Customer Reviews

The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Wilhelm Keitel: Chief of the German High Command, 1938-1945

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3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(1)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

Granted, Field Marshal Keitel was a rather pathetic and hollow man, but even a man such as he did not deserve to see is memoirs so badly taken care of by a bad publishing company and a clueless editor. Let's start from the beginning, my first problem is with the binding of the book : it's cheap very cheap... Next, there's not a single personal picture (I'm amazed the publisher didn't bother to print some considering how there is such a huge number of pictures of the man and of the period...). The price is also much to high if you compare it with other memoirs of the period, also the book quality and it's size doesn't justify such a high fee.

On to the editing job it's the worst, any serious scholar or historian will tell you that the most interesting thing about memoirs is the fact that they are direct sources of information on a given period, as long as they remain integral. Sadly, the editor didn't see it that way and every time Keitel tried to talk about something other than army administration to express himself about more personal subjects it was edited out of the book! Also all the beginning of the memoirs from year 1934 to 37 were cut from this edition... It's not like the book would have been to big or anything! (It's actually rather small...) The only positive thing is the addition of some personnal letters which weren't present in the german original version.

On to the content of the memoirs. The botched editing gives for a rather ironic result. Imagine a man like Keitel, a fair administrator a very obedient soldier but a rather weak and empty fellow whom Hitler pushed around and forbade to express any personnal feelings all is life. Now that he finally decided to speak and try to express is own feelings, thoughts and emotion on something which ultimately resulted in the death of millions, including is own at the hand of Nuremberg's hangman; it is the editor who decided to cut him off...

In case you didn't get the point yet, stick to the german version, it's much more rewarding for any serious reader unless you're only interested in hearing Keitel ramble on an on about the different aspects of the OKW organisation and being edited out every time he goes out of line (that should be enough to put anybody to sleep...)

I believe few people would not read this book without more or less a kind of admiration for the author for his unique strong nerve, because without strong belief and strong nerve system, knowing any moment death would be at his door, he would not have put not only his personal history but also a whole nation's history into the account in such an accurate and crystal way within such short period-only six weeks.
The power of this extraordinary book lies in that the author as an exclusive high rank of a Field Marshal of German armed forces, the Chief of Staff to the High Command of Armed Forces, who working inside the German headquarters, who having participated all the enginering of military plans, has provided rare and valuable historical materials and revealed the truth of the inside the Third Reich, contributing to the establishing the truth of history from the other side, although they are certainly not welcome by the current official establishment account of the history. I wish people read this book with a wide open mind.

According to the Marshal, the invasion of Poland was to retake the territory that originally belonged to Germany; while the invation of the Soviet Union belonged to a preventive war (which has been confirmed by Soviet historians after more than forty years later). From the point of view of the Marshal, before invasion of Poland, Germany had tried hard to resolve the problem by negotiation, and they provided pretty fair offer to both Poland and France: Germany Government even publicly disavowed his interest in Alsce-Lorraine which, I believe few people know that before Louis XVI was part of Prussia. The Marshal has revealed some truth of the history which I believe have never been known to the public for some political reason. For instance, the Marshal has given justification about the famous commissar order and commando order in the east front, he pointed out that because the Soviet arbitrary refusal either to recognize the Hague Rules on Land Warfare or to consider themselves bound by the Geneva conventions on the treatment of prisoners of war, and due to the illegal partisan warfare occurred in the east front which was openly encouraged by Britain and the Soviet Union, so that the war with Soviets was a war fighting for survival, and Hitler demanded that German should dispense with all their outdated and traditional ideas about chivalry and the generally accepted rules of warfare, and smash terror with counter-terror. Another fact the Marshal revealed is the chivalry act German shown in their offering Greek honorable settlement in recognition of their brave struggle and of their blamelessness for the war: Hitler ordered the release and repatriation of all their prisoners of war immediately they had been disarmed; the poor countryside was to be preserved and the country's production was not to be touched except where it might be used to aid the British. And Hitler wanted the troops' victorious entry into Athens without a special parade in order to avoid injuring Greek national pride. The Marshal has cleared the true nature of the Conference that had took place in 1937 which Allied exaggerated its importance at the Nuremberg Trail, the Marshal argued that on the contrary to what Allied asserted, there was no Otto contingency plan, no Green or Red contingencies, but only the most tenuous defense of German frontiers to the east and to the west and preparations of the evacuation of the endangered frontier area to the west of the Rhine and the east of the Oder. Based on the Marshal, unlike what the Nuremberg imposed on German, the fact was that Germany had no any plan to wage a war against the Allied when Germany invaded Poland, because Hitler was strongly confident that the Allied would not intervene the matter which was a pure German domestic affair; the Marshal pointed out that at the time when the war broke out not only German Navy was in an infancy stage compared with the British mighty Royal Navy, but also German Army and German Air Force were in a weak shape: There were only 23 army division, while opposing them were 110 British and French divisions! The Marshall revealed the true reason of why German army halted before Dunkirk : Unlike all the accounts prevails in the current history, Keitel states it was not Hitler who should be responsibility for it but the generals who did not have guts to accept responsibility for it themselves if the operation failed due to the disadvantageous terrain which was with an extensive low-lying plain, intersected by thousands of waterways and all well below sea-level where the Kleist's Tank Army standing near by.

