Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition [Paperback]

Bent Flyvbjerg (Author), Nils Bruzelius (Author), Werner Rothengatter (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: March 10, 2003 | ISBN-10: 0521009464 | ISBN-13: 978-0521009461 | Edition: Reprint

Promoters of multi-billion dollar land-use development megaprojects systematically misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get them approved and built. This book not only explores these issues, but suggests practical solutions drawing on theory and scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations and five continents. It is of interest to students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians and concerned citizens.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition provides a fascinating look at the pervasiveness of misinformation in the planning of major construction projects and the systematic bias of such misinformation towards justifying project implementation. The power of its analysis is vastly reinforced by the range of cases examined, extending over 70 years and five continents. An extraordinary accomplishment, it will doubtless serve as the standard reference on this topic for many years to come." Alan Altshuler, Professor of Urban Policy and Planning, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

"Anyone concerned with public works projects, planning, and ethics in public policy should read this book. It provides a genuinely original perspective on why large complex projects often cost much more than their planners say they will and treats this problem as a fascinating puzzle involving technical methods, professional ethics and the politics of urban decision making." Martin Wachs, Director of Institute of Transportation Studies, Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Professor of City and Regional Planning, University of California at Berkeley

"Flyvbjerg's damning analysis concentrates on a series of financial nightmares that should bring even the most casual reader out in a sweat." New Scientist

"Life is too short to read every tome penned by Scandinavian and German social scientists. But Megaprojects and Risk, written by Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius and Werner Rothengatter, is a cracker. In lurid and startling detail it examines dozens of vast construction schemes around the world." Times Online

"The book is provocative throughout, documenting the often dismal performance history of these huge projects and calling attention to the forces that make reform a formidable undertaking." Civil Engineering

"By vividly illustrating the dynamics of megaprojects, Flyvbjerg and his colleagues clearly and acutely identify the problem and propose sensible solutions. Hopefully, their work will receive the kind of attention that it deserves from planners, decision makers, technical experts and the public, stimulate discussion on how to resolve what is likely to be an ever growing problem and lead to the adoption, by at least a few countries, of a new approach to megaproject decision making." Journal of Planning Education & Research

"With his two co-authors, Flyvbjerg has produced a clear and lucid account of the economic, environmental, and social impacts of megaprojects...a lucid critique of existing norms is combined with practical suggestions for improvement." Canadian Journal of Urban Research, Carolyn Whitzman

Book Description

This book is a fascinating account of how promoters of multi-billion dollar megaprojects systematically and self-servingly misinform parliaments, the public and the media in order to get projects approved and built. The authors not only explore the problems but also suggest practical solutions drawing on theory and scientific evidence from the several hundred projects in twenty nations and five continents that illustrate the book. Accessibly written, it will be the standard reference in its field for students, scholars, planners, economists, auditors, politicians and interested citizens for many years to come.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Paperback: 215 pages
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press; Reprint edition (March 10, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0521009464
• ISBN-13: 978-0521009461
• Product Dimensions: 6 x 0.6 x 9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12.3 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (10 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #263,069 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #39 in Books > Politics & Social Sciences > Politics & Government > Public Affairs & Policy > Regional Planning

More About the Author

Bent Flyvbjerg is the first BT Professor and founding Chair of Major Programme Management at Oxford University and founding Director of the University's BT Centre for Major Programme Management. He was previously Professor of Planning at Aalborg University, Denmark and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands. Flyvbjerg has written extensively about megaprojects, decision making, city management, and philosophy of social science. He originated the social science methodology called "phronetic social science," which led to the so-called "Flyvbjerg Debate" (see http://bit.ly/YscJOb). Bent Flyvbjerg has twice held the Fulbright Scholarship. He was knighted in the Order of the Dannebrog in 2002. See more at uk.linkedin.com/in/flyvbjerg

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

19 of 20 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars A fool, his money and the bridge that parted them....... September 12, 2003

