Customer Reviews

Men on Iron Ponies: The Death and Rebirth of the Modern U.s. Cavalry

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This book is at best supplemental reading to the better researched, organized, and conceptualized book, "Through Mobility We Conquer" (2006 University of Kentucky).
Colonel Morton appears to have based his work on the false assumption that the prior to WWII the only tactical role for the U.S. Cavalry (horse and mechanized) was reconnaissance. This is nonsense. He compounded this false assumption by either failing to read or failing to understand the basic doctrine guiding the transformation of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Regiment into a mechanized cavalry regiment beginning in 1932. This regiment was designed to be a combat force with attached reconnaissance elements in the form of an armored car/scout car troop. Its main force however was to be light tanks, originally the obsolete 6-ton infantry tank (which for bureaucratic reasons were called `combat cars' by the cavalry).
By a fortunate coincidence in 1935 an entirely new `combat car' was developed as the M1 Combat Car. The M1 was fast, reliable, and, for the time, well armed with turret mounted .50 caliber and .30 caliber machineguns as well as a hull mounted .30 caliber machine gun. This new mount was used to equip both squadrons of the 1st Cavalry and allowed the troopers to fight mounted and efficiently perform the traditional cavalry multiple roles of screening, reconnaissance, and attacking enemy formations while mounted. Incidentally the M1 introduced a proto-type suspension and track system that was so successful, it was used for all U.S. tracked armored vehicles during the first three years of WWII.
The newly mechanized 1st Cavalry was soon joined by the newly mechanized 13th Cavalry (also equipped with M1's) to form the 7th Mechanized Cavalry Brigade which also incorporated artillery and infantry elements for specific exercises and maneuvers. Up until 1938 this was the largest armored formation in the U.S. Army. Yet in the end, the 7th Brigade was absorbed into the newly created Armored Command.
This is what Colonel Morton should have been discussing, but he seems to have gotten somewhat sidetracked.

An excellent and well researched book on the death of the horse cavalry and it's re-birth into motorized cavalry.
The book shows how backwards so many army leaders were about the horses place on the modern battlefield. The author shows how several officers pushed there ideas and there doctrine on how best to fight the mechanized war that was in front of them. It is an asset to any military historian and should be read by current generation of military leaders.

Matthew Morton has written a cogent, thoughtful study that blends historical narrative with timely analysis. "Men on Iron Ponies" describes the development of U.S. Army mechanized cavalry units in the interwar period and their experience of combat in World War II. The author employs this fascinating case study to shed light on military issues that still resonate today: the importance of people and ideas and their ability to influence large organizations for good or ill; the pernicious role that flawed assumptions play as armies prepare for future conflict; dealing with the contrived and sometimes bizarre arguments often mustered to justify the relevance of concepts that have outlived their usefulness; and the continuous struggle to find what it takes in terms of doctrine, equipment, and organization to fight and win on the battlefield ... that is, discovering the right mix of firepower, mobility, protection, and stealth and then adapting appropriately based on the lessons learned in combat.

"Men on Iron Ponies" examines how the U.S. Army's Cavalry Branch responded to the emergence of mechanization and the development of armored vehicles in the interwar period. In the decades preceding World War II, the branch fractured amid an increasingly heated debate between mechanization advocates and traditionalists who retained confidence in the "proven technology" of the horse. This schism widened as Germany's panzers rolled to victories in Poland and France. Horse advocates became more intransigent, insisting that mechanized vehicles in the cavalry were useful only insofar as they helped large formations of horsemen. In their eyes, maintaining the cavalry's place as an essential component of America's ground forces relied entirely on sticking with the horse, which seemed to become an end in itself. In their zeal, horse advocates sidelined mechanized cavalry units, seeking to limit these nascent organizations to reconnaissance missions only.

As the U.S. Army geared up for war and later fought in North Africa, Italy, and across France, something interesting happened. For all the hoopla their supporters raised, horses--as we know--played no significant part in this offensive. Their limited appearance was a far cry from their mechanized counterparts, whose role was not only substantial but quite unanticipated. Finding it difficult to perform reconnaissance by relying on stealth and avoiding combat as doctrine prescribed, commanders of mechanized cavalry units accepted reality and adapted to better equip their organizations to fight for information. Though no longer horsemen, these leaders remained loyal to the cavalry spirit and embraced the broad set of missions the branch had traditionally carried out. They simply fulfilled it on different mounts--armored cars and light tanks.

Horse advocates saw the dawn of mechanization and fought to preserve cavalry's relevance by preserving a role for "hay-burning" mounts of flesh and bone. In contrast, mechanization advocates in the branch saw a similar future yet came to realize that the true identity of cavalry lay not with the horse but, more importantly, with the combat missions its units accomplished as part of the Allied war machine. Thanks to their ideas and efforts, these adaptive leaders bore witness to the cavalry's death but went on to serve as the midwives of its "rebirth."

Morton tells this story as only a cavalryman and careful historian can ... seeking out the evidence; exploring and engaging events and personalities with keen accuracy, balance, and insight; and reporting to the reader what he has discovered with verve and style. A rewarding book for any student of modern military history!