I should say that after reading the whole book nobody who has a slight sense of military virtue would deny that the Field-Marshal should not be regarded as war criminal but a loyal and patriot soldier for his country; that nobody who has heart would be indifferent to the dignity and noble act the Marshal shown in the Trial by fighting not for his own skin but for Germany, by shouldering the whole responsibility to shield German armed forces, would be unmoved by the touching letters the Marshal wrote to his defense counsel and the Allied Control Council for Germany to request a soldier's death, to face firing squad, instead of being hanged; that anyone who has a little knowledge of the international law, especially of one of the western world's fundamental legal doctrines: Nulla Poena Sine Lege-No punishment without a penal law in force at the time of the commission of the act, would come to the conclusion that the Field-Marshal should be acquitted and the trial for him is unjust.

I'd like to draw readers much attention to the last chapter written by Walter Goblets who like many politicians, high rank of military personalities, diplomats all around the world bravely and sharply criticize the Nuremberg Trial as a travesty on justice based on international law, shedding new lights on history, and arousing people to deeply contemplate. On this subject, I also recommend the book Nuremberg: A Nation on Trial and the book Doenitz at Nuremberg: A Re-Appraisal.

Granted, Keitel was not the most gifted German Field Marshal in the German Army, yet he held his job until the very end. There are several reasons for this; the first being of course his blind obedience to Hitler. However, Keitel was not the only German officer to fall completely under Hitler spell. Secondly, whatever his faults, he was a capable administrator who managed for Hitler the vast amounts of paperwork, the OKM was bound to receive from all three branches of the military, in addition to other branches of the Third Reich.

His was a thankless job which in the end reduced a man who had once been a respected officer in the Army to a defeated man who was left to answer for his master crimes. Keitel, in his defence makes one excellent point, he argues that if so many within the Armed Forces hated him or believed that he should be replaced, why didn't anyone force him to go? These officers did nothing, because no one else wanted his thankless job, because they all saw what it did to Keitel. At Nuremburg, Keitel was sentenced to death by hanging; a fate which Keitel knew awaited him as soon as he was informed of the trial. The fate that Keitel did not attempt suicide to escape the trial shows us that in the end, Keitel was an honorable man whose only crime was to let himself fall totally under the spell of a Hitler.

The book itself only rates 3 stars because as someone has mentioned in a previous review, the editors of this book have taken it upon themselves to decide what to keep and what to edit out. A total lack of any photographs adds to the less than perfect rating. All in all however, this was an interesting book which allowed us a glimpse into the mind of Field Marshal Keitel.

