit for what turned out to be a successful landing by saying he had saved Fifth US Army's bacon. After leaving his Army in Italy Monty assumed command of the ground forces for Operation Overlord. In the third book of the Trilogy Hamilton repeatedly refers to Overlord as Monty's victory. But as you read what he writes in this volume you get the feeling that Overlord was successful in spite of Montgomery, not because of him. Monty's failure to take Caen in a timely manner after stating that he would take it by D+1, the failure of Operation Goodwood, the failure at Falaise, which must be shared with Bradley, are all detailed by Hamilton. Hamilton does attempt to give Montgomery full credit for Operation Cobra to which, in fact, he contibuted little other than his approval. There was one episode in the book that was mentioned so often by Hamilton that it became annoying and added nothing to the book. This is the episode of the Flying Fortress which Montgomery won in a bet with General Bedell Smith. Hamilton refers to this episode seven times in this volume, way too much overkill. This book could have been a 5-Star based on the history of the campaigns except for Hamilton's failure to distinguish success from failure and professionalism from unprofessionalism. Monty failed to destroy Panzer Army Africa even though he had superiority in every class of supply; he failed to successfully execute his own plans in Sicily and then in Italy. And Monty's insubordination and back stabbing of his superiors, especially Alexander and Eisenhower are prime examples of unprofessionalism. Hamilton was certainly writing with his rose color glasses on. It is Hamilton's lack of objectivity that made this volume a 2-Star book for me. I am however glad I read it. Hamilton's history of the campaigns made it all worth wile for me.