From Publishers Weekly
The trouble with most historical examinations of the Cuban missile crisis, contends Colby College historian Weisbrot (Freedom Bound), is that they focus too much on the character, motivations and actions of one man, JFK. In this view, he was either a saint or a sinner, a wise and calm statesman or a reckless poseur driven by a neurotic machismo. Such interpretations miss the mark, however, as they do not consider the all-important context, "the framework of national values" within which Kennedy had to operate. By looking carefully at magazine articles, newspaper editorials, opinion polls and other sources produced during the late 1950s and early 1960s, Weisbrot shows that America at the time was both fearful and insecure. The arms race with the Soviets was at its height, dangerous confrontations with the Soviets were building in places like Berlin, Khrushchev was seen as a blustering bully, and then there was Cuba. Ninety miles from the U.S., Castro had installed a Communist regime, a dangerous and unacceptable part of what was then seen as the international Communist conspiracy. When Soviet missiles showed up in Cuba, Kennedy simply could not accept it, bound as he was by the dictates of the national mood and the inherited policy of the containment of Communism. Weisbrot concludes that JFK was "a moderate leader in a militant age," and if his willingness to risk nuclear war over missiles in Cuba now seems excessive, it expresses the excesses of an entire age. His story, then, is less about JFK and more a cautionary tale about the American people, who they were at the time, and the pressures they created that no democratically elected leader could ignore. (Oct. 19)Forecast: The 2000 movie Thirteen Days focused mass attention on the Cuban missile crisis, but it's not likely to spill over into large sales of this worthy book.
Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information, Inc.
From Library Journal
President Kennedy was neither the solitary profile in courage nor the reckless, macho avenger claimed by those with either pro- or anti-Kennedy views who have investigated the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Instead, Weisbrot (Freedom Bound) portrays him as a sensible leader during a hair-trigger phase of the Cold War. Kennedy's conflict with Soviet Premier Khrushchev was motivated and limited by diplomatic rule established at the outset of the Cold War 15 years earlier: fighting Communist expansion, especially in the Western Hemisphere, without killing Soviet soldiers. This understanding made the President more cautious than his advisers, Congress, and the public, inflamed by major newspaper columnists, who would not tolerate at any cost Soviet missiles 90 miles from the United States. This intriguing appraisal of the Missile Crisis emphasizes foreign policies and public perceptions rather than fixations on Kennedy's character. Most enlightening is the dialog about the important but secret role the removal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey played in the crisis's peaceful resolution. This stimulating complement to The Presidential Transcripts: John F. Kennedy; The Great Crises is recommended for public and academic collections. Karl Helicher, Upper Merion Twp. Lib., King of Prussia, PA
Copyright 2001 Reed Business Information, Inc.