Gorlitz tries to portray Keitel as a simple soldier who followed orders, and one who was executed at Nuremberg as a result of the forceful postwar impulse to punish Nazi criminality. Keitel's memoirs themselves give comparatively little insight into Nazi ideology. (This review is based on the 1966 English-language edition).

Keitel does not describe the 1939 German-Soviet conquest of Poland as a cakewalk. He is mystified by the fact that the French did not attack western Germany even though it was so thinly protected. (p. 94). He mentions Westerplatte, and also comments on the combat in the surrounding area: "The officer casualties suffered by the Pomeranian nobility in this yeomanry division had been particularly heavy." (p. 96). Later, Gorlitz singled out Poland as a particularly notable example of guerilla warfare against German rule. (p. 253).

When discussing the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Keitel mentioned the crucial two-month delay in starting it (p. 131). As for Stalingrad, he contends that Paulus' army could only have been saved by a timely retreat in 1942. He also suggests that the eastern front could have been stabilized by a general German withdrawal to a line stretching from Lake Peipus to the Carpathians. (p. 186).

Much has been said in recent years about how Allied incendiary bombing was supposedly ineffective. Keitel, in a letter to his wife, did not share this view. He wrote to her: "That is why I want you to leave Berlin as soon as possible in view of the enormous danger there now is of fires breaking out; fires are far more dangerous than high explosive." (p. 187). As for labeling the Allied bombers "terror fliers", Gorlitz realized the fact that, were this to be done, then those Germans who launched V-1 rockets against London would also have to be called "terror fliers". (p. 262).

Was Keitel complicit in the murder to 50 recaptured Allied officers in the wake of what has become known as the Great Escape? (pp. 259-261). Gorlitz contends that this charge against Keitel was unjustified, and that Keitel vainly tried to persuade Hitler to spare the captured officers who, after all, were POWs protected by the Geneva Convention. Supposedly, Keitel managed to save the lives of those recaptured POWs who were already back in Stalag Luft III.

Of all Hitler's generals, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel is arguably the most villified. Nicknamed "Lackeitel" (Keitel the Lackey) and "The Nodding Jack*ss", the Chief of Nazi Germany's Armed Forces High Command has been dismissed by both his contemporaries and historical critics as a servile, desk-bound, paper-pushing non-entity, professionally incompetent and morally weak, whose bumbling and sycophancy noticibly hobbled the Reich's war effort. Albert Speer described him coldly as "one who blindly and without dignity echoes his master's opinion", and Hitler himself, while admitting Keitel was "loyal as a dog", treated him very much like a dog, once mocking him for not understanding the differences between a field piece and an anti-tank gun - "And he's a general of Artillery!"

A description can be accurate without telling the whole story, in his memiors, penned while he was awaiting execution at Nuremberg, Keitel - who was fully aware of how he was percieved by both "friend" and foe alike - tried very hard to tell his side of the story. For that reason alone, aside from its obvious historical value, this book is worth reading.

Keitel was selected by Hitler in 1938 to head up the Oberkommado der Wehrmacht, in theory a military bureau designed to take over the functions of the Minister of War (a post Hitler abolished to increase his control over the Armed Forces) and to serve as Hitler's military staff, but in actuality a body created soley to undercut the power of the OKH, the Army High Command. As its leader, Keitel therefore found himself known as "Hitler's man" in the Army and incurred the appropriate wrath of his former comrades. Unfortunately, Keitel also bore the brunt of Hitler's animosty towards the Army, so much so that he nicknamed himself "the Fuehrer's lightning rod." His principal role throughout the war was as an executive agent of Hitler's will, administrator of a huge staff apparatus, and the duties of a personal secretary and government minister. In those tasks he performed quite well, bringing the qualities of obedience, diligence, and hard work to a table that was overflowing with work from day one. Fully cognizant that his position was merely a tool of Hitler's power aspirations, he referred to the OKW as an "abortion of an office" and made it clear that he would have been much happier somewhere else - anywhere else, but that Hitler refused to either let him resign or take any of his advice. So perhaps Keitel was not so much a lackey himself as merely occupying the job description of one.

