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9 of 9 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A Game Changer in the Study of the Rise of Rome, May 29, 2007
This review is from: Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome (Hellenistic Culture and Society) (Hardcover)
Since 1979, the dominant theory explaining the rapid expansion of the Roman Republic has been that Rome was an exceptionally agressive, predatory power -- even by Ancient standards. And, that Rome's heavily militarized culture, greed and lust for power, drove its ruling class to war with its neighbors and increasingly any powers on the periphery of its sphere of influence until it became the hegemonic power of the mediterranean.
The above theory was most forcefully propounded by the scholar, William V. Harris in his seminal work "War and Imperialism in Republican Rome" first published in 1979, and revised in 1985.
To most outside observers, Harris' thesis would seem rather obvious and non-controversial. But Harris' book was itself a reaction to a tradition [mostly based upon extant Roman sources] that held that most of Rome's early and middle-Republican wars were of necessity and in self-defense.
Arthur Eckstein is, in a sense, rebalancing the scales with this book.
Eckstein's central aim is to apply the modern "realist" school of international relations theory to put the rise of Rome into a wider context within the Classical and Hellenistic mediterranean systems of polity interactions.
Eckstein argues that in a multi-polar anarchy (which fits the description of the ancient periods under discussion extremely well), all states, out of a sense of self-preservation, become highly militarized and aggressive.
Eckstein asserts that the modernm realist theories are exceptionally well-suited to explain state behavior for this period precisely because there were no established international dispute resolution mechanisms, including any coherent concept of international law, and very rudimentary diplomacy. In fact, the dominant form of diplomatic discourse at the time consisted of sending a delegation to the polity from which you sought redress, and forcefully asserting that they comply with your demands -- often in a self-righteous and insulting manner. Realist theorists call this "compelance diplomacy," and Eckstein's text is replete with examples of it -- and its subsequent failure to avert wars.
Eckstein concedes that Rome was, indeed, heavily militarized, brutal and aggressive. He, in fact, frequently praises Harris for "brilliantly" laying this out. But Eckstein makes the case that Rome was not unique in these charateristics during this period. And he then explains the parallel aggressive and highly militarized (and yes, brutal) nature of all of the regimes that existed at the time, for which we have good evidence.
Eckstein explains that Harris' mistake is in assuming that Rome was unique, and making few if any comparative analyses of other contemporaneous regimes. Realist theoretcians call this "unit-attribute theory." Or, explaining state behavior solely by virtue of its internal characteristics. Or. at most, with its bi-polar interactions with other states on a case by case basis.
Realist theory, according to Eckstein, puts the primacy for explaining state behavior on the pressures of the international system. Paraphrasing a prominent realist theorist frequently cited by Eckstein in the text -- in a multipolar anarchy, all states start to resemble one another.
Finally, Eckstein argues that what actually set Rome apart was the strength of its organization, depth of its resources and its ability to manage allies and client states more effectively than its competitors in the interstate system -- not its excessive militarism or aggressiveness.
A few weak points with Eckstein's otherwise very well-argued treatise must be noted, however. When arguing that all of Rome's competitors of that era were as equally aggressive and militaristic as Rome, Eckstein's inclusion of the City-State of Carthage in that group seems forced. He manages to make the Carthaginians seem far more militarily aggressive than even their Greek opponents portrayed them in antiquity.
And, obviously, this is necessary for Eckstein because of the three major wars Carthage fought with Rome from 264 b.c to 146 b.c.
In particular, Eckstein imputes the excessive ambition and lust for power of the Barcid family (Hamilcar and Hannibal) to the Carthaginian state itself. The passages doing so have an air of special pleading about them. He also, almost gratuitously, mentions the increase in Carthaginian child sacrifice for this period in an attempt to demonstrate the pressure Carthage was under from the "system." When, of course, the only serious threats Carthage faced at the time came directly from Rome or were due to complications that arose from fighting with Rome. Thus, it's somewhat of a circular argument.
Eckstein also, at times, tends to over rely on certain singular sources. This may be due, in part, to the relative lack of source material applying realist theory to ancient history. But, in some cases, Eckstein seems to have found a source that says what he wants, and did no further research to corroborate or bolster it.
All in all, however, the book is extremely well researched, and argued. And it will change the way Rome's rise to power is studied from now on. Either the Harris school will be forced to rebut Eckstein to justify their unit-attribute theory's primacy, or others in the field will adopt Eckstein's thesis and expand upon it. Either way, it will stimulate an energetic debate among scholars of the middle Roman Republic.
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3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
"A major scholarly work" - the Author, August 13, 2011
This book is aimed at an audience of both historians and Political Scientists. The first two chapters introduce the two disciplines and their terminology to each other and to the general reader. Political Scientists have appropriated the word `scientist' in order to give their discipline a fake measure of credibility, as I'm sure any Scientologist would disagree. Note that historians don't call themselves Historical Scientists. The jury is still out on Social Scientists, though the Royal Society probably has a view on that. However, all that aside, this is, in fact, a very interesting study of early Rome and its neighbours, and their interaction with each other. If you can cope with the political-science jargon, you will find an excellent account of inter-state relationships in the ancient Mediterranean - for example:
Chapter 1: "International politics in the ancient Mediterranean world was long a multipolar anarchy - a world containing a plurality of powerful states, contending with each other for hegemony, within a situation where international law was minimal and in any case unenforceable. None of these powerful states ever achieved lasting hegemony around the shores of the great sea: not Persia, not Athens, not Sparta; not Tarentum, not Syracuse, not Carthage. Alexander III the Great... might have established a permanent political entity encompassing the entire Mediterranean, but the conqueror of Asia died prematurely... and the empire he had created almost immediately fell apart. During the chaos that followed Alexander's death, several of his generals founded great territorial states themselves, Macedonian dynasties with worldwide ambitions, each in bitter competition for power with the others... none of these monarchies was ever able to establish universal domination. The world of multipolarity and unstable balances of power continued in the Mediterranean - along with the prevalence of war and the absence of international law. Eventually, however, one state did create predominance throughout the Mediterranean world: the Republic of Rome. By the 180s B.C... the Mediterranean finally had only one political and military focus, and only one dominant actor; there was a preponderance of power in the hands of a single state. In political-science terminology, a system of unipolarity had replaced the long-standing multipolar anarchy."
