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Mechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach (Econometric Society Monographs) Hardcover – May 16, 2011
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"Rakesh Vohra's exposition of the theory of mechanism design is wonderfully transparent and elegant. This short book equips the reader with a remarkably deep and comprehensive understanding of this important subject." - Tilman Borgers, University of Michigan
"Vohra convincingly demonstrates that linear programming can give a powerful and unified perspective on mechanism design, clarifying the ideas and methods underlying existing results, and leading in many cases to greater generality or new findings. Graduate students, researchers in other areas, and experienced mechanism designers will all benefit from this book, which will influence mechanism design research for years to come." - Andrew McLennan, University of Queensland, Australia
"Professor Vohra's rigorous text is unique in showing how numerous central results in mechanism design can be unified using the methodology of linear programming. His treatment is elegant and original, and it touches the most recent research frontiers. - Benny Moldovanu, University of Bonn, Germany
"Rakesh Vohra takes the reader from the basics of social choice theory and network flow problems to a deep understanding of optimal incentive systems for complex resource-allocation problems, using the mathematics of linear programming elegantly throughout the book." - Roger Myerson, 2007 Nobel Laureate, University of Chicago
"By situating the fundamental questions of social choice, incentive compatibility, and auction design within the theory of linear programming, Vohra is able to address the modern themes of mechanism design in a cohesive manner. The result is inspiring, enjoyable, and extremely compelling." - David Parkes, Harvard University
"This beautiful book provides an insightful and useful treatment of the fundamental theorems of social choice and mechanism design from the unifying and powerful perspective of linear programming. A terrific read covering a broad range of topics including a serious and rare treatment of multidimensional mechanism design." - Phillip J. Reny, University of Chicago