Keitel's MEMIORS are various in objective. He wanted to tell the story of the years 1938 - 1945 from his own perspective, to defend his personal reputation against criticisms which were dogging him even at Nuremburg, and he wanted to answer the moral charges leveled against him at his trial. It is in the last two capacities that the book is most interesting; Keitel has some interesting criticisms of his own to throw around, most notably of Hitler, whose autocratic-but-chaotic command style, unstable personality and lust for power made him a truly difficult man to work for; and of the Allies, whose prosecution of Keitel (as well as the other Nuremburg defendants) was tainted by a hypocrisy and self-righteousness Keitel exposes in some detail.

MEMIORS is obviously not a perfect book. Keitel wrote it on death row, with the clock literally ticking in his ears, and was operating mainly from memory; furthermore, editor Walther Goerlitz (THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF) took it upon himself to edit Keitel's person reminiscences wherever he found them, something I found very annoying, as were the footnotes which argued with Keitel's assertions - footnotes are for facts; the editor's personal opinions need to be handled in a forward. This aside, I found it an entertaining and valuable read, one that provided "a view from Hitler's elbow" and gave a man who would rather have been a farmer than a soldier a chance to speak his mind before it was snuffed out by the hangman's noose.

Keitel's memoirs make an interesting read. .In his life, Field Marshal became butt of derisory comments. With some referring him as `Hitler's lackey'.

What Keitel's detractors fail to understand that Hitler was former's boss that you cannot hope to disobey your boss. Keitel's sense of loyalty ,devotion to duty did not allow him to do that.Field Marshal was a competent administrator having excellent managerial abilities and made him indispensable to the Fuehrer. He served as a shock absorber managing to shield his subordinates against Hitler's wrath. During wartime OKW Supremo led an austere,frugal life eschewing all pomp and splendour. Irony of Keitel's life was he never aspired for an exalted post in Wehrmacht. Left to himself ,he would have returned to his 600-acre family estate at Helmscherode in the Duchy of Brunswick and led life of a farmer.

It must be noted Keitel penned his memoirs under incarceration. Writing memoirs under stressful circumstances required strong nerves. Book is based on Keitel's role as chief of German High Command. Since he had no opportunity to go out and mine for information some inaccuracies and distortions have crept into the text. Editor has done a commendable job in correcting them in appendices section of the book. Further it appears Keitel was in hurry to finish the book, for he feared hangman's noose to fall upon his neck at any time.

Coming to the text, few things need straightening out. Keitel considers Fuehrer a genius. Especially after Wehrmacht's stunning victory in the West on May-June 1940. Field Marshal says that idea of breaking through rugged Ardennes terrain thereby outflanking Maginot line was Hitler's brainwave. This is debatable because General Erich Von Manstein working independently conceived similiar notion. Keitel dubs invasion of Soviet Russia as a pre- emptive strike. I remain skeptical about this. This does not mean Stalin had no territorial ambitions. Soviet dictator was wily,shrewd and calculative; he bided his time. Had Wehrmacht been entangled in a prolonged struggle in the West , Red Army waiting on the wings after regaining strength would have assailed Germany from behind. Exploiting German pre occupation in the West, Red Army quickly occupied Baltic Repupblics, Bukovina, Bessarabia which lends credence to this view.

Keitel alludes to enemy espionage network operating from Germany. We know today this was much-acclaimed `Red Orchestra' erected by the Intelligence Directorate of Red Army: GRU. Field marshal refers only to Shultz- Boysen ring.They were other cogs in the wheel [Trepper ring ,Lucy network in neutral Switzerland ] which escaped his notice. Keitel says treachery ruined Hitler's Operation Case Blue: plan to seize Stalingrad and rich oil-bearing region in Caucasus in the summer of 1942,an opinion which I endorse. Communist spies having excellent sources of information in German High Command uncovered full extent and scope of operation and informed their Soviet masters.

