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Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's "More Flags": The Hiring of Korean, Filipino and Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War

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Prior to reading Robert Blackburn's book, I had very little knowledge of the extent L.B.J. went to sell the Vietnam War to the reluctant ears of the "Free World". After reading this book, it was apparent that he would go to any lengths to sell his cause. When you consider any accounting of this war, it is usually the 58,000 Americans that lost their lives there. Rarely, does anyone discuss the 5,241 troops killed from other free world countries that fought alongside Americans from 1962-1973. Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1961-1973 Notwithstanding halting the spread of Communism, the true bottom line is that these men fought and died in Vietnam so American soldiers wouldn't have to. Aside form Australia and New Zealand troops, they served as paid mercenaries, in service to the U.S. free world countries which sent ground troops to South Vietnam and their totals killed were as follows: Republic of Korea, 4,407 dead, Australia and New Zealand 475 dead, Thailand 3510 dead and the Philippines 9 dead.

The name of the program the U.S. State Dept. used for obtaining allied aid for the war was called "More Flags". Blackburn points out that regardless of what eventually transpired in the war, America's supposedly closest allies (Great Britain, Canada, Mexico and West Germany) all said "no way" to sending ground troops to South Vietnam. Allies and Mates: An American Soldier with the Australians and New Zealanders in Vietnam, 1966-67 This book is about how L.B.J., using a 1950's cold war scare tactic called the "Domino theory" went about doing the following:he rapped the U.S. taxpayer. Blackburn proves this by starting with S. Korea, who at it's height in 1968 had 50,003 combat troops risking their lives in place of U.S. servicemen. Korea: The First War We Lost While L.B.J. went out of his way to present to the free world the fiction that Korea was in Vietnam on it's own volition and was self-financing the military venture, the truth was the U.S. was paying 100% of the costs using a covert program called the "PL480 Foodstuffs". With this, the U.S. "donated" massive agricultural commodities given at taxpayer expense to South Korea to sell, with the proceeds being used to foot the entire South Korean military bill.

While L.B.J instructed Korean President Chung Hee Park to assert that the Korean commitment was the result of gratitude for American assistance in the Korean War of 1950-1953 as well as to help a sister Asian nation defend itself against Communism, the truth was that this "mercenary force" would have never materialized without U.S. payment, which Blackburn postulated at $107 million. With the Philippine contingent, called "PHILCAG" (Philippine Civic Action Group), which numbered 2,061 mercenary soldiers at it's height in 1966, "PL-480" cost U.S. taxpayers 9.13 million a year from 1964-1972. In Buddha's Company: Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War (Southeast Asia: Politics, Meaning, and Memory) With the Thai commitment (at it's peak numbered 11,586 troops in 1970) the U.S. taxpayer was taken for $3 billion dollars between 1962-1972. However, besides Thai troops, the U.S. received Thai air bases that the majority of B-52 bombers flew out of for the duration of the war.

In the Australian and New Zealand contribution, it was clearly not mercenary in nature. There for the entire war, top troop levels reached 7,672 Australians and 552 New Zealanders in 1969. MERCS: True Stories of Mercenaries in Action Neither country accepted payment for their service in Vietnam. So why did L.B.J keep his methods secret from the American public? Blackburn points out that like most U.S. school children are taught that England's use of German "Hessian" mercenaries during the Revolutionary War was an evil act of oppression, most Americans would feel that the use of mercenary troops was equally disreputable. Crossfire: An Australian Reconnaissance Unit in Vietnam Blackburn concluded that with L.B.J's shroud of secrecy, he denied the U.S. citizenry the chance to air their opinions as to how their tax dollars were used. However, in fairness to L.B.J., by using mercenary armies to fight the Vietnam war, it enabled American boys to stay at home. This is a book about the Vietnam War that has information you will rarely, if at all, find in any accounting of this conflict! Be prepared to find out information unattainable elsewhere!

In this study of foreign assistance of Johnson's "More Flags" policy, Blackburn uncovers the international reaches of Johnson's need for international acceptance of the U.S. action in Vietnam. Unfortunately it unravels quickly as an argument when he introduces the literal meaning of 'mercenary' in conjunction with morality. His bias logically would extend to any soldier who receives pay for duty based on the political objectives of their nation. It is a work rife with the emotion of his Vietnam experience that draws little from the international need of assistance in conducting war in geographically remote areas. Blackburn pays little regard to the request from South Korea's president Pak(South Korea played the largest share in the "more flags" program) to ensure the request for assistance came from The Vietnamese provisional government or that the North Koreans had already pledged their support for the North Vietnamese people with troops and pilots. In a sense this became an extenuation of situation faced on the Korean peninsula. It is a valuable resource for research however as a polemic study it leaves much to be desired