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Mechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach (Econometric Society Monographs) Hardcover – May 16, 2011


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Product Details

  • Series: Econometric Society Monographs (Book 47)
  • Hardcover: 184 pages
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press (May 16, 2011)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 1107004365
  • ISBN-13: 978-1107004368
  • Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 5.9 x 0.8 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 13.4 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
  • Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (2 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,361,437 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

Editorial Reviews

Review

"The new book by Vohra is an excellent and most timely introduction into mechanism design. It offers a concise introduction to the theory of mechanism design, currently missing in the literature; it uses linear programming to great benefit to analyze the structure of incentives; and it provides a comprehensive account of the seminal results in auction and mechanism design. A splendid treatment for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in economic theory!" - Dirk Bergemann, Yale University

"Rakesh Vohra's exposition of the theory of mechanism design is wonderfully transparent and elegant. This short book equips the reader with a remarkably deep and comprehensive understanding of this important subject." - Tilman Borgers, University of Michigan

"Vohra convincingly demonstrates that linear programming can give a powerful and unified perspective on mechanism design, clarifying the ideas and methods underlying existing results, and leading in many cases to greater generality or new findings. Graduate students, researchers in other areas, and experienced mechanism designers will all benefit from this book, which will influence mechanism design research for years to come." - Andrew McLennan, University of Queensland, Australia

"Professor Vohra's rigorous text is unique in showing how numerous central results in mechanism design can be unified using the methodology of linear programming. His treatment is elegant and original, and it touches the most recent research frontiers. - Benny Moldovanu, University of Bonn, Germany

"Rakesh Vohra takes the reader from the basics of social choice theory and network flow problems to a deep understanding of optimal incentive systems for complex resource-allocation problems, using the mathematics of linear programming elegantly throughout the book." - Roger Myerson, 2007 Nobel Laureate, University of Chicago

"By situating the fundamental questions of social choice, incentive compatibility, and auction design within the theory of linear programming, Vohra is able to address the modern themes of mechanism design in a cohesive manner. The result is inspiring, enjoyable, and extremely compelling." - David Parkes, Harvard University

"This beautiful book provides an insightful and useful treatment of the fundamental theorems of social choice and mechanism design from the unifying and powerful perspective of linear programming. A terrific read covering a broad range of topics including a serious and rare treatment of multidimensional mechanism design." - Phillip J. Reny, University of Chicago

Book Description

Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design based on linear programming.

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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful By Vjkamble on November 23, 2013
Format: Paperback Verified Purchase
Absolute gem of a monograph. A great compendium of some of the deepest and newest results in Mechanism design through the elegant lens of linear programming. A must read for anyone looking to do research in Mechanism design, especially from the CS side.
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0 of 1 people found the following review helpful By Ana Arroyo on April 9, 2013
Format: Paperback Verified Purchase
Very useful. I definitely recommend this book. The product arrived on time, before that deadline. Great book for everyone who wants a basic book in this item.
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