Keitel dwells on another misfortune which spoiled German campaign. Incident involved a staff officer of 23rd Panzer Division Major Reichel who lost his way while flying in two-seat Fiesler Storch reconnaissance aircraft. Reichel `s aircraft crash landed behind Russian front. In his briefcase, contrary to Hitler's instructions, he carried operational orders of 40th Panzer Corps and outlines of Case Blue. Wehrmacht officer and his pilot were killed. But Soviet infantry patrol managed to reach the scene and retrieve the briefcase with 1:100,000scale map. Documents were immediately placed before Stalin who contemptuously brushed them aside. What Keitel did not know , Soviet dictator thought the information a deception; a feint designed to draw his attention away from critical Moscow axis where he expected German offensive to unroll. Unfortunately for Wehrmact, Russian espionage network managed to disabuse Stalin's notion. Red Army General Staff drew correct operational conclusion. In view of this , claim by leading Eastern Front historians that Russians were again taken by surprise when Germans renewed their summer offensive stands discredited. Recent research has uncovered facts which has deepened and revised our understanding of war in the Eastern Front.

Concluding portion of the book reads like a Keitel apologia. Here Editor has tried to mitigate Field Marshal's guilt. Allied powers have claimed for themselves a high moral ground. This is understandable as only victors make History. Unfortunately for Keitel, he happened to be on the wrong side and was condemned to die in the gallows.

The memoirs of German Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, the head of the Supreme Command of the Werhmacht during World War II, and thus in paper (though not so much in reality) the second man in command in Germany's military effort during the conflict after Adolf Hitler. Remarkably, Keitel wrote this book under extraordinary circumstances, while being imprisoned in Nuremberg in 1946 and waiting for the hangman (he stopped writing this book just 6 days before his execution).

Keitel's has been criticized by historians for not being very bright and for being servile, blindly obedient to Hitler. This memoir in many ways reinforces this view. It makes clear that Keitel, even after Germany's defeat, believed Hitler to be one of history's greatest military geniuses. On page 127, for instance Keitel writes about the Fuhrer's "unparalleled inventiveness" in planning military operations. Keitel was impressed by Hitler's apparent knowledge of many facts during war conferences. In contrast, Von Manstein and Speer both make clear in their respective memoirs that this sort of memorizing was shallow and ultimately meaningless. This book also makes clear that Hitler constantly humiliated Keitel, yet Keitel sheepishly remained at his side. Keitel defends the infamous Commissar Order and, without giving any solid evidence, insists that Operation Barbarossa was a preventive war, that the Soviets were preparing an invasion of Germany (like many historians, Keitel thinks that Germany could have prevailed over the Soviet Union if the unexpected failure of the invasion of Italy in Greece and the invasion of Yugoslavia would have made possible for Germany to attack Russia in early May instead of late June, reaching Moscow before winter).

This volume is not very well written, the prose often clumsy and disjointed. This is understandable since Keitel never pretended to be a writer, he wrote from memory and without access to files, did not have time to revise it and he wrote it knowing that in a few weeks he would be hanged. Nevertheless, he wanted to leave his important testimony to history. Ultimately, this memoir' stylistic flaws are more than made up by the very interesting story it tells. The book is certainly recommended for those interested in World War II and military history in general, though not necessarily for those whose interest in those subjects is passing.

Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel remained at the head of OKW from 1938 until the end of World War II in 1945. He was the only top commander who held his position throughout the war. He was a part of everything that happened. Often Hitler's whipping boy and by no means the finest of Field Marshals, nevertheless he had an astonishing ability at organization and remained unquestionably loyal to his government until the end. With the recent release of two biographies of Field Marshal von Manstein this biography of Keitel has regained its importance. They complement each other in many ways and it was always Manstein that Keitel recommended for his own job if he were to be replaced.