By Gary C. Marfin

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

I am the first amazon.com reviewer of this short, but important book. It concerns me that this might reflect a diminished U.S. readership. That would be unfortunate. Professor Bent Flyvbjerg and his colleagues have written a book of significance to taxpayers everywhere. It's apparent that they have written this book largely for the policy-maker; yet, make no mistake about it: the ordinary taxpayer has a major stake in this book's message. The central characters in Megaprojects and Risk are three large-scale, European transportation projects: the Chunnel, the Great Belt and the Oresund. American readers unfamilar with these names (the chunnel connecting London and Paris is perhaps the most recognizable to American readers) will nonetheless recognize familiar features. Specifically, they will find project costs that exceed estimates, and revenue inflows that are below projections. The traits are not unique to these projects. In fact, cost over-runs and revenue disappointments are a familiar global refrain, according to these authors. In spite of this, the number and scale of infrastructure projects continues to grow, forming what they call the megaproject paradox. The book is stronger on documenting problems, including the lack of project post-audits, than on providing solutions. I think they have correctly identified the problem -- the lack of accountability throughout the project life-cycle -- but their solution, which largely involves ensuring a healthy segment of private capital not supported by state guarantees, together with more attention to genuine risk assessment, falls short of the mark. The risk assessment tools are firmly established and largely well-understood (Monte Carlo simulation packages are increasingly available). So is the "moral hazard" problem that rears its ugly head when projects (in this case) are "over-insured." The difficulty, which they acknowledge, is that the political interplay between state, private interests and NGOs are decisive in determining whether and to what extent the appropriate risk assessment and risk management tools are used.

This problem is inherent in the beast. Policy-makers would love for the private sector to shoulder the risk, but may not be willing to permit a commensurate return. Private players, just as understandably, are apt to seek insurance of one kind or another on the downside. The best medicine, and one that this book delivers admirably, is simply to raise our awareness of the track record from the start.

This short book has the look and feel of an academic work. It would, however, be unfortunate if it languished at the university bookstore. Global demographics dictate that larger-scale infrastructure investments are in our future. No one should pay for, promote or plan for such projects before they have digested the lessons in Megaprojects and Risk.

10 of 11 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Packed with Knowledge! March 1, 2004

By Rolf Dobelli HALL OF FAMETOP 1000 REVIEWER

Format:Paperback

Every once in a while a little book comes along that, while small in size, carries sufficient intellectual weight to strike the body politic between the eyes, thereby getting its collective attention. This may be one such book. It offers a realistic look at megaprojects - those major infrastructure endeavors that span vast bodies of water, dam natural resources to generate energy and extend rail lines to previously unreachable regions - and compares the promises of these projects to what they actually deliver. The report card isn't very good. Cost overruns are typically 25% to 100%, and sometimes 200% or more. Worse yet, studies show that the public tends to use megaprojects - be they airports or subway systems - only a fraction of the amount predicted. We strongly recommends this book to politicians, legislators and anyone who wants to know the truth behind these huge infrastructure projects, as well as to CEOs, CFOs, project managers and risk officers in the private sector - this applies to your projects, even if there is a difference of scale.

6 of 7 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Important, a quick read, a valuable reference. December 8, 2007

By R. A. Dunning

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition

It is not an accident that your local megaproject is running at least 50% over budget or, more likely, 100% (plus) over budget. It is so much of a problem in megaprojects that the only reasonable conclusion is to assume all announced megaproject budgets are low by multiple factors. The numbers are produced by experienced consulting professionals under the direction of government planning agencies. Both groups should know better. We are therefore forced to conclude that the numbers are not off by accident.

This book is an easy read with a recurring theme. By the time the book is finished the point is pounded home. Until the trend is corrected, which is until people and organizations are rewarded or penalized based on the accuracy of their numbers, all megaprojects everywhere are highly suspect - if not already convicted of deliberate deceit of the public.