Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command [Paperback]

S.L. A. Marshall (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: September 15, 2000

S.L.A. "Slam" Marshall was a veteran of World War I and a combat historian during World War II. He startled the military and civilian world in 1947 by announcing that, in an average infantry company, no more than one in four soldiers actually fired their weapons while in contact with the enemy. His contention was based on interviews he conducted immediately after combat in both the European and Pacific theaters of World War II.

To remedy the gunfire imbalance he proposed changes to infantry training designed to ensure that American soldiers in future wars brought more fire upon the enemy. His studies during the Korean War showed that the ratio of fire and more than doubled since World War II.

Editorial Reviews

About the Author

S. L. A. Marshall served in World War I and then embarked in a career in journalism. In World War II, he was chief combat historian in the Central Pacific (1943) and chief historian for the European Theater of Operations (1945). He is the author of World War I, Blitzkrieg, Armies on Wheels, The River and the Gauntlet, and Pork Chop Hill.

Product Details

• Paperback: 224 pages
• Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press; 1 edition (September 15, 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0806132809
• ISBN-13: 978-0806132808
• Product Dimensions: 5.3 x 0.8 x 8.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 10.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.8 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (18 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #171,843 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #26 in Books > Education & Reference > Encyclopedias > Military

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

23 of 30 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars Pioneering Analysis...in 1947, Today: Little Value! January 14, 2005

By Gregory Canellis VINE™ VOICE

Format:Paperback

First published in 1947, S.L.A. Marshall's "Men Against Fire" argues that in spite of long-range nuclear weapons, the next war of nations will not be a push-button war. Rather, individuals engaging each other on the battlefield will again provide the mainstay of a total war even more destructive than World War II. Obviously, Marshall did not foresee the advent of limited wars in Korea and Vietnam just around the corner. Nevertheless, Marshall poses some thought provoking questions of Americans in combat. In a highly controversial claim based on questionable research, Marshall concludes that in World War II, only one-in-four soldiers fired his rifle in combat. Marshall claims to have "personally" conducted mass interviews with approximately 400 infantry companies in the Central Pacific and European Theaters immediately following important battles (If you are doing the Arithmetic, approx. 200 men per company x 400 companies, you're getting the idea!). Not one platoon, company, or battalion commander, argues Marshall, was aware that only twenty-five percent of soldiers engaged in combat fired their weapons. As a result of his findings, Marshall then campaigned for the need of new training methods for infantry soldiers. He stressed, this individual training should be based on long-term psychological camaraderie, not the quick turnover replacement system that was utilized during World War II. Marshall's un-refuted claims (until recently) have influenced a generation of military historians including T.R. Fehrenbach and Russell F. Weigley. Marshall is quick to point out that the alleged seventy-five percent of those who did not shoot were not shirkers or meanderers. These men were on the front line with their assigned units and often performed other essential tasks relating to combat duty. When the confusion and chaos of a fire fight ensued, however, they just did not shoot their weapons. Marshall rejects the reason most often used for not firing, that of giving one's position away. Instead, Marshall contends it is just a gut-level fear that prevents these men from firing at the enemy. Fears of letting down one's comrades were also prevalent among the interviewees. Most importantly, however, Marshall found "that fear of killing, rather than the fear of being killed, was the most common cause of battle failure in the individual, and that fear of failure ran a close second." Predictively, Marshall does not cite any of his evidence and his less than scientific methods have been widely refuted in recent decades. However, the questions that he poses about the psychological makeup of an American in combat have some merit. It is widely agreed by military professionals that two years is enough time to adequately train an individual for combat. Yet given the uniquely American dependence on the citizen soldier, is this time period sufficient to turn an ordinary civilian into an effective combat soldier? Is an American conscript morally and ethically suited for this role? Is there a solution other than Marshall's proposing that units train together and stay together with a tight knit cadre of officers and non-coms that would provide the basis of moral support all through training and eventual deployment in combat? In hindsight, one such inception, "Operation Gyroscope" in the late 1950s was a complete failure. It is the thought provoking answers to these questions that make S.L.A. Marshall's book a significant addition to any bookshelf, though its viewpoints are severely dated and controversial.

27 of 38 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars The Proof is in the Pudding November 13, 2003

By A Customer

Format:Paperback

I love this book. I've quoted it in articles and still recommend it to anyone currently in Army leadership training, especially PLDC or OCS. It's on my shelf with Keegan's "Face of Battle" and Grossman's "On Killing."

The criticisms of Marshall are entirely baseless. One example: a critic here claims that in the 1970s, veterans retiring from service disagreed with Marshall, claiming that his statements about low rates of fire in WII ("only 15-25% of riflemen actually fired their rifles in combat") MUST be untrue, because... well, because the rate was over 90% in Vietnam (which is the conflict a soldier would have retired from in the 1970s). None of these critics seem to notice that they were the beneficiaries of a training system based on Marshall's book, precisely designed to raise their rates of fire!

The Army applied the lessons Marshall wrote down, and the result was exactly what Marshall predicted.

His observations seem commonsense, but we have to remember that WWII began with a US Army completely unprepared for modern combat. They were still making some things up as they went.

An example of his findings: four men in the dark, who stay in communication and coordinate their weapons, will not panic as often as four men in daylight who make no effort at teamwork. You can prove this to yourself playing paintball. In fact, there is no better predictor of small-unit success.

As for the supposed "lies," such as not being present at D-Day: these are based on flimsy paper evidence ("floaters" like Marshall can often out-travel their paperwork), as well as personal attacks (I'm thinking specifically of Col. Reeder, whose own observations emphasized tactical individual success - but interestingly enough, Reeder found an average of ONE such "pointer" per platoon, which suggests a fire rate LOWER than Marshall's!)

If you want to know how men act under fire, this is one absolute necessity for your bookshelf.

22 of 33 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Marshall still rules July 14, 2002

By A Customer

Format:Paperback

The negative review from "a reader in Boston" is misinformed. As Lt. Col. Dave Grossman puts it in On Killing (Little, Brown, 1996): "Some modern writers (such as Harold Leinbaugh, author of The Men of Company K) are particularly vociferous in their belief that the firing rate in World War II was significantly higher than Marshall represented it to be. But we shall see that at every turn my research has uncovered information that would corroborate Marshall's basic thesis, if not his exact percentages. Paddy Griffith's studies of infantry regimental killing rates in Napoleonic and U.S. Civil War battles; Ardant du Picq's surveys; the research of soldiers and scholars such as Colonel Dyer, Colonel (Dr.) Gabriel, Colonel (Dr.) Holmes, and General (Dr.) Kinnard; and the observations of World War I and World War II veterans like Colonel Mater and Lieutenant Roupell -- all of these corroborate General Marshall's findings. Certainly this subject needs more research and study, but I cannot conceive of any motive for these researchers, writers, and veterans to misrepresent the truth. I can, however, understand and appreciate the very noble emotions that could cause men to be offended by anything that would seem to besmirch the honor of those infantrymen who have sacrificed so much in our nation's (or any nation's) past."