That wasn't too bad, but try page 121 - "As among both the Classical and Hellenistic Greeks, the ideals of communitarian discourse maintained by modern Constructivist international-systems theorists once more have little relevance to the actual menacing realities of the interactions among these ancient Latin states. The common annual sacrifices of the Latins on the Alban Hills had a cultural importance, but the ancient tradition is insistent that early Latium was convulsed by conflicts and wars among these states."
If you can cope with the modernist terminology, then you will find an interesting book, analysing the author's thesis that Rome was not unique among its neighbours in its use of violence (page 3) -
"The present study... finds militarism, bellicosity, and diplomatic aggressiveness rife throughout the polities of the ancient Mediterranean both east and west. And it argues that while Rome was certainly a harshly militaristic, warlike, aggressive, and expansionist state from a modern perspective, so too were all Rome's competitors, in an environment that was an exceptionally cruel interstate anarchy. Moreover, the present study finds the origins of the harsh characteristics of state and culture now shown to be not just Roman but common to all the ancient Mediterranean great powers, all the second-rank powers, and even many minor states as well, not so much within the specific pathological development of each state (what political scientists call "unit-attribute" theory), but rather proposes that these characteristics were caused primarily (though not solely) by the severe pressures on all states deriving from the harsh nature of the interstate world in which they were forced to exist."
And page 4 -
"The major theme of this monograph is, then, that the Mediterranean interstate system, when considered as a whole, was structurally what modern political scientists call a "multipolar anarchy"; that it possessed little or no international law, and was regulated solely by complex and fluid balances of power (primarily, and very crudely, military power); and that the compelling pressures toward bellicosity and aggressiveness exerted by this exceptionally harsh and competitive interstate environment upon all the states within it are visible throughout the entire warlike history of Mediterranean interstate life. This is the case both in European Greece and the eastern Mediterranean as well as in Italy and the western Mediterranean".
I went in to this book determined to find fault with the author, having been put off by his tone (I wonder if he had annoyed his editor for them to have got through - he can sound like Professor Dawkins hectoring the believers in places, and quite smug in others), but he managed to overcome my prejudices, and account for my (obviously now) mistaken belief that somehow the Roman military system was superior to its opponents. They actually lost as many battles as they won, but their social organisation was such that they were able to continue the wars where their opponents were unable to muster reserves, due, apparently to the Roman ability to assimilate outsiders, unlike Greek city states. Athens would only field citizen soldiers in her army; Rome would field allies and even give citizenship to communities it had recently conquered - pages 246-247:
"To understand the Roman ability to integrate both friends and former enemies into a durable alliance system - and eventually to integrate both friends and former enemies into a system of citizenship - one starts from the fact that the societies of central Italy were more open to immigration of outsiders than were the contemporary societies of Greece, which tended to virulent exclusivity."
Anyway, even if you do not accept the author's findings, this is an interesting and thought-provoking book. The political-science terminology can be translated into English without too much effort. He doesn't claim that the Romans were nice people, just that their neighbours were no worse and no better.
The chapters are -
P001: Political Science and Roman History
P012: Realist Paradigms of Interstate Behaviour
P037: The Anarchic Structure of Interstate Relations in Classical Greece
P079: The Anarchic Structure of Interstate Relations in the Hellenistic Age
P118: Terrores Multi: The Rivals of Rome for Power in Italy and the Western Mediterranean
P181: Rome and Roman Militarism within the Anarchic Interstate System
P244: Roman Exceptionalism and Nonexceptionalism
P317: Appendix
P319: Bibliography
P343: Index
Four excellent maps.
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5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Great book, long title, August 27, 2008
This review is from: Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome (Hellenistic Culture and Society) (Hardcover)
The fact that this book not only blows out Harris' theory of Rome being pathologically more violent than everybody else, but also reads a whole lot better, makes it worth your reading. If you are interested in how Rome became an Empire, this is your book, its not the best narrative telling you about battles, treaties and alliances, but it explains that Rome was part of a really cruel, really violent state system that glorified violence and punished weakness with total obliteration. The Carthaginians are not "peacefull little merchants" like some would have it, and the author uses Greek sources to show how bloody-minded that Carthage, Classical and Hellenistic Greece, and those poor friendly city sacking and human sacrificing Gauls really were. Rome's reasons for success are illuminated at the end chapters, and I wont ruin it.
In addition, Alexander to Actium by Green also gives a decent account of Rome's rise...Scullards Grachi to Nero also helps fill in this period. The best of all would be Polybius, but at 12 volumes, its not quite the kinda book you can bring to the beach, or even carry out of the library, that is, if you find yourself in a university that actually contains a copy, since not even NYC public libraries carry it. Unless I get a kindle, Ill probably never get the opportunity to do Polybius myself.
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