Most Helpful Customer Reviews
|
|
17 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Horses in World War II, August 4, 2006
Although this is an extremely interesting book and was perhaps even ground breaking when it was published in 1991, it is no longer particularly insightful nor worth the hefty price. It is neither an indepth history of the horse in the German armed forces of World War II nor a statistical compilation. Rather, it is a collection of chapters based on a wide range of sources, most published, some unpublished. The unpublished sources are mostly Allied interrogation reports of German officers conducted after the war. Even these reports, however, are not used to their best advantage. Thus, "Mechanized Juggernaut or Military Anachronism" is not a coherent whole, but a rather disjointed collection of chapters.
Not that horses did not play an critical role in the major armies of World War II. The German army maintained an average strength of around 1.1 million horses throughout the war. Of the 322 German and SS divisions existing in November 1943, only 52 were armored or motorized. And of the 264 combat divisions existing in November 1944, only 42 were armored or motorized. Depending on the year, the average German infantry division in World War II relied on between 4,600 and 5,300 horses to propel itself.
The German army began the war with a single cavalry division. In 1943, however, it began to raise new cavalry units, due mostly to the critical shortage of motorized transport as a result of losses in Russia and Northern Africa. By early 1945 there were some six German cavalry divisions and two cavarly corps in existence.
How was this possible and why? The great East Prussia horse-breeding farms were left relatively alone by Allied bombers, thus the availability of horseflesh for the Wehrmacht continued undimished. And the Germans quickly discovered that the terrain in Russia and the Balkans favored the use of mounted troops. These two factors, when combined with the critical shortage of motorized tranport, resulted in the resurrgence of cavalry units in the German Army.
Stalin's Red Army also relied heavily on horses during the Second World War. Indeed, the Red Army order of battle on the eve of the German invasion of Russia included four cavalry corps and 13 cavarly divisions totaling some 80,000 cavalrymen. The formations, however, were quite weak and most were destroyed in the opening months of Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. Between July and December 1941, the Soviet High Command created 82 new cavalry divisions and these proved invaluable during the fighting in the late Summer of 1941 and later, during the Battle of Moscow and the Red Army's winter offensive of 1941-42. By February 1942, the cavalry strength of the Red Army had peaked at 17 cavarly corps and 87 cavalry divisions. By the end of 1943 this had been reduced to eight cavarly corps and 26 cavalry divisions.
Thus, the full story of the horse in World War II has yet to be told. This certainly is not it!
[None of the figures cited here for either the German or Soviet cavalry forces in World War II are taken from DiNardo's book. German figures are taken from unclassified U.S. Army WWII Intelligence Bulletins available on the internet. Soviet figures are taken from David Glantz, "Colossus Reborn. The Red Army at War, 1941-1943"]
|
|
|
3 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
An Irony to the "Polish Cavalry vs German Tanks" Concept, December 28, 2007
DiNardo contends that the great exaggeration of the degree of mechanization of the Wehrmacht occurred because it served the propaganda purposes of both sides. The motion picture had become a major medium in the 1930's and 1940's, as did its ability to shape public opinion. "First, Goebbels obviously wanted to impress the German people with the modernity, speed, and power of the German Army." (p. 108). On the other side, "...Capra sought to convince people that the Nazis were dangerous, and, as previously stated, tanks, aircraft, and truck-towed 88s look far more dangerous than a column of horse-drawn transportation." (p. 109)
The Wehrmacht was really two armies: the rapidly-moving panzer columns and the much-larger and much-slower horse-dependent infantry and supply columns. So long as the distances to cover (as in the German conquest of Poland) were small, this disparity was irrelevant (p. 116). In contrast, "The vast distances in the Soviet Union ultimately proved insurmountable. It accentuated the difference between the marching capabilities between the motorized units and the nonmotorized formations" (p. 117). The partially-mechanized Germans also had to face the fully-mechanized western Allies after D-Day (p. 96).
"Aside from representing Lebensraum (living space) to Nazi ideologists, Poland also represented a source of valuable horseflesh." (p. 24). Ironic to the much-ridiculed Polish cavalry, "In fact, von Rundstedt lamented that the German Army did not use more cavalry in Poland." (p. 81).
After conquering Poland, the Germans took over Polish horse establishments for their own purposes (p. 24). Confiscated Polish horses were made to serve the Germans in their 1940 campaigns (p. 27). The Germans also heavily despoiled Poland of horses and peasant carts during Operation Barbarossa (p. 38, 46).
Of all German-ruled European nations, the Soviet Union and Poland suffered the greatest losses in horses (p. 72). All told, during their occupation of Poland, the Germans had confiscated 36% of Poland's horses (p. 73). In view of the fact that Polish farming (and, for that matter, European farming in general: p. 2, 12) depended upon horses, this was a particularly grievous loss, contributing to the near-starvation conditions in German-occupied Poland.
|
|
|
5 of 7 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
The truth behind the myth of mechanized Wehrmacht!, August 25, 2005
DiNardo overturns the myth of mechanized Wehrmacht presenting a lot of facts and statistics which prove the opposite: the German Army of World War II had never enough vehicles of any kind and due to Hitler's premature attack in Poland it couldn't reach the same level of mechanization as the British or the US Army. The Germans used hundreds of thousands of horses on all fronts and that was one of the reasons the trapped 6th Army didn't attempt to break out from Stalingrad: the Soviets had captured most of its horses and the heavy weapons couldn't move at all! This is a very interesting and thought provoking book which will change many of your perceptions regarding World War II in Europe.
|
|
|
Most Recent Customer Reviews
|
If you need help or have a question for Customer Service, 